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THESIS SUMMARY 
 
UNIVERSITY OF SUSSEX 
LAURENCE WILLIAMS 
PHD IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY STUDIES 
CHANNELLING SENSITIVITY: THE PRODUCTION OF JUSTIFICATION FOR SHALE GAS DEVELOPMENT 
THROUGH THE ENGLISH PLANNING SYSTEM 
This thesis analyses the participation of the environmental NGO Friends of the Earth (FoE) in a planning 
inquiry into the company Cuadrilla’s appeal against Lancashire County Council’s decision to refuse 
planning permission to their proposed shale gas exploration sites at Roseacre Wood and Preston New 
Road. Participant observation, document analysis and video analysis were employed to chart the 
treatment of FoE’s arguments at the inquiry. Conceptually, the thesis is interested in the notion of 
justification, and in particular Stirling’s insight that appraisal processes can, through their design and 
conduct, be conditioned toward providing justification for particular options (Stirling 1994; Stirling 
2008). Four such conditioning influences – termed ‘forms of closure’ here - are found to be operating 
through the design and conduct of this inquiry and channelling it toward the production of justification 
for the appeals in question and shale development more broadly. These forms of closure each render 
the inquiry insensitive to certain arguments and matters of concern raised by FoE by either blunt 
procedural exclusion or by displaying insensitivity in the conduct of appraisal itself. This thesis builds on 
existing work on the necessity of and capacity for planning appraisal processes on fracking in the UK to 
accommodate sceptical public views. In particular, this study contributes fine-grain detail on how 
participating publics and experts are treated in practice within planning, and makes clear the key 
influence of prior commitments at the broader level of Government policy. This study also extends the 
concept of justification by focusing on the ‘downstream’ location of planning appraisal and by 
considering the relationship between framings of fracking and planning decision-making.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 1.1 HYDRAULIC FRACTURING AND SHALE GAS DEVELOPMENT IN THE UK SO FAR 
 
Hydraulic fracturing is a technique mainly associated with the extraction of oil and gas resources, 
particularly ‘unconventional’ hydrocarbons such as shale gas. This involves injecting high-pressure fluids 
into perforated, sometimes horizontal wells, releasing gas molecules trapped in the pores of shales so 
that the gas can flow to the surface. The process is commonly abbreviated to ‘fracking’, a term often 
used to include a broader set of practices associated with the exploitation of unconventional 
hydrocarbons – including site preparation and construction, drilling wells, dealing with waste fluids 
produced by the wells, flaring, well abandonment and site restoration, as well as ultimate use of the 
fuel. Fracking was first widely deployed to extract unconventional hydrocarbons in the US in the 2000s, 
where it was a key driver of a dramatic increase in domestic gas production (Stevens 2012; Trembath et 
al. 2012). This saw fracking described as a ‘game changer’ (Rao 2012; Yergin 2011, both quoted in Mazur 
2014), a ‘revolution’ (IHS Cambridge Energy Research Associates 2010) and as potentially heralding a 
‘golden age of gas’ (International Energy Agency 2011). In the US context, fracking has been credited 
with lowering prices, improving energy security, stimulating economic benefits, and helping to combat 
climate change (see, for exampe, Bellelli and Troszczynska-Van Genderen 2013). Other countries with 
domestic unconventional hydrocarbon resources have been keen to explore possibilities to repeat the 
US shale ‘revolution’ in their own territories. This is certainly the case in the UK, where fracking has 
enjoyed high levels of support and enthusiasm from governments since around 2010 (see, for example, 
Cameron 2013). 
Fracking, however, has been highly controversial in the UK, as indeed it has been more-or-less wherever 
proposed (see Steger and Milicevic 2014 and Wood 2012 for summaries of controversy globally). The 
development of a shale gas industry in the UK has been promoted by supporters as bringing about 
economic, energy security and environmental benefits (see, for example, Department for Communities 
and Local Government (DCLG)/Department for Energy and Climate Change (DECC) 2015). However, the 
prospect of shale gas development has given rise to grassroots protest groups across the country. 
Concerns have been raised about the possible contamination of water resources, water consumption, 
waste disposal, seismicity, the industrialisation of rural landscapes, irreconcilability with climate change 
commitments, industry-academic relations, democratic deficits in decision-making, and more besides. 
Key early moments in the emergence of controversy have included two small seismic events caused by 
the company Cuadrilla when test-fracking at their Preese Hall site in the Fylde region of Lancashire in 
2011, as well as ‘scare stories’ emanating from the United States, most notably from the documentary 
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Gasland (Fox 2010). The Government imposed a de facto moratorium on fracking after Preese Hall 
whilst the Royal Society and Royal Academy of Engineering conducted a joint report into the risks of 
fracking. That report concluded that the risks of fracking could be effectively managed if operational 
best practice was ensured through regulation, and was used to justify the Government considering 
proposals for new operations (DECC 2012; The Royal Society / Royal Academy of Engineering 2012). 
Expert assurances of manageable risk, however, appear to have had limited success in reassuring a 
largely ambivalent UK public. Polling had suggested that generally the British public was turning against 
fracking since high-profile protests in the West Sussex village of Balcombe in the summer of 2013 
(O’Hara et al. 2015; O’Hara et al. 2016), although recently there has been a slight increase in support 
(Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) 2018a). Opposition to proposed 
unconventional hydrocarbon sites has been apparent in those Balcombe protests, as well as in 
campaigns by local groups in Lancashire, North Yorkshire, and elsewhere, including efforts to resist 
developments through the planning system.  
Nonetheless, encouraging the development of a shale gas industry remains UK Government policy 
(DCLG/DECC 2015). Progress towards this goal has been somewhat slow and stuttering. At the time of 
writing the first hydraulic fracturing treatment in the UK since the ill-fated test fracking at Preese Hall in 
2011 is yet to occur. The companies Cuadrilla and Third Energy do however have both planning 
permission and environmental permits in place for sites at Preston New Road (PNR) and Kirby Misperton 
respectively. Both sites are expected to be fracked in 2018. In fact, 2018 is expected by some to be a 
breakthrough year for the industry in England (see Vaughan 2017), with the likes of the large 
petrochemicals multinational INEOS in particular primed to submit several applications. In other words, 
after one or two false starts there is the sense that the ‘ramp-up’ to a domestic shale gas industry might 
finally be about to begin.      1.2 CUADRILLA’S PLANS AT ROSEACRE WOOD AND PRESTON NEW ROAD 
 
Two key sites in the early stages of this prospective ‘ramp-up’ are the Cuadrilla sites at Roseacre Wood 
(RW) and PNR in the Fylde region of Lancashire. They remain the most ambitious fracking sites so far 
proposed in the UK, with each site planned to house four wells, each of which is comprised of a vertical 
and horizontal section (Arup 2014a; Arup 2014b). Cuadrilla initially applied for planning permission for 
the two sites in February 2014. The Environment Agency (EA) granted the two sites environmental 
permits in early 2015. At around the same time Lancashire County Council’s (LCC) planning officer, 
Stuart Perigo, recommended that LCC’s development control committee should refuse both sites 
planning permission - on noise grounds in the case the of Preston New Road and noise and traffic 
grounds in the case of RW. In response, Cuadrilla asked for a deferment of the decisions and put 
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forward new plans for acoustic noise barriers. This response was felt by Perigo to deal with the noise 
issue at both sites, however the traffic issue at RW remained unacceptable. Therefore, Perigo changed 
his recommendation on PNR to now advocate granting permission, but continued to recommend that 
RW be refused permission. In late June 2015, LCC’s development control committee refused both sites 
permission, going against their officer’s recommendation in the case on PNR, which was refused 
permission because of unacceptable noise and visual impacts. RW was more predictably refused 
permission on traffic grounds in line with Perigo’s recommendation.  
Cuadrilla announced they would appeal against both decisions and in November 2015 Greg Clark, then 
the Secretary of State (SoS) for Communities and Local Government, confirmed that he was ‘recovering’ 
the appeals. This meant that instead being determined by a planning inspector, the appeals would be 
determined by the SoS for Communities and Local Government. The SoS’s decision would be informed 
but not bound by a recommendation from a planning inspector. The Government had made clear that 
they would consider recovering planning appeals and calling-in applications (where applications are 
decided by the SoS without initially being considered and rejected by a local authority) on shale gas 
development in August 2015 (DCLG/DECC 2015). The appeals were heard at a public inquiry during 
February and March 2016 and it is this planning inquiry that constitutes the empirical focus of this 
thesis. The Inspector ultimately recommended that PNR be granted permission and that RW be refused 
permission, again on traffic grounds. The SoS (who by this point was Sajid Javid) accepted the 
recommendations and reasoning of the Inspector and duly granted PNR permission on October 6 2016. 
On RW, whilst he agreed with the Inspector’s conclusion that the site would give rise to unacceptable 
highway safety impacts, he decided to re-open the inquiry to provide Cuadrilla an opportunity to revise 
their traffic management plans. This re-opening of the inquiry has recently occurred, but at the time of 
writing its outcome is yet to be announced. Cuadrilla began work on the PNR site in January 2016 and 
the site has consistently been the scene of protests ever since (see Hayhurst 2018a and Hayhurst 2018b 
for useful timelines summarising key events relating to the two sites). Cuadrilla have completed the first 
horizontal well drilled in the UK at PNR, and have started work on a second. The company recently 
applied to BEIS for permission to frack the completed well at PNR - the final consent required before 
fracking can commence – and at the time of writing the decision is pending (see Cuadrilla 2018)   1.3 PARTICIPATION AND POWER IN TECHNOLOGY POLICY- AND DECISION-MAKING 
 
Whilst empirically this thesis focuses on the case of planning decision-making on shale gas in the UK 
there is a conceptual interest in the broader themes of participation and power in decision-making on 
technology and innovation. These themes have received much attention in the field of Science and 
Technology Studies (STS). The normative programme to democratise science and technology, pursued 
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by many in STS, has consistently argued for greater participation from a wider diversity of views, values 
and voices in decision-making about science and technology (de Vries 2007; Durant 2011; Lovbrand, 
Pielke, and Beck 2010; Thorpe 2007). This programme is underpinned by concerns about technocratic 
styles of governance that marginalise publics, overlook alternative technological trajectories and 
unaccountably promote particular normative visions of progress (Grove-White, Macnaghten, and 
Wynne 2000; Irwin and Wynne 1996; Jasanoff 2005; Macnaghten and Chilvers 2014; Stirling 2008). As 
well as these issues with decision-making over science governance and innovation pathways, concerns 
have also revolved around the depoliticising impacts and overstated authority of scientism in the use of 
knowledge in decision-making more generally, especially the dominance of risk discourse and risk 
assessment and management practices (Felt et al. 2007; Jasanoff 1990; Sarewitz 1996; Stirling 2009; 
Stirling 2014a; Stirling and Mayer 2000; Wilsdon and Willis 2004; Wynne 1992a). Partially in response to 
such issues and concerns, various forms of public engagement aimed at enabling greater public input in 
decision-making have been designed and experimented with, including citizen juries, consensus 
conferences and deliberative polls (Braun and Schultz 2009; Carter 2005; Dryzek et al. 2009; Irwin 2006; 
Laurent 2011; Lezaun and Soneryd 2007; Pallett, Chilvers, and Hargreaves 2017). However, such 
processes have increasingly provoked scepticism and critique, often centred around issues like their 
restrictive framing and unclear impact (Irwin 2001; Jasanoff 2003; Wynne 2005; Wynne 2006; Wynne 
2007). 
This thesis casts planning as a site of downstream technological decision-making, and the themes of 
participation and power in decision-making have also received a great deal of attention in planning 
studies. Mirroring their colleagues in STS, many planning scholars hold a commitment to 
democratisation. This commitment is particularly evident in various strands of participatory planning 
theory and practice, including, perhaps most influentially, Habermas -inspired ‘communicative’ or 
‘collaborative’ planning (Allmendinger and Tewdwr-Jones 2002; Forester 1999; Healy 1993; Healy 1997; 
Innes and Booher 1999). Again, similarly to STS, this communicative turn in planning was in part 
provoked by dissatisfaction with the technocratic or rationalist view of planning, which has been 
characterised by some as possessing ‘top-down’ and exclusionary tendencies (Campbell and Marshall 
1999; Sandercock 1998; N. Taylor 1999). Many studies have used Habermas’ theory as a normative 
yardstick against which the assess planning practice (e.g. Kemp 1985), whilst others have assessed the 
challenges of putting theory into practice (Bedford, Clark, and Harrison 2002; Legacy, Curtis, and 
Neuman 2014; Legacy, March, and Mouat 2014). Criticisms of communicative planning have, amongst 
other things, focused on the role of power in planning. On a practical level, doubts have been raised 
about whether the communicative turn can even be practically achieved within existing power 
structures – for instance the politico-administrative institutional context of the English planning system 
(Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger 1998). Furthermore, the extent to which deliberative procedures can 
actually equalise power differences between participants or eradicate strategic behaviour in practice 
has been questioned (Bickerstaff and Walker 2005). Finally, on a more fundamental level, critics have 
questioned the possibility and desirability of achieving consensus (Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger 
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1998; McGuirk 2001), questioned the possibility of evacuating decision-making processes of power 
(Flyvbjerg 1998; Huxley 2000), and argued for an approach based on the irreducibility of conflict and 
difference (Gunder 2003; Hillier 2003; Pløger 2004). It is within this broad thematic sweep, spanning 
both STS and planning studies, that the present study is located.        1.4 THE STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
 
The following chapter deals with the academic interests of the thesis, honing in to a greater level of 
specificity than the broad thematic terrain sketched immediately above. The chapter is split into three 
sections covering theory, concepts and literature. In section 2.1 three normative theories of decision-
making are reviewed to establish two key consistent concerns in theorising about decision-making. They 
are, first, the issue of regulating the role of interests, power and strategy in decision-making; and, 
second, the potential for ‘frontstage/backstage’ dynamics that may give decisions an undeserved and 
misleading air of legitimacy. This paves the way for the adoption of a particular approach to the concept 
of justification which is introduced in section 2.2. Boltanski and Thevenot’s ‘sincere’ conceptualisation is 
initially considered (see Boltanski and Thevenot 2006). This approach is rejected in favour of the more 
power-sensitive rendering that emerges from Stirling’s engagement (Stirling 1994; Stirling 2008) with 
the work of Collingridge (Collingridge 1980; Collingridge 1982; Collingridge 1983). This latter view of 
justification is argued to better recognise the problematic susceptibilities of decision-making highlighted 
in the prior theoretical review. This section establishes a conceptual interest in the ‘production of 
justification’ through the design and conduct of decision-making processes. The term ‘production of 
justification’ refers, most simply, to the generation of support for a favoured outcome. Section 2.3 then 
considers the relevant literature. The three literatures surveyed concern ‘framing fracking’, ‘closure 
through planning’ and ‘participation in the planning of shale development’. A growing number of studies 
now catalogue the diversity of ways in which fracking is framed by various groups, with many authors 
expressing concern about the possible marginalisation of public frames within decision-making 
processes where they differ from dominant policy frames. At the same time, there has been much work 
on the ways in which public and expert participation in the planning of various forms of energy 
development have been curtailed through a range of what this study will call ‘forms of closure’. These 
first two literatures establish planning decision-making processes on shale gas development as 
potentially fertile ground for studying the production of justification through the closure-oriented 
design and conduct of such processes. The final section of the literature review considers the studies 
that have so far covered this ground in the UK context and highlights a number of gaps where this thesis 
aims at making a contribution.                
Chapter 3 details the methodological approach through which the prior academic concerns where 
initially developed and then explored empirically. Having already established the case (planning 
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decision-making on shale gas in the UK) as fertile ground for producing insights on the production of 
justification, the rationale behind and a brief guide to the ‘field-site’ (the inquiry into RW and PNR) is 
offered. Section 3.2 discusses the ‘theory of method’ underpinning the study and introduces Glynos and 
Howarth’s ‘retroductive’ approach to explaining and theorising in the social sciences (Glynos and 
Howarth 2007), before clarifying the slight adaptation to that approach taken here. Moving on to the 
‘practice of method’, section 3.3 then covers both the methods of data collection and the approach to 
analysis deployed. Finally, the thesis’ research questions are formally stated. Chapter 3 establishes the 
failure of the case of Friends of the Earth (FoE) at the inquiry as the empirical problem to be explained 
by this study, and that in doing so will shed light on the conceptual interests established in chapter 2.    
The first empirical chapter, chapter 4, gives a rich descriptive account of the case of FoE at the inquiry, 
detailing their arguments, the counter-arguments of rival parties, and whether FoE succeeded in 
influencing the decision. This chapter is split into four sections, organised according to the four key 
issues that FoE participated on at the inquiry. They were: climate change, public health, waste disposal, 
and economic impacts. The second empirical chapter, chapter 5, analyses how and why FoE’s case came 
to fail at the inquiry. This explanation is built around four ‘forms of closure’. Collectively, these forms of 
closure - namely ‘double compartmentalisation’, ‘vertical deference’, ‘horizontal deference’ and 
‘selective scepticism and credulity’ - are argued to have prevented FoE’s case from receiving serious 
consideration at the inquiry through a mix of procedural exclusion and insensitive conduct. It is 
therefore the central contention of this thesis that these forms of closure channelled the inquiry toward 
both the granting of permission for these specific applications and the production of justification for UK 
shale policy. Finally, in chapter 6 the implications and limitations of the study are discussed and 
conclusions are drawn. Turning back to the academic interests from chapter 2, a series of contributions 
to the literature and insights into the production of justification are elaborated. The conceptual and 
methodological approaches are then critically reflected upon, and a series of implications from the 
research are offered to both academic and non-academic audiences. Finally, the entire argument of the 
thesis is briefly summarised before the study’s conclusions are presented.   
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2. THEORY, CONCEPTS AND LITERATURE  
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2.1 THREE THEORIES OF DECISION-MAKING 
 
The following review considers three normative decision-making theories and their critiques. 
Considered first is the analytic-rational model of decision-making, which is followed by two approaches 
that were born, at least in part, in response to dissatisfaction with that approach – namely, partisan and 
deliberative decision-making.  The review will sketch out the key features of each model, but primarily 
of interest here is the purpose of these normative prescriptions about how decisions should be made. 
The simple answer is of course that these theories promise better, more rational or legitimate decision 
outcomes. To make good on these promises, however, they share a common concern. They are all 
concerned by the potentially distorting influence of power on and through decision-making, and how 
this influence can be regulated if not eradicated entirely by following their prescriptions. The implication 
of this, I will suggest, is that just as power is a key consideration in the elaboration of normative 
decision-making theory it must also be a key consideration in the study of decision-making in practice. 
This is especially so given that the normative prescriptions put forward by these theoretical models are 
rarely explicitly used as a blueprint for practice, let alone faithfully or successfully so. In other words, 
they – with the possible exception of partisan decision-making - are typically preached more than they 
are practiced. As such, they may not operate as the bulwarks against power that their advocates 
imagine them to be.      
 2.1.1 AN A LY TI C-RATI ONA L 
 
The term ‘analytic-rational’ decision-making is employed here to describe the shift toward an 
increasingly central role for scientific knowledge as an input to decision-making, and the attempt to 
formalise the process of decision-making into something akin to a scientific technique. This attempt is 
associated in particular with the field of economics, the quantitative revolution in the social sciences 
more broadly, and the application of related techniques to real-world policy issues usually referred to as 
‘policy analysis’ or ‘policy science’. Within this combination of academic theory and practical 
experimentation resides a series of assumptions and prescriptions about how decisions should be made 
which I collectively refer to as the analytic-rational model of decision-making.  
This approach to decision-making is built on an instrumental model of rationality. Decisions are rational 
to the extent that they identify and pursue the optimum means to achieve a given end (Albæk 1995). 
The process involves specifying goals, comprehensively reviewing options, evaluating the consequences 
of each, and establishing the optimum option (Albæk 1995; Tribe 1973). A decision problem of any 
complexity therefore requires access to or the production of a great deal of knowledge, and the aid of 
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experts, analysts and advisors. To the extent that there are either multiple decision makers or a decision 
maker aspires or represent a broader constituency, collective values must be elicited and pursued. 
The analytic-rational approach to decision-making concerns itself with a truncated decision process. The 
development of input values that precedes the process is viewed as non-rational, and thus falls outside 
of the theory’s scope (Torgerson 1986; Tribe 1972; Tribe 1973). Any subsequent efforts of the decision 
maker to persuade a broader audience of the optimality of the identified option are also beyond the 
scope of the theory (Majone 1989). In between the provision of values and persuasion lies the purely 
technical process of identifying alternative options, comparing consequences and selecting the optimum 
way forward.           
As well as process, the model prescribes the role of particular forms of knowledge, particularly 
probabilistic knowledge about the consequences of various options (Collingridge 1982). This restricts the 
application of the model to situations where sufficient knowledge is either already available; or can be 
produced, where the pay-offs of the optimum option outweigh the costs of both delaying the decision 
and producing the knowledge (Collingridge 1982). This calculation itself may require knowledge not 
possessed - i.e. how long will it take to produce the necessary knowledge, how much will it cost to delay 
the decision (Collingridge 1982). 
The model at least implicitly envisages a small decision-making elite – a single decision maker, or a small 
group, and their advisors (Majone 1989). The model focuses on this closed relationship between 
decision maker and advisor, with criticism or disagreement from the outside not typically considered 
(Majone 1989). Where decision makers aspire to represent public values, these are typically produced 
by means of eliciting and aggregating individual preferences into some benefit maximising yet fair 
distribution (Collingridge 1982). Although – as a question of values – the elicitation of social values falls 
outside of the purview of the model, the tendency has been to at least implicitly be satisfied with 
delegative and aggregative modes of value elicitation (Campbell and Marshall 2002). Within the 
decision-making elite roles are split sharply between the representative decision maker who provides 
the evaluative inputs – whether personal or as a conduit for social values; and the expert who employs 
the neutral machinery prescribed by the analytic-rational model, embodying scientific ideals of 
objectivity, neutrality and disinterestedness (Tribe 1972). 
The analytic-rational model is objectivist, which is to say that decision-making as a science consists of a 
single and universally applicable set of procedures for the unambiguous establishment of the optimum 
option (see Dryzek 1993). As such, disagreement, argument, and persuasion are largely ignored by the 
model. Once revealed, the objectively compelling optimum option will be recognised as such by all 
rational onlookers. Given the same value inputs, all analysts – barring error – will reach the same 
optimum option. Disagreement over value inputs, which precedes the decision-making process, is 
beyond the scope of the model. As such, those evaluative inputs are not questioned through the process 
(Tribe 1972), and all experts ought to be able to agree on factual matters during the process. All of this 
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makes for an implicitly envisaged smooth process producing objectively compelling decisions. The 
analytic-rational model, at least in the minds of its early, bold advocates sought to replace power and 
politics in decision-making with objective knowledge (Torgerson 1986). 
The normative decision theory presented above, and attempts to apply it by turning real world decision-
making into a scientific technique, are closely associated with the increasing use of and reliance on 
scientific knowledge and expert advice in public decision-making. In fact, some have argued that the 
analytic-rational model’s supposedly neutral technique has a bias in favour of technical, ‘hard’ forms of 
knowledge (see Tribe 1973). In the linear model of science advice, the role of science in public policy has 
been best captured in the slogan ‘speaking truth to power’ (Wildavsky 1979). In this view, science 
produces objective knowledge which is then unproblematically translated into action, decisions and 
policy. 
It is the positing of an objectively optimum decision outcome and the claimed elaboration of a rigorous 
and neutral technique through which it can be unambiguously identified that position the model as a 
bulwark against power. The objectively compelling best option is the objectively compelling best option 
irrespective of whether it happens to be expedient to powerful interests or not. In other words, the 
power of rationality keeps other, less legitimate forms of power (e.g. sectional material interests) in 
check. Archetypal examples of this analytic-rational power constraint would include public policy 
decisions over smoking or climate change. For instance, policy-makers pursuing the objective of 
improving public health would be instructed to introduce specific policies aimed at reducing smoking 
rates as they emerge from the rational-analytic process as the objectively compelling best means to 
pursue the given ends. No amount of lobbying or obfuscation from the tobacco industry could bend the 
truth to become more expedient to their material interests.      
In truth, however, even during the 1960s heyday of social scientific positivism, the analytic-rational 
model was only ever aspired to as an ideal rather than fully or successfully implemented (Albæk 1995). 
The model has been subjected to sustained critique for several decades now – the most relevant 
arguments of which will be considered next. 
Perhaps the most obvious issue with the analytic-rational decision-making model is that it requires a 
decision maker to possess unrealistic levels of knowledge, particularly concerning the future 
consequences of various options. This makes the model an unrealistic aspiration in practice. An early 
and influential critique of the analytic-rational decision-making model comes from Charles Lindblom 
(Lindblom 1959; Lindblom 1965). Lindblom’s critique identifies, in what he terms the ‘synoptic ideal’, an 
unrealistically demanding intellectual task, ill-suited to complex and open-ended decision problems, and 
likely to prove a strain on resources. 
Building on Lindblom’s work, David Collingridge identifies and critiques what he terms the justificationist 
model of decision-making (Collingridge 1982 especially; but also Collingridge 1980; Collingridge 1983). 
The ambitious aim of decision justification is to demonstrate a particular option to be the best of all 
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open options. This apparently common-sense aspiration turns out to require such exacting levels of 
knowledge, particularly about the future, as to exclude the possibility of its full application on many 
quite typical knowledge-intensive decisions concerning, for example, environmental and technological 
regulation. The daunting epistemic and axiomatic requirements include knowing the full range of 
options, knowing the consequences of each, reconciling all interpretations, and eliciting and establishing 
the relevant values and preferences (Collingridge 1982). Collingridge concludes that “justification calls 
for such extensive knowledge of options, states of the world, pay-offs and so on, that it has little reality 
beyond the covers of textbooks” (Collingridge 1982, 32). In other words, the establishment of the 
optimum option on which the model’s ability to regulate power is based, is, according to Lindblom and 
Collingridge, routinely unachievable. 
A second issue with the analytic-rational model is its naivety or silence about the institutional contexts 
and political realities in which decisions are actually made. For instance, Albaek suggests that:         
“Many researchers had the notion that, if they were involved in the political-administrative 
decision-making process, they would be able, given the scientific insight afforded by their 
respective disciplines, to make other decisions than the existing decision-makers. This notion 
itself reveals an abysmal lack of insight into and respect for the nature of the political-
administrative process” (Albæk 1995, 82–83). 
In other words, despite the attempted implementation of an analytic-rational approach to decision-
making, the same decisions can be expected to be made as if the decision was left to nakedly political, 
non-rational processes such as lobbying and horse-trading. In this somewhat dispiriting view, politics 
and power remain the actual driving force behind the decision-making process, with the analytic-
rational process relegated to a misleading presentational smokescreen.   
Collingridge suggests that the analytic-rational model neglects questions about the institutional setting 
of the decision maker, where the potential for various forms of bias and distortion exist. These biases 
and distortions present the opportunities through which power and politics can continue to drive 
outcomes (i.e. make the same decisions) despite an analytic-rational approach ostensibly being taken. 
Options may be neglected, analysis may focus on a feature where the favoured option is felt to be 
superior, information may be supressed or not sought, objectives and values may go unquestioned with 
dissent discouraged or ignored, and the problem may be framed in ways that shape and constrain the 
likely outcome (Collingridge 1982). Of course, these biases and distortions deviate from a consummate 
implementation of the ideal (i.e. it is not a criticism of the model itself, but its misapplication). However, 
given that the ideal is only possible in the simplest of decision problems, the door is opened for it to 
operate not only, or even not at all, as the actual basis of decision-making, but also as a political tool for 
justification. In other words, a decision maker may appeal to the caste-iron justification provided in 
theory (i.e. ‘this is objectively the best option’) without the decision-making process actually having 
faithfully followed the prescriptions that supposedly enable such a claim in practice (if for no other 
reason than they’re typically impossible). 
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As Torgerson (1986) points out, the issue here is as much about the influence of analytical-rational 
decision-making on politics, as it is politics distorting attempts to apply the ideal. In other words, as the 
apparent objectivity of the analytic-rational style and imagery “become part of political rhetoric”, 
“irrational claims and expectations are advanced under the banner of reason” (Torgerson 1986, 39). So 
not only is analytic-rational decision-making susceptible to distortions in real world institutional contexts 
enabling essentially the same decisions to be made, but it may lend those same decisions a veneer of 
rational respectability. In other words, there is what Erving Goffman (Goffman 1959) would describe as 
a frontstage/backstage relationship between the imperatives actually underpinning decisions and the 
altogether more respectable rational process through which a decision is presented as having been 
arrived at (see also Flyvbjerg 2003 who suggests such a frontstage/backstage relationship is often the 
case between ‘rationality’ and ‘rationalisation’). In this case, far from acting as a bulwark regulating 
illegitimate forms of power, the analytic-rational model is seen as being susceptible to being subverted 
by power - to becoming a strategic tool for the pursuit and justification of favoured outcomes that 
obscures that pursuit behind ‘frontstage’, presentational rationality. By ‘presentational rationality’, I 
refer to a serviceable impression of rationality, the purpose of which is not to instruct the identification 
of the rationally best decision option but rather to present an outcome as if it had been selected in that 
manner.     
A third issue is that the procedures and methods prescribed by the analytic-rational model are not a 
neutral technique, but display a tendency to favour particular sorts of knowledge over others. For 
example, the approach privileges smoothly commensurable factors at the expense of ‘softer’, ethical, 
uncertain, qualitative and other more elusive concerns (Tribe 1972; Tribe 1973). A fourth and related 
issue is the permissive approach to the provided evaluative inputs. The truncation of the decision-
making process considered by the analytic-rational model leaves key questions over values and 
purposes to the powerful interests capable of sponsoring such analysis, with no prescribed provision for 
input from a broader set of actors. Fifth, the model reifies a simple-minded distinction between facts 
and values. The model mistakenly assumes that analysis can be entirely evacuated of ‘values’, ignoring 
the norms and assumptions involved in all analytic work (see Felt et al. 2007). In all three cases, 
normative and political commitments are either separated from or obscured within a supposedly 
technical process, and so potentially shape the outcome without public acknowledgement, scrutiny or 
contestation. In this view, power and politics are being obscured and eluded, rather than regulated or 
eradicated.    
Finally, the field of STS has comprehensively critiqued the linear model of science advice and the role of 
scientific knowledge in decision-making. First, science is not the only legitimate source to inform public 
decision-making, and factual answers to propositional questions fail to address normative questions 
over purposes and direction (Felt et al. 2007). Here the concern again is that an overly technical framing 
of the content of policy processes hides and so fails to regulate key normative and political aspects of 
policy issues. This obscured politics has been referred to as “science”-protected politics (Wynne 2007). 
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Second, this overly technical framing also marginalises the role the public play and restricts the sorts of 
arguments raised during the process. This raises questions about public alienation from decision-making 
processes and compounds concerns about the existence of a democratic deficit in knowledge-intensive 
policy issues (Wynne 2001). Here the concern is the marginalisation of certain voices and concerns in 
decision-making processes involving science, which are then typically dominated by certain actors and 
interests.  
Third, the linear model overestimates the smoothness with which scientific knowledge is translated into 
public policy and underestimates the role of political-administrative processes in procuring scientific 
advice and interpreting its policy implications (Sarewitz 2000; Stirling 2008). Here the concern centres 
on the scope for non-rational processes, again potentially dominated by certain actors and interests, to 
influence the production and use of policy-relevant scientific knowledge in potentially unaccountable 
and obscured ways. Fourth and finally, the model routinely under emphasises the extent of incertitude 
in relevant areas of scientific knowledge, the extent of expert disagreement over complex issues that 
cross disciplinary boundaries, and the propensity of scientific knowledge to fuel rather than settle policy 
disputes (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1993; Sarewitz 1996; Sarewitz 2004; Stirling 2014b). Again, the criticism 
stresses scepticism over the plausibility of science furnishing policy processes with a compellingly 
optimum option. ‘Speaking truth to power’, according to this critique, may in practice routinely fail to 
provide policy processes with the unambiguous facts required to regulate power. Moreover, as well as 
not necessarily providing the envisaged bulwark, it may present opportunities for the subtle operation 
of power over and through policy processes. 
The analytic-rational model of decision-making, then, proposes to regulate if not entirely eradicate the 
role of power in decision-making by elaborating a technique to identify the objectively best means to 
pursue given ends. The above critique, however, identifies a series of issues with this approach to the 
regulation of power. First, the knowledge requirements are unrealistic in many typical decision 
situations. Furthermore, the expectation that the evidence base of a given policy issue will in practice 
unambiguously point to a particular option appears fanciful for issues of any complexity. Second, the 
analytic-rational process, and the prior process of value establishment, present ample scope for 
inadvertent bias and intentional action to influence the outcome. These first two points open the door 
for the model to be preached more than practiced in such a way as to lend the justification of 
‘presentational rationality’ to decisions arrived at through the old imperatives of power and politics. In 
this case, ironically, the imperatives supposedly regulated by the model either inadvertently elude or 
intentionally subvert the process to secure a favoured preference whilst lending it the justificatory 
credibility of a decision arrived at rationally. The model becomes a tool for power rather than a bulwark 
against.  
Third, the models supposed neutrality is undermined by its preference for certain forms of knowledge 
and its permissive attitude to supplied values. In both cases, the outcome of a process may be shaped 
by values and normative commitments that go unacknowledged and unchallenged. Furthermore, the 
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simpleminded distinction between ‘facts’ and ‘values’ at the heart of the model obscures the norms and 
assumptions entailed in all analytical work, and an overly technical framing of the policy process may 
overlook broader questions over values and purpose. In all cases, normative and political commitments 
made by a potentially narrow set of actors are hidden within a supposedly purely technical exercise and 
so denied a public airing through a proper political process. In short, the model is susceptible to various 
forms of ‘cryptonormativity’ (see Kolodny 1996; see also Evensen 2015 for a discussion in relation to the 
use of science in policy decisions on shale development). Fourth, and closely related, the model is elitist 
and potentially marginalises the role of publics in decision-making processes, leaving decision-making in 
the hands of a relatively small group of actors and interests.  2.1.2 PA RTI SA N  
Charles Lindblom (1959) viewed the analytic-rational model as a poor description of real-world decision-
making, an unrealistic ideal, and as normatively suspect (Wandling 2011). A poor description because 
real world decision-making rarely satisfies the prescriptions of the restricted view of rationality 
stipulated by the analytic-rational model. An unrealistic ideal because in complex decision-making 
contexts these prescriptions simply cannot be fully satisfied. And, finally, normatively suspect because of 
its technocratic and authoritarian proclivities (Albæk 1995). His alternative model, disjointed 
incrementalism, or as I’ll refer to it the partisan model, is, he argued, both a better description of how 
decisions actually get made, and, happily, this is as it should be, with incrementalism being both more 
rational and normatively acceptable in pluralist political systems.  
Lindblom’s decision-making method, in stark contrast to the analytic-rational approach, treats analysis 
and values as intertwined. There is no discrete, preceding phase of value establishment, followed by a 
purely technical assessment of the best means to pursue the afore-established objective. That is 
because, so Lindblom argues, there is likely to be widespread disagreement over both broad values and 
specific objectives, and public preferences are often not registered on a given issue, or at best are only 
imperfectly captured. In other words, ‘social values’ often don’t exist, or cannot be authoritatively 
established. Even when merely imposing their individual values, decision makers will often not be able 
to rank values in some abstract way, but will clarify them in choosing in concrete circumstances. 
Therefore, administrators: 
“[C]hoose directly among alternative policies that offer different marginal combinations of 
values. Somewhat paradoxically, the only way to disclose one’s marginal values even to oneself 
is to describe the policy one chooses to achieve them” (Lindblom 1959, 82). 
In this way, decision makers focus on marginal or incremental values as expressed in a restricted subset 
of options. This of course violates the instrumental rationality underpinning the analytic-rational model. 
Instead of the optimum means to achieve established ends, the test of a good policy is agreement on 
the policy itself. 
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A second key feature of disjointed incrementalism is its explicit satisfaction with non-
comprehensiveness. The analytic-rational model’s requirement of a synoptic view is itself irrational, 
ignoring as it does the unrealistic expectations it places on a decision maker’s intellect and resources. 
The partisan model does this by limiting ambition in two directions. Firstly, limiting alternatives to those 
only marginally different from those policies currently in place – thus reducing both the number of 
alternatives to be investigated and the complexity of that investigation. Secondly, “ignoring important 
possible consequences of possible policies, as well as the values attached to the neglected 
consequences” (Lindblom 1959, 77). This provocative idea is tempered by the diverse and distributed 
nature of participants in policy-making processes across government agencies and beyond to civil 
society pressure groups and industry lobbies. In this way, each facet of a policy problem, each possible 
consequence and set of values and interests has its ‘watchdog’. This system, argues Lindblom, “often 
can assure a more comprehensive regard for the values of a whole society than any attempt at 
intellectual comprehensiveness” (Lindblom 1959, 77). This is the crux of Lindblom’s claim that the 
partisan model is normatively preferable to the analytic-rational model – that this fragmented process 
can give a voice to a wider range of interests in public policy processes than a single, centralised 
authority could.  
A third and final key feature of the partisan model is its serial, iterative nature. Rather than labour 
futilely on establishing the optimum means to pursue stated ends, the partisan model is a process of 
‘successive approximation’, in which policy is endlessly remade and objectives may periodically be 
reconsidered. Proceeding through a succession of incremental changes, serious and lasting errors are 
avoided. Grand predictions are not required because of short lag times between interventions; and 
these short lag times provide regular opportunities to ‘test’ the intervention and to feed the experience 
back into subsequent decisions, so enabling errors to be remedied quickly.     
The partisan model, then, envisages a much broader set of actors as potentially implicated in decision-
making processes, going beyond the implicit small decision-making elite of the analytic-rational model. 
Distinct constituencies emerge as ‘watchdogs’ for particular interests, values and preferences. The 
requirement for scientific disinterestedness is replaced by the partisan pursuit of interests, and the 
search for the objectively compelling optimum option is replaced by pragmatic satisfaction with 
agreement over action. 
Regarding legitimate inputs to the decision-making process, scientific knowledge is just one kind. In fact, 
if anything, in certain contexts it is subordinated to more tacit forms of know-how (established norms 
and procedures, rules of thumb, professional judgement, so on - Lindblom and Cohen 1979), because 
pressing issues can rarely wait for decisive scientific proof (Albæk 1995). Values and interests are also 
explicit, central and entirely proper inputs to the process. ‘Partisan analysis’, not some ‘objective’ 
version, “is the most characteristic analytical input into politics and also the most productive” (Lindblom 
1979, 524). It is more or less a matter of ‘anything goes’ when it comes to the conduct of a partisan 
contest over a particular policy decision. Different forms of ‘partisan mutual adjustment’ are the 
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techniques of partisan contest. They may be adaptive or manipulative, where the former involves 
adapting to the decisions of others and the latter involves active attempts to shape the decisions of 
others through negotiation, bargaining, manipulation, authoritative prescription, and so on (Lindblom 
1965). In other words, there is an explicit and sanctioned role for power in decision-making.      
The partisan model, then, takes a rather different approach to the regulation of the role of power in 
decision-making compared to the analytic-rational model above. Far from attempting to regulate or 
even eradicate power with rationality, rationality is redefined and located within the interactions of 
competing powers. Power is not regulated but allowed to run free with the only limit on each individual 
‘watchdog’ arising from the existence of other partisans and the pressure to mutually adjust toward a 
single course of action. 
Lindblom’s partisan decision-making model has been criticised on three main fronts. First, some have 
questioned its account of the role of scientific knowledge in decision-making. For instance, it has been 
suggested that the model has a tendency to reduce scientific and technical knowledge to mere 
instruments “which can be used and are used more or less at will to further one's own ends” (Albæk 
1995, 89). Second, its marginal, incremental nature limits the range of options considered to those only 
marginally different from recent policies and decisions. This discourages radical, deep and rapid shifts in 
approach and would seem to encourage path-dependency, myopia and tunnel-vision. 
Third, it is inherently conservative, favouring powerful and incumbent actors and helping to preserve 
business-as-usual. Collingridge, for instance, argues that all methods of partisan mutual adjustment – 
save for partisan discussion -  lead to decisions being determined by “the relative strength, power and 
pockets of the partisans” (Collingridge 1982, 182). Similarly, Stirling suggests that the decision-making 
process is, in effect, reduced to a situation of political “might is right” (Stirling 1994, 87). The partisan 
model is therefore likely to tend towards decision outcomes that preserve the status quo. Furthermore, 
as Stirling points out, Lindblom’s dual normative and descriptive case for the partisan model seems to 
imply a satisfaction with how things are currently done (Stirling 1994). In Lindblom’s account, the 
partisan model is how decisions are already largely made, including those presented as having been 
underpinned by the analytic-rational model. In this way, the partisan model’s ambitions are limited to 
the accurate description of decision-making processes, rather than any fundamental shift in how 
decisions are actually made. Contrary to the analytic-rational model’s presentational smokescreen, the 
partisan model argues that there is nothing to hide. 
In fairness to Lindblom, he himself did at least partially recognise some of these issues from the outset, 
admitting that “the method is without a built-in safeguard for all relevant values” and that “it also may 
lead the decision-maker to overlook excellent policies for no other reason than that they are not 
suggested by the chain of successive policy steps leading up to the present” (Lindblom 1959, 79–80). He 
defended the explication of a decision-making method that he fully expected to produce as many foolish 
decisions as wise ones for three reasons. Because it is how many decisions are actually made, because it 
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is superior to the analytic-rational model for complex problems, and because decision-makers becoming 
more reflective about a method they currently use largely tacitly might be expected to improve their use 
of it. 
The main issue for the partisan model’s approach to the regulation of power is its positing of a kind of 
‘rationality of power’ (as opposed to the analytic-rational model’s reliance on the power of rationality - 
see Flyvbjerg 2003). The idea that this rationality of power(s) produces better decisions relies on there 
being a state of equilibrium, with power relatively equally distributed amongst a plurality of partisans. 
The notion of justification is also expanded and redefined in ways unlikely to be acceptable to audiences 
in practice. According to its critique, the analytic-rational approach is used as a tool to justify the existing 
preferences of powerful actors to broader audiences. The actual rationale behind a choice – for example 
that it was in the interests of powerful actors – is implicitly not seen as a sufficiently compelling reason 
to garner the support of a broader audience. The partisan model however, with its anything goes 
approach to ‘adjustment’, sanctions ‘might is right’ reasoning unlikely to be acceptable in practice. For 
example, citizens are unlikely to accept a change in a country’s energy policy on the grounds that the 
fossil fuel lobby is powerful and has deep pockets. Even if that were the underlying reason for the 
change, policy-makers would at least have to be seen to have made the decision according to other 
imperatives. The biases, distortions, and role of power in decision-making shift from crypto to psilo1 but 
ultimately remain unacceptable, leaving decision makers with little help in persuading a broader 
audience of the wisdom of their decision.             2.1.3 DELI BER ATIV E  
Deliberative democracy emerged as the preeminent force in democratic theory from around 1990 
(Dryzek 2000). It is an approach to democracy that locates legitimacy in the capacity of those subject to 
decisions to participate in preceding deliberations (Dryzek 2000). That is to say, it is a theory of 
democracy with a central focus on collective decision-making processes. 
Habermas turns from subjectivity to intersubjectivity and communication in his search for a universal 
rational foundation for modern institutions (Flyvbjerg 2001). Habermas’ theory of communicative action 
presumes a rational basis to mutual understanding on the grounds that it is unavoidable (Habermas 
1984). Communicative rationality entails “a noncoercively unifying, consensus-building force of a 
discourse in the which the participants overcome their at first subjectively biased views in favour of a 
rationally motivated agreement” (Habermas 1987, 315). For Habermas, communicative rationality 
occurs to the extent that mutual understanding enables coordinated action (Habermas 1979; Habermas 
                                                                
1 Psilo is the antonym of crypto. Where the latter means concealed, the former literally means bare or naked. In 
other words, in Lindblom’s approach these questionable aspects of decision-making may no longer be hidden but 
are no more acceptable for this.    
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1987). Rational communication entails the free acceptance of the consequences of a claim or norm by 
all affected, known as the universalisation principle of discourse ethics (Habermas 1990). The result is 
consensus achieved through the ‘forceless force of the better argument’ (Habermas 1984; Cohen 1989), 
which is to say without coercion or power. The purpose of communicative rationality is understanding, 
as opposed to the success-oriented instrumental rationality and partisan strategies underpinning the 
analytic-rational and partisan models (Pellizzoni 2001).   
The establishment of pure communicative rationality requires an exacting list of procedural 
requirements to be satisfied – if and when they are an ‘ideal speech situation’ is said to emerge 
(Habermas 1990). No viewpoint and no affected party can be excluded; there should be equal 
opportunity amongst participants to present and criticise claims; participants must be willing to 
empathise with each other’s claims; power differences between participants must be neutralised; 
participants must be honest and sincere with themselves and others (Flyvbjerg 2001; Kemp 1985). 
Habermas is prescriptive about process, whereas the proper content and outcome of deliberation is 
determined by participants’ interactions through the process. Full and successful adherence to these 
procedural requirements produces universal moral truth or normative rightness (Habermas 2003). 
The democratic theory inspired by Habermas’ critical project is therefore a model of legitimate decision-
making. Decision-making is collective, interactive, talk-centric, and perhaps implicitly face-to-face2 
(Chambers 2003); and decision outcomes ought to be the result of a process of inclusive, open, non-
coercive, reflective and sincere deliberation. Inclusive because all those affected by a decision ought to 
have the opportunity (not the obligation) to participate in its making (Benhabib 1996; Cohen 1989; 
Dryzek 2000). Open because all participants should have the opportunity to put forward arguments and 
criticise those of others, because the extension of this opportunity is not dictated by status or 
qualification, and because the relevant arguments and perhaps admissible forms of communication are 
not a priori circumscribed3. Non-coercive because ‘cognitive’ persuasion is the only acceptable route to 
consensus. Reflective because participants can change their judgements, preferences and views in the 
course of deliberations. Sincere because deliberations should be authentic rather than strategic or 
symbolic. 
Advocates argue that a series of benefits flow from deliberative decision-making. As a model of 
decision-making derived from democratic theory, more democratically legitimate decisions is a central 
normative claim. More instrumentally, decisions that are widely viewed as having been arrived at 
through a legitimately democratic process are perhaps likely to be adhered to and respected. The 
experience of participating in deliberation is also expected to produce citizens who are more informed, 
                                                                
2 Although Dryzek outlines the more distributed, systematic notion of ‘deliberative capacity’ (Dryzek 2009), many 
attempts to experiment in practice with deliberative democratic theory have brought together ‘mini-publics’ for a 
limited duration, and often as a one-off, to deliberate about a given issue or decision problem (Dryzek et al. 2009). 
3 Habermas would privilege reasoned argument (Habermas 1996), Dryzek on the other hand would allow rhetoric, 
humour and storytelling – the only requirement being that communication induces reflection on preferences non-
coercively (Dryzek 2000; Dryzek 2009). 
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co-operative, understanding, and who give a fair hearing to the arguments of others and are willing to 
alter their views (Bohman 1996; Cohen 1989; Warren 1992). Broad participation may bring new 
perspectives and knowledge to bear on a decision problem (i.e. the political rationality of pluralism – 
Popper 1966). The process may help participants refine and better articulate their arguments and reflect 
on the arguments of others, and the transformation of views may produce new points of view which 
transcend an old impasse (Fearon 1998; Miller 1992).   
A role in decision-making is therefore theoretically open to anyone ‘affected’ by a decision. How this is 
reconciled with notions of competence, specialisation and expertise is an ongoing debate. This issue is 
felt to be particularly acute for public issues involving technology or domains of science, and as a result 
involving high levels of technical information. Fischer suggests that deliberative democratic theory has 
neglected the issues of expertise and complexity, which have largely been taken on by those 
experimenting with deliberative processes  in practice (Fischer 2009). 
The content of deliberation is largely determined through the interaction of participants but there are 
some tendencies and limits. As already seen (see footnote 3), whether reasoned argumentation should 
be privileged is a matter of debate. Furthermore, theorists tend to prohibit ‘intrinsically anti-
deliberative’ forms of communication such as lies, threats, commands, manipulation, propaganda, the 
expression of mere self-interest, the imposition of ideological conformity, so on (Dryzek 2000; Dryzek 
2009). It is a matter of debate as to how this is to be policed – whether through the work of an authority 
or as a tendency inherent to the procedure. For instance, Dryzek suggests that expressions of self-
interest, for example, are disadvantageous as a consequence of ‘mechanisms endogenous to 
deliberation’, which “promote the expression of interests in public interest terms, and the crafting of 
proposals sensitive to interests so expressed” (Dryzek 2000, 169). Preventing crypto-self-interest being 
smuggled in duplicitously as if it were the public interest, though, presumably relies on ensuring the 
authenticity and sincerity of communication. Although prescribed in theory, this seems far from a 
straightforward accomplishment in practice. More generally, Dryzek prefers the use of ‘endogenous 
mechanisms’ to change views and behaviours than forbidding them through preconditions for entry 
(Dryzek 2000). 
Decisions are settled through arriving at consensus, though again there is disagreement over the 
required depth of consensus. This centres on whether consensus needs to be grounded in shared 
principles, or whether convergence on ‘what is to be done’ is sufficient. For Habermas, at least in his 
early work, there must be agreement over the solution and why that solution is preferable (Pellizzoni 
2001). Dryzek and Bohman, on the other hand, take the shallower view, necessitated they argue by the 
complexity of problems and the existence of irreducible differences (Bohman 1996; Dryzek 1990). 
Consensus is reached through the satisfaction of the universalisation principle in the first case, and the 
resumption of co-operative action in the second.   
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The deliberative model, then, makes a series of procedural prescriptions designed to ensure the 
opportunity of free and equal participation in a decision-making process by those subject to its 
consequences, where consensus emerges through the power of the better argument alone. As such, 
deliberative decision-making delivers on its promise to regulate the role of power to the extent that its 
prescriptions are truly able to equalize or eradicate all other forms of power in practice. 
The most obvious and common criticism of the deliberative model is the implausibility of its full 
realisation. To do so - particularly the early, ‘strong’ Habermassian version - may require unlimited time, 
an unmanageable number of participants, and the equalisation of all inequalities between them 
(knowledge, resources, etc.). Some argue that this is a poor criticism (Kemp 1985; Pellizzoni 2001). 
Habermas himself does not expect the ideal speech situation to actually be achieved, and it can operate 
successfully as a regulative ideal without ever being so. It can be “a critical standard”, says Habermas, 
“against which every actually realized consensus can be called into question and checked” (Habermas 
1973, 258). The charge of impracticality has less traction for the more pragmatic approach of Dryzek and 
others who compromise on key points to improve real-world feasibility. 
Other criticisms are raised by constructivists, agonists, feminists and others concerning impartiality, 
reason and power. These criticisms concern the tensions between difference and consensus in collective 
decision-making, and the extent to which pure, forceless, reasoned communication can bridge 
differences, or even be achieved. The goal of an impartial (general) public reason and rational consensus 
in the interests of all raises suspicions about the flattening and marginalisation of difference (Young 
1996). The impartiality of the deliberative procedure has been questioned as it privileges a particular 
form of political action (public debate) and even particular forms of communication within that 
(reasoned argument) (Marres 2005; Mouffe 1999). The unity of reason – agreement over why to favour 
a particular outcome by all subject to its consequences – is viewed as impossible in many circumstances 
as there are differences (situations of incommensurability, or fundamental clashes of identity, for 
instance) that simply cannot be resolved through rational debate (Bernstein 1992; Pellizzoni 2001; 
Pellizzoni 2003). Finally, there are doubts over whether pure, forceless rational debate can actually be 
achieved, and both whether power can and conflict should be eliminated from the public sphere 
(Flyvbjerg 2001; Mouffe 1999). 
Here, in ways that interestingly parallel the critique of the analytic-rational model above, the issue of 
justification as a political tool emerges once again. Like the analytic-rational model, the deliberative 
model converges on a single decision outcome in a way that is said to be neutral and above the 
distortions of interests and power. Like the objectively best option supposedly highlighted by the 
analytic-rational model, the deliberative model is said to elevate an outcome to, in its strongest form, 
universal moral truth. Though if power is not and cannot be eliminated from deliberative processes, 
then it can operate in perhaps subtle ways to pursue favoured outcomes through them. Again, the 
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potential is there to be a tool for advancing whilst obscuring the role of power in public decision-making. 
As Pellizzoni puts it: 
“In these situations the force of the best argument is only a myth. A dangerous myth, the 
constructivists contend. As a regulatory ideal, it may legitimate nothing but expressions of 
external power, thereby enabling the strongest party to impose its reasons as objectively the 
best” (Pellizzoni 2001, 72)4. 
The extent to which these criticisms trouble Dryzek’s more pragmatic view is questionable. Dryzek’s 
satisfaction with a plurality of reason – agreement over an outcome for different reasons – and 
permissiveness over forms of communication partially insulate him. Dryzek and Niemeyer note that 
even agonists don’t propose eradicating communication in the name of difference, which implies some 
level of agreement and consensus no matter how fragile and contestable (Dryzek and Niemeyer 2006). 
Avoiding the misuse of deliberative processes to advance whilst obscuring power would be more of a 
practical achievement than procedural guarantee and would involve paying close attention to the 
conditions of the production of an agreement (i.e. symbolic politics in the service of partisans or 
hegemonic actors, or relatively authentic dialogue – Dryzek and Niemeyer 2006). Dryzek and Niemeyer 
seem implicitly confident that these ‘conditions of production’ will be visible, clearly discernible from 
one another, and not a matter of disagreement themselves.       
Finally, as Pellizzoni points out, the all-affected principle will often lead to unrealistic demands for 
knowledge about the future. In situations of radical uncertainty, “the impossibility of establishing with 
mutually acceptable approximation what the outcomes of a choice will be prevents a justification in 
terms of its being in the interest of everyone affected” (Pellizzoni 2003, 209). In other words, the 
deliberative model’s partial consequentialist mode of justification necessitates degrees of knowledge 
about the future hard to come by on issues of any complexity5. 
The deliberative model arouses the same ‘frontstage/backstage’ suspicions as the analytic-rational 
model. As a normative ideal its full realisation is implausible, especially on policy issues of any 
complexity or depth of disagreement. If power cannot be eradicated from deliberative processes, but 
rather operates subtly through them, then such processes may be channelled towards particular 
outcomes. Once selected, these outcomes may enjoy the illusory justificatory resource associated with 
being the subject of rational consensus and the outcome of a democratically legitimate process. Again, 
the scope is clear for the deliberative model to in practice work as a tool for rather than bulwark against 
the role of power in decision-making.      
In sum, the deliberative model seeks to eradicate power and private interests from decision-making 
processes through a series of prescriptions aimed at the creation of an ’ideal speech situation’ in which 
                                                                
4 By ‘external power’ Pellizzoni means all forms of power other than the purely cognitive power of the best 
argument, which in Pellizzoni’s terms is internal, i.e. internal to communication (Pellizzoni 2001). 
5 As a procedural approach, part of the justification of the outcome of a deliberative process is the legitimacy of the 
process itself. However, references to the acceptance of those affected by the consequences of a decision 
necessitate levels of knowledge about the future often not possible at the time of the decision.   
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the only power at play is the forceless force of the best argument. However, much like the analytic-
rational model, as a distant regulative ideal implementations of the model are unlikely to successfully 
realise this power constraint. As such, scope exists for power and interests to distort such processes and 
influence their outcomes in ways that may be obscured or overlooked. This lends a misleading 
‘presentational legitimacy’ to decision outcomes actually arrived at in a less acceptable fashion. 
 2.1.4 SU MMAR Y AN D  IMP LI CATION S 
 
Three normative theories of decision-making have been reviewed, with particular attention paid to the 
promise each made to regulate the role of power, interests and politics in decision-making. The key 
features of each are summarised in table 1 below. 
Table 1: The three normative theories of decision-making summarised 
Model Details Power Constraint Issues 
Analytic-
rational 
The elaboration of a 
scientific technique of 
decision-making to 
reveal the optimum 
option, as well as the 
central role of technical 
knowledge therein 
The identification 
of the objectively 
compelling 
optimum option  
Unrealistic knowledge 
requirements; relies on existence 
and demonstration of an 
objectively ‘best’ option; ample 
scope for bias and distortion in the 
design and execution of processes; 
potential to be (mis)used as a tool 
for justification; susceptible to 
various cryptonormativities; 
potentially marginalises the role of 
publics  
  
Partisan The partisan pursuit of 
favoured options 
amongst groups 
representing a non-
comprehensive range of 
different preferences, 
values and views; an 
anything goes approach 
to ‘adjustment’ towards 
pragmatic agreement 
over action 
Partisans inter-
regulate one 
another with very 
little ‘external’ 
constraint on 
permitted 
behaviour within 
the process 
Potentially views scientific 
knowledge as too malleable; 
wilfully blind to many options and 
consequences; inherently 
conservative and preservative of 
the status quo; relies on a relatively 
well-balanced power distribution 
amongst partisans to prevent 
policy processes being dominated 
by a small number of powerful 
actors and interests; would often 
fail to provide credible decision 
justification in practice 
 
Deliberative Inclusive and open 
deliberation in which all 
affected by a decision 
have the opportunity to 
participate and through 
which consensus 
emerges around an 
The deliberative 
procedure which 
eradicates or 
equalizes all power 
but the forceless 
force of the better 
argument  
Unrealistic resource requirements; 
suspicions over consensus’ 
tendency to marginalise difference 
and dissent and the impartiality of 
the procedure; relies on 
eliminating power from the public 
sphere; potential to be (mis)used 
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The purpose here is not to use these models as ideals against which to assess decision-making in 
practice. Instead, the above theory will play the more limited role of highlighting particular phenomena 
of interest in a given social context (see Chapter 3 for a discussion of the role of theory as adopted in 
this study). The three theories above demonstrate that a consistent concern for normative theorists of 
decision-making is the problem of how to regulate the potentially distorting effect of power on decision-
making. The role of power therefore emerges as a phenomenon of central interest in the study of 
decision-making. 
A second key implication of the review above concerns the distinction between the actual process of 
choice through which an option is selected, and the process of decision justification through which a 
broader audience is persuaded of the apparent wisdom of that option and/or the legitimacy of the 
process that selected it. Critics suggest that the models that in their ideal form furnish decision-makers 
with authoritative means of decision justification are at risk of becoming a tool for rather than bulwark 
against power, especially if the ideal is likely to be unachievable in practice. In other words, that the 
actual method of decision selection fails to consummately apply the ideal does not necessarily prevent 
the decision being presented as if it had. Similarly, if power works through decision processes subtly, 
then it may shape them towards particular options. In these ways, decision-making has repeatedly been 
suspected – by critics of the analytic-rational and deliberative models in particular – of being susceptible 
to frontstage/backstage dynamics. Here, a presentational smokescreen obscures the continuing 
distorting influence of the very ulterior imperatives supposedly being regulated. Again, this relatively 
consistent concern marks out possible frontstage/backstage dynamics between the influences driving 
selection and the image presented for the purposes of justification as a phenomenon of interest in the 
study of decision-making.       
option whose 
consequences can be 
non-coercively accepted 
by all 
as a tool for justification; 
consensus may be impossible and 
consequences unknown in 
‘intractable problems’ 
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2.2 THE CONCEPT OF JUSTIFICATION 
 
In the previous section a consistent concern with the role of power in decision-making was identified in 
the normative decision-making theories reviewed. Furthermore, where theories claimed that their 
approach provided compelling decision justification – whether as the objectively compelling optimum 
option or as the subject of rational consensus – concerns regarding the distinction between the actual 
basis of choice and the way decisions are justified arose. Critics pointed to the possibility of innocently 
flawed or deliberately manipulated implementations of these approaches misleadingly supplying 
decisions with ‘presentational’ justification. In this section I will explore the concept of justification in 
greater detail, and will argue that these two concerns necessitate a sceptical approach to the concept. 
Firstly, because even if the models reviewed in the previous section would in theory regulate the role in 
power in decision-making in the way they recognise is necessary, they are unlikely to be fully or 
successfully adhered to in practice. Secondly, because, as will be made clear in an engagement with the 
work of Boltanski and Thevenot below, only a sceptical approach to the concept of justification can 
recognise the potential for a discrepancy between the actual basis of choice and the presented 
justification. By a sceptical approach to the concept of justification I refer to one sensitive to the 
possibility of the existence of scope for inadvertent bias or intentional action to secure and justify a 
particular decision outcome, even through ostensibly rational or legitimate decision-making processes. 
This idea will be fleshed out more fully in what follows.  
 2.2.1 JU STI FI CA TION  A S A  CON STR AININ G  FOR CE  
Before elaborating a sceptical approach to the concept of justification, Boltanski and Thevenot’s 
‘sociology of critical capacity’ will be considered. Boltanski and Thevenot do not produce normative 
prescriptions for decision-making like the theories reviewed in the previous section. Instead, they seek 
to elaborate the normative frameworks that are employed by and constrain actors in practice. Boltanski 
and Thevenot view certain domains of social action as situations of justification and criticism (Boltanski 
and Thevenot 1999; Boltanski and Thevenot 2006). They have in mind situations in which social order or 
routine cooperation is interrupted and disagreement needs to be resolved to some extent in order for 
collective action to resume. They refer to these situations a ‘critical moments’ (Boltanski and Thevenot 
1999), though in the language of this thesis they can be thought of as situations of public decision-
making. Boltanski and Thevenot provide a conceptualisation of justification applicable to these 
moments that can be described as principled and sincere. These situations, for Boltanski and Thevenot, 
are characterised by the constraint of justification – that is, the imperative to justify one’s actions, or to 
justify criticism of the actions of another. In their own words: 
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“A first characteristic of these situations is that the persons involved are subjected to an 
imperative of justification. The one who criticizes other persons must produce justifications in 
order to support their criticisms just as the person who is the target of the criticism must justify 
his or her actions in order to defend his or her own cause. These justifications have to follow 
rules of acceptability” (Boltanski and Thevenot 2006, 360). 
Consciously departing from the ‘hermeneutics of suspicion’ (Ricoeur 1986) of the likes of Bourdieu and 
Foucault, Boltanski and Thevenot take seriously the criticisms and justifications of actors as opposed to 
attempting to reveal otherwise hidden interests, power and forms of oppression (Wagner 1999). In their 
account, situations of justification are not driven by power and interests but sincere attempts justify 
actions and beliefs or evaluate those of others in reference to ‘rules of acceptability’. As they put it: 
“When one is attentive to the unfolding of disputes, one sees that they are limited neither to a 
direct expression of interests nor to an archaic and endless confrontation between 
heterogeneous world views clashing in a dialogue of the deaf. On the contrary, the way 
disputes develop when violence is avoided, brings to light powerful constraints in the search for 
well-founded arguments based on solid proofs, a search that thus manifests efforts towards 
convergence at the very heart of a disagreement” (Boltanski and Thevenot 2006, 13). 
Furthermore: 
“[P]eople do not ordinarily seek to invent false pretexts after the fact so as to cover some 
secret motive, the way one comes up with an alibi; rather they seek to carry out their actions in 
such a way that these can withstand the test of justification” (Boltanski and Thevenot 2006, 
37). 
Disagreement, then, is not accounted for by interests or irreconcilable clashes of values or identity, but 
instead by the existence of multiple, mutually incompatible ‘practical philosophies’ (Wagner 1999) or 
‘orders of worth’ (Boltanski and Thevenot 1999; Stark 2009; Boltanski and Thevenot 2006). These orders 
of worth are single-axis scales based on a particular higher common principle on the basis of which 
situations are evaluated as more or less worthy (Boltanski and Thevenot 2006). They are not usually 
consciously employed in practice, rather their presence is more subtle and their use tacit. They are 
though employed, however opaquely, as principles of evaluation underpinning the prosaic disputes of 
actors in practice (Boltanski and Thevenot 1999). For example, the industrial order of worth evaluates 
the worth of objects, acts and situations in relation to the higher common principle of efficiency – the 
more efficient a state of affairs or proposal the more justifiable it is (Boltanski and Thevenot 2006). 
Disagreement may therefore turn on the validity of a test made in accordance with one particular order 
of worth (i.e. how justifiable is the act or situation in reference to an agreed order of worth), or more 
fundamentally may concern the relevant order of worth (i.e. is this the correct basis against which to 
assess the act or situation) (Boltanski & Thevenot, 2006). These tests vary depending on the order of 
worth to which they refer and can include testimony, popular vote, the general will, paying the 
established price, relying on the competence of experts, and so on (Boltanski and Thevenot 2006). 
In On Justification Boltanski and Thevenot elaborate six of these practical philosophies, each of which is 
elaborated in reference to a grand old work of political philosophy in which they were crystalized 
(Boltanski and Thevenot 2006). Boltanski and Thevenot make clear that the list is not exhaustive, and 
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later propose further orders of worth (Boltanski & Chiapello, 2005; Holden & Scerri, 2015; Lafaye & 
Thévenot, 2017). The details and characteristics of these practical philosophies are not of interest here. 
Instead, what is of interest is the approach taken to the concept of justification in which they play a key 
role, and whether this conceptualisation convinces generally and provides useful insights for the present 
study. 
Boltanski and Thevenot’s key theoretical commitments regarding the concept of justification are that, 
firstly, during public6 decisions actors are compelled by the imperative to justify. Second, those 
justifications are based – however indirectly – on one of several incompatible principles of evaluation, 
each underpinned by a distinct, unitary measure of worth (Stark 2009). Third, in disputes actors are 
ordinarily sincere in their attempts to reach a justifiable settlement, motivated by an authentic desire to 
be justified. This leads, fourthly, to the methodological commitment to ‘take seriously’ the stated 
justifications and criticisms of actors. It also leads, fifthly, to the insight that disagreement is driven – in 
these kinds of situations at least7 – by conflicting evaluations of worth according to a common principle 
of evaluation or more fundamentally by the use of conflicting principles of evaluation, as opposed to 
clashes of interests, values or identity.        
The first commitment – that actors are constrained by the requirement to justify – is uncontroversial. 
Whatever their motivations or aims, in order to be successful, actors in public decision-making situations 
have to at least attempt to be seen to make justifiable decisions on defensible grounds. As Boltanski and 
Thevenot themselves rather colourfully put it - “[we] cannot say, for instance: ‘I don’t agree with you 
because I don’t like your face’” (Boltanski and Thevenot 1999). The second commitment, too, is 
perfectly sensible. They may or may not look precisely like the principles elaborated by Boltanski and 
Thevenot, but it seems reasonable to suggest that actors in public disputes at least attempt to justify 
their views, acts or preferences in accordance with what is felt is or should be a shared principle of 
evaluation, no matter how implicitly or mistakenly. It is the next step - that these justifications and 
evaluations are ‘ordinarily’ sincere attempts to produce well-founded arguments based on the desire to 
act justifiably – however, that stretches credulity and unduly circumscribes analysis. The empirical 
observation that these constraints (to justify in reference to collectively acceptable rules) exist does not 
preclude the possibility that actors do not occasionally behave strategically by paying hollow deference 
to them whilst pursuing goals driven by other, obscured imperatives. In other words, the provision of a 
justification and the apparent appeal to a shared principle of evaluation may be strategic rather than 
sincere, and the constraints of justification may not be the consummate bulwark against strategy that 
Boltanski and Thevenot appear to believe.   
                                                                
6 ‘Public’ in the sense that they involve at least two parties to a dispute – and so the possibility of the invocation of 
multiple principles of evaluation exists; but also in the sense that they call for collective agreement on a general 
conception of the good, or an entities worth evaluated in reference to it (Wagner 1999). 
7 Not all social situations fall under the regime of justification. According to Boltanski and Thevenot, other regimes 
of social life exist when no dispute arises over the justness of a situation or order (the regime of fitness), or when no 
appeal to a common principle of evaluation is made (the regime of love when there is no dispute, or violence when 
there is) (see Wagner, 1999).   
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This commitment comes about through a combination of empirical observation and theoretical 
contention. Empirically, Boltanski and Thevenot observe that humans are “equipped with a moral 
competence and an authentic desire for justice” (Annisette and Richardson 2011, 231). They also 
observe that actual disputes where violence is avoided reveal the powerful constraints of the imperative 
to justify (Boltanski and Thevenot 2006). They observe this empirically in the mundane arguments of 
graduate students and then use classical texts of political philosophy to formalise a repertoire of 
common principles on which an agreement about a social ordering can be based (Boltanski and 
Thevenot 1999). As they put it: 
“Observing the course of disputes, or, more precisely, disputes in which violence is excluded, 
one cannot fail to observe the common constraints which shape the behaviour of the people 
involved. For example, they must base their arguments on strong evidence, expressing in this 
way their will to converge towards a resolution of their disagreement. Political constructions 
[the classical texts of political philosophy] can be used as powerful tools to clarify these 
constraints and make explicit the grounds of reasoning, which are most of the time 
encapsulated in an implicit form in the arguments exchanged during the course of action” 
(Boltanski and Thevenot 1999, 366). 
Finally, they match up each classical text with a contemporary corporate handbook or ‘how-to’ guide 
(e.g. matching the industrial order of worth, a productivity how-to guide, and the work of Saint Simon), 
from which they “extracted the principles of order that are implemented in different daily situations” 
(Boltanski and Thevenot 1999, 369). 
These empirical observations would be more persuasive if the stakes were a little higher – say if the 
dispute concerned the political future of a nation, or the fate of a highly valuable resource. Are actors 
expected to be principled and sincere in these scenarios? The deliberations of graduate students in class 
may also be far from typical. Furthermore, the examples that Boltanksi and Thevenot furnish On 
Justification with add to the impression that their notion of justification – and in particular its 
commitment to the sincerity of actors - only applies to mundane, relatively low stakes, and often face-
to-face disputes between at most a handful of interlocutors. One wonders whether the same sincere 
approach to justification would be observed, for instance, in anonymous strangers discussing a 
controversial geopolitical situation on an internet forum.     
Theoretically, they take issue with suspicious analyses that employ forces such as power and interests as 
explanatory resources, and which – in their view – mistake justification for deceit (Boltanski and 
Thevenot 2006). They set out to explicitly provide an alternative to the social worlds theorised by 
Bourdieu and Foucault, which – again in their view – seem entirely governed by power and so unliveable 
(Wagner 1999). This theoretical ‘scepticism over scepticism’ takes issue with what they see as these 
analyses’ tendency to ignore the competencies demonstrated by people when they criticise and justify 
(Boltanski and Thevenot 1999). This is because, for Boltanski and Thevenot, agreement over the 
justification of a social ordering in which there was a role for power, interests and strategy necessarily 
means both that certain actors were deceived and so denied their critical competency, and that certain 
actors behaved strategically and so denied their competency for justifiable conduct. However, it is far 
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from clear why recognising the role of power and interests in decision-making necessarily denies actors 
their critical competencies. Boltanski and Thevenot think that justification must be sincere and not 
strategic in order to grant actors their critical capacity because actors would either display their critical 
competence and not stand for an illegitimate justification, and so there would be no agreement; or they 
would be deceived, and so there would be no critical capacity. However, ‘agreement’ may be far from 
an enthusiastic endorsement and actors may very well not be deceived but nonetheless powerless to 
resist. In short, admitting the possibility of a role for interests, power and strategy in justification does 
not necessarily render those that lose out dupes. Regarding the strategic actors, an actor displaying 
strategic behaviour in a dispute is not necessarily incapable of principled and sincere conduct, or of 
accessing potentially shared frameworks of evaluation, but has decided there is a benefit to be gained 
from not engaging such competencies in this particular moment. As such, neither critical nor strategic 
capacity should be stripped from actors a priori, the existence of one does not necessarily deny the 
possibility of the other within the same situation, and principled and sincere justification should be 
demonstrated in conduct rather than granted as an ordinarily natural state.  
Wagner admits that Boltanksi and Thevenot - mirroring the flaws they perceived in Bourdieu and 
Foucault - gave the impression of having produced an equally unliveable world where actors seemed to 
constantly be involved in justice (Wagner 1999). They clarify that this is only how actors are expected to 
behave in one regime of social life – the regime of justification. It is not clear whether this means that, 
by definition, the presence of strategy, interests and power in a situation necessarily means that it must 
belong to another regime of social life. There is a potential circularity to this defence, however, as any 
case conflicting with Boltanski and Thevenot’s expectations about the conduct of actors engaged in 
justification can merely be semantically shuffled into another regime of social life, leaving their 
principled and sincere conceptualisation of justification intact.          
According to Wagner, Boltanski and Thevenot are not so much saying that sociology cannot be critical, 
but that the capacity to criticise also exists beyond academia (i.e. amongst actors in practice) (Wagner 
1999). However, there is some ambiguity about Boltanski and Thevenot’s methodological prescription 
regarding the taking seriously of the critical competencies of actors and constraints of justification, and 
what this means for analysis in practice. For instance, Boltanski and Thevenot clarify that they “do not 
underestimate the importance in social life of domination, force, interests and even of deceit, delusion 
and self-deception” but that a representation of the social world completely grounded in deception is 
not able “to understand the critical operations undertaken by the actors” (Boltanski and Thevenot 1999, 
364). In order to do so, however, and in order to “recognise the normative principles which underlie the 
critical activity of ordinary persons”, Boltanski and Thevenot suggest that the critical stance must be 
given up, if only temporarily (Boltanski and Thevenot 1999, 364).  
There is also a potential methodological paradox in situations where actors in practice themselves couch 
their criticisms in a register of power and (attempted but failed) deceit (i.e. that they criticise elites for 
misusing power). In this case, Boltanski and Thevenot would paradoxically instruct the analyst to ‘take 
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seriously’ the actors criticism, whilst suggesting that taking these practical critical evaluations seriously 
requires jettisoning power and deceit from the account. As they later go on to clarify (Boltanski and 
Thevenot 1999), however, the point is that when actors criticise power and deception (as it is by now 
admitted they do) they are demonstrating a competence for distinguishing legitimate and illegitimate 
justifications and criticism, and to do so necessarily entails an appeal - however implicit - to a common 
principle of justification (i.e. that it is unjustifiable for elites to misuse power). But what of the elites in 
this scenario? Would their justifications as to why this was a legitimate use of power be ‘taken seriously’ 
as well? And what in practice prevents ‘taking seriously’ from amounting to uncritically taking at face-
value? Boltanski and Thevenot would explain the difference in view as to what is legitimate behaviour as 
coming down to the deployment of distinct and incompatible principles of evaluation. But is it not also 
possible that the elites are appealing to what they consider to be a shared principle of evaluation in 
order to obscure their misuse of power? In their keenness to grant actors their critical capacity, 
Boltanski and Thevenot appear to have stripped them of their capacity to act strategically. Readers will 
also notice that in such a scenario justification is wielded as a strategic tool by one set of actors (i.e. the 
elites), whilst another set of actors display the capacity to criticise on the basis of a principle of 
evaluation that distinguishes legitimate from illegitimate conduct. In other words, strategy and critical 
capacity coexist in the same situation, suggesting that a role for power does not necessarily involve 
denying actors their critical capacity.  
A sincere conceptualisation of justification is one that makes no distinction between the means of 
evaluation on the one hand, and justification on the other. The means of evaluation – an attempt at a 
shared principle of evaluation – sincerely was the means of evaluation employed, and is also the means 
of persuasion precisely because it aspires to be common. However, once we grant actors their strategic 
capacity – as I argue we must to provide an intellectually plausible and politically useful account of 
justification – we break the link between the actual basis of choice and the presented justification. This 
is because sectional interests are largely unpersuasive as reasons to pursue a particular option over 
alternatives in public decision-making. Therefore, if such influences are actually steering decision 
selection, then an alternative means of justification must be presented to a broader audience. In short, 
the way a decision is made and justified become two separate phenomena masquerading as a single 
entity, with the latter attempting to obscure the former. Therefore, a conceptualisation of justification 
which recognises the possibility of this distinction – between the material process of selection and a 
presentational process of justification – is required. The elaboration of such a conceptualisation is the 
task taken up in the second half of this section.    
In sum, Boltanski and Thevenot provide an account of public decisions in which they take seriously the 
constraints and practical competencies of critique and justification. For them, both empirical 
observation and theoretical reasoning suggest this task requires accepting that the justifications offered 
by actors are based on common principles of evaluation which are invoked in a sincere attempt to reach 
a justified settlement. I have accepted the first two commitments – that actors are compelled by the 
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constraints of justification, and that they at least attempt to make reference to what they consider to be 
shared principles of evaluation. However, the third has been rejected. Actors may be compelled to 
justify and may attempt to make reference to a generally acceptable standard in so doing, but they do 
not necessarily do so sincerely or innocently. Aware of the reality of such requirements for success in 
disputes, actors may strategically pay lip service to them in order to advance interests motivated by 
imperatives beyond the authentic desire for justice. Boltanski and Thevenot’s approach to recognising 
the capacity of actors to criticise appears to strip them of their ability to act strategically. As a result, 
both their methodological prescription to take seriously the justifications of actors and the insight that 
disagreement is driven by conflicting principles of evaluation are rendered problematic. Instead, I will 
now turn to a sceptical conceptualisation of justification in order to furnish this study with the ability to 
recognise the strategic capacity of actors, the distinction between the basis of choice and the means of 
justification, and the role of power in decision-making.          2.2.2 JU STI FI CA TION  A S A  PO LITI CA L R ESO U RCE OR  TOO L   
 
Stirling starts from a very different position to Boltanski and Thevenot. Instead of observing that 
justification in practice is ordinarily sincere and principled, Stirling attempts to understand the enduring 
appeal of technology assessment techniques in spite of their failure to live up to early promises of a 
‘science of technology choice’. The initial goal of achieving a truly comprehensive and objective means 
of technology choice is widely accepted – even implicitly amongst many advocates (see Stirling, 1994, p. 
78) – to have eluded such techniques. As such, Stirling suggests that their enduring appeal is not as a 
means of selection but of ‘justification’. They are, in Stirling’s rendering, “better regarded as a means to 
the ex post facto rationalisation of technology choice to a sceptical audience than as a normative 
decision-making procedure” (Stirling 1994, 80).  
Here justification is a quite different notion than in the work of Boltanski and Thevenot above. For 
Stirling, justification is a resource accrued in favour of a preference, designed to help persuade a 
broader audience. Stirling’s concept of justification has a potentially deceptive or misleading quality to 
it, as decisions actually taken according to narrower interests may be subsequently justified through an 
ostensibly rational and so more widely persuasive process. In other words, the actual basis of choice is 
obscured and presented as the (typically more agreeable) means of legitimation. As Stirling puts it, 
technology assessment techniques can operate as “an effective tool for the wider rationalisation of 
decisions taken according to narrower interests” (Stirling 1994, 80). 
Stirling extends this conceptualisation of justification to apply to participatory processes of technology 
appraisal as well as the analytical processes already considered (Stirling 2008; Stirling 2006). Stirling 
separates processes of appraisal (i.e. assessing the merits of different policy options) on the one hand, 
and commitments (i.e. committing to a particular option) on the other. In the conventional view, policy 
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commitments are the outcome of policy appraisal processes. Stirling suspects, however, that sometimes 
appraisal processes may anoint already formed commitments with justification. Both analytic and 
participatory appraisal processes are susceptible to various kinds of conditioning in their design, 
implementation and interpretation that provide “scope for contingent variability, inadvertent bias, or 
the exercise of deliberate conditioning influence” (Stirling 2008, 275). For example, choosing policy 
questions, bounding remits, including disciplines, accrediting expertise, choosing methodologies, 
defining metrics, prioritizing criteria, and interpreting uncertainties all effect the outputs of analytic 
appraisal; whereas recruiting participants, phrasing questions, characterising alternatives, providing 
information, conducting facilitation, and managing dissensus provide scope for channelling outcomes of 
participatory processes (Stirling 2008, 275). This scope for conditioning is the means through which 
processes of appraisal might inadvertently align with or be steered toward powerful incumbent 
commitments and interests. Stirling is quite clear that the influence of power might be inadvertent and 
tacit, as well as potentially deliberate. 
Stirling draws a distinction between two instrumental imperatives toward decision justification 
potentially operating through appraisal processes. ‘Weak justification’ describes the desire for 
decisiveness in general, where the specific outcome is unimportant but a decision must be made, 
possibly reflecting a desire to settle an issue or pool blame. ‘Strong justification’, on the other hand, 
describes the desire to justify a particular decision option, which may be favoured for narrow reasons 
not likely to be persuasive to a public audience. As such, the conditioning of appraisal provides a route 
to secure and justify such favoured outcomes in ways that obscure the reasons actually underlying the 
commitment to them. Stirling suggests that, “[s]uch is the manifest latitude for conditioning appraisal 
that there need often be no compromise on (let alone violation of) disciplinary rigor, methodological 
conventions, or individual integrity” (Stirling 2008, 276). Again, Stirling stresses that “imperatives to 
strong justification need not necessarily be explicit and deliberate, even on the part of incumbent 
interests” (Stirling 2008, 276). This is because: 
“Such interests are often directly engaged in individual projects through the formal structures 
of financing, sponsorship, clientship, patronage, or stakeholder oversight as well as in 
associated general processes of research governance, disciplinary funding, peer review, and 
professional advancement” (Stirling 2008, 276–277). 
It is worth pointing out here that the production of justification is not an easy or riskless endeavour. As 
Stirling suggests, “recognition of the scope for inadvertent bias or deliberate manipulation seriously 
undermines the basis for providing either weak or strong justification in decision-making” (Stirling 2006, 
99). Here an audience is invoked with the critical capacity to recognise the potential for an appraisal 
process to be used as a tool for, or inadvertently shape towards, the production of justification. In other 
words, justification needs to either actively deceive or more passively be overlooked in order to 
simultaneously secure the preferred outcome (either any decision or a specific outcome in the weak and 
strong variant respectively) and be persuasive to a broader audience (in order to produce the political 
resource). If the outcome of an appraisal process was widely perceived to be the result of systemic bias 
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and deliberate influence, then the process would obviously not have succeeded in producing 
justification. It is easy to see how an attempt at deliberate strong justification, say, could therefore 
backfire. Too blatant an attempt to secure the favoured outcome and observers will consider the 
process to be a ‘captured’ white-wash and no resource of justification will have been produced (in fact 
suspicion will have been engendered). Too many concessions to persuasiveness and incumbents may 
risk losing the ability to channel the process toward their favoured outcome (they may even unwittingly 
produce justification for another option). In short, the instrumental and expressive tasks of justification 
are in tension. Boltanski and Thevenot’s initial insight – that actors operate under the constraint of 
justification – continues to exert regulatory pressure on actors who at least have to be seen to operate 
justifiably, even as they work strategically toward securing support for a favoured outcome. Boltanski 
and Thevenot’s constraint of justification militates against strategy and indeed inadvertent bias, but it 
does not consummately prevent them.  
It is also worth clarifying that appraisal processes are not doomed to be a tool for the production of 
justification. Such processes “may be undertaken and presented in such ways as alternatively to conceal 
and reify, or acknowledge and interrogate, these imperatives, sensitivities and susceptibilities” (Stirling 
2006, 101). In Stirling’s vocabulary the former direction is described as ‘closing down’ and the latter as 
‘opening up’ (Stirling 2006; Stirling 2008). The purpose of appraisal geared toward closing-down is to 
authoritatively provide a single option with decision justification (Stirling 2008). Closing-down therefore 
either cuts through potentially intractable disagreement and incertitude to enable any decision to be 
made and defended, or it produces support for a particular outcome through inadvertent bias or 
deliberate action oriented toward the closure of consideration of particular options, issues and 
perspectives. The purpose of appraisal geared towards opening-up on the other hand is to make clear 
the extent to which the outcome of appraisal is sensitive to different conditioning effects in its design, 
conduct and interpretation, leading to ‘plural and conditional policy advice’ (Stirling 2008). Therefore, 
the scope of appraisal processes to produce justification is dependent on the extent to which their 
orientation toward disagreement and diversity in views, values and voices is one geared toward opening 
or closure.        
A sceptical approach to justification therefore recognises that decision-making processes are susceptible 
to various forms of action and bias with the potential to steer them towards closure generally or to 
provide support for a particular outcome in ways that are potentially obscured from a wider audience 
and even decision-makers themselves. Boltanski and Thevenot see the desire and requirement to 
achieve a state of justification as a positive regulatory force. The sceptical view, on the other hand, sees 
justification as potentially a tool or resource that can aid typically powerful actors’ pursuit of favoured 
outcomes, whilst at least partially obscuring that pursuit either behind some more agreeable 
presentation or by simply being overlooked (because these processes are only revealed on close 
inspection). Justification is therefore not just a constraining force but potentially an enabling one too, 
and can be produced through the closure-oriented conditioning of decision-making processes. 
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For Stirling, then, justification is a resource produced through scope for inadvertent bias or deliberate 
agency to condition appraisal processes towards either general decisiveness (‘weak’) or a particular 
favoured outcome (‘strong’). Appraisal processes may not actually inform commitments, but, in a 
reversal of the conventional view, may be shaped and co-opted to produce justification for existing 
commitments. This conceptualisation recognises the distinction overlooked by Boltanski and Thevenot 
between the actual basis of decision selection (prior commitments formed in whatever obscured way) 
and the process of justifying that commitment to a broader audience. It also recognises the possibility of 
strategic behaviour and the role of power in decision-making. Stirling’s repeated insistence, 
furthermore, that the production of justification is not necessarily intentional is a further important 
insight. As well as potentially being strategically produced, justification may also be the inadvertent 
result of systems, habits and other tacit or structural influences.  
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2.3 FRACKING, PLANNING AND CLOSURE 
 
The previous section established a conceptual interest in scope for the production of justification 
through the closure-oriented conditioning of decision-making processes. The present section will review 
three relevant literatures. I start by considering the literature on ‘framing fracking’ at a broad discursive 
level before discussing the literature on ‘closure through planning’ on relatively similar energy 
infrastructure planning disputes. The former demonstrates differing perspectives between public and 
institutional actors and flags a possible issue with the accommodation of public views in formal 
processes of policy- and decision-making. The latter provides an account of similar issues as they have 
played out across planning processes on relatively comparable types of development. Together these 
literatures locate planning decision-making on shale gas development as potentially fertile ground for 
studying processes of closure curtailing the role of expertise and public participation in decision-making 
and geared towards the production of justification for a particular form of development. Finally, I 
engage with early work positioned on or around this terrain in the section on ‘participation in the 
planning of shale development’ and highlight the ways the present study will extend understanding.   
 2.3.1 FR A MIN G FRA CKI NG 
 
A growing body of literature considers the framing of unconventional gas debates in the UK and beyond. 
Framing refers to the process of discursively constructing a particular and partial representation of an 
issue that either strategically or tacitly presents it in a particular light. These frames mix empirical 
information, interpretive perceptions, and normative or evaluative judgements, and often emphasise or 
background particular aspects of the issue and highlight or obscure attendant solutions. Frames then are 
interpretations of an issue that varyingly define the issue, evaluate what is at stake, and prescribe 
solutions (see Entman 1993; Hänggli and Kriesi 2012; Hilson 2015; Schon and Rein 1994). The present 
study focuses on a concrete and situated process of regulatory decision-making, as opposed to these 
studies which focus on the more decentred and intangible ways in which the same issue can be viewed 
and how those distinct ways variously resonate with diverse political values and identities. However, the 
two foci are related given both that concrete features of a decision-making process may render it more 
or less receptive to a particular way of framing the issue under consideration, and that the dominance of 
a particular issue-framing amongst groups with the resources or authority to sponsor or commission 
appraisal processes may influence the design and conduct of those processes in particular directions (i.e. 
conditioning pressures towards strong justification).     
Of these studies, many take a largely typological approach, distinguishing and describing the ‘frames’ or 
‘storylines’ employed by pro- and anti-fracking coalitions, and charting their relative success. Bomberg, 
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for instance, finds an opportunity and reassurance storyline amongst advocates, where economic, 
security and environmental benefits, and robust regulation are stressed. This is contrasted with a threat 
storyline amongst objectors which emphasises a triumvirate of threats from risk, fossil fuel dependence 
and bad governance (Bomberg 2015). Bomberg suggests that over time focus has shifted both 
geographically to more local concerns, and in terms of substance from risk to issues of governance, 
accountability, power and democracy (Bomberg 2015). In Scotland, Stephan finds a relatively consistent 
set of storylines. Amongst the pro-development discourse coalition an emphasis on economic benefits 
and energy security is found. Furthermore, discourses of reassurance (stressing the trustworthiness of 
operators and playing down the novelty of the process) and responsibility (where natural gas is framed 
as clean and a bridge, domestic supplies are framed a morally preferable to imports, and a direct energy 
systems transition to renewables is framed as irresponsible) are also found amongst this group (Stephan 
2017). On the other hand, anti-development storylines focus on, amongst other things, uncertainty, bad 
governance and ‘non-transition’ (Stephan 2017).  
Similarly, Cotton et al. report three overarching storylines in the UK national debate - ‘cleanliness and 
dirt’, ‘energy transitions’, and ‘geographies of environmental justice’. Within each storyline distinct 
coalitions with distinct values and worldviews compete to frame the issue (Cotton, Rattle, and Van 
Alstine 2014). Cotton et al. suggest that oppositional frames have struggled to influence the 
development of UK shale gas policy (Cotton, Rattle, and Van Alstine 2014). Steger and Milicevic survey 
the diversity of frames employed by the ‘global anti-fracking movement’. They find diagnostic frames 
that define fracking as a problem of health and safety, climate change, and democracy, as well as 
attendant prognostic frames. Crucially, when framed as a problem of democracy, the better 
understanding and management of risk is potentially insufficient as a governance response because it 
leaves intact the top-down, scientized (see Sarewitz 2004) decision-making processes that are 
established as part of the problem. As Steger and Milicevic put it: 
“Such framing of the “fracking problem” does not lend itself to easy technocratic policy fixes 
but brings proper politics back into the arena of contention” (Steger and Milicevic 2014, 26). 
Participatory methodologies have also been employed by researchers in an attempt to understand how 
publics perceive and think about the issue of unconventional hydrocarbon development. For instance, 
an early UK engagement exercise run by Sciencewise and TNS for DECC reported public concerns that 
included those caused by perceptions of risk, but also concerns provoked by views of shale gas as finite, 
polluting and a ‘non-transition’; scepticism over the distribution of benefits; a lack of confidence in the 
impartiality of decision-making bodies in the face of vested interests; a series of uncertainties over 
impacts, the scale of resource and economic viability; and the view that the Government had taken a 
prematurely partisan position and would likely be unresponsive to public opposition (TNS 2014). In 
deliberative workshops across the US and UK, Thomas et al. find a focus on risks and doubts about 
benefits and their distribution, as well as sceptical perceptions of the trustworthiness of governing 
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institutions and the motivations of corporations. Furthermore, and particularly in the UK, they find 
concern over a  lack of local control over regulatory decision-making (Thomas et al. 2017).  
Partridge et al. also conduct a series of deliberative workshops across the UK and US and report the 
importance not just of specific risks, but also of the perceived compatibility of shale development with 
participant visions of and concerns about long-term energy futures (Partridge et al. 2017). They report 
that shale development was typically seen as short-term, insufficient, and possibly counter-productive 
as a response to climate change. These ‘too little too late’ or ‘backwards step’ storylines also 
emphasised concerns about the crowding out of renewables investment and further entrenching an 
unhealthy reliance on fossil fuels, and echo earlier findings of a sceptical ‘non-transition’ discourse 
amongst UK publics (Parkhill et al. 2013). In some critical comments in their discussion, Partridge et al. 
suggest that the UK governments public knowledge deficit diagnosis of the issue (see Williams and 
Macnaghten, forthcoming) was seen as problematic by participants for underplaying uncertainties and 
failing to recognise the broader nature of concerns. They reflect on the problematic lack of “space for 
other perspectives” that this official storyline leaves (Partridge et al. 2017, 9).  
Other studies take a more thoroughly critical stance, arguing that dominant forms of industry, 
government or scientific discourse frame the issue in such a way as to marginalise and potentially 
exclude from sites of policy and decision-making the perceptions and understandings structuring public 
concern over the matter. Williams et al. analyse both Government rhetoric and public perceptions 
through public pronouncements and focus groups respectively, before exploring alignments and 
divergences between the two (Williams et al. 2017). They detect a ‘risk and safety’ framing and corollary 
public knowledge deficit diagnosis amongst governance actors. In this institutional storyline, public 
scepticism over fracking is caused by public misunderstandings over shale gas and hydraulic fracturing, 
scientific knowledge about impacts is the key basis of decision-making, and public resistance is remedied 
through the pedagogical communication of this knowledge to publics. This deficit model approach was 
found to be poorly aligned with public discourse on the issue, and furthermore is not well supported by 
the available evidence (see Williams and Macnaghten, forthcoming; see also Stedman et al. 2016 for a 
contrary view). Four themes of public concern were reported over the trustworthiness of institutions, 
the inclusivity of policy- and decision-making processes, the responsiveness of policy to public values 
and arguments, and the perceived lack of precaution in the Government approach. As such, public 
concern was found to relate not only, or even primarily, to the impacts (i.e. risks and benefits) and their 
distribution which dominated Government thinking, but also the processes through which commitments 
and decisions were being made and the perceived behaviour and orientations of institutional actors. As 
such, Williams et al. conclude that the Government response to public controversy is at best partial and 
at worst risks failing to recognise let alone address key issues motivating public concern, particularly 
those that relate to the processes and behaviours of regulatory agencies and governance institutions 
themselves. In other words, the UK fracking controversy: 
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“[I]s not just about the existence of objective risks, nor just about the public’s ability to 
understand them, but also about the institutional ability and willingness to recognise, 
encounter and accommodate diverse and polyvalent public views” (Williams et al. 2017, 100). 
Writing from a political economy perspective, Mercer and de Rijke also report a similar misalignment 
between anti-development campaigners, and the state Government and industry in the case of Coal 
Seam Gas (CSG) in Queensland, Australia. Their critical discourse analysis finds themes of 
irreplaceability, damage and interference amongst the discourse of the ‘Lock the Gate’ campaign, 
contrasted to a shared focus on themes of growth and prosperity amongst the Queensland state 
government and CSG companies. Mercer and de Rijke conceptualise this distinction as being one 
between ‘neoliberalising’ and ‘non-neoliberalising’ beliefs and perspectives where the latter are 
foreclosed and silenced as unthinkable and unreasonable in decision-making (Mercer and Rijke 2014).         
In sum, this literature catalogues the diversity of ways shale gas development is ‘framed’ amongst 
various groups. In terms of oppositional frames, whilst this literature demonstrates that the perceptions 
and judgements underpinning public scepticism are varied and complex, I would argue that a fairly 
consistent set of concerns is increasingly emerging. The process of hydraulic fracturing is seen as novel 
and risky and as producing impacts that are likely to be distributed unevenly and that remain the subject 
of scientific uncertainty and expert disagreement; the product of shale gas is perceived as representing a 
‘non-transition’ or ‘a backwards step’; governance and industry actors are not necessarily trusted to act 
in the public interest; and, finally, governance processes are viewed as exclusionary to publics and 
unresponsive to their concerns. Many of the studies point to a disconnect between publics and 
institutional actors and the ways they view and think about this issue. This is a fairly well observed 
phenomena across issues related to the environment and innovation (Dryzek et al. 2009). Some go 
further by arguing that this disconnect is marginalising typically more sceptical public framings at a 
broad discursive level, whilst also speculating about their possible exclusion from concrete exercises of 
policy- and decision-making. This prompts some of the authors above to make the general 
recommendation that decision-making processes will need to attempt the difficult task of recognising 
and accommodating public views in order to be legitimate or effective. Others attempt to locate specific 
areas of public concern and styles of reasoning that institutional discourses appear unreceptive to, and 
that decision-making processes may exclude or not take seriously. Beyond the handful of studies 
discussed in section 2.3.3 below however, little attention has been paid to concrete exercises of 
regulatory and governance decision-making on the matter of unconventional hydrocarbon development 
(as opposed to the more abstract broader frames discussed here). To the sites, mechanisms and 
practices through which public views are either included or not and taken seriously or not. In short, little 
attention has been paid to the inclusiveness of sites of regulatory and governance decision-making over 
shale development, and their receptiveness to public ‘frames’ and arguments. The present study locates 
itself within that gap by assessing whether planning decision-making processes are conditioned in such a 
way as to render them insensitive to fracking-sceptical public views and expert analysis alike. Similar 
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work has, however, been conducted on relatively comparable cases to shale development, to which this 
review now turns.   2.3.2 CLO SU R E TH RO U GH  P LANNI NG   
 
Here I focus on studies into the treatment of expertise and public participation in planning processes, 
the extent to which these groups are able to influence planning decisions, and the forms of closure that 
frustrate such efforts. I start with a couple of studies on general forms of development, before moving 
to energy development cases in particular.  
Bedford et al. assess the limits of ‘new’ public participation in planning development control in the UK in 
the context of contemporaneous and potentially contradictory moves to improve the efficiency of the 
system during the New Labour years. They argue that in two cases of residential development sites in 
London, such, at the time, ‘new participatory practices’ largely amounted to ‘consultation and placation’ 
rather than more meaningful ‘participation and empowerment’ (Bedford, Clark, and Harrison 2002; see 
also Arnstein 1969). This was primarily because these participation practices did  “little to lessen the grip 
of political or economic power on decision-making” (Bedford, Clark, and Harrison 2002, 322), and 
because there was a “basic disjuncture between what the public wished to object to and what was on 
the table for negotiation” (Bedford, Clark, and Harrison 2002, 326). They warn against raising 
expectations of meaningful impact on decision-making whilst limiting participation to consultation and 
placation, which they suggest may lead to greater cynicism and distrust of public institutions. As they 
conclude: 
“[P]articipants' experiences of 'new' participatory practices leave them feeling just as 
disempowered by a process that consults more but still does not permit them to gain effective 
purchase on the decision-making process” (Bedford, Clark, and Harrison 2002, 328). 
Bedford et al. encourage attention to the economic, political and institutional contexts and realities 
within which public participation in planning is situated, and the extent to which the former limits and 
circumscribes the latter. This study will focus on the extent to which a civil society organisation’s 
participation in a planning inquiry is circumscribed by the broader political and institutional context, 
especially the context of planning and energy policy. This study supports the idea that participation in 
planning decision-making enables little public ‘purchase’ on decision outcomes where participating 
publics are objecting to a form of development supported in the broader policy landscape. This study 
will demonstrate, through the notion of ‘vertical deference’ in particular, how this broader policy 
landscape shaped the inquiry’s ability to accommodate key arguments and frames of objectors in this 
case. 
Bickerstaff and Walker critically reflect on the upsurge of participatory rhetoric and practice in local 
government through the examination of two deliberative exercises employed in local transport 
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planning. In interviews with participants, planning officers and councillors they find a series of issues 
over both the process and outputs of such exercises. With regards to process, participants’ experiences 
of such processes make clear that unequal power relations may be reinforced rather than equalised 
through the dominance of particular forceful interests and various kinds of strategic behaviour. In terms 
of outputs, Bickerstaff and Walker argue that these deliberations were used to “justify or validate higher 
policy objectives or mobilise civic support” and that “the use of participatory outputs often served a 
rather symbolic role – to signal good decision-making without necessarily influencing it” (Bickerstaff and 
Walker 2005, 2134). Furthermore, the possibility of participatory outputs influencing decisions was 
constrained by statutory requirements and the broader institutional context. Ultimately, the local plan 
had to conform to government guidance, but government also encouraged public participation. Within 
the context of prescriptive central government policy, local authority influence on decisions and any role 
for public participation therein were heavily circumscribed and repeatedly seen as “a matter of 
tampering at the edges of decisions essentially made” (Bickerstaff and Walker 2005, 2137). They 
conclude with the warning that such deliberative exercises risk “providing something of a legitimatory 
veneer over existing relations of power within and between institutions and civil society” (Bickerstaff 
and Walker 2005, 2140). 
Turning to types of energy infrastructure more closely related to fracking, Wolsink considers ‘top-down 
planning’ as a major obstacle to development in a discussion on public opposition to wind farm siting in 
Europe (Wolsink 2007). Wolsink argues that how public concerns are treated and whether public values 
are allowed to influence decision-making at the local siting decision-making level are crucial in securing 
local support for wind developments and realising national policy on wind power. Crucial here, 
according to Wolsink, is the institutional tendency to misunderstand local opposition actually based on 
landscape values, community identity and environmental justice as being simple nimbyism. As Wolsink 
puts it: 
“For authorities and policy implementing agencies, the recognition of any NIMBY-motivated 
resistance is the ultimate legitimization for not considering the arguments that are put forward; 
however, the literature on facility siting and risk assessment shows that it is not a wise policy 
strategy to disregard the objections, and that ignoring the arguments might eventually become 
one of the major sources of societal resistance” (Wolsink 2007, 2701). 
Wolsink urges paying close attention to the fine detail of local planning decision-making on energy 
infrastructure siting, and especially to the treatment and categorisation of public concern and the 
influence of public values on decision-making. He is also concerned with the ‘closure’ performed 
through the institutional framing of public opposition (i.e. as nimbyism). The present study follows the 
former point closely. I chart the treatment and influence of the arguments of a civil society group 
through the fine detail of a local planning decision. However, I take a slightly different approach on the 
second point. I focus on the actual procedural mechanisms through which ‘disregarding objections’ and 
‘ignoring arguments’ – to use Wolsink’s terms from the quote above - are achieved, rather than the 
discursive work through which this achievement is then rationalised. 
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Turning to nuclear power, a by now classic series of studies into so-called ‘big public inquiries’ on 
nuclear planning decisions in the UK throughout the late 70s and 80s addresses the treatment of public 
participation and expertise within these processes. Kemp considers the planning system as a tool for 
legitimation in the case of the 1977 public inquiry into the proposal to build a thermal oxide 
reprocessing plant at Windscale in Cumbria (Kemp 1980). Adopting a Habermassian approach, Kemp 
assesses the inquiry against the normative yardstick of the ‘ideal speech situation’ (see Habermas 1990) 
and from the theoretical starting point of the ‘crisis of legitimation’ (see Habermas 1975). Kemp points 
to several deficiencies of the process, including inequalities in technical and financial support between 
objectors and applicants, the inability of objectors to question government policy, and the limited 
research capabilities available to the inquiry (Kemp 1980). Perhaps unsurprisingly then, Kemp concludes 
that the eventual decision to grant permission was not reached owing to the ‘force of the better 
argument’, and that it may be said to have been reached under conditions of ‘domination’ (Kemp 1980). 
He adds that rather than enabling public participation in decision-making the public inquiry served to 
procure legitimation for planned state actions (Kemp 1980). 
During the public inquiry into the Sizewell B pressurised water reactor, Kemp et al. note the emergence 
of a series of procedural innovations in response to questions about the legitimacy of decisions over 
large, complex, uncertain and controversial technological projects (Kemp, O’Riordan, and Purdue 1984). 
A key development, they argue, was the active investigatory role taken on by the public inquiry by 
commissioning and undertaking research itself, rather than relying on the information providing by 
interested parties. They argue that this arose from concerns over the fairness of the inquiry relating to 
structural inequalities between supporters of and objectors to the scheme. Specifically, the concern was 
that, given the complex and technical nature of the content of the inquiry, there was a clear disparity in 
the level of resources enjoyed by supporters and objectors and so their capacity to produce and present 
highly technical evidence. The recognition of this structural power imbalance led the inquiry itself to 
take an active role in filling this gap and producing the knowledge required to test the proposal 
thoroughly. Kemp et al. are therefore interested in emerging procedural responses to avoid the closure 
of public, NGO and expert criticism and scrutiny that would otherwise not be voiced, or at least not be 
voiced effectively, due to structural asymmetries in resources. 
Wynne highlights the limited scope for meaningful public influence in the nuclear planning inquiries of 
the 70s (Wynne 1982). Crucial here is the distinction between Government nuclear policy and the local 
impacts of specific siting decisions, with the former typically established as lying beyond the terms of 
reference of an inquiry. The Government was frequently in the position of supporter of a technological 
development and setter of the terms of reference within which planning appraisal of specific proposals 
for such development will be constrained, leading to ample scope for strategic behaviour to stifle 
potential arguments and avoid uncomfortable subjects. As Wynne puts it “[o]nly fragments [of the 
overall issue] are exposed for public participation, and the government can therefore control the 
comprehensive vision” (Wynne 1982, 59). In this context objectors are left with a dilemma since “an 
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inquiry promises potential influence, even if it flatters to deceive” and furthermore hands “the initiative 
in the overall definition and control of an issue to existing institutions” (Wynne 1982, 60). These 
inquiries, furthermore, typically considered safety issues as beyond dispute, with objectors often having 
difficulty accessing technical information from Government agencies for scrutiny. Wynne argues that 
these inquiries’ expression of an image of rationally discovering the best decision was a myth generated 
through procedural ritual, concealing social choice and producing legitimation for decisions already 
effectively made. However, having encouraged the public perception that such decisions should be 
rational (i.e. full and open examination of the issues), the reality of participating in these inquiries 
exposes “the contradictions in the ritual and is beginning to generate the hostility towards political 
authority it is supposed to preclude” (Wynne 1982, 73). 
Wynne also analyses key aspects of what he terms judicial rationality or thought. This includes ideas 
about the legitimate content of arguments but also deeper styles of reasoning, which together help to 
set the ‘shape’ of the issue. In his account of the 1977 inquiry into plans for a nuclear reprocessing plant 
on the Windscale site in Cumbria, Wynne outlines two forms of what I am here calling ‘closure’ as a 
result of judicial rationality. First, is the exclusion of certain issues as beyond the scope of the inquiry 
(e.g. Government policy, need, alternatives, etc.). Second, is the ostensive positivism of juridical 
rationality. This positivism maintains that issues can be purified into precise empirical questions which 
are answerable through reference to objective facts alone and is adopted at the expense of broader 
ethical, historical and sociological forms of argument (Wynne 1982). We will see that this distinction 
between legitimate and illegitimate styles of reasoning still more or less stands in the case presented 
here. This is demonstrated in the illegitimacy of arguments concerning the track record of Cuadrilla and 
the EA; and of the ‘similar facts’ case put forward by FoE regarding public health impacts in the US. 
Looking more broadly at conflicts in energy planning in the UK during the same period, Owens considers 
the increasing demands being placed on public inquiries from different groups. Central here is the 
extension of the terms of reference of inquiries from ‘traditional’ site-specific matters to consider 
broader issues such as government policy and national need. These broader debates were typically 
sought by environment groups who were sceptical about whether public discussion on energy policy 
was occurring elsewhere and so “[i]n the absence of a credible alternative forum… [these] groups 
persevere in raising these issues within the framework of the planning process” (Owens 1985, 549). 
They argued, therefore, that the development of say a nuclear reactor at Sizewell was part of a broader 
programme that regrettably could not be satisfactorily scrutinised by public groups in the round in any 
other forum. These groups ideally sought an extension of opportunities for public participation, and for 
such participation to occur at an early stage before policy commitments are made and become virtually 
irreversible. In contrast, developers tended to view these attempts to expand the terms of reference for 
such inquiries as going beyond the brief of planning and as resulting in unacceptable delays and costs. 
Developers therefore tended to be “in favour of ‘streamlining’ planning procedures, usually implying 
curtailment of debate on generic issues” (Owens 1985, 549). In conclusion, Owens suggests that 
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developer interests seemed more likely to win out at the time, suggesting a streamlining of the system 
and curtailing of debate rather than an expansion of participation and relevant issues. However, she 
argues that whether or not this would help achieve developer aims “to pursue and legitimize their 
development programmes with minimum delay”, will depend on “whether the reaction to ‘streamlining’ 
takes the form of acceptance with resignation, disruption by civil disobedience or explicit politicization 
of the debate” (Owens 1985, 557).         
In more recent work, Johnstone reflects on the continued dominance of the ‘streamlining’ approach to 
planning reform identified as having the upper hand by Owen around three decades earlier, with a 
particular focus on the 2008 Planning Act and its consequences for nuclear power consultation in the UK 
(Johnstone 2014). Crucial here is the creation of the Nationally Significant Infrastructure Projects 
regime, in part as a response to frustrations with local planning inquiries which had become increasingly 
seen as a hindrance to sustainability, not least because they had tended to become embroiled in 
national policy issues. Through these reforms, from the public inquiry format to various sites of 
‘consultation’, opportunities for engagement are compartmentalised, different publics are kept separate 
and the different issues that can be raised at different sites of consultation are closely policed. Activist 
interviewees fondly recall the ‘scalar fluidity’ of the public inquiries of the 80s where there was scope to 
raise broader issues around national policy, need and alternatives alongside local issues of amenity and 
siting. This is contrasted to the new regime of consultation within which two scales (local and national) 
and their issue-content and publics are distinguished and separated. Johnstone considers the 
“dissection of policy into contained scales” as a move that helps render a highly politicised form of 
development more ‘administrative’, and speculates that closing down the limited opportunities for 
challenging policy that existed in the public inquiry system will result in politics returning through other 
channels (e.g. the legal system and direct action protests, or ‘uninvited participation’ – see Wynne 2007) 
(Johnstone 2014, 708–709). 
Finally, in a historical case study of a planned Norwegian oil-fired power station that was never built, 
Asdal offers a corrective to overly pessimistic views on the use of public and expert participation to 
manage political contestation of planned energy infrastructure (Asdal 2008). Asdal focuses in particular 
on the role of a public hearing in jolting administrative practice from its default business-as-usual 
avoidance of ‘the political’ and reframing the prospective plant as an extraordinary and risky object. The 
hearing is a ‘technology’ for giving space to multiple judgements and in this case broke open the 
managerial space to enact difference and scepticism (Asdal 2008). As such, the hearing was not a 
technology of control but a tool for undermining management. As Asdal puts it, “[r]ather than stabilising 
or increasing the power of the centre, this tool at the heart of administration took part in transforming 
or undoing administration-as-usual” (Asdal 2008, 21). Asdal gives us little to go on in terms of the 
specific features of this hearing that enabled such effective unsettling of both the proposed object (from 
ordinary to extraordinary, risky, and old fashioned) and the administrative process (from business as 
usual, the avoidance of politics and seemingly routine acceptance to not only a space for different and 
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doubtful views to be voiced but also those voices successfully influencing the decision). She is keen to 
stress that it is the relationship or contact between the public, expertise and public administration that 
opens the possibility of the democratisation of the decision, rather than that capacity being the 
possession of any one in isolation. The present case tells a different story to Asdal’s abandoned power 
station. It demonstrates how publics (and dissenting experts) can be brought into contact with the 
administrative process without necessarily realising the possibility of democratisation - which according 
to Asdal is latent within this contact - and without these groups necessarily being able to gain a 
‘purchase’ on decision-making. It is an account of how the creation of space for different and doubtful 
views to be voiced (which did occur to an extent) did not lead to those voices unsettling either the 
mundane framing of the object under consideration or the business-as-usual managerialism of the 
administrative process. 
To summarise, several forms of ‘closure’ have been identified as curtailing participation in planning 
processes. First, many of the studies surveyed reflect on the impact of uneven resources and unequal 
power relations preventing certain voices from participating effectively in planning processes. Second, 
some of these studies flag the importance of formal inquiries possessing an investigatory capacity in 
order to redress such imbalances, as well as voicing concerns over insufficient scrutiny of or undue 
deference toward the technical case of the developer. Third, many demonstrate the prevalence of the 
closure of public and expert participation through the blunt procedural exclusion of defining certain 
issues as being beyond the scope of what can be discussed or questioned. Government policy in 
particular was regularly placed beyond what was permitted to be discussed. Another recurring finding 
was the compartmentalisation of the oversight of and opportunities to participate on related issues, 
broader programmes, and connected developments (i.e. oversight and participation was siloed not 
systematic). Fourth, the difficulty for local processes to enable participating publics to gain decisional 
influence was highlighted in the context of centralised and authoritative broader institutional contexts 
and statutory requirements. In short, where local decisions must align with central policy, public views 
not aligned with the Government view will always struggle to achieve decisional influence. Fifth, Wynne 
pointed to the juridicial-rational style of reasoning that dominates in such processes at the expense of 
other forms of argument. Sixth and finally, Wolsink drew attention to the closure performed by 
delegitimising public views by miscategorising them as nimbyism.  
The present study represents an opportunity to assess whether these or similar forms of closure are 
curtailing expert and public participation in contemporary planning processes over fracking. As already 
suggested, this study has a different focus to that of Wolsink, being more interested in the mechanisms 
through which arguments are rejected, rather than the miscategorisation of publics and their arguments 
used to rationalise such closure. It also does not attempt to assess material inequalities between parties 
participating in the process. Instead, it assesses, in a sense, inequalities in the treatment of arguments 
within the decision-making process. In addition, Wynne’s focus on styles of reasoning is not repeated 
here, with the focus instead being primarily on more procedural forms of closure. However, the forms of 
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closure relating to investigatory capacity and scrutiny of technical claims, deference to the policy and 
views of Government, the ‘compartmentalisation’ of issues and oversight, and the procedural exclusion 
of matters as beyond the scope of the inquiry will all be returned to in the discussion in the light of the 
analysis reported in chapter 5. 
 2.3.3 PA RTI CIP ATIO N I N T H E P LA NNIN G  OF SH ALE D EV ELOP MENT   
 
This review started by considering the diverse ways in which different groups frame fracking, and 
established a concern over the marginalisation of sceptical public frames and views from formal 
processes of policy-making and regulatory decision-making. We have just seen various ways in which 
contrary expert and public views have been involved but neutered through the design and conduct of 
participatory opportunities in the planning system. The ‘framing fracking’ literature establishes a 
divergence in the framing of fracking between the institutional actors who are promoting and 
overseeing shale development, and some of the publics they are attempting to persuade. The ‘closure 
through planning’ literature demonstrated that planning decisions are susceptible to the processes of 
justification discussed by Stirling, and detailed various forms of closure through such processes might 
operate. In short, they together locate planning decision-making processes on shale gas development as 
potentially fertile ground for the study of the production of justification through the closure-oriented 
conditioning of such processes. A handful of studies have already covered related ground, albeit from 
slightly different perspectives, and are considered next.              
In a particularly relevant paper Chris Hilson conducts an assessment of the capacity of both the EAs 
environmental permitting regime and the planning system’s development control regime to 
accommodate the key frames of the anti-fracking movement (Hilson 2015). Hilson identifies two key 
‘scalar frames’ amongst anti-fracking campaigners – local frames emphasising local environmental risk 
and global frames focusing on impacts on global climate change – as well as a ‘novelty’ frame 
emphasising fracking as a new and exceptional process. Hilson then examines whether these frames can 
“be heard and considered in the decision-making process” of the English planning and regulatory system 
(Hilson 2015, 186).  
Hilson notes that, whilst Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs) are required to consider both 
indirect and direct impacts of a fracking proposal on both the local environment and health and the 
global climate, there are two elements of policy that may prevent planning processes from 
accommodating the global anti-fracking frame. First, Hilson suggests that it is unclear for the purposes 
of an EIA whether the term ‘indirect’ includes the eventual use of produced gas as a fuel or is limited to 
off-site emissions used in the production and transport of goods used or disposal of waste generated 
on-site. Second, and less ambiguously, it seems clear that exploratory applications cannot take the 
global climate frame into account because any impact on the global climate, including potentially the 
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gas’ ultimate use as a fuel, are primarily associated with the production phase of operations which 
policy makes clear should be applied for and appraised as a subsequent and separate process (see DCLG 
2012, 36, para. 147; see also DCLG 2014, no pagination, para. 27–120).  
The second point regarding the phase-by-phase organisation of planning oversight of shale gas 
development will be returned to in the empirical chapters, and is a key part of one of the ‘forms of 
closure’ presented in chapter 5. The first has subsequently been clarified by a High Court ruling in the 
case between FoE and Frack Free Ryedale and North Yorkshire County Council (FoE/FFR vs. NYCC, Justice 
Lang 2016) over the latter’s granting of planning permission to the company Third Energy for their KMA 
site near Kirby Misperton, North Yorkshire. One of the grounds of appeal was that NYCC failed to take 
into account the end-use emissions of the gas as a fuel8. Briefly put, indirect effects can in principle be 
considered by planning processes depending on the details of the case, but the emissions as a result of 
the end use of gas as a fuel is unlikely to be such a ‘reasonably required’ indirect effect, primarily 
because they have already been overseen and accounted for by the EA in their permitting of the power 
station (see Justice Lang 2016). 
Turning from EIAs to the Planning Practice Guidance on minerals (PPGM), Hilson notes that many issues 
related to the oppositional local frame are to be considered by planning decision-makers. However, 
there a matters relating to well construction and the control of processes or emissions that are the 
responsibility of specialist regulatory regimes (the Health and Safety Executive – HSE - and the EA 
respectively) which planning should assume will operate effectively (see DCLG 2012, 29, para. 122; see 
also DCLG 2014, no pagination, para. 27–112). Moving onto the global climate change frame, Hilson 
observes that the PPGM prevents planning authorities from taking into account key elements of this 
frame. At paragraph 124, the guidance states that “planning authorities should take account of 
Government energy policy, which makes it clear that energy supplies should come from a variety of 
sources” (DCLG 2014, no pagination, para. 27–124). 
 As Hilson concludes: 
“This clearly rules out (at any stage) consideration by MPAs [Mineral Planning Authority, the 
county council in most cases] of the 'eventual use' type of indirect climate change impacts of 
shale gas adverted to above in discussing EIA/ERA. They have to assume that energy supplies 
from all sources are equally valid and they are not permitted to consider the reduced 
greenhouse gas potential of alternative supplies such as renewables or ('demand') of energy 
efficiency measures” (Hilson 2015, 196). 
Hilson finds a similar unreceptiveness to the indirect ‘end-use’ element of the oppositional global frame 
in the EAs environmental permitting regime, suggesting that this is because this argument “calls into 
question government energy choices which are regarded as off-limits for the Agency” (Hilson 2015, 
202). 
                                                                
8 Third Energy were applying for planning permission for production phase operations at KMA in order to supply 
their own nearby gas-fired power station at Knapton.   
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In summary, Hilson suggests that both the planning and EA regimes have limits on the extent to which 
they can consider the global climate frame. He suggests that although the regimes can register 
argument concerning direct and some indirect climate emissions, the receptiveness of both to “indirect 
‘final fuel use’ emissions from the production stage appears to be at best unclear and, at worst, 
completely excluded insofar as this might be taken to call into question national government policy 
choices on energy” (Hilson 2015, 202). Hilson’s findings regarding planning are based on an assessment 
of EIA regulations and planning policy rather than how that policy is interpreted and implemented at the 
decision-making ‘coalface’. His findings on the environmental permitting side are based on two early 
decisions, as well as the draft decisions for the two sites focused on in this study. The present study 
represents a good opportunity to see if these largely anticipatory, in principle expectations about the 
ability of regulatory decision-making processes to accommodate key fracking-sceptical frames are borne 
out in practice.  
Cotton suggests that the ‘all out for shale’ policy position adopted by all of the last three UK 
governments has been a significant driver of UK planning reform (Cotton 2017). He locates that reform 
within the same recent tradition of the Planning Act 2008, the Localism Act 2011, and most recently the 
Infrastructure Act 2015, towards streamlining and centralising planning decision-making. Cotton in 
particular makes reference to the power of the SoS for Communities and Local Government to call-in 
planning applications and recover planning appeals (see DCLG/DECC 2015), the latter of which occurred 
in the case considered in this study. Taking an explicitly normative position that affected communities 
and publics should have the opportunity to participate in decision-making processes, which require their 
informed consent, Cotton considers moves to curtail opportunities for local deliberation and decision-
making control as a form of procedural injustice. 
Cotton’s interest, then, in planning processes on shale is in the extent of local community access to and 
control over decisions. The present study focuses on the forms of closure through which public and 
expert participation is circumscribed, and how these forms of closure render the process insensitive to 
certain arguments and matters of concern. In other words, how access is granted but control far from 
ceded. More specifically it highlights how ‘control’ is to a great extent situated in the broader policy 
context within which a local planning decision exists – particularly in this case the development of 
planning and other relevant Government policy. If not total control, then certainly potentially critical 
conditioning influence is situated at the level of national energy and planning policy formulation with 
few routes for meaningful public participation. Any public access to decision processes downstream 
from this is then highly constrained by these prior, remote and largely inaccessible national policy 
commitments.       
Whitton et al. assess and compare opportunities for public participation in the US and UK (Whitton et al. 
2017). In the UK, Whitton et al. focus on a shale wealth fund consultation document (SWF) which sets 
out a vision for the sharing of the economic benefits of shale development with local communities (see 
HM Treasury 2016). The document makes a clear rhetorical commitment to local participation in 
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decisions over funding allocation and the spending of proceeds, as well as on decision-making more 
broadly. They therefore focus on opportunities for participation on decision-making over benefit 
distribution rather than key prior areas of decision-making such as siting and technology and energy 
choice. The present study seeks to ask how public participation in decision-making one step back 
upstream is circumscribed by the conditioning of planning processes (i.e. over the siting of shale 
development rather than the distribution of benefits once potentially produced by those sites). 
Furthermore, Whitton et al.’s analysis is limited to an analysis of the prospective participatory rhetoric 
adopted in a consultation document and so they have relatively little to say about the authenticity of 
the participatory opportunity. The present study analyses the actual treatment of participants and their 
arguments in a planning decision-making process. Whitton et al. make some more generic normative 
claims about the importance of authentic public participation in decision-making for securing the social 
license to operate and producing environmentally just decisions, and suggest that failing to do so 
“would likely lead to public opposition, political controversy and eventual planning failure” (Whitton et 
al. 2017, 17). Finally, they claim that:  
“[T]here needs to be adequate public engagement in the processes of assessing both the social 
and ethical viability of shale gas as a fuel and a technological solution to energy security, 
climate change and economic growth (a participatory technology assessment process), and for 
siting new shale gas installations downstream at the point of siting actual fracking wells. If this 
is not observed, then decision-making will solely reflect the choices of central, institutional 
actors rather than those that are directly affected” (Whitton et al. 2017, 17). 
The present study can be seen as an assessment of whether the rhetorical commitment to the 
importance of public participation that Whitton et al. identify in the SWF consultation document 
translates in practice to meaningful opportunities for participation in planning decision-making. As 
already suggested, the discussion will also address the question of the relationship between 
unresponsiveness to public arguments at the level of downstream planning siting decisions and the prior 
national policy level energy and technology choice commitments already made by the UK Government 
on shale development and fracking.       
Finally, Stokes assesses the regulatory strategies employed by the UK Government over shale 
development and fracking. Stokes identifies two regulatory strategies working in tandem to enable and 
justify shale development in the UK which she terms ‘regulatory domain’ and ‘regulatory dexterity’. 
Regulatory domain frames hydraulic fracturing as a regulatory object that is mundane and only 
incrementally different from prior and more familiar forms of development (i.e. conventional onshore 
oil and gas extraction). As such, the regulatory focus is on the coverage of fracking by generic existing 
regulation, which is then taken to reflect the adequacy and efficacy of that existing regulation and so the 
lack of need for reforms. The image portrayed is one of reassuring regulatory comprehensiveness and 
control. Stokes demonstrates how the framing of fracking as an unexceptional regulatory object and the 
attendant satisfaction with existing regulation is largely selectively applied to matters of health, safety 
and the environment. In other words, areas relevant to the potential negative impacts of fracking. The 
envisaged benefits, on the other hand, are treated quite differently with fracking viewed as an exciting, 
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novel, and even revolutionary innovation requiring an approach of ‘regulatory dexterity’ to unlock them. 
As opposed to the satisfaction with broad, generic coverage in the domain approach, the dexterity 
approach identifies specific parts of the regulatory landscape that interfere with, or are insufficiently 
encouraging to the development of a shale industry. Areas where the dexterity approach has been 
applied include planning, finance and land access where regulation has been added or changed in order 
to produce an environment conducive to the speedy development of an industry (Stokes 2016).  
Stokes stresses that these two distinct approaches work in tandem in several ways. The selective 
application of dexterity to realise benefits is in part justified by the approach of domain which promises 
that risks are covered, and the two approaches help to mask the other’s weaknesses. Stokes also 
suggests that debate over regulation is flattened, “and fracking becomes difficult to contest on grounds 
that are not in some way answerable to domain or dexterity” (Stokes 2016, 984). Attempts to shift the 
debate to public participation in decision-making or human rights, Stokes suggests, are stymied as the 
dexterity and domain approaches ‘form the regulatory whole’ (Stokes 2016, 984). Finally, both work to 
encourage development in their inversely selective application. Domain is used the prevent burdensome 
extra regulation of risk, whereas dexterity enables new regulation or the amendment of existing 
regulation in order to encourage and remove obstacles to the realisation of benefits.  
Stokes concludes that: 
“Legal interpretation, therefore, can impact significantly on the nature and viability of 
particular technological choices – law is not a neutral arbiter of technological outcomes, since 
‘domain’ and ‘dexterity’ promote a particular technological trajectory as though there are no 
sound alternatives. Their straightjacketing effect needs to be subject to critical scrutiny” (Stokes 
2016, 985). 
Stokes repeats the need for further research, suggesting that “the normative pull of ‘domain’ and 
‘dexterity’ towards a particular technological end, deserves closer attention than they have recently 
found” (Stokes 2016, 986). 
Stokes demonstrates how particular framings of fracking as an object of regulation shape the regulation 
of that object towards operating as a tool for rather than bulwark against the emergence of a shale gas 
industry. Stokes makes clear that the selective application of domain and dexterity to risk normalisation 
and benefit realisation respectively is an intentional choice of Government and results in a normative 
pull towards the establishment of a shale industry. The present study will shed light on some of the 
consequences for planning decision-making that filter down from the utilisation of these regulatory 
strategies. Stokes briefly touches upon some of these when listing a series of examples of domain non-
interventions and dexterity interventions in planning policy and law. For instance, the domain approach 
to the risks of fracking leads to “deference to existing rules and suppositions of efficacy” being built into 
the regulatory structure to some degree (Stokes 2016, 973). Stokes points to the example of the 
assumption of effective regulation enshrined in planning policy (see DCLG 2012, 29, para. 122; see also 
DCLG 2014, no pagination, para. 27–112). This assumption of regulatory competence and the deference 
it requires from planning decision makers is explored in section 5.3 below as the key basis of a form of 
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closure I term ‘horizontal deference’. On the dextrous side, Stokes mentions the recovery and call-in 
powers already discussed (DCLG/DECC 2015). In short, the present study is an opportunity to explore 
the consequences of the strategies highlighted by Stokes at the ‘coalface’ of planning development 
control. 
In sum, work on the planning and regulation of shale development exhibits a concern over the extent to 
which certain sceptical frames and local publics are accommodated within and are able to influence 
decisions. Whitton et al. note a rhetorical commitment to public participation on decisions over benefit 
distribution and more broadly that they argue will have to be maintained and put into practice in order 
to avoid a deepening of controversy and local resistance to sites. Cotton argues that local community 
access to and control over decision-making are necessary for environmentally just shale development, 
but notes that planning reform by recent Governments has tended to travel in the opposite direction 
toward centralisation. Hilson’s assessment anticipates that planning decision processes will be 
unreceptive to key elements of the global climate frame of fracking opponents. Finally, Stokes identifies 
a ‘normative pull’ toward shale development as a result of two distinct strategies of regulation working 
selectively and in concert, as well as noting some implications of this that filter through to planning 
decision-making. So far, therefore, there has been some normative argument on the importance of 
public participation in decision-making, as well as some assessment of opportunities for such 
participation. This work has so far tended to overlook the fine-detail of how participating publics and 
their arguments are treated in practice within participatory settings, as well as the full-scale and specific 
mechanisms of the constraining influence of prior commitments at the broader level of Government 
policy. Furthermore, the focus has tended to be on public participation, with conditioning influences 
curtailing the role of expertise and scientific knowledge in decision-making largely overlooked. Stokes’ 
approach is slightly different, instead focusing on two distinct strategies of regulation and how in the 
case of fracking their selective use gears the regulatory task toward risk normalisation and benefit 
realisation resulting in a ‘normative pull’ toward shale development. The present study fleshes out how 
these regulatory strategies filter through to and shape planning decision-making processes, which in 
turn further entrench the normative pull toward shale development – or as this study terms it the 
production of justification for shale development - by closing-down opportunities for and receptiveness 
to sceptical publics and analysis.  
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2.4 THEORY, CONCEPTS AND LITERATURE SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
This chapter started by considering three normative theories of decision-making and their critiques. Two 
consistent concerns were identified. First, the potentially illegitimate and distorting role of power in 
decision-making was identified as a key concern because the regulation of power was a central purpose 
of these models’ normative prescriptions. Second, possible frontstage/backstage dynamics between the 
actual basis of selection and the subsequent process of decision justification were also identified as a 
key concern. A recurring concern amongst critics was that as well as failing to provide effective bulwarks 
against power, these models could operate as tools for power by offering powerful interests misleading 
‘presentational’ means of justification for preferred outcomes actually selected for typically less 
acceptable reasons. The exception here was the partisan model, though only through attempting to 
legitimise dubious means of decision selection, whilst offering no viable means of public justification. 
Section 2.2 then turned to the concept of justification. Two varying approaches to that concept were 
explored. First, the approach to justification as a ‘constraining force’ was considered through the work 
of Boltanski and Thevenot. Next, the work of Stirling was the focus in an elaboration of the view of 
justification as a political resource or tool. It was argued that the key theoretical concerns established in 
section 2.1 necessitated adopting this latter, more sceptical conceptualisation. Most importantly, the 
apparent unwillingness to grant actors the capacity to act strategically in situations of public decision-
making rendered Boltanski and Thevenot’s account both unduly restrictive to analysis and politically 
naive. Stirling’s alternative, on the other hand, holds open the possibility of a role for both strategic 
action and inadvertent biases in decision-making; offers an account of how justification as a tool or 
political resource is produced through the conditioning of analytic and participatory appraisal processes; 
and, finally, clarifies that such processes can be undertaken and presented in ways that acknowledge 
and interrogate (‘opening up’) rather than conceal and reify (‘closing down’) such susceptibilities. 
Finally, section 2.3 surveyed the relevant literatures. The literature on ‘framing fracking’ demonstrates 
the diversity of ways that fracking is framed by distinct groups, and many authors point to divergence 
between the views of policy and industry actors on the one hand and publics on the other. This 
divergence gives rise to concerns over the extent to which decision-making processes marginalise or 
accommodate and address public views. The ‘closure through planning’ literature highlights several 
forms of closure that have prevented both public and expert arguments from being voiced or taken 
seriously within planning appraisal processes, which in many cases were as a result argued to be geared 
towards the legitimation of particular forms of development. The literature considered in section 2.3.3 
bridges these two sets of insights by considering the necessity and capacity of planning and regulatory 
appraisal processes on fracking in the UK to accommodate sceptical public views. As already noted, 
though, this work has tended to overlook the fine-detail of how participating publics and their 
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arguments are treated in practice within such processes, the extent and mechanisms of the crucial 
influence of prior commitments at the broader level of Government policy, and the treatment of experts 
and their arguments in such processes.             
The subsequent empirical chapters of this thesis therefore follow on from the theoretical concerns, 
conceptual commitments, and existing insights and remaining gaps in the relevant literature established 
throughout this chapter. As such, of particular interest is the conditioning of planning decision-making 
processes on fracking in the UK and the extent to which they are geared towards opening up specific 
proposals and broader policy to scrutiny and influence from publics and experts. Or, on the other hand, 
whether the participation of these groups is curtailed in such a way as to position these processes as 
sites that enable and justify specific developments and produce justification for Government policy 
more broadly. As will be detailed in the following chapter, these questions will be explored through the 
case of the company Cuadrilla’s applications to drill and frack a total of eight wells at two sites in the 
Fylde region of Lancashire. Of particular empirical focus will be the planning inquiry held to consider 
Cuadrilla’s appeals against LCC’s initial rejection of these applications, and the participation and 
treatment of the arguments of the environmental NGO FoE throughout that process. 
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3. METHODOLOGY 
 
The previous chapter established planning decision-making over shale development in the UK as fertile 
ground for generating insights into the production of justification through the closure-oriented design 
and conduct of decision-making. Section 3.1 of this chapter starts by setting out how this case came to 
be studied and the rationale behind the field-site selection (i.e. the inquiry). Also included is a brief 
guide to the inquiry. In the following section, the concept of retroduction is introduced and then my 
particular approach to retroductive explanation and theory extension is presented. Leaving the theory of 
method, 3.3 covers the practice of method. Included here are sub-sections on both the methods of data 
collection and the approach to analysis. Finally, the process through which the study’s research 
questions were both developed and answered is summarised, and the research questions formally 
stated. 
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3.1 THE FIELD-SITE 
 
The research process began with an ‘intrinsic interest’ in the fracking controversy (Stake 2008). An initial 
research design dependant on the emergence of a physical field-site of protest within the fieldwork time 
window (early 2016) had to be revised due to delays in fracking companies receiving planning 
permission for projects throughout 2015. In particular, LCC somewhat unexpectedly refused Cuadrilla 
permission for the PNR site in June 2015 against the recommendation of their planning officer. There 
were also delays in the planning process for sites belonging to the companies Third Energy and IGas 
around this time. These sites of protest would of course eventually materialise in 2017. However, for the 
duration of my fieldwork period the fracking controversy had become stuck in the planning system. 
What emerged instead of field-sites of protest during this period therefore were field-sites of planning 
and regulatory decision-making and public and expert participation therein. The most extensive of these 
decision-making processes during this period was the public inquiry over Cuadrilla’s appeal against LCC’s 
decisions to refuse their sites at PNR and RW planning permission, which took place in February and 
March 2016. Although some general themes of interest carried over from the previous iteration of the 
research design (such as an interest in public participation in socio-technical controversies), fieldwork 
was approached with an open mind and a largely blank slate (i.e. with little thematic or theoretico-
explanatory pre-specification) and conceptual and analytic development took place subsequently.  
The major rule 6 parties at the inquiry were Cuadrilla (the Appellent), the North and Western Lancashire 
Chamber of Commerce (CoC, both in favour of the appeals), LCC (defending their initial decision to 
refuse), and the local community groups Preston New Road Action Group (PNRAG) and Roseacre 
Awareness Group (RAG, all against the appeals). Rule 6 parties are interested parties with a substantive 
case and rule 6 status is granted on request by the Planning Inspectorate  (The Planning Inspectorate 
2016). Each of these groups puts together a case across various issues based around the evidence of 
expert witnesses. The main issues covered at the inquiry were noise, traffic and highway safety, 
landscape and visual Impact, climate change, waste management, public health, economic impacts, and 
the correct planning approach to decision-taking. Prior to the inquiry each witness submitted their case 
in writing in a document referred to as a Proof of Evidence (PoE). PoEs set out a view as to the 
acceptability of the proposal and expressed the grounds on which this view was based. Witnesses also 
had the opportunity to rebut the Proofs of rival witnesses. 
The inquiry was held in a conference room within the stadium of Blackpool Football Club. The rule 6 
parties were arranged in a horse-shoe shape with the Inspector sat at the top, the parties in favour of 
the appeals to one side, and those against to the other. Immediately either side of the Inspector were 
two tables where witnesses would sit when they took the stand, when they would sit on the far side 
from whoever was questioning them at the time. Opposite the Inspector were rows of seating from 
which an audience of interested members of the public, the media and the odd PhD student could 
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observe proceedings. Each rule 6 party employed a barrister and legal teams of varying sizes (with the 
exception of the CoC who made do with a lay advocate). It was these barristers in combination with the 
expert witnesses who produced the vast majority of the content of the inquiry. The inquiry began with 
each barrister reading out their party’s Opening Statement – their case as it stood on day one of the 
inquiry. Then came the main body of the inquiry which involved each party, one-by-one, calling their 
witnesses to put their case. Each witness went through several stages. First, Evidence in Chief (EiC) saw a 
witness’ own barrister ask them to state the key points of their case. Second, Cross-examination saw 
hostile questioning from barristers of parties who had a different view from the witness on a particular 
point. For instance, Cuadrilla’s planning witness, Mark Smith, faced cross-examination from the 
barristers of LCC, PNRAG, RAG and FoE. However, not all of these barristers were interested in the same 
issues. PNRAG focused on the PNR site and RAG the Roseacre site, whereas FoE focused on distinct 
issues. In a third stage of proceedings that was in truth rarely taken up, interested persons in the public 
audience who had registered an interest to speak were invited to ask a relevant question of the witness 
if their point had not already been put by one of the barristers in the course of cross-examination. The 
fourth stage of Re-examination saw the witness’ own barrister re-question them with a view to clarifying 
answers that might not have been clear in the heat of cross-examination. In the final stage of the main 
body of the inquiry, Inspector’s Questions, the Inspector directly asked the witness questions. This 
entire process was then repeated for each witness. At the end of the inquiry each party’s barrister 
presented their Closing Statement – their case as it stood at the culmination of proceedings. Four public 
sessions were also held where interested members of the public could make a representation before 
the Inspector. These slots were limited to five minutes, and these sessions have not been focused on 
here. Subsequent to the inquiry, the Inspector considered her recommendation and compiled her 
report, which was submitted to the SoS by a deadline of July 4 2016. The SoS then made his decision, 
which was published along with the Inspectors report on October 6 2016 (see DCLG 2016; McKay 2016).      
Table 2: The inquiry protagonists relevant to the issues focused on here 
Planning Inspector  Wendy Mackay 
LCC’s planning officer for initial decision  Stuart Perigo 
Cuadrilla 
Barrister Natalie Lieven QC 
Planning expert witness Mark Smith 
FoE 
Barrister Estelle Dehon 
Planning expert witness Richard Bate 
Climate Change expert witness Professor Kevin Anderson 
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Waste Management expert witness Alan Watson 
Public Health expert witness Dr David McCoy 
LCC 
Barrister Alun Evans 
Planning expert witness Katie Atkinson 
CoC 
Advocate Peter Whitehead 
Economic impact expert witness Babs Murphy   
The decision was to be taken in accordance with the development plan unless material considerations 
indicated otherwise, as enshrined in section 38(6) of the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004 
(HM Government 2004). In this case the ‘development plan’ was comprised of a suite of local policy, 
namely the Joint Lancashire Minerals and Waste Development Framework Core Strategy DPD (The Joint 
Advisory Committee for Strategic Planning: Lancashire County Council; Blackpool Council; Blackburn 
with Darwen Council 2009), the Joint Lancashire Minerals and Waste Local Plan Site Allocation and 
Development Management Policies (The Joint Advisory Committee for Strategic Planning: Lancashire 
County Council; Blackpool Council; Blackburn with Darwen Council 2013a; The Joint Advisory Committee 
for Strategic Planning: Lancashire County Council; Blackpool Council; Blackburn with Darwen Council 
2013b) and the Fylde Borough Local Plan (Fylde Borough Council 2005). In the event, Cuadrilla did argue, 
unsuccessfully, that material considerations indicated that the decision should not be made in 
accordance with the development plan but directly with the National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF) 
instead. However, this procedural argument had no bearing on the issues considered here and so the 
reader will be spared the detail. Decision-taking is a matter of assessing whether the proposed 
development is in accordance with the prescriptions of the development plan and whether material 
considerations support or militate against the granting of permission. Material considerations are 
‘weighed’ through a heuristic method known as the ‘planning balance’ whereby considerations are 
found to be weighing in favour of or against the development and given a notional weight. For instance, 
in the case of PNR, the SoS found that the national need for shale gas exploration was a factor of ‘great 
weight’ in favour of the proposals whilst the modest local economic benefits were attributed ‘little 
positive weight’ (DCLG 2016).  
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3.2 THEORY OF METHOD 3.2.1 RET ROD U CTIO N 
 
In spite of the relatively linear way it has been presented here, the research process was in fact highly 
iterative with the theoretical concerns, and conceptual and analytic approaches developed largely after, 
and in part stemming out of the fieldwork. In other words, the sequence of research did not fall neatly 
into a deductive form – the identification of literature gaps and theoretical interests, the development 
of research questions, then entering the field followed by analysis and writing. Instead, the sequencing 
and rhythms of this research more closely resembled an approach to research known as either 
‘abductive’ or ‘retroductive’. The purpose of structuring and presenting the thesis in a more 
conventional sequence is not to mislead, but simply for clarity of argument. This sequencing of the 
research process was, in truth, dictated by events as much as being the product of design. However, the 
‘retroductive’ approach detailed in this section is in any event my preferred approach to research.         
In setting out their ‘retroductive’ approach to developing and testing critical explanations of the social 
and political, Glynos and Howarth begin from a critique of positivism in the social sciences (Glynos and 
Howarth 2007). Their issue here is with any straightforward transposition of deductive reasoning, the 
hypothetico-deductive method of scientific investigation, and the covering-law model of explanation 
from the natural to the social sciences. The starting point for their scepticism is the failure of social 
scientists to predict major social, economic and political events. Glynos and Howarth problematise, 
therefore, the central and elevated position of prediction in deductive reasoning and the law-like 
approach to explanation when it comes to studying social and political phenomena. In an idealised 
model of science, prediction plays a crucial role in justifying theories and explaining facts. Put simply, 
theories are corroborated or falsified by deducing predictions from them and testing these expectations 
against empirical observation, and these observations are explained wherever they conform to law-like 
expectations derived from theory. Explanation and prediction differ only in terms of whether we stand 
before or after the fact (i.e. a prediction is a proto-explanation awaiting corroboration, an explanation is 
a prediction that held). The task of explanation in the natural sciences is thus preoccupied with the 
context of justification. That is, the rigorous testing of a theory-derived hypothesis against empirical 
observation, where corroboration of law-like statements amounts to explanation. The important 
question is therefore not ‘how did you find your theory?’, which on this view of science is irrelevant, but 
‘how did you test your theory?’ (Popper 1961). 
What is neglected therefore is the question of where theories come from, or the context of discovery. In 
fact, the deductive account tends to view discovery as a matter of psychology (Popper 1980, 31), or 
serendipity. How the theory arises (discovery) is subordinated to its rigorous testing through the 
scientific method (justification). In the natural sciences, theory construction has been associated with 
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retroductive reasoning by some. For the American pragmatist philosophers of science, Norwood Hanson 
and Charles Sanders Pierce, casting theory construction as a-rational as Popper does is not satisfactory.  
They instead suggest that theory-construction in the natural sciences occurs through ‘retroduction’ (or 
‘abduction’), which Pierce describes as a matter of “studying facts and devising a theory to explain 
them” (Pierce 1934, 145). Theory building, Hanson suggests, starts from data and sets about the struggle 
for intelligibility from there (Hanson 1961). Retroductive reasoning, in other words, starts with empirical 
observation and then works backwards in the search for plausible hypotheses. Retroduction is therefore 
problem-driven in the sense that it begins with surprising (i.e. not predicted) empirical observations that 
call for explanation and theorising. Put another way, the task of explanation necessarily entails new 
theorising because the surprising fact is not covered by existing theory-derived predictions (hence the 
need for a new explanation). Once retroduced in this way, a theory’s explanatory power is then tested 
through deduction. As already seen, theories explain phenomena to the extent that expectations 
deduced from them predict those phenomena (the covering-law model of explanation). In this way, 
testing theories and explaining remain tied to prediction, and retroduction is limited to constructing 
theory. As Glynos and Howarth put it, “a positivist conception of testing and explanation is committed 
to the ideal that a hypothesis is detachable from the context of its discovery, enabling efforts to be 
directed primarily at the context of its justification” (Glynos and Howarth 2007, 35). 
Glynos and Howarth extend this notion of retroduction along two dimensions. First, they seek to extend 
retroduction’s utility from the task of building theory and the context of discovery to the task of 
explanation and the context of justification (i.e. testing and accepting hypotheses). Second, they seek to 
extend its relevance to social and political inquiry. They suggest that “the form of reasoning involved in 
positing a hypothesis and the form of reasoning involved in accepting a hypothesis cannot be 
differentiated so starkly in the a social science context” (Glynos and Howarth 2007, 27). This, according 
to Glynos and Howarth, is because of “the centrality of self-interpretations in the social world; the 
relevance of context in attributing sense and significance to data against which hypotheses are tested; 
as well as the contestability of the ontological presuppositions necessarily brought to bear when self-
interpretations and data are subjected to interpretation” (Glynos and Howarth 2007, 36). In other 
words, any attempt to explain an actor’s behaviour in a given situation necessarily makes a series of 
assumptions about how the actor themselves interprets that situation, and there may well be a diversity 
of equally reasonable ways of interpreting the same situation based on various positions and 
worldviews. Given the variable, evolving and complex nature of social contexts, no theory can be 
expected to cover the full range of these interpretive possibilities. Theory is likely to be especially 
neglectful of this full range of interpretive possibilities where theory construction has largely been a 
matter personal intuition on the part of the researcher (as in the case of the deductive view in the 
natural sciences). 
Instead of the stark separation of the contexts of justification and discovery, Glynos and Howarth argue 
for three moments of social science practice linked together in a recursive cycle, where the boundary 
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between discovery and justification is scrambled. They are: ‘problematisation’; ‘retroductive explanation 
and theory construction’; and ‘persuasion and intervention’ (Glynos and Howarth 2007). For Glynos and 
Howarth retroduction begins with a confounding or problematic situation - an observed anomaly which 
begs inquiry and explanation. It is therefore problem-driven and backwards working (when compared to 
‘positivist’ deduction which goes the other way, from theory to observation). The initial observation of 
an anomalous or unintelligible phenomena kick-starts a recursive ‘circle’. As Glynos and Howarth put it: 
“Work is then started on furnishing an explanation that can render the recalcitrant 
phenomenon more intelligible. This process is understood in terms of the logic of retroductive 
explanation and theory construction, which involves a to-and-fro movement between the 
phenomena investigated and the various explanations that are proffered. In this way, an 
initially chaotic set of concepts, logics, empirical data, self-interpretations, and so on, at varying 
levels of abstraction, are welded together, so as to produce an account which, if it removes our 
initial confusion, can constitute a legitimate candidate for truth or falsity” (Glynos and Howarth 
2007, 34) 
The task of explanation is to render a confounding situation more intelligible in comparison to existing 
explanations. An explanation is valid if it produces insights and greater illumination according to criteria 
(e.g. concerning evidence, consistency, exhaustiveness, etc.) where these criteria are themselves 
contestable. Testing the validity of explanations also encompasses practices of persuasion aimed at both 
the scholarly community and the actors being studied. Unlike the deductive approach then, where 
testing is a matter of falsifying or corroborating theory-derived predictions, testing becomes a matter of 
whether the explanation renders the situation more intelligible, not only in accordance with the 
researcher’s internal criteria but to external audiences too. Finally, the subject matter of this persuasion 
extends beyond the explanation itself to also include how the problem was characterised, and so 
implicating practices of discovery (problematisation, theorising) in processes of testing and persuasion. 
Figure 1: Post-positivist retroduction (adapted from Glynos and Howarth, 2007) 
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For Glynos and Howarth this means that justification is no longer merely a methodological issue (how 
did you test your theory?) but now potentially covers ontological, political and ethical issues as well. 
These attempts at persuasion are both instrumental and constitutive. In other words, the purpose is to 
persuade audiences that the explanation is correct, but any failed attempt at persuasion can result in a 
recasting of the problem, a theoretical revision, or a new awareness of an actor’s interpretative 
viewpoint not previously considered, which can then be fed back into another circumnavigation around 
the retroductive circle. In this way, the tasks of building theory and deriving and testing explanations are 
no longer neatly separated and sequenced, but are now scrambled and shot through a recursive process 
(see figure 1).  
In sum then, the process of research starts with an empirical problem that the researcher casts in a 
particular way and sets about trying to explain. This task of explanation involves a cycle of to-and-fro 
movements between theory and the empirical case. Candidate or proto-explanations can be extracted 
from theoretical insights and academic literature or come from the case itself. Testing these proto-
explanations involves assessing the extent to which they render the situation more intelligible against 
internal and external checks. The problematisation and theorisation that led to the explanations also 
require justification. Finally, any testing and persuasion failures furnish the research process with 
insights to feed back into the cycle. The previously separate contexts are now scrambled as the question 
‘how did you find your theory?’ requires an answer and the empirical case becomes a potential source of 
theoretical discovery rather than merely a yardstick against which to test predictions. Retroduction, in 
Glynos and Howarth’s hands, becomes a method for recursively developing and testing explanations of 
the social and political. The expectation is that the first few attempts at explanation will fail, which will 
give rise to new problematisation and theorising. In this way, a recalcitrant situation goes in, and an 
explanation that renders it more intelligible comes out. For this reason, Glynos and Howarth’s term 
‘retroductive circle’ is potentially misleading given that the aim is not to end up in the same position one 
started in (with an unintelligible problem). The desired movement is arguably more accurately described 
as a spiral.  
Having set out the process of retroductive explanation, Glynos and Howarth are relatively permissive 
about the possible content of explanations. They suggest that these explanations may involve 
contextualised self-interpretations (e.g. hermeneutics), causal mechanisms (e.g. critical realism) or logics 
(their own poststructuralist unit of explanation). In fact, the only rule is that explanations cannot 
accommodate entities that entail universal subsumption. In their words, explanations that aspire “to 
maximise the context-free status of causal laws (by discovering or approximating ‘natural laws of 
society’) or empirical generalizations (by transforming them into ‘probabalistic generalizations of 
society’, whether causal or correlational)” (Glynos and Howarth 2007, 41). 
 3.2.2 MY  A PPR OA CH 
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The key attraction of retroduction is its recursive nature. The assumption is that proto-explanations will 
be confounded the first few times around by failing to account for the situation against internal criteria 
or failing to persuade external audiences thus giving rise to new theory building more attuned to the 
context. Glynos and Howarth are not explicit about retroduction tending toward more context-attuned 
theorising and explanation. However, this seems a likely consequence of their approach especially 
where actor self-interpretations yield explanations or failed attempts to persuade a studied community 
give rise to a new round of problematisation and theorising. This suggests that the process spirals in 
towards producing better, more context-attuned explanations in a centrifugal movement. What I take 
from Glynos and Howarth’s retroduction is the recursive to-and-fro between heterogeneous elements - 
existing theory, case details and actor interpretations, failed proto-explanations, and new problem 
framing and theorising - honing in toward an explanation that renders the situation more intelligible and 
more context-attuned, refined theory. 
It should be noted that the approach taken here represents a marginal variation of Glynos and 
Howarth’s approach in a couple of ways. First, the hermeneutic insight and the self-interpretations of 
actors are less central here. The central task of the thesis became accounting for the near total failure of 
FoE’s case at the inquiry. Of course, the perceptions of the actors involved over why FoE’s arguments 
failed would have yielded interesting material, but this was not relevant to the focus here. As well as the 
clearly identifiable instrumental outcome of the decision, the focus here was on the expressive side of 
public decision-making. That is, the publicly viewable demonstration of good decision-making in action. 
As such, what mattered here was explaining the failure of FoE’s arguments as it was publicly on display, 
rather than garnering actor self-interpretations on why or how this had happened. This remoteness of 
self-interpretations to the focus of the study was reinforced by the type of forum being studied, and in 
particular the style of speech therein. The formal, disciplined and precise form of discourse at the 
inquiry left relatively little bandwidth for interpretative plurality, and where such scope did exist any 
difference in interpretation between parties (say, over the meaning of a passage of policy) was rendered 
explicit for all to see. Part of the point of cross-examination is to clarify the disagreement between 
parties. The hermeneutic minimum requirement (that the self-interpretations of actors should be taken 
into account) has therefore not been violated but for the reasons given here actor self-interpretations 
take a back-seat. The relevant self-interpretations here are the case that FoE considered persuasive or 
worth voicing, the difference in views with rival parties highlighted through cross-examination, and the 
judgements of the Inspector and SoS over who won the argument. In other words, what matters here is 
the relevant parties’ cases and the decision reasoning as stated, and not the actor reflections on the 
process that might have been gleaned through interviewing.  
Second, the approach taken here is more tilted to generating an explanation than building theory. The 
study has occurred at a relatively shallow level of abstraction. Therefore, although the study has been 
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inspired by and made use of theory as a key input to the retroduction of an explanation, the notion that 
this study has ‘built theory’ is somewhat grandiose. The key theoretical insight influencing the research 
comes from Stirling’s conceptualisation of justification. The approach has been more to extend or build 
on this insight, rather than construct theory in any more expansive fashion. By theory extension I mean 
taking a conceptual insight abstracted from a particular case or at least with a particular empirical 
context in mind and testing whether it is productively illuminating in a different case. The ‘foreign’ 
insight is translated to other contexts to see if it guides and informs the generation of an explanation if 
only as a starting point on the way to a more context-attuned explanation. The expectation is that as 
well as the insight helping to render the situation more intelligible, the translation of the insight to a 
new context will entail an at least partial transformation of the insight. In other words, putting the 
insight to work in a new context will likely ‘extend’ it in various ways. The point then is to put relevant 
‘foreign’ insights ‘at risk’ in an encounter with a new context to see both whether it helps to render the 
situation more intelligible and whether exposing it to a new empirical context necessitates the 
modification or qualification of the insight itself. Therefore, the process produces both an explanation 
inspired by both theory and empirical details and ‘extended’ or ‘translated’ (and thus partially 
transformed), more context-attended theoretical insights. These extended theoretical insights might 
possibly be subsequently translated or extended to other contexts or cases as the process starts afresh. 
The ways in which the concept of justification can be said to have been ‘extended’ as a result of being 
put to work in this particular case are discussed in section 6.2 of the discussion. 
Third, and related to the above, there is a slight difference in emphasis when it comes to the approach 
to theory and theorising taken here. The role of the normative decision-making theories reviewed in 
section 2.1 has been to highlight consistent academic concerns over decision-making, which in turn led 
to a sceptical conceptualisation of justification (section 2.2.2). The role of what has here been called 
theory (the normative models of decision-making) was neither theoretico-explanatory nor foundational-
evaluative. In other words, the reviewed models did not directly contribute towards the generation of 
an explanation and nor were they used as a normative foundation against which to assess decision-
making. The purpose of these models was to guide the framing of the research problem and so help to 
justify the task of problematisation. The role of theory here has therefore been more akin to that of a 
‘guidebook’. That is, it helped to direct and bound the focus of inquiry towards what was interesting and 
important in the case and the questions that ought to be asked of it. In this case, theory pointed 
towards the regulation of power, interests and strategy, and scope for frontstage-backstage dynamics in 
decision-making. This contribution to problematisation also informed the particular conceptualisation of 
justification adopted here. It is Stirling’s rendering of justification, which has been referred to as a 
concept here, that has acted as theory does in Glynos and Howarth’s postpositivist take on the 
theoretico-explanatory role of theory. In other words, it has gone beyond the identification of broader 
interests and ‘problems’ to furnish the analysis presented here with the explanatory resources to render 
FoE’s failure more intelligible. 
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The structure of the thesis potentially gives the impression that this problematisation and theorising 
occurred in a bloc and prior to fieldwork, but, as has already been said, this was not the case. The 
identification of consistent anxieties over the regulation of power, interests and strategy and 
frontstage/backstage dynamics in the theoretical debates and the commitment to a sceptical 
conceptualisation of justification all occurred after fieldwork. This theoretical and conceptual 
development occurred in a dialectic with my initial and emerging interpretations of the empirical 
material through which proto-problematisations and –explanations were cycled through. Initial 
problematisations were driven by the vague question ‘what is interesting or problematic here?’ and 
eventually honed-in on the question of the near total failure of FoE’s case having gone through several 
revisions. In other words, the theoretical interests and conceptual commitments were shaped by early 
engagement with the empirical material, and subsequent analysis of that material was then shaped by 
those interests and commitments.    
Fourth, the concept of a ‘case’, only briefly touched upon in Glynos and Howarth’s account, plays an 
important role here. Their discussion of testing explanations occurs at a largely abstract level and 
possibly overlooks the extent to which a particular empirical context or case can influence and inform 
the retroductive cycle in ways not quite captured in their discussion of actor self-interpretations. This 
role of concrete contextual detail is better captured in the methodological theorising of Bent Flyvbjerg 
(Flyvbjerg 2001; Flyvbjerg 2006). Flyvbjerg’s positive advocacy for ‘phronetic’ social science – much like 
Glynos and Howarth – starts with a critique of ‘epistemic’ social science (understood strictly as rule-
based, context-independent, ‘explanatory’ and predictive). Flyvbjerg’s phronetic approach is geared 
more towards understanding and learning than ‘explanation’ (in the positivist version of the term 
Flyvbjerg problematises). Flyvbjerg’s approach privileges particular contexts over the abstract or general 
and aims at stimulating broader reflection on questions of power, values and direction rather than 
making predictions.  
The notion of the ‘case’ is central to his approach. Case studies, according to Flyvbjerg, can enable a 
researcher to “”close-in” on real-life situations and test views directly in relation to phenomena as they 
unfold in practice” forcing researchers to revise “preconceived views, assumptions, concepts and 
hypotheses” (Flyvbjerg 2001, 82). What emerges from the process for Flyvbjerg would not be ‘theory’ or 
‘explanation’ but learning, reflection and understanding, though I sense Flyvbjerg would not object to 
Glynos and Howarth’s post-positivist notion of explanation as rendering a situation more intelligible. 
Flyvbjerg’s call for a ‘closeness’ to the empirical details of the case fits in nicely with the retroductive 
approach in ways not fully emphasised by Glynos and Howarth. Although they talk of a to-and-fro 
movement between theorising and testing, Glynos and Howarth are not clear about the to-and-fro 
movement between abstract insights and case details this entails. The case is not only a problematic 
situation requiring explanation but a key resource for the generation of that explanation. Case details 
are the yardstick against which the explanation will be tested (are they rendered intelligible?), and a 
reservoir of insights to feed into problematisation and theorising. Furthermore, it is the interaction 
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between theoretical insight and case detail that produces the explanation. That is, the testing of 
whether the insight productively illuminates the situation, and the extension or adjustment of the 
insight where it doesn’t quite fit with the fine-grain detail of the new context. In other words, not only is 
the case crucial to both discovery and justification, it is also crucial to the process of deriving a context-
attuned explanation from a ‘foreign’ insight.    
Fifth and finally, testing was largely introspective and so did not involve practices of external persuasion. 
This is not necessarily an unacceptable violation given that Glynos and Howarth give the impression that 
these practices of persuasion – whether to an academic audience or the actors being studied – do not 
have to occur within each research project but could occur over a longer time-frame. For example, one 
of the primary mechanisms for presenting explanations to the scholarly community for testing and 
persuasion is through the publication of work. This, of course, typically occurs at the end of the process 
but could still yield insights that might be fed back into problematisation and retroductive theory 
building and explanation in future projects. Hence retroduction, including practices of persuasion, might 
span several research projects rather than necessarily being neatly contained within projects. This 
means, in other words, that practices of external persuasion do not necessarily need to have occurred at 
the point of presenting this thesis. The testing of the explanation presented here against internal criteria 
will be discussed in section 6.4 below, as will the problematisation and theoretical commitments 
underpinning it.  
The process of arriving at the analysis presenting in this thesis through the modification of Glynos and 
Howarth’s retroductive approach just presented will be discussed in section 3.3.2 below. This will 
involve an account of the various revisions to the way the research problem was constructed, the 
various sources of insight that fed into theory extension and explanation generation, and the iterative 
process of refining research questions in response to the testing of early proto-explanations.   
In sum, Glynos and Howarth transform retroduction as they transpose it from natural to social science. 
Most notably they extend retroduction from being limited to the generation of theory and hypotheses 
(‘the context of discovery’), as it conventionally is in the natural sciences, to also being implicated in 
testing the explanatory power of that theory in specific situations (‘the context of justification’), 
scrambling these two contexts in the process. Theorising and building on the one hand, and explaining 
and testing on the other, now go together, with theorising tested as it is built and every failed test giving 
rise to a new round of building. The approach taken here differs in emphasis if not kind in a couple of 
ways to Glynos and Howarth. First, the self-interpretations of actors are important but only in the 
relatively specific ways discussed as a consequence of both the framing of the problem and the details 
of the case. Second, the approach is primarily geared toward the generation of an explanation, and has 
a secondary interest in ‘theory extension’. Third, there is a distinction between what has here been 
referred to as theory – which guided and justifies problematisation – and what has been referred as a 
conceptual insight – which was the theoretical input to the retroduction of an explanation. Fourth, the 
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notion of the case, and the role of case details in justification, discovery and deriving a context-attuned 
explanation from a ‘foreign’ insight was emphasised. Fifth and finally, the exclusively internal approach 
to testing was defended.       
 
  
74 
 
 
 
3.3 PRACTICE OF METHOD 3.3.1 METHO D S  
The practical methods of data collection employed were simply those that allowed the arguments, 
treatment and fate of FoE’s case to be followed. This involved participant observation, video analysis 
and document analysis. The inquiry was held in Blackpool between Tuesday 9 February and Wednesday 
16 March 2016 and was attended in full. During the inquiry, time-stamped notes were taken on the key 
points of the parties’ cases as proceedings unfolded. Audio recordings of the proceedings were captured 
by myself. Cuadrilla arranged for a video feed of the inquiry to be livestreamed over the internet and 
these recordings were downloaded and kept for analysis. After the inquiry, notes were consolidated into 
an outline of the case of each party and the key arguments over each issue. After the analytic approach 
to explaining the failure of FoE was settled on (see the following section for an account of how this was 
arrived at) the time-stamped notes were used to identify all relevant periods of the proceedings where 
the issues of climate change, public health, waste and economic impacts were debated. All of these 
sections were then watched back. Using Nvivo the videos were selectively transcribed, with key 
passages being transcribed verbatim and in full and less significant sections summarised in note form.  
Documents were then put together that charted the entire debate over each of the issues focused on, 
where each issue was split into sub-issues covering three identified levels of debate – procedural, 
epistemic, and substantive (although not all issues entailed debate at all three levels). These began with 
the planning inspector’s report to the LCC committee that initially rejected the applications at the end of 
June 2015. Following this, the arguments of the relevant parties on the particular issue from their pre-
inquiry documentation were summarised. This included the PoEs of each of the relevant party’s 
witnesses, as well as these witnesses’ rebuttals of each other’s proofs. Then, the particular issue-
relevant arguments from each party’s opening statement at the inquiry were covered. Following this 
were the selectively transcribed passages and notes from the video recordings (the back-up audio 
recordings had to be relied upon in a couple of cases where the sound quality of the video recording 
was too poor, in one case where there had been an error in downloading the video, and in one case 
where there was a gap in coverage of the inquiry between the end of one video and the beginning of the 
next). Finally, after the closing statements of each party, the Inspector’s recommendation and reasoning 
and the SoS’s decision were summarised.    
Wherever oral or written evidence made reference to an external document, the relevant section of 
that document was also analysed. In other words, the bounding of relevance of documents was largely 
carried out by the inquiry participates themselves. In some cases document analysis went beyond this 
inquiry-set boundary – particularly in the case of the epistemic contests over the estimates of both 
methane emissions and flowback fluid volumes. This was because it became clear that the inquiry had 
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not scrutinised these issues closely therefore necessitating an assessment of the detail that had been 
overlooked by this cursoriness. This also reflected the fact that whilst substantive contests hinged on the 
Inspector’s judgement of the balance of the evidence before the inquiry, and procedural contests 
referred to intentionally highly codified and authoritative documents (e.g. planning policy), these 
epistemic contests referred to the altogether messier and more contradictory worlds of academic 
climatic and geological science literatures.      
The purpose of these summaries was to establish precisely what each party argued, how they stated 
their case, and how they responded to their rivals’ arguments; and to chart how the debate over the 
issue unfolded throughout the inquiry. Each of these summaries was then written up into a descriptive 
account of how each issue was debated and resolved by the inquiry. These descriptive accounts 
ultimately became chapter 4 of this thesis.     
This combination of naturalistic methods was deemed to be sufficient for the purposes of this research 
without the need for triangulation with other methods, for instance interviews with those involved in 
the process studied. This is connected to the point in the previous section about actor self-
interpretations. The focus here is on how FoE’s case was dismissed by the Inspector and the largely 
procedural mechanisms through which this closure was achieved.  Therefore, participant ideas about 
why FoE’s case failed of the sort that could be generated through interviewing were not necessary. The 
case that FoE thought worth attending the inquiry to voice and the explicit reasoning of the Inspector in 
rejecting this case were sufficient for this study’s focus.      3.3.2 AN A LY SI S  
 
Defining the near total failure of FoE’s case as the research problem requiring explanation was the 
culmination of a process of retroductive reasoning as described earlier in this chapter. As such, the 
analytic approach went through several revisions. Arriving at FoE’s failure, of course, was only possible 
subsequent to the publication of the SoS’s decision and Inspector’s report on October 6th 2016, because 
prior to that it was not known that FoE had indeed failed.  
The entire backstory of the cycles of research problem framing and explanation generation and testing 
will not be fully restaged here as a full account would run to several pages and involve the repetitive 
description of a series of marginal revisions. The key shifts, though, will be briefly documented. The 
interest in the concept of justification was initially explored shortly after the conclusion of the inquiry 
and was spurred on by the initial impression that depending on the Inspector’s judgement, there was 
scope to defend both allowing and dismissing the appeal. Stirling’s approach to the concept of 
justification allowed processes of appraisal to be seen as potentially the means to produce justification 
for particular outcomes, and described the mechanisms through which this can occur (the design, 
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implementation and interpretation of such processes). Already at this point initial impressions of the 
empirical material made it obvious that if the Inspector was going to side with Cuadrilla on the issues 
that FoE pursued at the inquiry then this would likely entail procedural closure. These initial impressions 
highlighted, for example, the possibility of deferring to the Government view on the climate 
sustainability of shale gas, assuming consummate future regulation of public health, and defining waste 
as a matter for the EA.  
Initially then, at this pre-decision stage, the key questions were about the possible grounds on which 
resolutions might hinge (e.g. procedural materiality or epistemic credibility) and how the broader design 
and structure of planning oversight in general might shape the issues and debates that could be 
accommodated. In other words, I was interested in the grounds on which an argument might be 
accepted or rejected and how this might be shaped by the rules and norms of the process. To reiterate, 
the view was that depending on the particular interpretation of policy or evidence there was scope for 
the Inspector to resolve many arguments either way. A conceptual repertoire of terms began to emerge 
in order to describe the treatment of arguments – ‘claims’ or ‘arguments’ were put forward by parties as 
part of a ‘contest’ with rival parties which called upon an ‘adjudicator’ to ‘resolve’ which arguments 
would succeed or fail. Linking this back to the interest in Stirling’s work was the suspicion – shared by 
many participates at the inquiry at the time – that the prospects of success or failure at the inquiry (of 
claims and arguments but also cases and parties more broadly) might be conditioned in various ways. At 
this point, prior to the Inspector’s reasoning and the decision being known there was also an interest in 
the inquiry’s capacity for ‘opening up’. Also at this point, the work of Boltanski and Thevenot was 
engaged with but rejected as the conceptualisation of justification to be used here for the reasons 
detailed in section 2.2. 
An early iteration of the research questions drew an analytic distinction between the closure of 
arguments as determined by policy (e.g. particularly clear policy prescriptions such as the phase-by-
phase approach to oversight) and the closure of arguments through agency, discretion and, in some 
sense, choice (e.g. the judgement over the reliability of emissions estimates or the interpretation of a 
more ambiguous passage of policy). The key analytic-interpretative question became ‘why do 
arguments succeed or fail?’ An early working idea of the candidate answers to this question involved a 
distinction between arguments being successful because they were the better argument or because 
broader contextual factors led them to be seen as preferable (see, for instance, Pellizzoni 2001). A since 
dropped proto-concept ‘arbitrariness’ was used to try and capture the discretionary power to choose 
felt to be at play in the second above form of closure and its susceptibility to processes of justification in 
Stirling’s sense. At this point the review of the normative theories of decision-making which ultimately 
resulted in section 2.2 of this thesis was conducted. Initially, the purpose here was to harvest a series of 
candidate answers to the question of why particular arguments should or do succeed in influencing 
decisions.      
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The decision was published in October 2016 at which point much of this early, and by definition, 
speculative analytical development was thrown into sharper focus. The candidate answers harvested 
from the theoretical review were found to be largely unsatisfactory in accounting for the success or 
failure of arguments and a series of more in vivo candidate answers were developed. The normative 
theories of decision-making were then positioned as locating an interest in the role of power, strategy 
and frontstage/backstage dynamics in decision-making. Some of these in vivo candidate answers were 
derived directly from the overt reasoning of the Inspector. For example, the Inspector explicitly stating 
that an argument fails because it contradicts policy led to the candidate explanation that arguments 
would succeed or fail because of their consistency with policy. Some of these candidate answers were 
based on more inchoate and covert dynamics interpreted as being at play. In retrospect the 
overt/covert distinction was unhelpful. What, however, had started to be identified was that the failure 
of arguments was overwhelmingly the result of procedural immateriality and achieved through various 
means of procedural closure. In fact, it was rare that the Inspector would make a judgement over 
empirical claims. In other words, the story of the inquiry was largely about the procedural avoidance of 
considering certain arguments and matters of concern.  
Much like in the quote from Glynos and Howarth above, this “chaotic set of concepts, logics, empirical 
data, self-interpretations, and so on” (Glynos and Howarth 2007, 34) were consolidated into an account 
of why arguments succeeded and failed at the inquiry. These various lenses, proto-insights, concepts, 
and empirical details were tested against a selection of intuitively interesting details of the inquiry in an 
attempt to align, nest or discount the various strands of analysis into a more coherent account. Five 
arguments and their resolutions were chosen in order to test the emerging explanations (a mix of 
particular issues and broader, cross-cutting procedural arguments). At this stage it was noticed that key 
forms of procedural closure were ‘vertical deference’ and ‘horizontal deference’, as well as that when 
empirical claims were considered by the Inspector there were early signs of an apparent reticence to 
problematise Cuadrilla’s estimates (which would become ‘selective scepticism and credulity’).  
At this point I began the process of writing up a descriptive account of the chosen key arguments. A 
clearer sense of the bounding of the most relevant empirical material emerged through this process. 
The four issues of climate change, public health, waste, and economic impacts were settled on, and the 
thesis became about the failure of FoE at the inquiry. The rationale here was threefold. First, this gave 
the bounding of the relevant issues a nice symmetry as it restricted my focus to the issues contested by 
FoE. Second, these issues all involved procedural arguments over whether they were relevant and so 
revealed much more about what has come to be a primary focus of the thesis – the way the planning 
appraisal of fracking is restricted through procedural closure. In other words, nobody doubts that the 
local issues raised by other parties at the inquiry (noise, traffic, landscape) are planning issues and so 
there is no layer of argumentation concerning the scope of inquiry’s remit in their deliberation. Third, by 
this point it was already clear that presenting the arguments at the inquiry with sufficient attention to 
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detail was highly space consuming and that covering any further ground would result in a thesis of 
excessive length.  
As will be discussed in the following section, a refined set of research questions was now comprised of 
two descriptive questions, an analytic question and a conceptual question. The two descriptive 
questions, answered in chapter 4 below, simply invite a description of the arguments made by parties 
on the chosen issues and an account of which succeeded and failed. The analytic question, answered in 
chapter 5 below, asks why FoE’s arguments fail. In answer to this question I present four forms of 
closure - namely double compartmentalisation, horizontal and vertical deference, and selective 
scepticism and credulity. Finally, the conceptual question, engaged with in section 6.2, then orientates 
focus back to the conceptual interest in justification and invites reflection on the ‘extension’ of Stirling’s 
work.  
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3.4 SUMMARY AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
In sum then, the literature reviewed in the previous chapter highlighted planning decision-making on 
shale gas in the UK as potentially fertile ground for studying forms of closure curtailing the role of expert 
and public participation in decision-making in ways geared towards the production of justification for a 
particular form of development. The present chapter went on to detail how the conceptual and 
theoretical interests in justification and the role of power in decision-making were identified and 
developed in response to empirical engagement with the inquiry. This occurred through the 
modification of Glynos and Howarth’s notion of ‘retroduction’ presented in this chapter. Furthermore, a 
summary of the process of retroductive reasoning was given. This included the process through which 
the research problem of FoE’s failure at the inquiry was arrived at, the feeding in of various insights from 
the case and academic literature, the proto-explanations that were proposed and revised, and the 
various iterations of the research questions that were cycled through. It is through this process of 
retroductive reasoning that, ultimately, the explanation aimed at rendering a confounding situation 
more intelligible presented here was developed. The rationale behind the field-site selection and the 
methods of data collection have also been discussed. 
Having established the process through which they and their answers were developed, the study’s 
research questions can now be formally stated:  
Research problem – How do we account for the failure of FoE’s case at the inquiry? 
RQ1 – What key arguments are made by parties on the relevant issues? 
RQ2 – Which succeed and fail in influencing the decision? 
RQ3 – Why do arguments succeed or fail?  
RQ4 – What does FoE’s failure at the inquiry reveal about the production of justification through the 
closure-oriented conditioning of planning appraisal? 
As already discussed, the former two research questions are descriptive and will be answered in the rich 
account of inquiry proceedings in the following chapter. Question 3 is analytical and is answered 
through the elaboration of four ‘forms of closure’ in chapter 4. These forms of closure are argued to 
have played a key role in shaping the possibility of arguments succeeding or failing to influence the 
decision. Finally, question 4 turns attention back to the conceptual interest in justification and is 
answered through the discussion in section 6.2. The argument put forward is that these forms of closure 
helped to establish the inquiry as a site for the production of justification for both the specific 
applications in question and shale development more broadly, and a number of insights into and 
‘extensions’ of the concept of justification are elaborated.  
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4. FINDINGS I: DESCRIPTION – THE NEAR TOTAL FAILURE OF FRIENDS OF THE EARTH AT THE INQUIRY 
 
This chapter provides an account of FoE’s participation at the inquiry structured around the four main 
issues on which their case was based - climate change, public health, waste disposal and economic 
impacts. Each issue is in turn split into a number of ‘contests’ – the key procedural, substantive and 
epistemic disagreements on which the issues turned. For each, the key arguments of the relevant rule 6 
parties across the initial LCC decision, pre-inquiry written evidence and the inquiry itself will be 
presented, before considering how the contest is resolved in the Inspector’s recommendation and SoS’s 
decision.      
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4.1 CLIMATE CHANGE 
 
The issue of climate change turned on three key arguments at the inquiry. The first, procedural 
argument concerned the interpretation of the planning policy approach to the Government view on the 
relationship between shale gas and climate change. This view was expressed through a written 
ministerial statement (WMS) given to the House of Commons on September 16 2015 by the then SoS for 
Energy and Climate Change Amber Rudd (DCLG/DECC 2015). The second, substantive argument was 
over the judgement of the acceptability of the impact of the projects’ greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. 
And, finally, the third, epistemic argument concerned whether the emissions estimates on the basis of 
which that impact was assessed were credible. I consider each in turn below, following the contest 
across the various phases of the decision-making process before highlighting the approach taken by the 
Inspector and SoS. 
 4.1.1 CAN  T H E GOV ER NMENT  VI EW O N S HA LE G A S  AN D  CLIMAT E CHA NG E B E QU ESTI ON ED?  
 
The WMS sets out “the Government’s view that there is a national need to explore and develop our 
shale gas and oil resources in a safe, and sustainable and timely way” (DCLG/DECC 2015, no pagination, 
see A1.1.1). It states directly that it should be taken into account in planning decisions. This national 
need arises because “[e]xploring and developing our shale gas and oil resources could potentially bring 
substantial benefits and help meet our objectives for secure energy supplies, economic growth and 
lower carbon emissions” (DCLG/DECC 2015, no pagination). These emissions reductions benefits arise 
because gas provides flexibility and helps “to reduce the use of high-carbon coal” (DCLG/DECC 2015, no 
pagination) and because shale gas “can create a bridge while we develop renewable energy, improve 
energy efficiency and build new nuclear generating capacity” (DCLG/DECC 2015, no pagination).   
 
Pre-inquiry written evidence 
In his PoE, Professor Kevin Anderson, FoE’s climate change expert witness, sets out three headline 
conclusions, the first and third of which relate to the issue of how the inquiry should approach the 
Government view on the relationship between shale gas and climate change. The first states that under 
the existing UK carbon budget gas can only have a marginal and rapidly declining role in generating 
electricity post-2030. The third holds that post-Paris9, there is no viable emissions space within UK 
                                                                
9 The applications were made and initially determined by LCC pre-Paris, however the appeals inquiry was conducted 
in the February and March of 2016, shortly following the COP21 in December 2015 at which Paris was adopted. 
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carbon budgets for shale gas to fulfil even a transitional role (Anderson 2016a, 8–10). Elsewhere in his 
PoE, Anderson suggests that the projects are self-evidently an instrumental step towards a production-
phase, full-scale UK shale gas industry; that Cuadrilla justifies the projects in relation to benefits 
purportedly associated with a production-phase, full-scale industry; and that therefore any reasoned 
analysis of the appropriateness of the projects’ GHG emissions must be set in the context of the 
potential for a role for a UK shale gas industry in meeting the UK’s commitments under Paris (Anderson 
2016a, 9–10). He carries out just such an analysis in his written evidence, leading to his third headline 
conclusion.  
In his written evidence, Cuadrilla’s planning expert Mark Smith sets out Cuadrilla’s case on the issues 
raised by FoE generally. These issues have, he argues: either been assessed to not give rise to 
unacceptable impacts; and/or reliance can be placed on other regulatory regimes to effectively address 
the matter; and/or the issue is not with these applications but with Government policy on shale gas 
(Smith 2016a, 52). Smith then goes on to highlight the support for gas as a part of achieving Government 
commitments on climate change in national policy, referencing in particular the 2011 Carbon Plan and 
the 2015 WMS (Smith 2016a, 54–55).     
In a rebuttal to Anderson’s PoE, Smith suggests that with the exception of his criticism of the projects’ 
emissions estimates (see section 4.1.3 below), the issues raised by Anderson are a matter for national 
policy and not these applications. Quoting the WMS, Smith suggests that the Government position is 
that there is a need for shale gas as part of its policy response to climate change. He makes clear that, 
rather than contest the matter of the relationship between shale gas and UK climate change 
commitments with FoE, Cuadrilla’s approach is to “rely on the Ministerial policy” (Smith 2016b, 3). 
Furthermore, he argues:  
“In the context of the government support for shale gas as part of its response to climate 
change, as set out in the Ministerial Statement, an assessment of climate change implications 
of shale gas development has already been dealt with at the policy level. To debate this issue 
through this inquiry would merely extend the time and scope of the inquiry for no material 
purpose in the decision-making process” (Smith 2016b, 3). 
Adding: 
“Professor Anderson’s analysis and opinions on climate change therefore may provide useful 
information in the future to help shape any changes to policy at a national level. At present 
though national policy is clear and unequivocal, as set out above and in my Proof of Evidence 
that the government recognises that gas (and specifically shale gas) has an important role to 
play in achieving greenhouse gas reductions” (Smith 2016b, 4). 
In his counter-rebuttal to Smith, Anderson reasserts his position on the scope for a UK shale gas industry 
within the constraints of present, and especially expected future carbon budgets: 
“In short, Cuadrilla’s proposal is a non-starter. UK shale gas exploration either will use up an 
unacceptable amount of carbon only to discover that production at scale is not viable; or it will 
discover there can be production at scale, but there is no room in the carbon budget for 
industrial scale fracking. It is the ultimate lose-lose investment, unless the UK chooses to 
renege on its commitments under the Paris Agreement” (Anderson 2016b, 3). 
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Anderson then challenges Smith on two claims made in his written evidence. First, in relation to the 
Carbon Plan (HM Government 2011), Smith makes the claim that these applications are in line with the 
Government strategy to reduce emissions from electricity generation “through increasing the use of gas 
instead of coal” (Smith 2016a, 54; HM Government 2011, 9). Anderson argues that because coal phase-
out is planned to be completed by 2025, by which time a shale gas industry will not be ready at scale, 
and gas has a temporary and diminishing role to play in displacing coal in the UK, “[s]hale gas will not be 
a substitute for coal” (Anderson 2016b, 3). Second, Smith makes the claim that the Government has 
acknowledged that natural gas (including shale gas) has an important role to play in addressing climate 
change “whilst also seeking to ensure the availability of secure, clean and affordable energy” (Smith 
2016a, 55). Anderson suggests that Smith provides no evidence to show that shale gas is secure, clean, 
or affordable, before problematizing all three claims (Anderson 2016a, 15–18; Anderson 2016b, 3–6).        
A final relevant expert witness was Richard Bate, who appeared as FoE’s planning expert. In his written 
evidence to the inquiry he set out the general support in both local and national planning policy, as well 
as in law, for securing a radical reduction in GHG emissions (Bate 2016, 5–9). He concludes that the: 
“[D]etailed effects of the proposed developments on climate change, as established by 
Professor Anderson, would challenge the major national and local planning policy objective of 
securing a radical reduction in greenhouse gas emissions. The exploration drilling appeals 
before the inquiry would do the opposite” (Bate 2016, 11).  
At the point of the inquiry, then, Anderson’s evidence – though he was careful not to couch it in such 
terms – appeared to at the very least clarify the meaning, if not challenge the conclusions of the WMS. 
First, the vague reference to a need for gas ‘for years to come’ was, in the context of the current carbon 
budget, given a specific and relatively tight timeframe. Second, Anderson argued that the WMS’s view 
that there is a role for shale gas in transitioning to a low carbon economy has been subsequently 
rendered unsustainable by Paris. Cuadrilla’s response, through Smith’s written evidence, was that 
Anderson’s evidence concerning the viability of a transitional role for a UK shale gas industry was 
entirely immaterial. They argued that it is the clear government view that shale can play such a role, and 
it is not for this inquiry to question that. In other words, irrespective of its intellectual merits, 
Anderson’s line of argument was procedurally prohibited because it – in spite of Anderson claiming 
otherwise – questioned the view set out in the WMS.  
 
Inquiry proceedings        
In their opening statement at the inquiry, Cuadrilla reiterated their position that - with the exception of 
Anderson’s argument regarding the methane emissions estimate (see section 4.1.3 below)10 - the issues 
raised by Anderson are a matter of national policy, and national policy is presently settled emphatically 
in favour of envisaging a key role for shale gas in the policy response to climate change. “[I]t is the 
                                                                
10 Cuadrilla contest the methane emissions estimate issue at the inquiry because “this was not expressly covered in 
the Ministerial Statement” (Cuadrilla 2016a, 3). 
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Appellant’s absolutely clear view that”, set out their QC Natalie Lieven, “these are not material issues for 
the inquiry; that evidence upon them will not assist you or the Secretary of State; and therefore we do 
not intend to call evidence or make submissions that go beyond the national policy” (Cuadrilla 2016a, 2–
3). 
FoE, in their opening statement, contended that the projects are in breach of the Development Plan 
policy DM2 (see A1.2.1). DM2 provides that development be supported where a decision maker is 
satisfied by the provision of appropriate information that the development makes a positive 
contribution to, among other matters, the reduction of carbon emissions (The Joint Advisory Committee 
for Strategic Planning: Lancashire County Council; Blackpool Council; Blackburn with Darwen Council 
2013b, 10). Estelle Dehon, barrister for FoE, argued that Anderson’s evidence shows that the projects 
will do the opposite of what is required from DM2. The projects also, argued Dehon, fail to comply with 
para. 93 of the NPPF and its requirement for radical reductions in GHG emissions (FoE 2016b; DCLG 
2012, 21–22, see also A1.2.2). Turning to the WMS, Dehon argues that it does not bear the weight 
placed on it by Cuadrilla – it does not create a presumption in favour of these developments, nor 
displace relevant planning policy, nor reduce statutory duties under the Climate Change Act 2008 (FoE 
2016a, 9). 
In Smith’s EiC, Lieven stresses the more recent nature of the (2015) WMS, as opposed to the (2012) 
NPPF, para. 93 of which Dehon ‘placed considerable reliance’ in opening (INQ 9 Feb p3 23.30 - 24.30). 
“In that Ministerial Statement”, she asks Smith, “does the Secretary of State deal with the relationship 
between the extraction and exploration of shale gas and the Government’s climate change 
commitments?” “It does”, replies Smith, pointing to paras. 3 and 8 in his answer (see A1.1.1) (INQ 9 Feb 
p3 24.55 – 25.20). 
In cross-examining Smith, Dehon starts by challenging Cuadrilla’s position that the issues raised at the 
inquiry by FoE are immaterial. A long exchange follows concerning the relationship between para. 93 of 
the NPPF and paras. 3 and 8 of the WMS (see A1.1.1 and A1.2.2) (INQ 10 Feb p1 55.10 – 01.05.00). 
Dehon argues that para. 93 places the GHG emissions of the proposed sites squarely within the inquiry’s 
remit as a material consideration. Smith regularly seeks to return to the WMS to reiterate the (recent) 
Government support for shale gas. His point is that the Government envisages a role for shale gas in 
helping to respond to climate change, and therefore shale gas exploration applications are seen as - in 
general and necessarily - helping to fulfil the objectives of NPPF 93. He at one point questions the need 
for the Environmental Statements’ (ES) GHG emissions estimates in the light of the subsequent WMS 
(i.e. there is no longer a need to consider the amount of CO2e estimated to be emitted by particular 
shale gas sites because, in the Government view, shale gas development is in general an aid to the 
reduction of emissions and the response to climate change – INQ 9 Feb p1 26.00 - 28.40). 
Dehon puts it to Smith that the WMS’s view about what a shale gas industry ‘could potentially’ bring 
about (i.e. helping to tackle climate change, improving energy security) does not prevent a planning 
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decision maker from hearing evidence on the extent to which, under what conditions and within what 
timeframe that could come about. Smith replies that if there was such valid evidence, then that would 
be material and part of a decision maker’s consideration among the other evidence (INQ 10 Feb p2 
02.00 - 11.30). Focusing in on the phrase ‘the longer term’ in the WMS, Dehon puts it to Smith that on 
Anderson’s evidence the longer term would be up until 2025. Smith concedes that “I haven’t got the 
expertise or the knowledge to second guess that” (INQ 10 Feb p2 18.30 – 20.00). Finally, on Paris, Dehon 
asks Smith whether it is a material consideration to which he agrees (INQ 10 Feb p2 24.30 – 25.10).  
Helping Smith clarify his responses in re-examination, Lieven returns to the relationship between NPPF 
93 and the WMS. “To what degree, in your view, does the Ministerial Statement deal with that aspect 
[the role of planning in securing radical reductions in GHG emissions] of the NPPF?”, she asks. Smith 
answers that it confirms the important role shale gas will play in helping secure reductions in GHG 
emissions (INQ 10 Feb p4 2.02.30 – 2.03.15). 
In his EiC, referring to a recent letter from the Committee on Climate Change (CCC) to the SoS for Energy 
and Climate Change setting out an early assessment of the implications of Paris for the proposed fifth 
carbon budget and government policy more broadly11, Anderson picks out their continued advice to 
achieve ‘total [electricity] sector emissions intensity of below 100gCO2/kWh by 2030’ (CCC 2016, no 
pagination). Anderson suggests that this gives us a quantitative definition of low carbon for power 
generation by 2030, whilst pointing out that definition will have to fall again post-2030, with the need 
for an eventually zero carbon energy (not just power) system arising by 2050, if not significantly before 
that. He says natural gas burnt in efficient power stations generates power at 400-450gCO2/kWh (INQ 
26 Feb p1 32.00-35.20). “In terms of what low carbon means from the Committee on Climate Change”, 
asks Dehon, “does it or does it not include shale gas?”. “No, without a doubt, it does not include shale 
gas”, answers Anderson (INQ 26 Feb p1 35.20-36.05).  
Referring to two documents that he co-authored (Broderick et al. 2011; Broderick and Anderson 2012), 
Anderson suggests that shale gas, subject to best practice extraction and combustion, will deliver power 
at lower emissions per unit than is possible with coal. However, he adds two caveats. First, he points to 
uncertainty in the UK over levels of methane emissions. “Talking to my colleagues, who are experts in 
this area”, he says, “they certainly have some reservations about saying that shale gas will necessarily 
deliver lower emissions than coal”. Second, he refers to the ‘announcement from Government to phase 
out coal fired power generation by 2025’, alongside statements from Cuadrilla and others that do not 
anticipate a significant UK ‘shale industry until post-2025’, suggesting that there is therefore little scope 
for substituting coal for shale gas (INQ 26 Feb p1 36.20-44.15).  
This brings Anderson onto the role of shale gas as a ‘bridge’. Here he refers to a recent report from the 
UK Energy Research Centre (UKERC) – in fact it was published during the inquiry – entitled ‘The future 
role of natural gas in the UK’ (McGlade et al. 2016). “I would concur with UKERC”, he says, “that we are 
                                                                
11 ‘Implications of the Paris Agreement for the fifth carbon budget’, 28 Jan 2016 (CCC 2016). 
86 
 
 
 
significantly down that bridge… and that post-2030 we would need to be getting off the other side of 
that bridge”. He adds that the UKERC report is premised on the 4th carbon budget, not Paris or the 
proposed 5th carbon budget, both of which will “make the situation considerably more stringent and 
effectively you’ll have to get off the bridge sooner” (INQ 26 Feb p1 44.30-49.50).  
Lieven begins her cross-examination of Anderson with the WMS. This is the “current ministerial position 
in relation to planning decisions… for exploring for shale gas?”, she asks. Anderson answers that he’s not 
a planning expert and so wouldn’t know if Paris would supersede the WMS. Pointing to the statement 
that access to natural gas is a key requirement if the UK is to successfully transition in the longer term to 
a low carbon economy, she asks, “that was the Government’s position?”. “Yes”, replies Anderson, who 
then focuses in on the ‘for years to come’, suggesting that – interpreting the Governments own 
statements and policies, and their expert advice – this must mean out to about 2030. “So I think”, he 
continues:  
“I’m in full agreement here with the Minister, in that, in years to come, gas will play a role in 
that, but once we get to 2030, that is really very much a pivotal point as we start to rapidly 
ramp-off, ramp away from the use of gas for providing energy, because it is no longer in line 
with our commitments on climate change and therefore that transition to that low carbon 
economy the Minister talks about in that very paragraph” (INQ 1.22.25-1.27.20). 
“Can I just check, Mr Anderson, that you’re really in full agreement with the Minister”, asks Lieven, 
drawing Anderson’s attention to the WMS’s statement that ‘shale gas can create a bridge’. Eventually 
Anderson says that he isn’t in full agreement. There would be five years of opportunity where shale gas 
could play a role, he explains, and “I think we’d all agree”, he ventures slightly optimistically, “if it was 
only for five years, it would be foolhardy to go down a shale gas route”. “Does this statement say that 
the bridge should come to an end by 2030?”, asks Lieven. “No it actually makes no reference to time”, 
responds Anderson. He goes on to suggest that using the CCC’s clear quantitative interpretation of ‘low 
carbon’, along with other official positions and expert advice, you can interpret the length of the bridge 
as to around 2030 (INQ 26 Feb p1 1.27.30-1.32.00). 
Lieven then suggests that the implications of Paris are a matter to be considered by Government. “It 
would be strange to me”, responds Anderson: 
“To think that it is appropriate to focus on a document from the past, given the international 
repercussions of the Paris agreement. I’m a little baffled as to why we would focus on that 
statement [the WMS], given what has happened since”.  
Lieven asks if the Prime Minister’s speech at Paris says anything about shale gas. “No, it does not refer 
specifically to shale gas”, answers Anderson. Furthermore, she asks, “[i]s there any Government policy 
statement, whether from DECC, DCLG, or the PM [Prime Minister], post-Paris, about how to consider 
planning applications for shale gas, or indeed about gas and oil policy generally?”. Anderson is not 
aware of any (INQ 26 Feb p1 1.33.05-1.36.10). 
In re-examination, Dehon turns back once again to the WMS. She draws attention to the three 
conditions of Government support - namely, that exploration and development be conducted in a “safe, 
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and sustainable and timely way” (see A1.1.1, para. 1). She asks Anderson what he understands by these 
conditions. Anderson focuses on ‘sustainable’ and ‘timely’, suggesting that shale development would 
have to be in line with Government commitments on sustainability, including climate change 
commitments, and that it would have to fit into the timeframe we have to address issues of 
sustainability (INQ 26 Feb p1 1.39.05 - 1.46.20).  
In his EiC, Bate sets out the requirement in both local and national policy for the planning system to 
reduce GHG emissions (DM2, NPPF, PPG), as well as the objective, in law, to reduce emissions in the 
Climate Change Act. The combined effect of these policies, he argues, is that local authorities must take 
opportunities for GHG emissions reduction seriously; that decision makers in planning cannot leave 
GHGs for someone else to tackle ‘somewhere else, on another occasion’ (INQ 2 Mar 16.00 – 24.55; Bate, 
2016a: 9-10). 
He then deals with the, at that time, recent decision from the Government to withdraw £1b in funding 
to support Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) projects (DECC 2015). He sets out the importance of CCS in 
establishing compatibility between policy support for gas and climate change obligations. He quotes the 
House of Commons Energy and Climate Change Committee (ECCC) who, in their response to the 
withdrawal, conclude that “[w]ith gas and without CCS, we will not remain on the least cost path to our 
statutory decarbonisation target” (ECCC 2016, 19). The up-shot of this, argues Bate, is that little weight 
can be attached to previous statements made prior to the withdrawal (i.e. the WMS), and indeed to the 
prospect of a significant role for gas in the energy system going forward (INQ 2 Mar p2 24.55 – 36.00).  
Dehon turns to the approach to take to the WMS. Bate states that the WMS does not alter the necessity 
for applications to go through the planning process so as to ensure that they are indeed safe, 
sustainable and timely (mimicking the conditions set out in the WMS) (INQ 2 Mar p2 19.55 – 22.00). 
Dehon then asks what should be taken into account when determining the weight to be afforded to the 
support for shale development set out in the WMS. Bates replies that whilst the WMS is clearly an 
important consideration, two highly significant things have happened subsequently (i.e. Paris, CCS 
withdrawal) that reduce the weight that should be afforded to the Government view set out in it ‘quite 
substantially’ (INQ 2 Mar p2 22.00 – 26.15). 
In cross-examination, Lieven reiterates that the most recent and direct expression of the Government’s 
position on shale gas remains the WMS, and that position is that exploring for shale gas could 
potentially help to lower emissions. Furthermore, she stresses that the Government has not informed 
planning decision makers that their position has changed post-CCS and -Paris. In other words, these 
subsequent events do not undermine the WMS or the support for shale gas it articulates (INQ 2 Mar p2 
26.40 – 42.00). 
In closing, Lieven reiterates that the Government’s position on the relationship between shale gas and 
climate change is made clear in the WMS, which remains a consideration of very great weight in these 
appeals. The Government view is that shale gas has an important role to play in the transition to a low 
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carbon economy (Cuadrilla 2016b). Furthermore, the Government response to Paris and CCS are 
matters for national energy policy and not these appeals. Lieven concludes that “the need for SG [shale 
gas] exploration is set out in very strong terms in national policy, and the potential benefits that SG can 
bring in terms of national economic, energy and climate change and should be given very great weight” 
(Cuadrilla 2016b, 6).  
Dehon, closing for FoE, sets out climate change’s status as a material consideration in these appeals. 
Dehon then sets out what, in her case, as a matter of law is the correct approach to the WMS. The WMS 
sets out, she suggests, the government view of what potentially could be the case and it falls to the 
decision maker to assess, in light of the expert evidence before the inquiry, the weight to be given to 
that view. The question of need is “not predetermined by the government’s view in the WMS” (FoE 
2016b, 6).  As such, Anderson’s expert evidence on the scope for shale gas to act as a bridge is relevant 
to understanding the WMS. The WMS prescribes neither decision outcomes in specific cases, nor the 
weight a decision maker should attach to it, which are instead matters of planning judgement taking 
into account relevant material considerations. Paris and the CCS funding withdrawal are two such 
considerations that substantially reduce the weight to go to the WMS. The WMS does not diminish the 
weight to be given to potential adverse impacts arising from the applications, including on climate 
change; nor does it require permission be granted for shale gas exploration that is not safe, sustainable 
or timely (FoE 2016b). 
At the close of the inquiry, then, the parties disagreed over the approach the decision maker should take 
to the Government view about the relationship between shale gas and climate change. It was Cuadrilla’s 
case that the view set out in the WMS about the role for shale gas in transitioning to a low carbon 
economy was a consideration of great weight. Furthermore, this weight was undiminished by 
subsequent developments concerning Paris and CCS, and any response to those developments, if 
required at all, would be formulated at national policy level and was not a matter for this inquiry. This 
rendered Anderson’s evidence concerning the scope for a UK shale gas industry within the constraints of 
present and future carbon budgets immaterial. These matters would already have been considered in 
formulating the WMS and were not to be re-tread in the decision over these appeals. The Government’s 
view was that shale development would aid the honouring of climate change commitments and this 
inquiry was not the forum to register challenges to that view. FoE argued, on the other hand, that rather 
than being automatically compelled to accept the Government view without considering its merits or 
ongoing relevance, the role of the decision maker was in fact to assess the precise meaning of and 
weight to be given to the WMS on the basis of the expert evidence before them. This would include 
FoE’s arguments on the extent to which there was scope for a shale gas industry within the constraints 
of UK carbon budgets, and the impact of subsequent developments concerning Paris and CCS.          
 
Recommendation and Decision 
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In her report to the SoS, the Inspector, Wendy McKay, concludes that the WMS remains the 
Government’s position on shale gas and that the subsequent issues of CCS and Paris are matters for 
national policy development. The Inspector concludes that for “the purposes of these appeals, the 
analysis should be limited to a consideration of the project emissions during construction, operation and 
decommissioning, together with cumulative impacts as assessed by the ESs within the framework set by 
national and local policies” (McKay 2016, 407). The SoS fully agrees with the Inspector’s reasoning. The 
viability of shale policy in the light of Paris and the CCS withdrawal is a matter for future national policy 
development and not these appeals. The support for shale development set out in the WMS reflects the 
view that it could help achieve lower carbon emissions and help meet the Government’s climate change 
targets. This view is not to be questioned through this forum, and the weight to be attributed to this 
support is not diminished by the issues FoE raises (DCLG 2016). In short, the Government view 
concerning the relationship between shale gas and climate change was placed beyond criticism at the 
inquiry. As such, any evidence that suggested that a shale gas industry and the UK’s climate change 
commitments were not as easily reconcilable as the WMS suggests – the bulk of Anderson’s case - was 
effectively rendered immaterial for contravening the Government position.  4.1.2 AR E TH E P ROJ ECTS’  GHG EMI S SION S A CCEPT A B LE? 
 
Beyond the debate above about the reconcilability of a shale gas industry and the UK’s climate change 
commitments, FoE also argued that the emissions from these two exploration applications in and of 
themselves represented an unjustifiable proportion of the UK’s tight carbon budgets, especially when 
adjusted in anticipation of Paris. 
 
Pre-inquiry written evidence 
In his written evidence to the inquiry, FoE’s climate change expert Anderson draws three headline 
conclusions. The second of which, relevant here, states that the cumulative emissions of both projects 
together for stand-alone, non-productive activities cannot be justified within the tight UK carbon budget 
constraints consistent with the Paris agreement (Anderson 2016a, 8–10). Whilst arguing that Cuadrilla’s 
emissions estimates are likely to be an underestimation (see section 4.1.3 below), Anderson suggests 
that even this, in his view, low estimate represents too high a proportion of the Fylde’s Paris-adjusted 
emissions budget to be acceptable. FoE’s planning expert Bate adds that the effect of national and local 
policy support for radical reductions in GHG emissions is that “[t]he argument cannot be entertained 
that a development’s greenhouse gas emissions amount only to a ‘drop in the ocean’ and therefore be 
given little weight in a decision” (Bate 2016, 10). Cuadrilla’s planning expert Smith, on the other hand, 
states that the cumulative carbon footprint of both exploration sites as assessed in the ESs is “relatively 
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insignificant and accounts for less than 0.002% of the UK Carbon Budget” (Smith 2016a, 53; Arup 2014a, 
123). Smith goes on to judge this to be a “negligible and insignificant impact of the greenhouse gas 
emissions attributable to the sites” (Smith 2016a, 53).    
 
Inquiry proceedings 
In opening, FoE’s barrister Dehon takes issue with Cuadrilla’s argument that the emissions are justified 
because they are a small fraction of the UK carbon budget. FoE label this a ‘drop in the ocean’ argument, 
which they claim is neither cogent, nor in line with planning policy (FoE 2016a). 
In his EiC, Anderson suggests that, by his calculations, the cumulative emissions from both of the 
projects would account for between 5% and 9% of the Fylde’s prorated proportion of the UK’s carbon 
budget over the six years of the projects when adjusted for Paris, or between 0.007-0.01% of the UK’s 
Paris-adjusted budget for the same period. Anderson considers these figures to be very high, and a 
hugely disproportionate allocation of constrained carbon budget to non-productive activities (i.e. 
exploratory). He argues that the 124,000tCo2e high range estimate of emissions for each site in the ESs 
(Arup 2014a, 107) is unjustifiable to undertake exploration for its own sake. This would only be 
justifiable if the proposals were a stepping stone to a shale gas industry - as Anderson suggests is 
obviously the case given that Cuadrilla allude to benefits only associated with production at scale in 
support of the appeals - and then only if that industry would be compatible with present and future 
carbon budgets. Anderson argues that his evidence makes clear that a UK shale gas industry is 
irreconcilable with UK commitments on climate change. In other words, Anderson’s point is that the 
acceptability or otherwise of the emissions can only be fully understood in the context of the 
acceptability of what they are an instrumental step towards (i.e. shale gas production at scale). The 
acceptability of the emissions cannot be judged in isolation without an assessment of the acceptability 
of their purpose (INQ 26 Feb p1 49.50-57.20). 
Closing for FoE, Dehon argues that the emissions as estimated in the ESs are in themselves an 
irresponsible use of the UK’s highly constrained carbon budgets. This situation is only exacerbated when 
budgets are adjusted, as they will have to be, for Paris. The ‘drop in the ocean’ argument is an entirely 
wrongheaded approach that would result in the inability to secure emissions reductions through 
planning. The applications therefore do not comply with DM2, nor para. 93 of the NPPF (FoE 2016b). 
At the close of the inquiry, then, FoE had argued that the projects’ GHG emissions impact was 
unacceptable, especially when anticipating tighter carbon budgets to come post-Paris. Furthermore, 
they argued that the ‘drop in the ocean argument’ could not be entertained by planning decision 
makers. FoE also argued that the acceptability of the emissions impact of these applications could not 
be separated from the question of the acceptability of the emissions of the shale gas industry they are 
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an instrumental step towards. Cuadrilla, for their part, argued that the GHG emissions impact was 
negligible and insignificant.         
 
Recommendation and decision 
In her report to the SoS, the Inspector rejects Anderson’s second headline conclusion, in which he 
judges the emissions of the two sites taken cumulatively to be unjustifiable in the context of Paris. The 
projects would, suggests the Inspector, represent a very small percentage of total emissions whether 
compared at the regional or national level, even in the context of Paris. She concludes that, in “the light 
of the support provided by the national policy for shale gas exploration, I believe that those emissions 
would be entirely reasonable and fully justified” (McKay 2016, 408). As such, she implicitly adopts the 
‘drop in the ocean’ approach FoE criticised. Furthermore, in finding the support in national policy 
relevant to assessing the substantive impact of the GHG emissions of the projects she effectively accepts 
Anderson’s point about only being able to assess the acceptability of emissions in the context of their 
purpose, whilst – as we saw above – refusing to register his problematisation of that purpose.   4.1.3 AR E TH E GHG EMI SSION S  ES TIMAT ES  R ELIA B LE? 
 
FoE not only argued that the emissions estimates in the ESs were unjustifiable on their own terms, but 
also that they were likely to underestimate the true scale of emissions from the sites, rendering the GHG 
emissions impact even less acceptable. 
 
Pre-inquiry written evidence 
In his written evidence to the inquiry, FoE’s climate change expert Anderson expresses concern that 
Cuadrilla’s GHG emissions estimate is likely to underestimate the projects’ emissions, particularly the 
methane emissions (Anderson 2016a, 30–31). Anderson points to uncertainty in the scientific literature 
(Karion et al. 2013; McGlade et al. 2015) about expected levels of leakage and fugitive emissions from 
natural gas production, especially from shale gas. Anderson also criticises Cuadrilla’s use of a Global 
Warming Potential (GWP)12 figure of 25, as opposed to 34 – which he describes as “the latest scientific 
assessment (IPCC AR5) of methane’s global warming potential” (Anderson 2016a, 31).  
                                                                
12GWP conversion rates are used to convert the global warming effect of a given unit of various GHGs into an 
equivalent unit of measurement (CO2e) based on CO2 as a benchmark. In other words, how much more effective as 
a GHG is, in this case, a given unit of methane compared to the same unit of carbon dioxide. GWPs are dynamic 
over time and so change depending on the timescale over which they’re calculated (typically 20 or 100 years).  
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In response, Cuadrilla’s planning expert Smith defers to an appended technical note from a colleague at 
Cuadrilla’s environmental consultants Arup, Gordon Richardson. Unlike Anderson, Richardson did not 
appear at the inquiry and his views were not subjected to cross-examination. The technical note asserts 
that the ES analysis of GHG emissions was “based on reliable figures of GHG emission sources” 
(Richardson 2016, 2). It tells us that for each emission source more than one conversion factor was used, 
‘where possible’, to account for uncertainty associated with the input data. It tells us, furthermore, that 
the source data for their methane estimates comes from a US study (Allen et al. 2013). This study was 
chosen, we’re told, because it focuses on the stage of operations most relevant to these exploratory 
applications – well completion rather than the whole lifecycle of production wells. 27 such completions 
were surveyed across four US shale formations. Finally, the note concludes, that: 
“We (Arup) consider the method and assumptions used and the sources of data to be reliable 
and we therefore disagree with Professor Anderson that we have underestimated methane 
emissions” (Richardson 2016, 4). 
 
Inquiry proceedings 
Opening for Cuadrilla, their QC Lieven suggests that this matter has already been dealt with by the EA’s 
permitting regime, which includes the oversight of emissions to air including the flaring of gas. 
“[N]ational policy is entirely clear”, Lieven argues, “[w]here there is another regulatory regime that 
deals with a matter then the planning decision maker should rely on that regime and assume that it will 
operate appropriately” (Cuadrilla 2016a, 3). Lieven references para. 122 of the NPPF (see A1.2.2), 
‘similar guidance’ in PPGM13, and the ruling of the High Court in the case Frack Free Balcombe v West 
Sussex County Council (FFB vs. WSCC, see Justice Gilbart 2015, see also A1.3.1), before concluding:  
“There is no basis for you or the Secretary of State to go behind those regimes, and do anything 
other than assume that they will operate effectively” (Cuadrilla 2016a, 3). 
In his EiC, Smith summarises the responsibilities of the EA, including “emissions to air”. From his PoE, he 
states that the permits already secured from the EA cover “[t]he incineration by flaring of natural gas 
during the temporary (up to 90 days) testing of gas flow rate from each exploration well” (Smith 2016a, 
44). Finally, he quotes the EA permit decision document, which states:  
“We consider that, in reaching that decision, we have taken into account all relevant 
considerations and legal requirements, and are satisfied that the permit will ensure that a high 
level of protection is provided for the environment and human health” (EA 2015, 8). 
In other words, as well as contesting the content of Anderson’s claim about the underestimation of 
methane emissions in written evidence through Richardson’s note, Cuadrilla also argue – through 
Smith’s evidence – that it is procedurally immaterial to the inquiry. Flaring and emissions to air are 
                                                                
13 For example, paras. 12 and 112 (see A1.2.3) 
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regulated by the EA who should be assumed to operate effectively by planning decision makers, and 
who have already found the proposals – including presumably the emissions estimates - acceptable. 
In his EiC, FoE’s barrister Dehon asks Anderson for his response to Richardson’s technical note. There 
are, he answers at length: 
“Lots of issues around the production of methane from any fossil fuel sector, but particularly 
here from shale gas, and particularly for somewhere like the UK, because we have no 
experience of producing shale gas and it is very different from being in the US. So there will be 
lots of uncertainties…. there are an array of potential sources of methane that could 
themselves be very significant. The problem at the moment is to quantify those accurately is 
not possible. We are still trying to understand the mechanisms. We understand one of the 
mechanisms, that we are fairly confident will lead to some additional leaking of methane into 
the atmoshpere. But we have not been able to quantify that accurately as yet. So I think it is 
very fair to say, that because there are an array of different mechanisms by which… methane 
can enter the atmosphere the estimate in the ES is inevitably conservative. In addition, what 
we call the global warming potential… the estimate of the relative importance of methane in 
the latest IPCC report... in their latest set of reports they've increased the impact of the global 
warming potential - i.e. the impact of methane - to 34 compared with 25 that was used in the 
Environmental Statement. So, our best scientific understanding now is that the impact per 
molecule of methane is higher than we thought before, by a considerable margin, over 40% 
higher. And we're also aware scientifically that there will be… other mechanisms by which 
methane will be released into the atmosphere. So inevitably the Environmental Statement will 
be conservative and will be an underestimate of the methane sources” (INQ 26 Feb p1 1.14.05-
1.18.20). 
In closing, Dehon reiterates Anderson’s argument that the ES emissions estimates are likely to 
underestimate methane emissions from the schemes. His views on this matter, she suggests, are to be 
preferred to the less expert and untested views of Richardson (FoE 2016b, 15).  
By the close of the inquiry, then, FoE argued that the assessment of the GHG impact of the projects was 
likely to underestimate its true scale. They pointed to both scientific uncertainty over expected methane 
emissions from shale gas developments, particularly in the UK, and to the use of a low GWP figure in the 
ESs. Cuadrilla, on the other hand, argued both that these estimates had already been considered and 
found acceptable by the EA and should not be re-assessed through this process; and that, in any event, 
the estimates were indeed reliable.  
 
Recommendation and decision  
In her report to the SoS the Inspector concludes that she is “satisfied that the method and assumptions 
used, and the sources of data referred to, can safely be relied upon and there has been no material 
error in the ES estimate of methane emissions” (McKay 2016, 408). The SoS concurs that there has been 
no material error in the ES’s estimates of methane emissions (DCLG 2016), which are therefore found to 
be epistemically credible.     
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4.2 PUBLIC HEALTH 
 
Dr David McCoy, FoE’s expert witness on public health, helpfully distinguished between the various 
facets of public health at play at the inquiry in his written evidence. ‘Direct impacts’ to human health 
include both impacts from possible pollution to air and water, as well as ‘nuisances’ (i.e. noise, traffic, so 
on). On the other hand, ‘indirect’ impacts are impacts on human health and wellbeing mediated through 
the stress and anxiety caused by public concern and ‘perceptions of risk’. Finally, McCoy also included 
impacts to human health as mediated through both climate change and socio-economic impacts (McCoy 
2016). In what follows I consider potential direct impacts from air- and water-borne pollution and 
‘intermediate’ impacts together under the banner of ‘public health’ (i.e. waste and climate change will 
be dealt with separately, as they were at the inquiry, and nuisances and socio-economic impacts are 
beyond the scope of the present work). 
The issue of public health can be split into four contests: whether the Inspector should simply defer to 
the EA on health matters potentially arising from processes over which they have regulatory 
responsibility (i.e. emissions to air and water); whether the public health risks of a potential production-
phase industry at scale were material; how uncertainty over the public health impacts of fracking should 
be dealt with; and whether, finally, the indirect health risks were acceptable. For each of these 
questions I will provide an account of the parties’ arguments, and the approach adopted by the 
Inspector and SoS.   
 4.2.1 SHO U LD  PLANNI NG  SI MP LY  D EFER  TO  T H E EA’S  OV ER SI GHT  O N  ‘DIR ECT’  RISK S? 
 
The first key matter on public health concerned the extent to which the regulatory capacities of the EA 
could be relied upon by the planning decision maker to oversee any direct risks to public health. In other 
words, was there a role for planning generally and the inquiry specifically in regulating the issue? 
Cuadrilla’s approach was that it was clear that the EA had regulatory responsibility for the potential 
health impacts from pollution to air and water, and that a planning decision maker should assume that 
the EA has regulated and would regulate such matters effectively. It was FoE’s case that the decision 
maker was not forced to ‘irrebutably presume’ the effective operation of other regulatory regimes, and 
thus was still required to satisfy themselves that no unacceptable impacts would arise. In short, then, 
FoE argued for a more interventionist interpretation of planning’s role on matters of regulatory overlap, 
whereas Cuadrilla argued for a more passive or deferential approach.      
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Initial LCC decision 
In their response to the applications initially, FoE raised concerns about the regulatory system. Noting 
the contingency of Public Health England’s (PHE) general expectation of low risk to public health from 
fracking on operations being properly run and regulated (PHE 2014), they point to what they describe as 
Cuadrilla’s ‘very poor track record’ as an operator and self-regulator. They also point to a regulatory 
framework they describe as “inadequate, flawed or ineffectively applied and enforced” (FoE 2014b, no 
pagination, para. 134).  
 
Pre-inquiry written evidence 
McCoy reiterates the point in his written evidence, adding “Public Health England did not assess the 
adequacy of the regulatory system for shale gas exploitation, nor the capacity of regulatory bodies to 
implement regulation effectively and adequately” (McCoy 2016, 12). In other words, PHE do not assess 
whether their condition is likely to be satisfied. FoE’s case going into the inquiry, therefore, was that 
there are reasons to doubt the efficacy of regulation in the UK, and therefore whether PHE’s ‘low risk’ 
assessment holds in practice.  
In contrast, Smith, in his written evidence states that “[w]ith respect to potential public health effects 
for those matters that are the responsibility of other regulatory bodies, reliance should be placed on 
other regulatory regimes to control and manage the operations effectively to ensure that they do not 
cause harm to people or the environment” (Smith 2016a, 58). Smith adds in his rebuttal that: 
“The adequacy of the operations of other (non planning) regulatory regimes are not material to 
the determination of planning applications or any subsequent appeals. The NPPF is unequivocal 
in this respect…” (Smith 2016b, 5). 
He then quotes para. 122 of the NPPF (see A1.2.2). 
Going into the inquiry, then, FoE had sought to question the efficacy of the regulatory system, and also 
therefore to problematise assessments of low risk to public health which assume effective regulation. 
Cuadrilla had in response argued that these concerns were not material considerations because the 
decision maker is explicitly instructed in the NPPF to assume other regulatory regimes will operate 
effectively.    
 
Inquiry proceedings 
In her opening statement Dehon seeks to establish public health as a matter that planning policy 
dictates must be considered by a decision maker. “[A] whole chapter of the NPPF is dedicated to the 
promotion of healthy communities”, she argues, “and paragraph 1 of the PPG on Health and Wellbeing 
mandates local planning authorities to ‘ensure that health and wellbeing… are considered… in planning 
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decision-making’” (FoE 2016a, 8). Furthermore, “[p]ara 144 of the NPPF requires that decision-makers in 
determining applications for mineral development should ensure that there are no unacceptable 
adverse impacts on, amongst other things, human health” (FoE 2016a, 8). Lieven, on the other hand, 
points again to 122 of the NPPF and suggests this approach to other regulatory regimes was upheld by 
the High Court in the case FFB vs. WSCC (see A1.3.1). “These matters”, including impact on health, she 
concludes: 
“[H]ave been dealt with in great detail through the environmental permitting regime, and will 
be subject to intensive monitoring and regulation as part of that regime, if and when the 
proposals are implemented. There is no basis for you or the Secretary of State to go behind 
those regimes, and do anything other than assume that they will operate effectively” (Cuadrilla 
2016a, 3). 
In cross-examination Lieven takes McCoy to his own written evidence where at para 4.18 he states that: 
“The levels of risk to human health that is posed by various potentially hazardous pollutants 
associated with shale gas exploration have been generally assessed to be low or negligible. I 
would tend to agree with this assessment, but only on the assumption of adherence to best 
practice guidance and stringent safety measures (properly enforced)” (McCoy 2016, 15–16). 
Lieven then suggests that in planning terms, the assumption prescribed in NPPF 122 fully resolves 
McCoy’s point here. The Cuadrilla argument here is that concerns about the efficacy of regulation as 
required to ensure low or negligible risk to public health are not an issue with any weight in planning 
terms because NPPF 122 dictates that a decision maker can safely assume the effective operation of 
other regulators. 
In Bate’s EiC, whilst discussing waste but relevant to health too, Dehon draws a distinction between the 
requirement in local policy DM2 to ‘be satisfied’ on the basis of the provision of appropriate information 
and the requirement in NPPF 122 to ‘assume’ the effective operation of other regulatory regimes. 
“What, in planning terms”, asks Dehon “is required to be satisfied by the provision of appropriate 
information?”. “The key phrase”, Bate answers, referring to DM2, “is to the satisfaction of the mineral 
and waste planning authority – that is the criterion, they have to be satisfied that these matters will be 
resolved to the extent that the policy prescribes”. “It [waste, and other impacts with overlap between 
planning and the EA – i.e. risk of pollution to air or water] is very much a planning related issue”, he 
continues, “which has to be addressed in this case ultimately now by the Secretary of State, so that he 
can assure himself… to his satisfaction that these matters specified here have been taken into account” 
(INQ Mar 2 p1 02.37.00 – 02.41.25).   
Dehon then takes Bate to 122 of the NPPF – “What do you have to say in relation to that?”. “I think… to 
understand the NPPF just go back a couple of paragraphs, and start with paragraph 120”, responds Bate. 
Bate then reads 120 (see A1.2.2). “So it’s very clear, in the NPPF, what the starting point is”, continues 
Bate, “that these are matters for the planning authority to address” (INQ Mar 02 p1 02.41.25 - 
02.44.45). 
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Dehon then suggests that the interpretation of the word ‘assume’ in Smith’s evidence comes rather 
close to an ‘irrebuttable presumption’. That, in other words, one assumes it no matter the evidence 
before the inquiry, and indeed the inquiry must ‘close its eyes’ to evidence that questions the merits of 
assuming in this particular case. “How do you understand the term ‘assume’?”, she asks Bate. “I would 
view it as a working assumption”, says Bate - “the difference I have with Mark Smith is that I think 
there’s much more that is actually the province of the planning authority than he does” (INQ Mar 2 p1 
02.44.45 – 02.47.20). 
On health specifically, Bate, reading from his written evidence reiterates the requirements in planning 
policy for decision makers to consider health. This includes local policies CS5 and CS9 with their 
commitment to ensure that “amenity, health, economic well-being and safety of the population are 
protected” (The Joint Advisory Committee for Strategic Planning: Lancashire County Council; Blackpool 
Council; Blackburn with Darwen Council 2009, 30, 51); and para. 144 of the NPPF with its requirement to 
ensure “that there are no unacceptable adverse impacts on… human health” (DCLG 2012, 31) (INQ Mar 
p2 00.10.30 – 00.15.10). 
In cross-examining Bate, Lieven goes back to NPPF 122. The way you ensure there are no unacceptable 
impacts on health from emissions regulated by another regulator (and so satisfy para. 144), suggests 
Lieven, is to consult with that regulator and to take their consultation response into account. Bate 
suggests that Lieven’s argument is rather ‘black-and-white’. “As we saw with wastewater”, he continues, 
“there is scope for particular issues to be in the province of both the specific regulator and the planning 
authority”. “And also”, he adds, “there are general requirements in policy, particularly on health, as with 
waste too, on the planning authority to satisfy themselves that certain requirements are met”. Lieven 
ends the exchange by suggesting that a planning decision maker can ensure there will be no 
unacceptable impacts on health from a matter dealt with by another regime by assuming that regime is 
operating effectively, rather than having to consider each issue itself, to which Bate does not explicitly 
object (INQ Mar 2 p2 – 00.42.50 – 00.46.50). 
In closing, Dehon reasserts health as a matter of planning policy and as a material consideration in these 
decisions (FoE 2016b, 2). On NPPF 122 she reiterates that the ‘assumption’ is not an ‘irrebuttable 
presumption’. Justice Gilbart’s reasoning on FFB vs WSCC (that there is ample authority for the planning 
authority to in its discretion consider that matters could be left to the regulator), she suggests, has the 
obvious corollary that there is a discretion to consider relevant matters which cannot be left to the 
regulator. Lieven, on the other hand, reiterates that direct health effects from pollution of groundwater 
or emissions to air are strictly controlled by the EA, who will ensure there is no impact on human health, 
and the decision maker must assume they will operative effectively (Cuadrilla 2016b, 29). 
Cuadrilla, then, based on NPPF 122, argued that on health impacts arising from processes controlled by 
the EA, the Inspector must defer to their assessment in their permitting decision and more broadly 
assume any risks will be mitigated through effective regulation. In other words, satisfaction on these 
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matters is achieved through deference to the present and future work of the regulator. FoE argued for a 
more active approach to ‘being satisfied’, one in which the assumption of effective operation does not 
close down the discretionary possibility of considering such matters where there is evidence before the 
inquiry of planning issues not addressed by the regulator. In truth, by the close of the inquiry, on health 
(unlike on waste, see section 4.3 below), FoE do not emphatically argue that there are specific reasons 
why planning should not be satisfied that ‘direct’ health impacts from air and water pollution are 
acceptable in this case by merely deferring to the EA (both existing permit decisions and the assumption 
of effective operation going forward) (FoE 2016b, 18–20). Instead, they put forward general claims 
about the need for planning to consider public health and focus on ‘indirect’ impacts (section 4.2.4) and 
‘nuisances’ (not considered here). 
 
Recommendation and decision        
In her report to the SoS, on the question of air and water pollution and the relationship between 
planning and other regulatory regimes, the Inspector resolves that:  
“In the light of para 122 of the NPPF, and the Frack Free Balcombe case, I am content that it 
could be assumed that the regulatory system would operate effectively to control such 
emissions. There would be no health impacts resulting from these matters” (McKay 2016, 403).  
The SoS fully agrees with this approach and so the issue of direct health impacts from emissions to air 
and water is procedurally closed at the inquiry (DCLG 2016).   4.2.2 DO ES S CI ENTI FI C  U NCERT AINT Y  OV ER  DI RECT H EALTH  I MP A CT S NECES SIT AT E A PR ECAU TIONA RY  R EFUS A L?  
Initial LCC decision 
In their response to the applications during LCC’s initial decision, FoE sought to establish the 
precautionary principle as an approach to decision-making in the context of risk and uncertainty 
encouraged by UK planning policy (FoE 2014b). FoE argue for a precautionary approach to be adopted in 
this particular case because there is general uncertainty over the public health impacts of high volume 
hydraulic fracturing (HVHF) in the UK, there are reports of ground and surface water contamination 
from the US, and because of issues of insufficient information on certain matters in Cuadrilla’s 
applications (FoE 2014b). They suggest that adopting a precautionary approach to the matter of the 
potential risk of water-born pollution in this case would entail refusing permission “unless it can be 
proven that there will be no groundwater contamination”, and would mean that known impacts from 
the US and Australia cannot be ignored in decision-making (FoE 2014b, no pagination, para. 1). 
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Pre-inquiry written evidence 
In his written evidence to the inquiry, McCoy highlights the ongoing uncertainty concerning the health 
impacts of HVHF in the UK. He suggests that there are “few robust and long-standing ‘exposure and 
health impact studies’ of HVHF” and rigorous evidence would require costly and complex 
epidemiological studies and require many years to complete (McCoy 2016, 7). Notwithstanding this lack 
of understanding, McCoy points out that the scientific literature is growing rapidly, which he suggests 
now makes the PHE review that Cuadrilla rely on out of date. In response, Cuadrilla’s planning expert 
Smith refers to the ESs, which find impacts on air quality to be insignificant and the risk of water 
contamination as negligible (Arup 2014a).  
 
Inquiry proceedings 
In her opening remarks, barrister for FoE Estelle Dehon again reiterates the uncertainty surrounding the 
public health impacts from shale gas extraction. She suggests that “[t]his uncertainty is in itself a 
material planning consideration” (FoE 2016a, 7), all the more so because of the requirement of local 
policy DM2 for the decision-maker to be satisfied by the provision of appropriate information that all 
harmful impacts of the development can be eliminated or reduced to acceptable levels. FoE’s claim here 
is that the general scientific uncertainty over the health impacts of HVHF means that the Inspector 
cannot be satisfied that public health impacts will be eliminated or reduced, as DM2 demands. On the 
other hand, Cuadrilla point to specific assessments and consultation responses from the likes of the EA 
and PHE (EA 2015; PHE 2014), which find known risks to public health to be low to negligible if 
operations are properly run and regulated, and on the basis of which the Inspector should be satisfied. 
In cross-examination, QC for Cuadrilla Natalie Lieven challenges McCoy on extrapolating from reports 
and studies from the US. She takes McCoy to the PHE report, from which she quotes that “[c]aution is 
required when extrapolating experiences in other countries to the UK since the mode of operation, 
underlying geology and regulatory environment are likely to be different” (PHE 2014, iii). “I would 
assume that you would agree with that?”, she asks. McCoy responds that he does agree, but picks out 
‘caution’ as the key word. “You need to be cautious about applying evidence from elsewhere to the UK 
setting – it doesn’t say that you shouldn’t apply it at all”. He then suggests that some factors, such as 
population density, suggest the risks could be greater in the UK. Lieven then takes him to the Medact 
report (McCoy and Saunders 2015), of which he is a co-author – specifically to the section where the 
various differences between the US and UK are acknowledged (McCoy and Saunders 2015, 26–27). “So 
there’s a whole series of reasons”, she concludes, “why the US and the UK are not the same, in terms of 
risk”. “Exactly”, replies McCoy (INQ Mar 2 p1 01.16.30 – 01.20.30). Returning to the matter in re-
examination, Dehon makes the point that whilst urging caution the PHE report itself relies on the US 
experience to reach its conclusions. In response, McCoy makes a couple of general points about the 
state of scientific evidence linking shale development and health: 
100 
 
 
 
“The first point… is this is still a relatively new activity for which scientific evidence is being 
generated. The second is that there is a large amount of uncertainty in all of this. Uncertainty 
about the potential impacts on health of a variety of hazards, and uncertainty about the extent 
to which shale gas production actually creates human exposure to these potential hazards. 
We’re also seeing, within the evidence, quite varied findings… you have some research that 
shows that there’s very little exposure to potential hazards, [and] other studies that indicate 
that there is potentially significant exposure to hazards… However… independent public health 
people are saying two things. One is that there are clearly signals from the scientific literature 
that suggest that these hazards and the potential impacts of these hazards on human health 
are real and potentially significant. And secondly, we need to proceed with caution. That 
there’s certainly a requirement for more monitoring and evaluation. But, within that body of 
general opinion there’s also a view, in public health, that the signals are enough to suggest that 
we shouldn’t go ahead with shale gas production at all” (INQ Mar 02 p1 01.27.00 – 01.32.00). 
Richard Bate, FoE’s planning expert, is asked in EiC about the relevance in planning policy terms of 
McCoy’s evidence on uncertainty. “To what extent, if any”, asks Dehon, “is that lack of understanding 
relevant in planning policy terms?” “It is relevant” answers Bate. He then suggests that the approach in 
such a context is to put thorough monitoring arrangements in place to improve levels of knowledge; and 
to make a judgement in relation to risk, where, as dictated by DM2, the decision maker must be satisfied 
by the provision of appropriate information that the development will not produce adverse impacts 
(INQ Mar 02 p2 00.15.30 – 00.17.45). 
It is FoE’s case that these ‘signals’, as McCoy puts it, prevent the decision maker from achieving this 
satisfaction and are sufficient to justify a precautionary rejection of these applications on public health 
grounds. They claim the scientific literature primarily on the US is relevant to this decision, and, taken as 
a whole, demonstrates uncertainty over health impacts. It remains Cuadrilla’s case that the relevant 
regulators and consultees have assessed these specific applications and found no significant or 
unacceptable risk to public health, assuming operations are ‘properly run and regulated’. It is these 
assessments, and not ‘signals’ from the US experience, that are relevant to achieving satisfaction 
because of the difficulty in extrapolating from the US. The dispute is therefore over the steps the 
decision maker takes, and places they look, in order to be satisfied that the development will not 
produce unacceptable impacts on human health. FoE suggest the Inspector should take the US 
experience into account, and find the uncertainty over impacts therein a barrier to being satisfied. 
Cuadrilla suggest these signals are irrelevant in the face of the responses to the proposals of the EA and 
PHE, which ought to ensure the Inspector’s satisfaction.  
 
Recommendation and decision  
In her recommendation to the SoS, which on public health the SoS accepts in full, the Inspector notes 
that neither Perigo, nor PHE consider the risk to public health from the applications to be significant or 
unacceptable. On the question of US evidence the Inspector states that “[w]hatever the US experience, 
the regulatory regime in the UK is different” (McKay 2016, 403). Whilst providing no reasoning directly 
on scientific uncertainty over health impacts generally, she therefore concludes that any scientific 
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uncertainty over health impacts in the US is irrelevant. Finally, she concludes: “I am satisfied that the 
Appellants have demonstrated, by the provision of appropriate information, that all potential impacts 
on health and wellbeing associated with the projects would be reduced to an acceptable level” (McKay 
2016, 404).    4.2.3 AR E TH E P U BLI C H EA LT H  RI SK S O F P RO D U CTION-P HA S E,  I ND U ST RY-S CALE FR A CKIN G  MA TERI AL?  
Pre-inquiry written evidence 
In his written evidence McCoy sets out the importance of considering the potential impacts of 
production at scale at the stage of these two exploration applications: 
“These potential impacts of commercial shale gas production at scale are pertinent because 
they contribute to the current and considerable levels of anxiety and stress amongst certain 
communities in Lancashire” (McCoy 2016, 15). 
In other words, the Inquiry ought to consider the likely impacts of a production-phase industry – of the 
sort the Government seeks to encourage – because members of the community are reacting in 
significant part to that very prospect when expressing anxiety and stress over these applications, which 
in turn can cause ‘indirect’ health impacts. McCoy then suggests that the risk to public health is likely to 
be greater for the production phase than for exploration; with the negligible to low risk from water and 
airborne pollutants for these specific applications due to, in part, the temporary and limited nature of 
exploration. McCoy suggests that it is the greater intensity and cumulative nature of health risks from 
production at scale that make it a higher risk activity (McCoy 2016). He suggests Cuadrilla’s failure to 
assess the health impacts of production at scale is inadequate before, finally, he concludes: 
“[O]ne cannot reasonably avoid or neglect the relationship between shale gas exploration on 
two sites in Lancashire with the possibility or the likelihood of commercial shale gas production 
taking place at scale” (McCoy 2016, 19). 
 
Inquiry proceedings  
In his EiC, Dehon asks McCoy why it is relevant to consider commercial production at scale at the 
exploration application stage. “I think that the stress, anxiety and worry that is being experienced and 
expressed by members of the community”, answers McCoy, “relates only in part to the direct and 
immediate potential impacts of fracking on two exploratory sites, but relates to the future possibility of 
fracking having a much bigger impact both on the health of the population, but also on the wider social 
and ecological environment” (INQ 02 Mar p1 00.32.00 - 00.33.10).     
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In cross-examination Lieven takes McCoy to para. 147 of the NPPF, which includes the requirement for 
mineral planning authorities to “distinguish between the three phases of development (exploration, 
appraisal and production)…” (DCLG 2012, 36; see A1.2.2). 
“So the national policy position”, continues Lieven, “is at this stage to only look at the exploration phase, 
isn’t it?” “I think what’s really evident”, McCoy responds, is: 
“That even in this phase of exploration, concerning only two sites, what’s very clear is that the 
concerns, the stress, the anxiety, the mental health impacts of this exploratory phase is clearly 
related to fears about the risk of commercial scale production. And for that reason I think it’s 
completely reasonable for, even at this stage, for some form of risk assessment of commercial 
scale hydraulic fracturing being undertaken…” (INQ Mar 02 p1 01.0.50 – 01.08.30). 
Cuadrilla’s position, then, is that the planning policy is entirely clear – the only impacts to human health 
that should be considered at the exploration stage are those arising from exploration itself, and not 
from any potential future production application or hypothetical industry. FoE do not directly challenge 
this as a matter of policy, but suggest that impacts of production at scale are relevant in so far as their 
prospect is causing ‘indirect’ health impacts now.  
 
Recommendation and decision  
Ultimately the Inspector and SoS sided with Cuadrilla on this matter, with the Inspector concluding: 
“The health impacts associated with these exploratory works appeals should be distinguished 
from those which might be associated with production at scale. The available evidence does 
not support the view that there would be profound socio-economic impacts or the climate 
change impacts on health envisaged by Dr McCoy associated with these exploratory works” 
(McKay 2016, 404). 
 4.2.4 AR E TH E IN DIR ECT  HEA LT H  I MP ACTS  A CCEPT A B LE?  
FoE do not argue that the direct health impacts of emissions to air and water from the exploratory 
activities proposed at these two sites are unacceptable (though, as just seen, they do argue that 
uncertainty over the health impacts of fracking generally prevents reaching the ‘satisfaction’ on the 
basis of ‘the provision of appropriate information’ required by DM2). Instead it is McCoy’s case that 
direct health impacts from the proposals will “be most likely caused by the effects of noise and other 
nuisances” (McCoy 2016, 20). As such, there is no explicit disagreement between the parties on the 
acceptability of the direct health impacts from emissions to air and water, though as McCoy makes clear 
in his written evidence, this is only so on the assumption of effective regulation and only applies to the 
exploration phase: 
“In relation to other hazards (notably water and air borne pollutants), as noted earlier, a 
negligible to low risk is due to the specific combination of the temporary and limited nature of 
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shale gas exploration; and assumes that measures will be effectively applied to mitigate risk 
and harm” (McCoy 2016, 20). 
There was however disagreement on the matter of the acceptability of ‘indirect’ health impacts being 
felt already by communities and mediated through public concern and perceptions of risk.  
 
Pre-inquiry written evidence 
In his written evidence McCoy refers to a Health Impact Assessment (HIA), commissioned by LCC’s 
Director of Public Health and focusing on the two application sites, which reported that: 
“The over-riding responses about the two proposed exploration sites voiced by members of the 
local communities who attended the workshops were those of fear, anxiety and stress, which 
are affecting their mental wellbeing, with some people experiencing sleep disturbance and 
depression” (Cave et al. 2014, 2). 
McCoy suggests that this fear, stress and anxiety is likely to be caused by perceptions of risk, particularly 
in relation to production at scale; a lack of trust in the oil and gas industry in general and Cuadrilla in 
particular; and, finally, “feelings of anger and helplessness caused by the view that shale gas production 
will be forced onto local communities by national government policy and insistence” (McCoy 2016, 11). 
McCoy considers Cuadrilla’s proposed mitigations to alleviate such concern and perceptions to be 
insufficient so long as “there is a belief that the government is set to impose commercial shale gas 
production at scale”, the risks of production at scale have not been properly assessed, and reasons exist 
to doubt the efficacy of regulation (McCoy 2016, 11). McCoy goes on to claim that public concern 
regarding production at scale being conducted safely continues for a number of reasons, including: 
“[A]) the lack of certainty about the laws, policies and systems that would regulate commercial 
shale gas production at scale, including the specifications for impact assessments and 
monitoring; b) a reliance on self-monitoring and reporting by the industry; c) key regulatory 
bodies, including the EA, the HSE and local authorities, having experienced large budget and 
staffing cuts in recent years; and d) recent requirements for local authorities to speed up the 
process for assessing planning applications to conduct shale gas exploration”(McCoy 2016, 11–
12). 
In Smith’s written evidence, he acknowledges that health effects may be exacerbated or triggered by 
“the perceptions that people have about the projects and how they believe they may be affected by it 
rather than the likelihood of their exposure to it” (Smith 2016a, 57). He then sets out the steps Cuadrilla 
are taking to mitigate these ‘perception effects’. These include environmental monitoring and the 
publication of results, the implementation of comprehensive environmental operating standards, and 
continuing engagement with the local community.  
 
Inquiry proceedings  
In her opening remarks Dehon reiterates that the HIA demonstrates that negative health impacts arising 
from the public perception of risk are already being caused by these applications, and argues that 
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Cuadrilla’s proposed mitigation is unlikely to be sufficient for the reasons set out by McCoy above (FoE 
2016a). In Cuadrilla’s opening submissions, Lieven states that: 
“A number of third parties have raised issues around health impacts arising from the stress and 
fear induced by the proposal. Doubtless these concerns are very genuinely felt, and it is 
understandable that when a technology comes forward that they are not used to, and which 
has been subject to much adverse publicity people will feel anxious. There is much evidence 
that exactly the same was true of the development of railways in the early nineteenth century. 
The Appellant has done its utmost to deal with these concerns, and will continue to try to 
assuage concerns through monitoring and information” (Cuadrilla 2016a, 7). 
Followed by: 
“Public concerns can be material considerations. However, where those concerns are shown to 
be objectively not justified and to be fully dealt with by another regulatory regime, in this 
instance by the role of the EA and the environmental permitting process, they should be given 
very little weight” (Cuadrilla 2016a, 7). 
In his EiC, Dehon asks McCoy “to what extent are the perceptions of risk…. expressed by the 
communities objectively justified?”  
“The perception of risk is, by definition, something which is subjective… but… for the reasons 
that I’ve laid out in my proof of evidence… there are reasonable causes for members of the 
community – both within the immediate vicinity of the proposed sites but also across 
Lancashire generally – to have concerns about the impact of fracking on the local environment 
and the health of people living in Lancashire” (INQ Mar 02 p2 00.30.20 – 00.31.40). 
“To some degree”, Lieven asks during cross-examination, “public concern can only be displaced and will 
only be displaced when the activity actually commences and people see a) that it’s safe and b) [Notable 
disquiet in the audience at this point, Inspector has to interject] that the regulatory system is working 
properly”. “There isn’t really”, Lieven continues undeterred, “any other way to displace the kind of 
concerns the Inspector’s heard at the inquiry is there?” “I think there is”, McCoy responds: 
“A lot of the stress, concern, and anxiety arises from people’s concerns about the prospect of 
commercial scale fracking. And one way in which you could attempt to dispel that would be to 
conduct, at this stage, a comprehensive assessment of commercial scale fracking and what that 
might look like…” 
“Until you have fracturing in the UK”, Lieven persists: 
“It’s impossible to convince people that there won’t be pathways to human health. The way to 
prove that there is no pathway to human health, through a combination of good practice and 
good regulation - and geology - is for the process to start, and then those concerns will, we 
assume, and Public Health England assume, and the Environment Agency assume, will be 
dissipated, because [it] will be shown to be safe. You can study ‘til you’re blue in the face, but 
until you do it you’re not going to dissipate people’s fears”. 
“You’re assuming”, McCoy responds: 
“That it will be shown to be safe. And there’s no basis for making that assumption. But we do 
have experience from other parts of the world, and secondly, we do have experience from the 
oil and gas industry and the effects of oil and gas production in general, which has been noted 
as being a risky industrial activity” (INQ Mar 02 p1 01.10.30 – 1.16.19). 
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In Smith’s cross-examination, Dehon asks him whether perception effects are relevant to the health 
impacts of the development? “They can be relevant”, he answers. Dehon then turns to the steps taken 
to address these perceptions. Focusing on ‘engagement with the community’, she suggests that thus far 
Cuadrilla’s engagement with the community has not weakened the strength of their concern. “Very, 
very difficult to judge”, answers Smith: 
“You’re quite right, we’ve been involved in a lot of consultation, we’ve put the facts in front of 
a lot of people. I can’t really come to a view on whether the concern is greater or less than 
before that consultation was undertaken” (INQ 10 Feb p3 00.00.00 – 00.04.30). 
In closing Dehon reiterates McCoy’s view that public concern and perceptions in this case are justified. 
“There is”, she argues, “a significant degree of uncertainty in the scientific literature about the potential 
health effects of fracking, and so fears cannot be assuaged by turning to an established view on the 
matter” (FoE 2016b, 19). She submits, furthermore, that contrary to Smith’s answer, it is clear that 
Cuadrilla’s attempts so far to mitigate these concerns and perceptions have not been successful. She 
makes clear that McCoy rejected both the view that concerns can only be displaced after the activity is 
allowed to commence, and the assumption that its commencement would indeed necessarily 
demonstrate it to be safe. Finally, she reiterates McCoy’s view that a proper health assessment of 
production phase fracking at scale is an alternative means to potentially dispel (or indeed confirm) 
concerns (FoE 2016b).   
For Cuadrilla, Lieven repeats the claim that the “public anxiety here, and any stress related health 
effects here, can only ultimately be dispersed by allowing the development and then showing it can be 
undertaken completely safely” (Cuadrilla 2016b, 30). She then suggests that many of these fears are 
based on the US experience, where the regulatory regime is totally different, and from which there’s no 
basis to extrapolate. Finally, she accepts that public concern can be a material consideration, however, 
“when it relates to processes which are fully regulated and where it can be shown that all pathways that 
impact on human health are fully controlled, very little weight can or should be given to such concerns” 
(Cuadrilla 2016b, 30). 
Somewhat unusually the parties are in agreement about the procedural question over the materiality of 
‘indirect’ public health impacts. There is agreement that in principle public concern and perceptions are 
potentially material considerations. Nor do they disagree particularly over the scale or existence of the 
impact (unlike climate change, waste, economic and direct health impacts, the indirect health impacts 
are contemporaneous with the decision-making process as opposed to prospective scenarios and 
estimates). Where they disagree is whether the details of this case dictate that the impact is 
unacceptable, with the key test being whether the concern and perceptions through which the impacts 
are mediated are justified. FoE argue that public concern and the health impacts it is causing should be 
given significant weight – sufficient, along with the health impacts from ‘nuisances’ and waste disposal, 
to justify rejection on public health grounds. They argue that these concerns are justified by scientific 
uncertainty over the health impacts of fracking, particularly production at scale; as well as by the 
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prospect of Government imposition and reasons to doubt the efficacy of regulation. They also argue 
that Cuadrilla’s attempts to mitigate these impacts have been demonstrably unsuccessful. Cuadrilla, on 
the other hand, argue that these concerns should be given very little weight because they are based on 
perceptions, adverse publicity, and extrapolation, not fact; they relate to possible hazards which will be 
fully controlled by the regulator; and, finally, because the only way to address them is through granting 
permission, which will inevitably show them to be misplaced. 
 
Recommendation and decision 
On the matter of indirect health effects caused by public concern the Inspector sides with Cuadrilla in 
granting public concern little weight. She concludes that: 
“[T]he processes would be regulated and all pathways that could potentially impact upon 
human health would be monitored and appropriately controlled. Given these factors, I agree 
with the Appellants that little weight should be given to these concerns. I do not consider the 
expressed fear and anxiety can be regarded as being reasonably engendered or a justifiable 
emotional response to the projects in the light of the level of monitoring and controls that 
would be imposed upon the proposed activities” (McKay 2016, 404). 
Once again, the SoS does not demur (DCLG 2016). 
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4.3 WASTE DISPOSAL 
 
Once again, the dispute over waste was between Cuadrilla and FoE. The issue turned on three key 
contests. The first concerned – not for the first time – the procedural question on the relationship 
between planning and the EA. Here, Cuadrilla argued again that the EA had considered the matter of 
waste during its permitting process (in which Cuadrilla was awarded the necessary environmental and 
waste permits by the EA) and were satisfied that the matter was acceptable. The approach to take was 
to defer to the EA’s satisfaction, and that was the end of the matter. On the other hand, FoE’s argument 
was based on drawing a distinction between in-theory capacity to treat and dispose of flowback waste 
from the projects and the in-practice availability of that capacity. The EA had considered the former but 
not the latter, they argued, and so it fell to the planning decision maker to consider the latter and avoid 
a gap in regulatory oversight. The second contest concerned the acceptability of the projects’ demands 
on offsite treatment capacity for flowback waste. Cuadrilla acknowledged that, at peak demand, the two 
sites would require 68% of the identified treatment capacity for liquid radioactive waste which is 
classified as a ‘very substantial and significant’ impact (each site on its own at peak required 65% of said 
capacity, with the 68% figure achieved through staggering operations between sites). FoE argued that 
this was self-evidently a significant and adverse effect with the potential to overwhelm capacity in 
conjunction with the potential demands of other users, whereas Cuadrilla claimed that it could be 
acceptably managed and controlled. The third and final contest concerned the reliability of the 
estimates of flowback volume and reuse on which treatment capacity demand was based. Cuadrilla 
argued that their estimates were reliable, and in any event, unexpectedly large volumes could be 
managed acceptably. FoE argued there was an unacceptable possibility of higher than expected 
flowback treatment needs overwhelming capacity with potentially serious knock-on effects. For each of 
these contests I will provide an account of the rival parties’ arguments, as well as the Inspector’s 
recommendation and the SoS’s decision on the waste issue.  
 4.3.1 SHO U LD  PLANNI NG  SI MP LY  D EFER  TO  T H E EA’S  OV ER SI GHT  O N  T H E I MPA CT  ON W A ST E DI SPO SA L CA PA CIT Y? 
 
FoE’s primary concern over waste was that there may be insufficient national capacity to treat flowback 
fluid14 produced by the sites. Cuadrilla’s starting point on waste was that reliance should be placed on 
                                                                
14‘Flowback’ is comprised of fracking fluids which re-emerge from the well after fracking. Flowback is often 
distinguished from ‘produced water’ – typically lower volumes of much more contaminated wastewater produced 
in the longer term. The inquiry used the term ‘flowback’ to refer to both the immediate post-fracking flowback and 
the longer term produced water. It is anticipated that high volumes of flowback will be produced immediately after 
fracking, with lower volumes of more highly contaminated waste being produced throughout the life of the 
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the EA permitting regime, which had already addressed the issue and found the projects acceptable. The 
only knock-on planning issue arising from waste concerned HGV generation (to haul the waste to offsite 
treatment facilities). However, as peak waste generation is expected to occur during a relative lull in 
required HGV movements, this was deemed insignificant. In other words, there was no issue for a 
planning inquiry to debate. 
 
Pre-inquiry written evidence 
In his written evidence, Mark Smith, Cuadrilla’s planning expert, drew support from the conclusions of 
LCC’s planning officer. Waste would be “controlled by other regulatory regimes and… the County 
Council could assume and be satisfied that such controls would be enforced by the respective bodies” 
(Perigo 2015, no pagination); and: 
“This issue has been reviewed by the EA in their determination of the Mining Waste Permit and 
the EA is satisfied that the applicant has used appropriate information to design the proposals 
and that there are sufficient controls in place to ensure that flowback is controlled, treated and 
disposed of appropriately” (Perigo 2015, no pagination). 
In short, Cuadrilla argued that capacity to deal with the waste had already been assessed and found 
acceptable by the EA and so there was no action required from the planning decision maker other than 
deferring to the work and conclusions of the EA.  
Alan Watson and Richard Bate, FoE’s waste and planning experts respectively, sought to argue for the 
necessity of a role for the planning decision maker in regulating the treatment and disposal of flowback 
from the sites. Watson draws a distinction between the existence of capacity in theory and the 
availability of capacity in practice, the latter of which, including the current and projected demands of 
other users, has not been assessed by either Cuadrilla or the EA (Watson 2016a, 7). He draws attention 
to a DECC strategic environmental assessment for further onshore oil and gas licensing which 
acknowledges a possibly ‘substantial burden on existing wastewater treatment infrastructure capacity’ 
from further onshore licensing and development (DECC 2013, xvi). Ensuring this does not produce 
unacceptable effects will require, amongst other things, ‘scrutiny through the planning system’ (DECC 
2013, xvi). In short, Watson argues for precisely this scrutiny from the decision maker in this case over 
the availability of capacity, as it has not been provided by the EA. Bate adds that waste processing 
capacity is capable of being a material consideration in planning as established in a range of local and 
national policies (Bate 2016). Perhaps most pertinent is the requirement in para. 49 of the PPG for 
Waste (PPGW) that: 
“Before granting planning permission, the local planning authority will need to be satisfied that 
the impacts of non-waste development on existing waste management facilities are 
acceptable…” (DCLG 2014, no pagination, para. 28-049). 
                                                                
projects. Flowback is considered a low level radioactive substance by the EA, due to naturally occurring radioactive 
material (NORM) picked up in contact with the substrata. It therefore requires specialist treatment and disposal.     
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At the point of the inquiry then, Cuadrilla argued that the treatment and disposal of flowback waste had 
already been assessed and found acceptable by the EA. The planning decision maker was not required 
to reconsider the matter, but merely defer to the EA’s prior consideration. FoE, on the other hand, 
suggested that the EA had considered the matter within the bounds of their remit – whether there were 
facilities at which the waste could be treated. What the EA had not considered, argued FoE, was 
whether this capacity was likely to be available in practice to Cuadrilla, and any knock-on planning 
impacts if it was not. As such, the decision maker was required to consider the matter to prevent a gap 
in the regulation and oversee any impacts arising from the potential unavailability of treatment capacity. 
 
Inquiry proceedings 
In her opening statement on behalf of Cuadrilla, QC Natalie Lieven argued that the near entirety of FoE’s 
case across climate change, public health, and waste (with the exception of methane emissions 
estimates) was immaterial to the inquiry. Drawing on case law (FFB vs. WSCC) and national policy (in 
particular para. 122 of the NPPF), she suggested that:         
“These matters have been dealt with in great detail through the environmental permitting 
regime, and will be subject to intense monitoring and regulation as part of that regime… There 
is no basis for you or the Secretary of State to go behind those regimes, and do anything other 
than assume that they will operate effectively” (Cuadrilla 2016a, 3). 
On the other hand, Estelle Dehon, barrister for FoE, argued that neither the national policy nor the case 
law give rise to an ‘irrebuttable presumption’ (FoE 2016a, 6). That is, the EA’s satisfaction is not the 
beginning and end of the matter, and does not guarantee that the proposals are acceptable in planning 
terms. The Inspector, she suggests, has the discretion to consider whether these issues have been 
adequately addressed by the EA. 
In cross-examining Cuadrilla’s planning expert Smith, Dehon takes him to the local policy DM2 (see 
A1.2.1). Smith, in turn, prefers to focus on paras. 122 of the NPPF and 112 of the PPGM (see A1.2.2 and 
A1.2.3). 
Dehon puts it to Smith that the assumption prescribed in both paragraphs does not create an 
‘irrebuttable presumption’ that the regimes will operate effectively. “If there is evidence to show that 
the regime is not operating effectively”, she asks, “then the planning decision maker is not required to 
close their eyes to that?” “It clearly says that the planning authority should assume that those regimes 
will operate effectively”, Smith responds, “[i]t doesn’t say anything about… considering evidence that 
they don’t operate effectively – it says assume that they operate effectively”. Dehon persists, suggesting 
that the assumption prescribed in policy is not ‘the beginning and end of the matter’. Smith disagrees. 
“If someone was to bring evidence that the regime was not operating effectively… is your evidence 
really that the planning decision maker should… not consider it?”. “I don’t think it is a matter for this 
inquiry”, Smith replies, later suggesting that “that evidence should have been brought to the attention 
110 
 
 
 
of the Environment Agency before issuing their permit… it’s not a planning consideration”. “On your 
evidence”, Dehon summarises, “she’s [the Inspector] to close her eyes as to the wider effect on the 
availability of waste treatment capacity?” “In terms of capacity”, responds Smith, “that matter has been 
addressed through the issuing of the permit, and the assumption is that the regimes will operate 
effectively, as required by paragraph 122” (INQ Feb 10 p2 40.30 – 59.30).     
Dehon turns to PPGW para. 49 (see above). Dehon points out that Smith did not make reference to this 
particular policy in his evidence. Smith accepts that the acceptability of the impact on waste 
management facilities is relevant, but that this impact has been considered by the EA, who should be 
assumed to have operated effectively (INQ Feb 10 p2 01.07.00 – 01.10.00). Lieven returns to this with 
Smith in re-examination, pointing out that the following paragraph (PPGW para. 50) more or less 
repeats the formulation in PPGM 112 concerning other regimes and the assumption of effective 
operation (see DCLG 2014, no pagination, paras. 28–050). Reading 49 and 50 together, she asks, what is 
the guidance on the relevance of the capacity of off-site treatment? “The PPGs position is that that’s an 
issue for other non-planning related regimes”, answers Smith (INQ Feb 10 p4 02.08.40 – 02.11.25). 
In his cross-examination, FoE waste expert Watson is asked about the assumption of effective operation 
of other regulatory regimes in planning policy. Lieven suggests that planning policy makes it clear where 
the responsibility for offsite capacity lies. Watson, in response, draws a distinction between the 
existence of facilities where the waste can be treated and disposed of in principle, and the in practice 
availability of that capacity. Lieven then turns to the EA permit decision document which states that: 
“We have assessed the application and we are satisfied that the waste can be safely dealt with. 
Capacity is primarily an issue for the applicant and if an appropriately permitted outlet for the 
waste cannot be found, the operations will have to stop” (EA 2015, 93).   
Watson replies that he asked the EA about this, and they replied that there is sufficient capacity but 
they haven’t assessed the availability of it (see Watson 2016c, 4–5). Lieven responds that if there isn’t 
available capacity they’ll just have to cease operations. “Yep”, replies Watson:  
“Of course, that doesn’t stop the land use implications that flow from that. If you swamp the 
capacity with one application then we all bear the costs of that, which is quite clearly a planning 
issue”.  
He goes on to suggest that halting operations has implications for the risk of seismicity. “Offsite disposal 
is a matter for the EA”, Lieven tries one last time. “We’ve discussed that”, replies Watson: 
“And our understandings differ on that. Of course the EA regulate those facilities and make 
sure the discharges from them are acceptable. But what the EA doesn’t do and hasn’t done is 
look at the availability of capacity, of other users for example, and look at the impacts of that 
on those other users” (AUD Feb 26 PM 19.50 – 23.00). 
In his EiC, FoE’s planning expert Bate is asked about what the wording of policy DM2 means for the 
inquiry (see A1.2.1). As already seen in the discussion on public health above, Bate replies that the SoS 
must assure himself that these matters have been taken into account, and that waste impacts are “very 
much within the frame of reference for this inquiry” (INQ Mar 2 p2 48.00 – 49.20). On PPGM 112 Bate 
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draws attention to the first sentence which states that some “issues may be covered by other regulatory 
regimes but may be relevant to mineral planning authorities in specific circumstances” (DCLG 2014, no 
pagination, para. 27–112). “In other words”, argues Bate, “it’s making it quite clear that there is a 
possibility that some issues are relevant to both regulatory bodies” (INQ Mar 2 p2 55.20-01.01.00). 
Turning to the EA permit decision document Bate notes the approach taken by the EA to the availability 
of treatment capacity. There the EA explain that: 
“The Environment Agency regulates how waste will be dealt with. Issues relating to the 
provision and capacity of facilities are matters for the waste planning authority and market 
forces. In the event that sufficient storage and treatment capacity is not available for a 
particular waste stream operations generating that waste will need to cease” (EA 2015, 104). 
Bate argues that this makes clear that the EA is satisfied that the method of dealing with the waste is 
appropriate, but has “quite specifically left open the option that, for one reason or another, capacity 
might not actually be available in the real world”. Bate suggests that the EA has “washed its hands of the 
matter” of availability of capacity, and so the planning authority “needs to be satisfied that the waste 
can be dealt with” (INQ Mar 2 p2 01.01.00 – 01.08.20). Finally, summing up his case on the need for an 
active role for the planning decision maker in considering the impacts of waste on available capacity, 
Bate concludes that: 
“[B]ecause of the way the environment agencies role is constructed and expressed, we’ve got 
to the point where it is quite clear that the planning authority should be taking into account the 
practical availability of wastewater treatment capacity, because that isn’t something which the 
Environment Agency set out to do” (INQ Mar 2 p2 01.10.55 – 01.11.30). 
In cross-examining Bate, Lieven returns to the EA permit decision document. She suggests that the EA 
have assessed the application and are satisfied with it, and that availability of capacity is primarily a 
matter for Cuadrilla. Bate repeats that this shows how the EA has ‘washed its hands’ of the question of 
availability, and so the planning authority needs to consider it “in order for the decision maker… to be 
satisfied that planning policies will be met” (INQ Mar 2 p3 58.00 - 01.01.00). 
In her closing remarks for FoE, Dehon argues that Cuadrilla’s case on waste “requires the turning of a 
very blind eye to the repeated use of the word ‘satisfied’ in planning policy” (FoE 2016b, 11). She 
reiterates FoE’s position on the use of ‘assume’ in the NPPF and PPG (122 and 112 respectively). It is not 
an ‘irrebuttable presumption’, and does not “necessarily result in the decision-maker being satisfied in 
planning terms that the impacts on existing waste management facilities will be acceptable” (FoE 2016b, 
11). This is entirely in-line with the case law (FFB vs. WSCC), she argues, which establishes “a discretion 
to consider relevant matters which cannot be left to the regulatory authority, particularly where there is 
evidence that matters of concern will not be addressed by the regulator” (FoE 2016b, 12). She reiterates 
the argument of both Watson and Bate that the planning authority’s regulatory responsibility includes 
the accessibility of sufficient wastewater disposal capacity, and that the EA has made clear in their 
consultation responses that their responsibility does not extend to this issue. This is a matter for the 
planning decision maker, she concludes, because otherwise there would be no oversight of capacity 
availability (FoE 2016b, 12–13). On the other hand, Lieven reiterates that offsite capacity is not a matter 
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for this inquiry, and that ultimately in the event of insufficient capacity operations would just have to 
stop. There is, in other words, no risk that the waste will not be treated properly (Cuadrilla 2016b, 32). 
To summarise, then, Cuadrilla argued that the decision maker’s satisfaction on offsite treatment 
capacity ought to be a formality. The approach to being satisfied was to take the advice of the regulator, 
who it is assumed operate effectively. The EA, in issuing the permits, had made clear the waste impacts 
of the projects were acceptable, and as such an assessment did not need to be re-performed at this 
inquiry. FoE, on the other hand, argued that the EA’s satisfaction was limited to the existence of suitable 
treatment capacity, as opposed to the actual availability of that capacity in practice. This amounted to a 
gap in regulatory oversight, necessitating a more active role for the planning decision maker in assessing 
the projects’ impact on the national capacity for the disposal of wastewater.  
 
Recommendation and decision 
The Inspector initially agrees with FoE over the interpretation of FFB vs. WSCC, the assumption in 
planning policy not amounting to an ‘irrebuttable presumption’, and that a discretion exists for a 
planning decision maker to consider such matters. In principle, then, there “are clearly matters such as 
this which could potentially be taken into account by the planning decision-maker in the exercise of its 
discretion, particularly if there would otherwise be a gap in the environmental controls” (McKay 2016, 
392). “However”, she continues, “it is necessary to consider whether the particular matter raised by FoE 
falls within that category and whether the available information indicates that the matter could not and 
should not be dealt with by the regulatory bodies” (McKay 2016, 392). The Inspector concludes that this 
is not such a case. The Inspector does not consider the position adopted by the EA as having “left a gap 
in the environmental controls that would require further consideration of the matter by the decision-
maker” (McKay 2016, 399). If there is a growing need for more treatment capacity, she states, “this is a 
matter which would be dealt with via the normal and appropriate mechanisms of the market and the 
planning system” (McKay 2016, 399). The SoS concurs that the position adopted by the EA has left no 
gap in the environmental controls (DCLG 2016, 8). The Inspector confirms then that she had the 
discretion to consider the matter in principle had she felt the substantive details of the case merited it, 
which ultimately she did not. FoE’s argument was therefore procedurally possible but judged by the 
Inspector in her discretion as unnecessary in this case.   
 4.3.2 AR E TH E P ROJ ECTS’  D EMAN D S  ON  OFFSI TE T R EAT MEN T  CAP A CI TY  A CCEPTA B LE?  
As well as arguing that the matter of the availability of offsite capacity shouldn’t be considered, Cuadrilla 
also argued that in any event the impact was not unacceptable because they were capable of controlling 
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and stopping the production of waste by way of a mechanism called a ‘choke manifold’. In other words, 
should capacity be tied up by other users during peak waste production to the extent that there was 
nowhere for Cuadrilla’s waste to go, they would simply be able to slow or stop the production of such 
waste.  
 
Pre-inquiry written evidence 
FoE’s waste expert, Alan Watson, argued in his written evidence to the inquiry that the demand at peak 
times of both projects – estimated to be 68% of national treatment capacity - was acknowledged by 
Cuadrilla themselves to represent a ‘very substantial and significant’ impact (Arup 2014a, 525; Watson 
2016a, 7). Watson suggests that the significance of this impact is only likely to increase in the coming 
years, as more companies seek planning permission for shale gas development. This expectation is 
shared by DECC (DECC 2013, xvi). Watson also makes reference to the UK NORM Strategy from July 
2014, in which the expectation is set out that “the quantities and activities of NORM waste is likely to 
increase in the next five years” (DECC 2014, 56). The full scale of this impact is not able to be assessed 
because the applications do not contain estimates of projected future demands of other users. Bate 
adds in his PoE, in reference to the NORM strategy report, that the development and permitting of new 
treatment facilities is not expected to be easy or quick (DECC 2014, 32; Bate 2016, 17). Watson 
concludes that: 
“The Secretary of State would need to be sure, for example, that there were no other fracking 
sites or other major users which also anticipated using that limited treatment capacity. The 
information needed to assess this was not included in the application nor, so far as I am aware, 
is it available in evidence to the inquiry” (Watson 2016a, 23). 
As such, this ‘excessive’ demand on capacity, coupled with the lack of crucial information in the 
applications, fails to satisfy policy DM2 (see A1.2.1). 
Cuadrilla respond to Watson’s criticisms by way of a technical note (recall that Cuadrilla did not call 
corresponding expert witnesses to FoE as they disputed the procedural materiality of the issues). In the 
note, authored by Andrew Quarles, it is argued that: 
“The rate and volume of the fluid produced is controlled at the surface. In the event of 
limitations to traffic or storage, the flow can be reduced or even stopped” (Quarles 2016a, 9).  
In his response, Watson suggests that such an approach has a knock-on effect on the matter of the risk 
of seismicity. “Allowing the flowback of fluids, particularly immediately post-fracking”, he argues, “is 
necessary in order to address seismicity” (Watson 2016b, 3–4). This is acknowledged in the ESs, Watson 
points out, which recognise ‘rapid flowback’ as part of mitigating against seismic events (Arup 2014a, 
L120).  
Come the inquiry, then, the matter of the acceptability of the demand on offsite treatment capacity 
depended on the extent to which Cuadrilla could satisfactorily control the rate of or entirely stop 
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flowback via the choke manifold. Watson argued that such an approach had consequences for the risk 
of seismicity. Furthermore, FoE argued that Cuadrilla had failed to supply sufficient information to 
assess the impact of their demand on capacity by failing to estimate the projected demands of other 
users. This is despite the recognised possibility of increased demand for such treatment facilities from 
other shale gas developments, potentially within the relevant timescale. As such they had failed to 
satisfy the ‘provision of appropriate information’ requirement in DM2 (see A1.2.1). 
 
Inquiry proceedings 
In his EiC, Cuadrilla’s planning expert Mark Smith reiterates that any issues with capacity could be 
mitigated by controlling rates of flowback via the choke manifold. This was, he suggested, a tried and 
tested approach within the industry that did not present the ‘high environmental risk’ suggested by FoE. 
Furthermore, he reiterates that the EA had assessed the matter and were satisfied that the waste could 
safely be dealt with (INQ Feb 9 p3  29.00 – 30.15). 
In his EiC, Dehon asks Watson about the planning ramifications of an exceedance of capacity. He 
answers that the waste would start to build up on the site, and if the reason for exceedance was that 
more flowback was generated than expected this would require extra HGV movements. Furthermore, 
ultimately operations may have to be stopped in which case the close coordination between the sites 
required to ‘sneak under’ the capacity levels would be prejudiced and the length of the project would be 
extended. Dehon then asks Watson about the choke manifold. “There’s no doubt”, Watson responds, 
“that the choke manifold can be used to regulate the flowback of fluids”. However, using it would be 
inappropriate in a ‘red seismic event’ as retaining fluid in the well increases the likelihood of seismicity. 
Retaining fluids in the well for longer also increases their levels of contamination, making the waste 
more difficult to treat. Watson describes this as ‘a rock and a hard place’ scenario. Watson concludes 
that the choke manifold is not a solution, but a stop-gap measure that ‘might allow it to stutter on a 
little bit longer’ (INQ Feb 26 p2 01.15.10 – 01.19.50). 
In closing, both parties reiterate their arguments about the choke manifold – Cuadrilla maintain that the 
quantity of waste can be fully controlled, whereas FoE suggest that the role of allowing fluids to 
flowback in mitigating seismicity means that it is not so simple (Cuadrilla 2016b; FoE 2016b). 
 
Recommendation and decision 
On the issue of seismicity and what this means for the choke manifold’s ability to control the generation 
of waste, the Inspector is satisfied by the explanation given in a note submitted to the Inquiry by 
Cuadrilla. The note (Cuadrilla 2016c) explains that Cuadrilla’s mitigation measures would mean ‘Red 
Traffic Light Events’ would be rare, and in any event, the volume of flowback during a ‘Red’ event would 
not exceed either the onsite storage capacity or offsite treatment capacity. “Despite the concerns on 
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this matter expressed by Mr Watson”, she concludes, “I am satisfied that the choke manifold would 
provide an effective means of controlling the quantum of flowback fluid on-site” (McKay 2016, 397). As 
such, because Cuadrilla would have the “means to slow down or stop the generation of flowback fluid 
until treatment capacity became available”, there would be no material adverse impact associated with 
the unavailability in practice of capacity to treat the flowback fluid. In conclusion, she states that: 
“I am satisfied that the Appellants have demonstrated, by the provision of appropriate 
information, that all impacts associated with the production of flowback fluid by the projects 
would be reduced to an acceptable level. The proposed development would be in accordance 
with JLMWLP Policy DM2 and relevant national policy” (McKay 2016, 399–400).   
Her reasoning and judgement is fully adopted by the SoS (DCLG 2016, 8). 
 4.3.3 AR E TH E FLOW B A CK VOLU ME ESTI MAT ES R ELIA B LE? 
 
In the final contest on the issue of waste disposal, FoE argue that through a combination of uncertainty, 
underestimation, insufficient disclosure, lack of clarity, and mistake, the ES’s flowback volume estimates 
could potentially be underplaying the scale of the impact and fall well short of the ‘appropriate 
information’ required by DM2. 
 
Pre-inquiry written evidence 
FoE’s waste expert Alan Watson points to uncertainties concerning flowback volumes in his written 
evidence. This is especially true for the UK because of the experimental nature of HVHF here (Watson 
2016a, 6). Watson argues that the assessment of demand (68% of capacity at peak) is based on 
conservative volume estimates and that “actual demands for treatment capacity could be much larger 
than indicated in the ES” (Watson 2016a, 9). He suggests that it is difficult to understand how Cuadrilla 
have arrived at a 40% worst case scenario return rate (the proportion of total fluid injected that returns 
as flowback, on which the capacity demand is based), the precise timescale to which this refers, and 
how it is reconciled with the figure for total water injected as well as the traffic generation assessment. 
Watson references the DECC Strategic Environmental Assessment, which assumes 30-75% of total fluid 
injected returns, whilst acknowledging that some wells exceed 100% (i.e. more fluid flows back than was 
initially injected) (DECC 2013). Watson also points out that the applications are ‘strangely quiet’ about 
the local data available – Preese Hall, a well fracked by Cuadrilla in the same part of Lancashire in 2011. 
The rate at Preese Hall was 70% (Watson 2016a, 25). Watson suggests that the Preese Hall data “is the 
only real and local data and is therefore the most appropriate flowback rate to use (at least as an ‘upper 
bound’)” (Watson 2016b, 2). Finally, Watson claims that the limited onsite treatment proposed will limit 
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the scope for reuse15, and it is unclear what levels of reuse Cuadrilla are basing their estimates on. These 
various uncertainties and the general lack of clarity, he suggests, violate DM2, and could mean an 
already significant impact is being underplayed. 
Cuadrilla respond through a technical note written by Andrew Quarles. Quarles defends the 40% figure, 
clarifying that it is based on published literature on North America, and Bowland geology and data from 
the UK. “We believe”, he suggests, “that this is an appropriately conservative estimate; most likely the 
flowback percentage will be less than 40%” (Quarles 2016a, 6–7). Quarles makes reference to a US 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) daft report (EPA 2015), which he says demonstrates that most 
US geological formations experience flowback volumes lower than 40%, with the Barnett shale being an 
outlier skewing the overall picture. Quarles suggests that this is because of specific geologic conditions 
(an underlying prolific aquifer) which are not analogous to the Bowland in the UK (Quarles 2016a, 7). 
The EPA study also suggests that vertical wells (like Preese Hall) tend to have higher flowback than 
horizontal ones (like these applications). Furthermore, the operations at Preese Hall were different than 
those proposed here, and included injection of water, further explaining the higher rates and rendering 
it an inappropriate comparator. Finally, Quarles points out that the EA were satisfied with Cuadrilla’s 
estimates when granting the permit (Quarles 2016a, 7–10). 
At the point of the inquiry, then, the parties disagreed over the estimates on which waste treatment 
capacity demand was based. The focus, in particular, was on whether Cuadrilla’s 40% worst-case 
scenario return rate was a reasonable assumption. FoE suggested that there is evidence to support the 
possibility of a much higher return rate, most notably the data from Cuadrilla’s previous operations at 
nearby Preese Hall. Cuadrilla, on the other hand, argued that differences in operations and well-type 
made Preese Hall an inappropriate benchmark, and that the most geologically comparable formations 
from the US supported the view that their 40% estimate was appropriately conservative.    
 
Inquiry proceedings 
In his EiC, Watson and Lieven discuss the flowback volume estimates. The ESs estimate the total volume 
of flowback during the 60-90 day initial flow testing (IFT) phase as 21,250m3 per site (Arup 2014a, 511, 
table 17.52). Watson is unclear how this is reconciled with the 40% return rate figure, given that the 
total fluid injected is 112,000m3 (seemingly a return rate of ~19%). Watson, furthermore, is frustrated 
by the lack of a week-by-week breakdown of expected flowback volume during the IFT. Instead, the ESs 
present a total (21,250m3) and a maximum weekly figure (1,750m3). The total weekly capacity is 
                                                                
15Reuse of flowback refers to using flowback again in the fracking fluids for subsequent fracturing operations. 
Before this can occur sand and natural gas must be removed, and the flowback is treated with UV disinfectant to 
control bacterial growth and may be diluted with water. Whether these treatments enable reuse will not be fully 
known until the composition of the flowback is known. Reusing a proportion of flowback would both reduce the 
total volume of waste and lessen peak demands. 
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assessed as 2,700m3, hence the 65% peak demand figure (Arup 2014a, 511). The 40% return rate figure 
and the maximum weekly IFT flowback of 1,750m3 are both referenced to a Cuadrilla study (Cuadrilla 
2014a). This assessment is not in the public domain and not before the inquiry for what are described as 
commercial confidentiality reasons. Watson accuses Cuadrilla of giving the ‘appearance of being 
scientific’ by basing key assumptions on referenced documents which can’t be checked by third parties 
(INQ Feb 26 p2 29.30 – 37.00). He suggests, furthermore, that: 
“It’s difficult for us to know how reliable this assessment is, because although we know what 
Cuadrilla say is the total amount, the 21,250, they don’t provide the breakdown of the 
timescale and the spread of that 21,250 cubic metres, which will almost certainly be included in 
that Cuadrilla report [Cuadrilla, 2014a]… ” (INQ Feb 26 p2 37.00 – 38.20).     
Remaining on the issue of non-disclosure, Watson turns to an email correspondence between the EA 
and Cuadrilla accessed by FoE via an FOI request (Watson 2016c, 19–20). In it, Cuadrilla report that the 
Preese Hall flowback after 3 months was 70% of fluid injected, and at the point of the email (Feb 2012) 
the well was still generating 20m3 of produced water per day. Cuadrilla then predict the 1st year and 
subsequent year return rates for the two sites in question at the inquiry, though these estimates are 
redacted (INQ Feb 26 p2 38.40 – 41.16).   
Watson then highlights a discrepancy he has discovered between the ESs and the Waste Management 
Plan (WMP, part of the EA permit). The WMP states that the overall quantity of flowback generated 
during initial flow testing is expected to be 22,000m3 per well, whereas the ESs report a similar figure 
per site (there are four wells on each site). Watson explains that whilst he initially considered this likely 
to be a typographical error, he is no longer sure as the WMP total per site (roughly four times the ES 
figure) is more easily reconciled with the total volume of fluid injected figure. The 22,000m3 per well 
figure would give a per site figure of 88,000 which added to the high-end scenario amount of flowback 
expected to remain in the ground (24,000, presumed by Watson to be per site – Cuadrilla 2014b, 35; EA 
2015, 35) would roughly add up to the total water injected figure (112,000 – though this gives a return 
rate of ~80%). Watson cannot reconcile the ES’s per site figure in this way (Watson 2016a, 24–25). 
Furthermore, the EA accepts the larger figure and continues accepting it through to version 7 of a 
statutory document. If the WMP figure is not just a typographical error but is the real estimate then the 
projects can be expected to produce roughly four times as much waste as the estimate on which the 
assessment of treatment capacity demand in the ESs was predicated. This would result, explains 
Watson, in a massive increase in traffic generation, much more difficulty in coordinating between sites, 
and a much greater likelihood of exceeding both onsite storage and UK-wide offsite treatment capacity 
(INQ Feb 26 p2 41.16-51.22). Finally, Watson reiterates that it is not at all clear what level of reuse will 
be possible (INQ Feb 26 p2 47.00 – 48.15).   
Turning to Quarles’ rebuttal note, Dehon asks Watson about the idea that the Barnett shale flowback 
rates are inappropriate comparators. Watson answers that Quarles’ hypothesis – that the higher rates 
are explained by the presence of an underlying prolific aquifer called the Ellenberger – has been 
considered and rejected by the EPA (EPA 2015, 7–11). Watson argues that the Barnett has previously 
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been considered as quite analogous to the Bowland as they are both carboniferous formations, and, in 
any event, the aquifer in question only underlies part of the Barnett which mostly sits on limestone. 
“Convenient as it would be to have that as an explanation for the high flow rates in the Barnett”, 
concludes Watson, “it doesn’t seem that it’s been accepted by the EPA, and it’s not consistent with the 
geology” (INQ Feb 26 p2 51.22-01.00.30). 
Asked about a table in Quarles’ note setting out the US studies that helped inform Cuadrilla’s 40% 
figure, Watson urges caution about the specific definition when discussing studies on flowback. “You’ve 
got to make sure you’re talking about the same thing”, explains Watson, particularly regarding the 
timescale over which the flowback is measured. Watson argues that the studies in Quarles’ table 
(Quarles 2016a, 8, table 7.1) – with low flowback rates – are largely expected rates over short timescales 
(e.g. 10 days), and therefore exclude subsequent flowback contributing to final levels. He reiterates that 
Preese Hall is the most appropriate benchmark, though he “can quite understand why Cuadrilla don’t 
want to draw our attention to it, because it presents them with major problem with treatment” (INQ 
Feb 26 p2 01.00.30 – 01.06.40). 
Watson then turns to Quarles’ distinction between vertical and horizontal wells. Watson suggests that 
the study Quarles relies on here uses a small sample of only 18 vertical wells. Furthermore, he suggests 
that whilst it may be true that vertical wells produce higher rates in the short term, horizontal wells can 
be expected to produce higher rates later in their life. Watson describes this as “a devil and the deep 
blue sea scenario” (the higher the early rates, the steeper the peak and the greater difficulty for volume 
treatment capacity; but the longer the tail, the more contaminated the flowback, and the greater 
difficulty for contamination level treatment capacity). A longer tail to flowback, Watson suggests, also 
has implications for re-use, as it may be either too late (because it may flowback after fracking 
operations have ceased) or too contaminated (because it has been in contact with the ground for 
longer) to reuse (INQ Feb 26 p2 01.06.40 – 01.10.00). 
Finally, Watson suggests that there may be confusion between the planning applications and the EA 
documentation as to the specific timescale to which the term ‘flowback’ is being applied. Watson 
suggests that in the ESs ‘flowback’ refers to all phases of the development, whereas the EA refer to 
flowback as occurring “between hydraulic fracturing stages” (EA 2015, 22, 27). The implication is that 
the EA’s satisfaction with the impacts of flowback waste may be based on a limited proportion of that 
waste (i.e. Watson is not sure whether the EA’s assessment includes flowback produced from the IFT 
phase onwards) (INQ Feb 26 p2 01.10.00 – 01.12.45). 
Cross-examination starts with this question of the timescale to which the 40% return rate relates. The 
EA decision document states that 10-40% of the injected fluid will return as flowback “between 
hydraulic fracturing stages” (EA 2015, 22). To Watson, the reference to ‘between the hydraulic 
fracturing stages’ from the EA suggests that they expect a 10-40% return rate during the hydraulic 
fracturing stage of the project, but then do not specify what is expected in the subsequent IFT and 
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Extended Flow Testing (EFT) phases. To Lieven, the EA are ‘clearly’ referring to the IFT, and she is 
expressly instructed by Cuadrilla that the 10-40% figure relates to the IFT. Watson suggests that the EA 
know the difference between the fracturing stage and the testing phase, and had they meant the latter 
they would have said so (AUD Feb 26 PM 06.15 – 14.45).  
Lieven returns to the question of whether Preese Hall is an appropriate analogy. Watson accepts that 
generally vertical wells appear to produce higher flowback in the short term, though he repeats his point 
about the small sample size of verticals in the study on which Quarles relies; and that more flowback 
may come back later and overall, and be more contaminated with horizontal wells. Watson then 
dismisses Quarles’ point about the different nature of operations between Preese Hall and these 
proposals as very tenuous (AUD Feb 26 PM 27.20 – 32.30).  
Lieven then questions Watson on his criticisms about the lack of clarity and disclosure in the applications 
about how the flowback rate estimates were arrived at. Watson’s primary concern is to review how the 
total IFT flowback of 21,250m3 converts into the maximum weekly figure of 1,750m3. It is currently 
impossible to say, suggests Watson, whether this key part of the assessment “is reasonable and 
evidence based” (INQ Feb p4 02.58 – 06.00). 
Lieven argues that the EA had all the data they required, including the ESs, when they were satisfied of 
the acceptability of the projects’ waste impacts, but Watson remains of the view that a lack of disclosure 
has prevented third parties from properly assessing the proposals and their demands on offsite 
treatment capacity. He argues that: 
“The environmental assessment process is not just supposed to involve the Environment 
Agency on our behalf, but allow NGOs and the public to participate. Cuadrilla and the 
Environment Agency in this case have prevented that by not providing the data that’s needed 
to assess these things” (INQ Feb 26 p4 12.30-13.00)        
On the discrepancy between the WMP and ESs, Lieven suggests that it’s clear that the per well figure in 
the WMP is a typographical error, and that the similar per site figure (i.e. approximately four times less) 
is the true estimate, though Watson does not agree (INQ Feb 26 p4 13.30 – 19.30). 
Subsequent to the conclusion of all cross-examination on the issue of waste, Cuadrilla submit an inquiry 
document authored by Andrew Quarles to try and clarify a number of issues that arose in cross-
examination (Quarles 2016b). In it, Cuadrilla clarify that they estimate approximately 40% of the injected 
volume of hydraulic fracturing fluid will return, and that flowback will be generated in the hydraulic 
fracturing phase as well as the two testing phases. They expect a return rate of 15-25% during the 
hydraulic fracturing phase, which they expect to be able to reuse. Assuming a 40% return rate, and 
reuse within the fracturing stage, this results in total per site flowback waste of 22,050m3 (Quarles 
2016b). 
In response, FoE submit a further inquiry document (FoE 2016c). On the well/site discrepancy, they 
suggest that Quarles overlooks the ‘internal consistency’ of the WMP figures. On the question of the 
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timescale of return rates, they suggest that Quarles fails to address the EA’s references to 10-40% 
returning ‘between hydraulic fracturing stages’, and how this is reconciled with Quarles’ 15-25% figure. 
On the expectation of 100% reuse during the fracking stage, FoE point to the generally more cautious 
expectations throughout the ESs and WMP (‘a proportion’, ‘wherever possible’ – Arup 2014b, 568; 
Cuadrilla 2014b, 5, 25, 85), and that the EA has not endorsed this expectation.  
In closing for FoE, Dehon reiterates that the site/well discrepancy cannot be dismissed as a 
typographical error because of the internal consistency of the WMP figures. In general, argues Dehon, 
the inconsistencies and errors within the applications regarding waste fall well short of the ‘appropriate 
information’ that DM2 requires (FoE 2016b). For Cuadrilla, Lieven reiterates that the 40% estimate is 
conservative, that there are good reasons to discount examples of higher rates (whether Preese Hall or 
the Barnett shale), and finally that the well/site discrepancy is merely a typographical error in the EA 
permit (Cuadrilla 2016b).  
 
Recommendation and decision  
On the flowback volume estimates the Inspector reasons that “it seems to me that they have provided 
valid and logical reasons for distinguishing the Preese Hall experience from what is likely to occur at the 
appeal sites” (McKay 2016, 394). The Inspector considers that “taken as a whole the review of the US 
information and the characteristics of the Bowland Shale in Lancashire do indeed provide strong 
grounds to support the Appellants’ view that the flowback percentage estimate of 40% is appropriately 
conservative” (McKay 2016, 394). Regarding the ES/WMP discrepancy, the Inspector finds that “[i]n my 
view, the Appellants have provided a straight forward and plausible explanation for the discrepancy 
between the ES and the WMP and Permits”, which is “most likely to be simply due to a typographical 
error and that the fault lies with the WMP and Permits, rather than the ES” (McKay 2016, 396). As such, 
the Inspector judges the flowback volume estimates to be epistemically credible, and the proper basis 
on which to judge the capacity demand impact. The SoS doesn’t explicitly mention the flowback 
estimate contest, though is satisfied that Cuadrilla have demonstrated ‘by the provision of appropriate 
information’ that flowback disposal impacts would be reduced to an acceptable level (DCLG 2016, 8). 
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4.4 ECONOMIC IMPACTS 
 
The issue of the economic impacts can be split into the impacts of these two specific exploration 
applications, and the more speculative impacts of these sites going into production and ushering in the 
emergence of an industry at scale across Lancashire and the UK more broadly. On the economic benefits 
of these exploration applications there was relatively little disagreement (though RAG did put forward a 
case on the negative economic impacts of these applications, which was contested by the CoC and 
Cuadrilla, and which the Inspector found to be localised and short-term and so not unacceptable). The 
ESs estimated that each exploration site would generate 11 full time jobs in the region (Arup 2014a, 
151, table 9.6). As various parties pointed out this figure includes indirect supply chain effects and 
induced effects associated with increased spending by workers (Arup 2014a, 151). Furthermore, 
specialist labour is anticipated to be drawn from outside of the local area, with opportunities in the local 
area envisaged to arise largely from less skilled jobs such as security and cleaning (Arup 2014a, 153, 
table 9.7). The economic benefits of the exploration stage were expected to extend beyond Lancashire, 
though the ESs make no attempt to quantify such impacts (Arup 2014a, 151).  
Cuadrilla, for their part, did not seek to derive a great deal of weight in support of the appeals from 
these site-specific, exploration phase economic benefits. For example, in closing on behalf of Cuadrilla, 
their QC Lieven states that: 
“The Appellant has not sought to place much weight on the economic benefits of exploration. It 
is accepted that the job generation from exploration alone is limited” (Cuadrilla 2016b, 33).  
The Inspector concludes that:  
“[T]he local economic benefits of the exploration stage would be modest. There would be 
limited job creation generally in low paid unskilled jobs” (McKay 2016, 423).  
The SoS attributes “little positive weight” to these exploration-phase economic benefits (DCLG 2016, 
11). 
 4.4.1 AR E TH E ECONO MI C B EN EFIT S  O F PRO D U CTION-P HA S E,  I ND U ST RY-S CALE FR A CKIN G  MA TERI AL? 
 
The primary issue regarding economic impacts at the inquiry related to the procedural question of the 
materiality of production-phase, industry-scale benefits of shale gas development. The CoC were the 
party that most vigorously argued for the inclusion of these prospective benefits at the inquiry, though 
they were latterly joined by Cuadrilla. LCC, on the other hand, argued that it was clear that such an 
approach was not permitted by planning policy, and that determining exploration applications should be 
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limited to the impacts of the exploration phase only. FoE argued for a consistency of approach – if the 
Inspector was to consider the economic benefits of production-phase at scale, then she must also 
consider the adverse impacts of this later stage and wider scale too (on which FoE’s expert witnesses on 
climate change and public health, in particular, gave evidence). In what follows I will provide an account 
of the various parties’ arguments on this question, as well as the Inspector’s recommendation and SoS’s 
decision.  
The key passages of planning policy relating to this matter were NPPF paragraph 147 and PPGM 
paragraph 120 which both stress the phase-by-phase separation of shale gas planning oversight (see 
A1.2.2 and A1.2.3). 
 
Pre-inquiry written evidence 
In her written evidence to the inquiry the CoC’s chief executive Babs Murphy set out her case on the 
importance of considering the prospective economic benefits for Lancashire of the emergence of a shale 
gas industry in the region. “The evidence presented by the Chamber”, she argues, “shows that there are 
potentially widespread benefits to the UK in terms of economic development and energy security that 
would arise from the development of the shale gas industry”, and these appeals “are at the leading edge 
of this new industry” (Murphy 2016, 2). She goes onto to argue that rejection of these appeals may 
strangle this new industry at birth, or see Lancashire miss out to other regions. Her case relies on a 
number of reports on the potential economic benefits of a UK shale gas industry from the likes of 
Deloitte (Deloitte 2013), Ernst and Young (EY 2014), the House of Lords Economic Affairs Committee 
(HoL 2014), and the Institute of Directors (IoD 2013). Whilst there is variation in the precise scale of 
economic benefits across the aforementioned reports, Murphy argues that the direction of travel is 
clear: 
“My view is that these reports demonstrate that, whatever scenario is most likely, the 
economic benefits from the development of this industry will be considerable and that 
Lancashire is well-positioned to gain if we seize the opportunity and allow shale gas exploration 
to take place on these sites” (Murphy 2016, 3).    
Whilst they do not initially emphatically pursue the prospect of future production-phase at scale 
economic benefits in support of these appeals, Cuadrilla – through their planning expert Smith’s written 
evidence – do hint at doing so. For instance, in his written evidence Smith invokes the NPPF’s paragraph 
144, which prescribes that in determining applications local authorities should “give great weight to the 
benefits of mineral extraction, including to the economy” (DCLG 2012, 34; Smith 2016a, 78). 
Furthermore, he suggests that the proposals help achieve NPPF objectives through the “[e]conomic 
benefits at the exploration stage and wider benefits to the local economy as well as the national 
economy that will follow if sites go into production” (Smith 2016c, 9); and criticises LCC’s initial decision 
for not taking the opportunity to “realise the wider economic benefits that would arise” (Smith 2016c, 
10).      
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Inquiry proceedings 
In their opening statement to the inquiry the CoC reiterate their argument concerning the importance of 
future economic benefits (CoC 2016a). In opening for FoE, Dehon argues that the proposed 
developments do not garner the support of NPPF 144, as Smith suggests in his written evidence above, 
because the economic benefits of the proposed developments are admitted to be minimal. Turning to 
the case of the CoC, Dehon argues that “[t]he evidence of the North West Chamber of Commerce in 
relation to the economic benefits that will flow from a commercial scale industrial shale gas industry are 
both speculative and of little relevance” (FoE 2016a, 9). There is, argues Dehon, a requirement for 
consistency of approach: 
“If the assessment of the project is to be limited only to the developments as “exploration”, 
then the putative benefits of shale gas production cannot be taken into account, nor can they 
be balanced against the climate change, waste disposal, public health and other harms caused 
by the exploration…   If, however, the assessment is to include putative benefits of developing a 
shale gas industry, then the adverse impacts of commercial scale production must also be 
weighed in the balance, including the climate change, waste disposal and public health impacts 
of high-volume hydraulic fracturing at scale” (FoE 2016a, 9–10). 
At the point of cross-examination then, the CoC argued that the Inspector should take into account the 
prospective benefits of a production-phase industry at this exploration application stage. They certainty 
argued that she ought to do so, but – without any planning expertise – were a little light on the question 
of whether planning policy actually permitted such an approach. Cuadrilla, at this stage, only very 
tentatively pursued this line of argument through somewhat vague allusions to wider benefits to the 
national economy if sites go into production. FoE, on the other hand, hedging their bets somewhat, 
argued in the first instance that the case of the CoC was irrelevant, and in the second instance that if it 
was accepted then there was a requirement for a consistency of approach across potential benefits and 
harms. 
In cross-examination, FoE’s barrister Dehon seeks clarification about whether Smith’s case relies on the 
wider economic benefits of production. “As I’ve clarified”, answers Smith, “only through exploration and 
testing will those potential substantial benefits… be realised”. Dehon then makes the point that whether 
exploration will lead to these potential benefits of production is at this point unknown. Smith replies 
that the WMS is quite clear that exploration could lead to those potential substantial benefits (INQ Feb 
10 p3 17.30 – 24.40). Dehon points out that neither the ESs nor Smith in his evidence seek to assess the 
economic benefits from production. “I don’t seek to quantify them”, responds Smith. Dehon points out 
that Smith has nonetheless weighed unquantified general economic benefits in the planning balance in 
favour of the appeals. Smith responds that he did so on the basis of “the policy objectives, one being the 
statement that we’ve referred to a number of times [WMS], that recognises that through exploration 
there could be potential substantial benefits including to the economy”. Seeking clarity, Dehon asks 
directly whether Smith is asking the Inspector to take into account the economic benefits of the sites 
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going into production, to which Smith eventually gives a straight yes. “If the Inspector does take into 
account the economic benefits of production”, she follows up, “as a matter of principle she also has to 
weight in the balance the potential harms caused by the sites going into production does she not?” 
Smith replies that “if that information is available, clearly – I’m not aware if that information is available 
– [then it should be] taken into account”. Finally, Dehon points out that Smith, in his assessment, has 
not factored in such potential harms, in spite of his previous answer. Smith responds that those 
potential harms can be controlled by condition or other regulatory regimes (INQ Feb 10 p4 15.50 – 
45.00). 
In her EiC, the CoC’s chief executive Babs Murphy reiterates once more the chamber’s case on the need 
for the economic benefits of a prospective production phase industry to be included as a consideration 
in this exploration phase decision. Her advocate Whitehead asks her whether it is fair to say that the 
chamber’s approach is one of ‘looking forward’, “raising our eyes from the ground and looking into the 
horizon to see what may be available to Lancashire should exploration be successful”. “I believe”, 
answers Murphy, “that the chamber is duty bound to take a long-term view when it comes to promoting 
initiatives which will help secure the future of the county” (AUD Feb 18 morning 13.55 – 25.50).        
In cross-examining Murphy, LCC’s barrister Alan Evans attempts to locate the CoC’s case on future 
economic benefits within the context of planning policy, which he begins by pointing out Murphy has 
barely mentioned. Evans starts with NPPF 147 (A1.2.2), and puts it to Murphy that “a clear distinction is 
made, is it not, between the various phases?” Murphy eventually answers that she is not a planning 
expert and cannot provide an adequate answer. “But you’ve treated the matter compendiously”, Evans 
persists, “as part of one overall process haven’t you?” “That’s correct”, replies Murphy. Evans takes 
Murphy to PPGM 120 (A1.2.3). “It’s telling us quite clearly, is it not”, proffers Evans, “that you look at 
the exploratory phase on its own merits, without having regard for what might happen in the future if a 
production phase takes place?” Murphy again suggest that she can’t answer the question because she 
lacks the expertise (AUD Feb 18 morning 36.10 – 54.40). 
Evans’ cross-examination of Murphy is immediately followed by that of Dehon for FoE, who gratefully 
adopts Evans’ questioning on planning policy matters. Dehon, in reference to a Department for 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) report on the impacts of shale gas on the rural economy16, 
asks Murphy about the possibility of economic disbenefits to certain sectors of the rural economy, in 
                                                                
16 This report has a slightly chequered history. It was initially released, heavily redacted, in July 2014 following a 
Greenpeace FoI request. The Government came under sustained pressure to release the full report in early 2015, at 
the time when the Infrastructure Bill was going through Parliament, but resisted doing so. By June 2015, around the 
time LCC were initially determining these applications, the Government was ordered to release the report by the 
Information Commissioner. The report was finally released on July 1 2015, subsequent to LCC’s rejection of these 
applications. The unredacted report comes with a covering note stating that the “paper is an early draft; it is not 
analytically robust”, it relies on US evidence which cannot be extrapolated with any reliability, and that the author 
did not have an in-depth knowledge of the UK regulatory framework (DEFRA 2014[2015], no pagination). Murphy, 
in something of an oversight, has only seen the redacted version, which she relies on in part for her case. Dehon 
focuses in particular on the formerly redacted suggestion that “[t]here will also be sectors that gain from the 
expansion of drilling activity but others that may lose business due to increased congestion or perceptions about 
the region” (DEFRA 2014[2015], 11). 
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particular agriculture and tourism. Murphy replies that she doesn’t believe that claims of a negative 
impact on agriculture are ‘necessarily substantiated’, and that she’s “not aware of any evidence that 
tourism in this area would be negatively affected”. Dehon responds that the DEFRA report suggests 
these sectors may be negatively affected, though Murphy picks out ‘may’ as the operative work. Dehon 
suggests that the benefits and disbenefits are unknown, to which Murphy attempts to suggest that the 
estimates of benefits are based on ‘reasoned assumptions’ (and that by implication the estimates of 
disbenefits are not) (AUD Feb 18 morning 1.34.00 – 1.49.00). “When making a general assessment of the 
economic benefits of shale gas”, Dehon then asks, “it is relevant to consider adverse effects is it not?” 
Murphy replies that those effects could be a material consideration at production stage rather than 
looking at it today (AUD Feb 18 morning 1.51.50 – 1.52.55). 
Dehon then turns her attention to several of the documents on which the CoC rely. Starting with the EY 
report (EY 2014), Dehon points to a disclaimer on the final page which states that the information in this 
publication “should neither be regarded as comprehensive nor sufficient for making decisions, nor 
should it be used in place of professional advice” (EY 2014, no pagination). Dehon then goes to page 37 
– with the “little pictures of gas and pipelines and dollar signs” – to point out that the report was 
commissioned by the UK onshore oil and gas (UKOOG) industry body. “As you can see from the 
rainbows and dollar signs”, Dehon asks in a slightly arch tone, “this report is essentially a piece of PR 
produced for the industry isn’t it?” Murphy disagrees that EY would risk their reputation to co-author a 
biased report. Dehon then points out the EY report is based on the high-end scenario for a UK shale gas 
industry from the IoD report (IoD 2013). Moving on to that IoD report, Dehon points out that it was 
sponsored by Cuadrilla. Again, Murphy suggests that she doesn’t believe that this would have influenced 
the IoD. Finally, they move onto the Deloitte report (Deloitte 2013), which, again, Dehon points out was 
commissioned by Cuadrilla (AUD Feb 18 morning 1.52.22 – 2.06.10). 
In a final relevant section of inquiry proceeding, LCC’s barrister Evans asks LCC’s planning witness Katie 
Atkinson “whether the benefits and impacts of a potential future production phase… should be 
considered at this point in the decision-making process…?” “No it shouldn’t”, replies Atkinson 
emphatically, “paragraph 147 of the NPPF clearly states that we should treat all three stages separately 
and this is supported by paragraph 120 of mineral planning policy guidance” (INQ 25 Feb p1 52.15 – 
53.05).  
At the close of cross-examination, then, the CoC had stood firm on their case that the Inspector should 
take the economic benefits of a production-phase shale gas industry into account in this exploratory 
decision. LCC had argued that planning policy plainly forbids this. The evidence of Cuadrilla’s planning 
expert Mark Smith had sought to open up scope for interpretative flexibility in that policy position by 
arguing that the benefits of production phase should weight in favour of the exploratory projects on 
which their realisation is contingent. FoE, finally, challenged Smith on his weighing of prospective 
benefits in favour of the appeals and reiterated the requirement for a consistency of approach; and 
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challenged Murphy on the economic disbenefits of a shale industry and the credibility of the economic 
estimates on which she relied.         
In closing for the chamber, Murphy acknowledges the difficulty of “putting a proportionate weighting on 
the possibility of future economic potential”, but suggests that the question should not be totally 
excluded, before concluding that:   
“It’s our view that the approval of these planning applications could help to kick-start an 
important new industry that would bring significant economic benefits to Lancashire. We 
believe that these potential benefits should be taken into account in determining these 
applications…” (CoC 2016b, no pagination). 
Closing for Cuadrilla, their QC Lieven mounts an argument for an inconsistent approach to the 
consideration of future, production-phase economic benefits on the one hand, and future, production-
phase adverse impacts on the other, at the exploratory application decision-making stage.   
“[I]t is a necessary truth that the UK and Lancashire will never get the potential benefits of SG 
extraction if the exploration phase is not allowed to go ahead. It is therefore not possible to 
wholly divorce the two. In other words whilst it is appropriate to limit the consideration of 
impacts to exploration because if there is a subsequent extraction application impacts will have 
to be considered all over again, the same is not quite the same for wider economic benefits. On 
the long term economic benefits these can only ultimately follow if these appeals are allowed 
and exploration goes ahead” (Cuadrilla 2016b, 33–34). 
She then sets out the positive side of the planning balance, including the ‘great weight’ to be given to 
mineral extraction in the NPPF and to the benefits of shale gas exploration – energy security, economic 
growth, responding to climate change – set out in the WMS (Cuadrilla 2016b, 35).  
Dehon, for FoE, argues again that there is “a clear requirement for consistency of approach”, and points 
out that Cuadrilla have drawn attention to the phase-by-phase separation of oversight prescribed in 
policy when it has suited them (on public health) (FoE 2016b, 22). In conclusion, she suggests that: 
“If the assessment of the project is to be limited only to the developments as “exploration”, 
then the putative benefits of shale gas production cannot be taken into account, nor can they 
be balanced against the climate change, waste disposal, public health and other harms caused 
by the exploration... If, however, as Mark Smith suggested in his evidence, the assessment 
should include putative benefits of developing a shale gas industry, then the adverse impacts of 
commercial scale production must also be weighed in the balance” (FoE 2016b, 22).  
Finally, Evans, closing for LCC, reiterates that the “potential benefits of any future production phase do 
not fall for consideration at this point” as is made clear in NPPF 147 and then ‘put beyond doubt’ in 
PPGM 120 (LCC 2016, 33). The CoC, he argues, has “stationed itself on the very territory which that 
policy places out of bounds” (LCC 2016, 34).  
 
Recommendation and decision 
In her recommendation, whilst recognising that the WMS references substantial benefits that exploring 
and developing shale gas resources could potentially generate, the Inspector nonetheless finds that “in 
127 
 
 
 
the light of the NPPF and PPGM guidance, the potential wider economic benefits of shale gas production 
at scale should be given very limited weight at this stage” (McKay 2016, 421). She concludes that: 
“The national economic benefits would only flow from commercial production at scale at some 
point in the future depending to an extent upon the outcome of the exploration works. I 
attribute little weight to those wider benefits in the context of the exploratory works 
development which is the subject of these appeals” (McKay 2016, 423). 
The SoS gives “no weight” – going slightly further than the Inspector - to the national benefits which 
could flow from commercial production at scale at some point in the future (DCLG 2016, 11). Ultimately, 
then, the Inspector finds that the future benefits of production at scale are procedurally prohibited from 
consideration by NPPF 147 and PPGM 120. As will be explored in the analysis to come, however, this 
apparent procedural exclusion did not prevent these envisaged economic benefits of a production-
phase shale gas industry from having an influence on these decisions. This influence occurred indirectly 
via the support and national need set out in the WMS on the basis of these very, ostensibly immaterial 
benefits (alongside the energy security and emissions reduction benefits stemming from production at 
scale also envisaged in the WMS). 
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5. FINDINGS II: ANALYSIS – THE PRODUCTION OF JUSTIFICATION THROUGH FOUR FORMS OF CLOSURE 
 
Having presented the near total failure of FoE’s case across the four issues of climate change, public 
health, waste disposal, and economic impacts in the previous chapter, this chapter analyses the reasons 
for that failure. It will be argued that justification was produced for these proposals and shale 
development more broadly through four ‘forms of closure’ through which the inquiry was rendered 
insensitive to the concerns of FoE. Those four forms of closure are ‘double compartmentalisation’, 
‘vertical deference’, ‘horizontal deference’, and ‘selective scepticism and credulity’.  
Each of these forms of closure will be explained in turn, along with their impact on the decision-making 
process. The term ‘forms of closure’ is used here to describe various mechanisms through which the 
inquiry is rendered insensitive to certain arguments and matters of concern. This insensitivity can arise 
from either procedurally excluding a matter from consideration or the conduct of consideration itself. 
The effect of these forms of closure is that arguments are either not given serious consideration and not 
weighted in the decision, or not given proper scrutiny yet registered. The first three forms of closure are 
procedural – arguments and concerns are excluded as immaterial because the rules are interpreted as 
prescribing as much. The final form of closure operates through the conduct of scrutiny – claims made 
by FoE and Cuadrilla are treated differently and scrutiny of the proposals is generally shallow.      
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5.1 DOUBLE COMPARTMENTALISATION 
 
Double compartmentalisation is a procedural means of closure that dictates that the oversight of shale 
gas development is bounded and sequenced on an application-by-application, phase-by-phase basis. 
That is, arguments and matters of concern relating to a production-phase, and industry scale are 
immaterial, rendering the inquiry insensitive to such issues. The first, application-by-application 
compartmentalisation is a general convention in planning, whereas the second, phase-by-phase 
compartmentalisation is prescribed in planning policy specific to onshore oil and gas development. Key 
passages of policy here include paragraph 147 of the NPPF and paragraph 120 of the PPGM (see A1.2.2 
and A1.2.3). 
The compartmentalised approach to shale gas planning then is a means of closure through blunt 
procedural exclusion. Arguments and matters of concern relating to a potential production-phase and 
broader industry scale are rendered immaterial as they overflow the bounds of relevance drawn by 
double compartmentalisation. As will be argued below in relation to the issues of public health and 
climate change, the double compartmentalised approach produces justification through the exclusion of 
future phase and industry scale concerns whilst potentially promoting myopia and tunnel-vision in 
regulatory oversight. Furthermore, as will be discussed in relation to the issues of climate change and 
economic impacts, justification is also produced through the selective and partial suspension of double 
compartmentalisation when it comes to the Government envisaged benefits expressed in the WMS.  
 5.1.1 TH E EFFECT  O F DOU B LE COMPA RT MENT ALI S ATION  ON  T H E IS S U E O F PU B LI C H EA LT H 
 
On the issue of public health Cuadrilla and FoE contested the procedural question of whether evidence 
on the public health impacts of a production-phase shale gas industry should be considered material to 
these applications. Cuadrilla argued that this was clearly not the case, relying primarily on NPPF 147. FoE 
argued, on the other hand, that production at scale health impacts should be considered at the inquiry 
because it was the very prospect of those impacts that was in large part causing ‘indirect’ health impacts 
on local residents manifesting at this point. The disagreement turned therefore on the question of 
whether these indirect health impacts necessitate the consideration of future production at scale health 
impacts. As we saw in the previous chapter, the Inspector sided with Cuadrilla’s interpretation of the 
correct planning approach in answering no.  
The main consequence of this ‘double compartmentalisation’ for the issue of public health is the 
procedural exclusion of the public health impacts of the production phase of these sites (phase-by-
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phase), and of a prospective shale gas industry (application-by-application). FoE’s public health expert, 
Dr David McCoy, argued that the public health risks of production at scale are greater because of the 
potentially greater longevity, intensity and concentration of operations. 
The phase-by-phase closure is of course only a delay, given that the public health impacts of a 
production phase application will be considered in a subsequent planning process. This delay, however, 
is itself potentially problematic given that it renders exploration application decisions myopic to possibly 
obvious issues on the horizon. It would of course be a waste of everybody’s time and resources to grant 
exploration permission to sites that are unacceptable in planning terms for production in foreseeable 
ways. The point here is not necessarily that there are foreseeable ways in which these or other sites will 
be unacceptable for production, but that the phase-by-phase sequencing of oversight prevents 
consideration of that possibility. In this way, the phase-by-phase compartmentalisation is susceptible to 
producing ‘lock-in’ (see David 1985; see also Arthur 1994). In other words, the issue here is one of 
causing stranded assets (because sites that were acceptable for exploration turn out to be unacceptable 
for production) or the generation of pressure to force through unacceptable production applications (to 
avoid the stranding of assets). 
Whilst the phase-by-phase compartmentalisation obscures future concerns, the application-by-
application compartmentalisation obscures consideration of spatiality. That is, the possible cumulative 
impacts arising from an industry – many sites across the country or a region operating concurrently and 
in some cases closely together. If the phase-by-phase compartmentalisation risks myopia, then the 
application-by-application approach risks tunnel-vision. Of course, the notion of ‘cumulative impacts’ in 
planning has the potential to enable consideration of broader and snowballing issues that would begin 
to arise with the ramp up of an industry, though it remains to be seen how the concept will be wielded 
in planning decision-making in practice. Without a relatively expansive interpretation of the concept of 
cumulative impacts, planning processes are effectively prohibited from inquiring into the acceptability in 
planning terms of the public health impacts – or any other impacts for that matter - of a shale gas 
industry as a whole. 
In sum then, the closure performed by double compartmentalisation on the issue of public health 
rendered the inquiry insensitive to potential matters of concern arising from production-phase 
operations (phase-by-phase) and a shale gas industry as a whole (application-by-application). The 
former type of closure is a delay in consideration, but carries with it the potentially foreseeable risks of 
‘lock-in’ or stranded assets. The latter potentially prevents consideration of the acceptability of the 
impacts of an industry in planning terms unless a relatively expansive interpretation of the concept of 
‘cumulative impacts’ counteracts its tendency towards tunnel-vision.  
 5.1.2 TH E EFFECT  O F DOU B LE COMPA RT MENT ALI S ATION  ON  T H E IS S U E O F CLI MA TE CHA NG E 
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On the issue of climate change, FoE again claimed that the future phase and industry scale impacts of 
shale gas development – which FoE’s climate change expert witness Professor Kevin Anderson argued 
would be irreconcilable with UK climate change commitments – were relevant for consideration at this 
exploration decision stage. In this instance they argued that these future and wider impacts were 
relevant because Cuadrilla alluded to climate and energy security benefits relating to production at 
scale, to which Anderson provides a counter argument. Cuadrilla don’t actually contest the materiality 
of FoE’s climate change case on the grounds of it overflowing the scope of the inquiry as set by double 
compartmentalisation. Instead, they argue that Anderson’s case is immaterial on the grounds that it 
conflicts with Government energy policy as set out in the WMS. Here Cuadrilla appeal to the form of 
closure discussed in the following section - ‘vertical deference’. Nonetheless, in resolving the contest the 
Inspectors rejects FoE’s climate change case by appealing to both forms of closure. Not only is 
Anderson’s case rejected because “there can be no doubt that shale gas is seen [in policy] as being 
compatible with the aim to reduce GHG emissions by assisting in the transition process over the longer 
term to a low carbon economy” (McKay 2016, 407), but also because:     
“For the purposes of these appeals, the analysis should be limited to a consideration of the 
project emissions during construction, operation and decommissioning, together with 
cumulative impacts as assessed by the ESs within the framework set by national and local 
policies” (McKay 2016, 407). 
Anderson’s arguments that relate to the climate change benefits envisaged in the WMS are rejected, in 
part, because they relate to a future production phase, and wider industry scale (in so much as they 
relate to a role and carbon budget space for gas and shale gas generally, rather than the gas emitted by 
these applications). Therefore, double compartmentalisation performs part of the work of closure 
alongside the approach of vertical deference toward the Government view (see section 5.2 below).  
Double compartmentalisation takes a key matter influencing the acceptability of the projects’ GHG 
emissions – what these emissions work towards (production, an industry), and whether that is 
acceptable on climate change grounds - off the table. Despite this question of purpose necessarily 
impacting on the judgement over the acceptability of the emissions considered here, it relates to a later 
phase (production) and a broader scale (an industry) than can be accommodated in this forum as a 
result of double compartmentalisation. What is left on the table – the Government view, which of 
course also relates to phases and scales beyond the scope of what’s material as dictated by double 
compartmentalisation – is therefore shielded from criticism. This shielding occurs both because of 
vertical deference (see section 5.2 below) and because criticising this view would entail an analysis, like 
Anderson’s, that goes beyond ‘a consideration of the project emissions during construction, operation 
and decommissioning’ to consider the reconcilability of a shale gas industry with climate change 
obligations.   
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In this way, double compartmentalisation is unevenly applied on the issue of climate change. Alongside 
vertical deference it closes Anderson’s case on the negative impacts of production at scale on climate 
change as immaterial. On the other hand, this studious policing of the phase-by-phase, application-by-
application bounding is not extended to the reasoning behind the Government support for shale 
development articulated in the WMS. This support is based on three anticipated benefits – economic, 
energy security, and climate change mitigation. Obviously, the Government-anticipated climate change 
benefits of shale gas will require production phase development, and any appreciable benefit would 
require production on an industry scale. The policy support set out in the WMS is given ‘great weight’ in 
favour of the appeals in spite of the benefits on which it is based only arising from phases and scales 
ostensibly beyond the remit of the inquiry as set by double compartmentalisation. The issue is 
compounded by the fact that inquiry participants cannot question these Government-claimed benefits - 
not only because as will be seen the possibility of doing so is closed by vertical deference, but also 
because double compartmentalisation prohibits arguments at the inquiry from straying to the future 
phases and wider scales that such questioning would entail. This bounding of materiality, however, 
appears to apply only to the arguments of inquiry participants and is overlooked when it comes to the 
expressed reasoning underpinning Government policy. The myopia and tunnel-vision of double 
compartmentalisation is partially lifted as the inquiry registers an optimistic vision of the climate change 
impacts (and indeed economic and energy security impacts) of future phase, industry scale shale 
development, whilst remaining in place to block the inquiry from considering any scrutiny of that vision.  
In sum then, the closure performed by the double compartmentalisation of oversight rendered the 
inquiry insensitive to Anderson’s case on the reconcilability of production at scale and the UK’s climate 
change obligations by way of blunt procedural exclusion. Furthermore, the uneven application of double 
compartmentalisation between rule 6 party participants on the one hand, and the reasoning behind 
Government policy on the other, led the inquiry to register Government-expected climate change 
benefits in favour of the proposals whilst maintaining an insensitivity to any scrutiny of those 
expectations. 
 5.1.3 TH E EFFECT  O F DOU B LE COMPA RT MENT ALI S ATION  ON  T H E IS S U E O F ECONO MI C I MPA CTS      
The uneven application of double compartmentalisation is repeated on the issue of economic impacts. 
The arguments of FoE and LCC were ostensibly successful here, as the Inspector rejected the CoC’s 
argument on the materiality of future economic benefits of a shale gas industry. Here, double 
compartmentalisation initially appears to count against the appeals. This is potentially myopic too, as 
the exploration phase produces only limited benefits in its own right, but is a necessary step towards the 
development of an industry that – according to its advocates – represents a potential bonanza. 
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Employing their own sensory metaphor, the CoC’s position was that the inquiry should raise its ‘eyes 
from the ground and look into the horizon’. However, the effect of compartmentalisation is ultimately 
subverted in this application-hostile case. This is because the policy support of the WMS, based in part 
on precisely the same envisaged benefits that were immaterial in the hands of the CoC (who even rely 
on the same IoD report), is given great weight in favour of the appeals. The double compartmentalised 
approach is therefore effectively partially suspended on the one issue where it stood to exclude a 
benefit from weighting in favour of the appeals. These putative benefits are registered as counting in 
favour of the proposals, whilst the inquiry is rendered insensitive to potential future and cumulative 
adverse impacts through the myopia and tunnel-vision enforced by double compartmentalisation.    
It is only a partial suspension because scrutiny of these economic benefits remains closed through a 
combination of vertical deference and double compartmentalisation - much in the same way as on the 
climate change issue above. That there is a national need for shale gas development in part because of 
the envisaged economic benefits of an industry at scale cannot be questioned because these matters 
are beyond the bounds set by double compartmentalisation and because the Government view is 
deferred to. Nonetheless these ostensibly immaterial benefits weight in favour of the appeals indirectly 
via the policy support established in the WMS.  
The economic benefits anticipated in the WMS are referenced to the EY report (EY 2014). FoE’s barrister 
Estelle Dehon pointed out during the cross-examination of Babs Murphy that this report includes a 
disclaimer that states that the publication “should neither be regarded as comprehensive nor sufficient 
for making decisions, nor should it be used in place of professional advice” (EY 2014, no pagination). 
Furthermore, she described it as “a piece of PR produced for the industry”. The EY report was 
commissioned by UKOOG, and takes its assumptions about a future UK shale gas industry from the high-
end scenario of the IoD report (IoD 2013). The IoD study’s high-end scenario envisaged the drilling of 
4,000 lateral wells between 2016 and 2032, and was ‘sponsored’ by Cuadrilla. In other words, the 
envisaged future economic benefits that weighed in favour of the granting of permission to Cuadrilla’s 
exploration applications in this case whilst not being scrutinised by the inquiry were ultimately derived 
from a vision of a future UK shale gas industry from a report that Cuadrilla themselves sponsored. 
Furthermore, the inquiry also failed to consider the potential adverse impacts on climate change, public 
health and waste of the IoD’s 4,000 lateral wells scenario from which those benefits are expected to 
arise. It was these very matters of concern that Anderson and McCoy unsuccessfully attempted to raise. 
However, their consideration was placed beyond the remit of the inquiry as set by the double 
compartmentalised approach, which in these cases was studiously observed. As such, all scrutiny of 
future phase and industry scale impacts (positive and negative) is closed at the inquiry, but the expected 
positive impacts are nonetheless selectively and blindly registered in the decision through the WMS. 
This case, along with the climate change example discussed previously, demonstrates how the 
Government view is subject to different rules than the arguments of rule 6 parties. Government energy 
and climate change policy can be based on reasoning that would be excluded as immaterial through the 
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closure performed by double compartmentalisation were it expressed by a rule 6 party (as the fate of 
the CoC makes clear). However, because it comes from the Government that very same argument is 
treated with vertical deference, not scrutinised, and registered as a matter of great weight. 
In sum then, the economic benefits of production at scale, which the CoC argued ought to be taken into 
account at the inquiry, seemingly suffered the same fate as FoE’s similar arguments on climate change 
and public health. However, these very benefits ultimately still weighed in favour of the applications via 
the WMS. As such, the uneven application of double compartmentalisation led to the inquiry registering 
Government-expected economic benefits in favour of the proposals whilst the fog of double 
compartmentalisation continued to block both any scrutiny of those expected benefits and any 
consideration of matters of concern arising from a production-phase industry of the scale required to 
produce them.   
 5.1.4 SU MMAR Y   
Table 3: The uneven effect of double compartmentalisation 
Issue FoE argument Resolution 
Public health The negative public health 
impacts of future production at 
scale (which McCoy claims will 
be more intense than for the 
exploration phase) should be 
scrutinised and taken into 
account now because their 
anticipation amongst the public 
is resulting in ‘indirect’ health 
impacts at this point 
The negative (FoE claim) 
production at scale health 
impacts are immaterial 
Waste Did not robustly put forward an 
argument concerning the 
potential impacts of future 
production at scale on waste 
treatment capacity, though 
Watson does allude to the 
obvious point that the present 
level of capacity would be 
quickly overwhelmed  
Resolution not required, though 
Watson’s non-raising of the 
issue may have been because he 
anticipated the double 
compartmentalised approach 
Climate change The negative climate change 
impacts of future production 
phase at scale (which Anderson 
argues would be incompatible 
with climate change 
commitments) should be 
scrutinised and taken into 
account now because Cuadrilla 
allude to the supposed benefits 
of such production at scale in 
support of the proposals 
The negative (FoE claim) 
production at scale climate 
change impacts are immaterial. 
The positive (the Government 
claim) production at scale 
climate change impacts are 
taken into account in favour of 
the applications via the WMS, 
whilst FoE’s questioning of the 
purported climate change 
benefits is closed through a 
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combination of double 
compartmentalisation and 
vertical deference 
Economic impacts There should be a consistency 
of approach. If future economic 
benefits are deemed material 
at this point then so should 
FoE’s arguments concerning 
future adverse impacts on 
climate change and public 
health 
FoE’s argument is ostensibly 
successful, though the positive 
(the Government claim) 
production at scale economic 
impacts are taken into account 
in favour of the applications via 
the WMS, whilst FoE’s 
questioning of the purported 
economic benefits is closed 
through a combination of 
double compartmentalisation 
and vertical deference 
     
As can be seen in tables 3 and 4, where possible negative impacts of production at scale were raised by 
FoE, the inquiry was rendered insensitive to those matters of concern through double 
compartmentalisation. However, where the expectation of future industry-scale benefits underpinned 
Government policy support, that policy support was registered as counting in favour of the proposals 
(even where those very same benefits had been explicitly resolved as immaterial when put forward by a 
rule 6 party, as in the case of the CoC’s arguments on economic impacts). Furthermore, questioning of 
these claimed benefits remained closed through a combination of double compartmentalisation and 
vertical deference. The bounding of the inquiry’s remit according to double compartmentalisation is 
studiously policed in all cases except where production at scale benefits anticipated by the Government 
underpin policy support. This has the unfortunate and irrational effect of waiving through claims of 
benefits made by the Government (because of the status of their maker), whilst rendering the inquiry 
insensitive to both any scrutiny of those claimed benefits and any corollary negative impacts of 
production at scale. It appears, then, that either the ostensibly immaterial benefits were obscured and 
smuggled in behind the categories ‘policy support’ or ‘national need’, or that when they come into 
tension ‘vertical deference’ trumps ‘double compartmentalisation’ (i.e. double compartmentalisation’s 
tendency towards closure on these future phase, industry scale issues was superseded by vertical 
deference’s normative pull towards the realisation of Government policy).     
Table 4: The uneven effect of double compartmentalisation continued     
Issue Do the impacts 
weight in favour 
or against the 
proposals? 
Are future 
production at 
scale impacts 
found material? 
Are the 
impacts taken 
into account in 
the decision? 
The effect of double 
compartmentalisation 
Public health FoE argue 
against 
No No Scrutiny and registration 
of claimed negative 
impacts are closed 
Waste n/a n/a No The obvious argument is 
not made in the first place 
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In conclusion, the myopia and tunnel-vision caused by double compartmentalisation is compounded by 
the selective suspension of double compartmentalisation when registering Government-expected 
benefits in favour of the appeals whilst any scrutiny of those expectations remains prohibited. In this 
way, justification is produced through the insensitivity to future phase and industry scale matters of 
concern created by the blunt procedural exclusion of double compartmentalisation. This is 
supplemented by a selective receptiveness to Government-envisaged benefits whilst double 
compartmentalisation continues to block their scrutiny. 
 
  
Climate change FoE argue 
against; the 
WMS argues in 
favour 
No The positive 
impacts are via 
the WMS 
Scrutiny and registration 
of the claimed negative 
impacts are closed; 
scrutiny of the claimed 
benefits is closed whilst 
they are deferentially 
registered, partially 
subverting double 
compartmentalisation 
Economic 
impacts 
CoC and the 
WMS argue in 
favour; FoE 
argue against 
(they emphasise 
economic 
disbenefits) 
No The positive 
impacts are via 
the WMS 
Scrutiny and registration 
of the claimed negative 
impacts are closed; 
scrutiny of the claimed 
benefits is closed whilst 
they are deferentially 
registered, partially 
subverting double 
compartmentalisation 
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5.2 VERTICAL DEFERENCE 
 
Vertical deference is a procedural means of closure arising from a deferential orientation to 
Government policy and the reasoning underpinning it. Where Government articulates claims about the 
benefits of shale gas development in general, any line of argument or matter of concern that conflicts 
with this Government view is rejected as procedurally immaterial. To be clear, these excluded 
arguments are not rejected on the basis of their intellectual merit – no such judgement is made one way 
or the other. They are simply procedurally excluded and so not considered or registered. 
The WMS given by Amber Rudd to the House of Commons on September 16 2015 was the key 
expression of Government shale policy at the inquiry. The statement makes clear that there is a 
“national need to explore and develop our shale gas and oil resources” (DCLG/DECC 2015, no 
pagination). This national need arises because of anticipated energy security, economic and emissions 
reduction benefits from exploring and developing domestic shale resources (see A1.1.1, para. 2). 
The expectation of ‘lower carbon emissions’ is explicitly based on the ‘bridging fuel’ argument (see 
A.1.1., para. 8). The ‘bridging’ argument sees coal-to-gas or indeed imported-to-domestic gas supply 
substitution as a positive and necessary, immediate short-to-medium term step towards meeting the 
UK’s GHG emissions reduction targets. 
As will be argued below – using the example of climate change – the vertical deference of planning 
towards current Government policy (to encourage shale gas development) and the Government view 
(the reasoning and claims underpinning that encouragement) produces justification through the 
procedural exclusion of arguments and concerns contrary to the Government view. This results in the 
shielding of the claims underpinning policy as critique-protected beliefs.  
The prospective economic benefits of a shale gas industry were another underpinning reason behind the 
policy position adopted in the WMS. However, unlike on the issue of climate change, the Government 
view on prospective economic benefits was not directly challenged by FoE, and so won’t be covered in 
detail here (FoE did of course challenge the plausibility of the CoC’s economic benefits case, which, as 
already seen, refers to the same benefits envisaged in the WMS).  5.2.1 TH E EFFECT  O F V ER TI CA L D EFEREN CE O N T H E IS SU E O F CLI MAT E CH AN G E 
 
On the issue of climate change, Cuadrilla and FoE argued over whether the credibility of the 
Government view on the relationship between shale gas and climate change as set out in the WMS 
could be questioned at the inquiry. Ultimately, the WMS and the support for shale development it 
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expresses are given ‘great weight’ by the Inspector. Anderson’s first and third of three headline 
conclusions – the two relevant here – stated that: 
“[U]nder the UK existing carbon budget, gas can only have a marginal and rapidly declining role 
in generating electricity post-2030” (Anderson 2016a, 8). 
And that: 
“If the UK is to abide by the explicit commitment of the Paris Agreement… then there is no 
viable emission space within the UK’s carbon budget for shale gas to fulfil even a transition 
role. This stark conclusion holds for shale gas in relation to electricity generation, as a source of 
energy for heating fuel or indeed as a transport fuel” (Anderson 2016a, 10). 
The Inspector suggests that both headline conclusions are headed-off by the WMS, which is at present 
“the Government’s position in relation to the need for shale gas exploration and the need for gas to 
support its climate change target” (McKay 2016, 407). Furthermore, she agrees with Cuadrilla that:  
“[T]he issues raised by Professor Anderson as to how shale gas relates to the obligations such 
as those set out in the Paris Agreement, and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) carbon budgets, are a matter for future national policy and not for these appeals” 
(McKay 2016, 407).  
In her conclusion on climate change, the Inspector states that “[t]aking an overall view of national 
policy, there can be no doubt that shale gas is seen as being compatible with the aim to reduce GHG 
emissions by assisting in the transition process over the longer term to a low carbon economy” (McKay 
2016, 429). 
The first headline conclusion stands irrespective of (though is exacerbated by) Paris, is not exclusively 
related to shale, and is not necessarily incompatible with the WMS. It’s distinguished from the WMS on 
the basis of the level of detail it provides about the likely timescale over which gas can play a role of any 
significance in electricity generation in the UK. Elsewhere Anderson also argues that neither DECC nor 
the CCC have been able to develop ~2 degree post-2030 scenarios that maintain a significant role in 
supplying domestic, commercial and industrial heat for gas (Anderson 2016a, 8). Whereas the WMS 
envisions a need for gas ‘for years to come’ (see A1.1.1, para. 3), Anderson envisions a need to move 
significantly away from gas – for power generation and heating – beyond 2030. So long as the WMS’s 
‘years to come’ do not extend beyond 2030, the two statements are not in conflict. 
FoE, no doubt conscious of the inquiry’s vertical deference, were careful to couch their approach on this 
issue as a matter of helping to understand the WMS as opposed to challenging it. On this headline 
conclusion that description is entirely apt. The credibility of the claim about the role for natural gas ‘for 
years to come’ is not challenged, Anderson merely provides greater detail on the timescale and the 
reasoning behind it. 
The third headline conclusion, on the other hand, does blatantly challenge the WMS, albeit in the light 
of subsequent events. There being – in the context of Paris – no viable emissions space within the UK’s 
carbon budget for shale gas to fulfil even a transitional role clearly questions the credibility of the claim 
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that ‘shale gas can create a bridge…’. Anderson argues that the Government view is rendered out-of-
date by Paris and Bate makes much the same point regarding CCS. As such, FoE argue that the weight 
given to the support expressed in the WMS should be substantially reduced. This argument, and its 
inherent criticism of the Government view, is rejected by the Inspector because it is at odds with the 
policy position, and because the Inspector identifies national policy development as the site to respond 
to those subsequent events.  
Furthermore, Dehon’s procedural claim - that as a matter of law the correct approach to the WMS is for 
the Inspector to assess the weight to be given to it in the light of the evidence before the inquiry – is 
implicitly rejected. The approach is not, as Dehon suggests it should be, to assess Anderson’s evidence, 
come to a view about whether the Government view remains credible in the light of subsequent events, 
and then adjust the weight given to the support of the WMS accordingly. The approach is, instead, to 
consider whether this inquiry has the authority to do the above – the conclusion being no. The 
assessment travels in the opposite direction - instead of looking to FoE’s case first and then adjusting 
the weight of the WMS accordingly, the move is to look to the WMS first and foremost and assess 
whether FoEs’ case is compatible with it. At no point is the credibility of, say, Anderson’s claim about the 
effect of Paris on the continuing viability of UK shale gas policy assessed. The assessment is whether 
Anderson’s claim can or needs to be considered in this forum. When the Inspector explicitly states in her 
reasoning that she has given ‘careful consideration’ to Anderson’s evidence on the weight to be given to 
the Government view (McKay 2016, 283), she is being somewhat disingenuous. She has instead, I would 
argue, given (no doubt careful) consideration to whether she has the authority to, or is required to, 
consider the evidence of Anderson that leads to his first and third headline conclusions. The twin 
procedural closures of vertical deference and, as we saw in previous section, double 
compartmentalisation mean that such consideration is closed. 
The contest, therefore, is entirely procedural - it concerns whether the rules of the process allow the 
argument to be considered; as opposed to epistemic – concerning the credibility of the beliefs on which 
the argument is based. What is closed from consideration at the inquiry is the debate about whether 
Paris and CCS undermine the belief that shale gas can act as a bridge, and so render Government shale 
policy problematic. That debate, resolves the Inspector, can only be conducted at the level of national 
energy policy. The effect of this is to shield the belief that shale gas can act as a bridge from criticism at 
the inquiry, in spite of a major change of circumstance and expert evidence before the inquiry 
suggesting that that change of circumstance now renders the belief problematic. The Government 
support based on this belief, therefore, cannot be undermined at the inquiry. 
As such, the WMS is not just a material consideration to be weighed in the balance. In conjunction with 
vertical deference, it renders the issue of climate change necessarily and entirely closed at the inquiry. 
In other words, the WMS is not only weighed in the balance, but actively defines and excludes 
arguments that cannot add their weight to the other end of the scales. No GHG impact from the projects 
could have been considered anything other than an aid to the reduction of GHG emissions. The 
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approach of vertical deference taken to the WMS here, and so the closure of the contrary claims of 
Anderson concerning the beliefs about shale gas and climate change therein, render the assessment of 
the acceptability of the projects’ GHG emissions a foregone conclusion. So long as the present WMS 
remains in place, and decision-makers don’t take an entirely different approach to it, this will be the 
case at any shale gas planning decision-making exercise.  
In sum then, as is demonstrated in figure 2 below, the procedural approach taken to the WMS was one 
of vertical deference, resulting in the shielding of the Government view from criticism. The Inspector 
deemed that the inquiry did not have the authority to question the beliefs about the relationship 
between shale gas and climate change on which the support expressed in the WMS was in part based. 
This was reinforced, as was previously demonstrated, by the double compartmentalisation of planning 
oversight. This twin procedural closure resulted in claims that questioned the Government view on this 
matter – most notably Anderson’s third headline conclusion and Bate’s arguments on CCS – being closed 
as immaterial, even though both were based on a change of circumstance subsequent to the WMS. 
Irrespective of the relative epistemic credibility of the FoE challenge and the Government’s original 
view, the general relationship set out in the WMS – that shale gas helps reduce GHG emissions – could 
not be unsettled in this forum. As such, the contest over the acceptability of these specific projects’ GHG 
emissions was rendered a foregone conclusion by the deferential approach adopted to the WMS. The 
inquiry therefore produced justification for these appeals and shale development more broadly through 
the blunt procedural exclusion of certain arguments and matters of concern as they conflicted with the 
Government view. As a result, this view could not be questioned at the inquiry whilst the policy support 
based on it weighed in favour of the appeals.  
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Figure 2: Procedural closure through vertical deference and the critique-protected nature of the Government view 
142 
 
 
 
5.3 HORIZONTAL DEFERENCE 
 
‘Horizontal deference’ is a procedural form of closure based on a deferential orientation to other 
regulators and regulation in general. Where vertical deference imposed a deferential orientation 
upwards to Government policy, horizontal deference refers to a similarly deferential orientation across 
to other regulators (mainly the EA in this case) and the regulatory system in general. Horizontal 
deference can relate to the regulatory responsibilities of another regulator where particular issues are 
found to be immaterial at the inquiry because the EA have or will deal with matter in their permitting 
process. Furthermore, horizontal deference can relate to a more generic expectation of the 
consummate regulation of shale development. The former is to do with regulatory responsibility and 
excludes certain matters from consideration by the planning decision-maker; whereas the latter is to do 
with the regulatory system’s capacity to control potential hazards and closes concerns based around risk 
and uncertainty to serious consideration. I will refer to the former variant as ‘regulatory remit 
deference’ and to the latter as ‘consummate regulation deference’. 
The key existing regulatory decision in this case was the EA’s decision to grant the projects the required 
environmental permits (see EA 2015). This had involved the EA scrutinising matters that had some 
degree of overlap with the issues raised by FoE at the inquiry. However, the precise degree of overlap 
was often slightly ambiguous. For example, on the issue of climate change the EA had scrutinised the 
effect of the projects’ emissions on local air quality, but not the impact of a subset of those emissions 
(i.e. GHGs) on climate change.      
Regulatory remit deference excludes arguments and matters of concern considered by the EA in their 
environmental permitting process as immaterial. Below I will consider how the matter of waste disposal 
capacity was closed in such a way. Consummate regulation deference excludes arguments and matters 
of concern that contradict the assumption, enshrined in planning policy, that the regulatory system will 
operate effectively. Below I will consider how the issue of public health was closed in such a way. As 
such, and as will be argued below, horizontal deference produces justification through the procedural 
exclusion of arguments and matters of concern that either are interpreted as being the responsibility of 
another agency, or that violate the expectation of the consummate regulation of operations. 
The approach of horizontal deference is established in planning policy, in particular paragraphs 122 and 
112 of the NPPF and PPGM respectively (see A1.2.2 and A1.2.3). There is a discretionary possibility for a 
planning decision maker to override the approach of regulatory remit deference which arises from the 
Inspectors interpretation of the case of FFB vs. WSCC (see A1.3.1). The Inspector’s interpretation of this 
ruling was that: 
“Mr Justice Gilbart did not, in that case, say that there is an irrebuttable presumption that 
matters which are addressed to any extent by a regulator cannot be taken into account by the 
planning decision-maker. He identified that the committee had sufficient information to 
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determine the application and that it could and should assume that the matters could and 
should be dealt with by the EA and the HSE. There were no gaps left in the environmental 
controls. However, he did not rule out the possibility that, in the exercise of its discretion, a 
decision-maker might consider such matters, particularly where there was any question of a 
gap being left in the environmental controls” (McKay 2016, 391–392). 
As such, regarding waste disposal, the Inspector concludes: 
“There are clearly matters such as this which could potentially be taken into account by the 
planning decision-maker in the exercise of its discretion, particularly if there would otherwise 
be a gap in the environmental controls” (McKay 2016, 392).    
In other words, the approach of regulatory remit deference prescribed in planning policy can be 
overridden if in the judgement of the planning decision maker the available evidence indicates that such 
deference would leave a gap in regulatory oversight. This variant of horizontal deference is therefore 
not prescribed or automatic in the way that double compartmentalisation or vertical deference are, but 
it is imposed or revoked on the basis of an evaluation of the completeness of regulatory coverage in 
practice. There is though the possibility that the consummate regulation variant may militate against a 
decision maker from finding there to be a gap in the controls, and so revoking the application of the 
regulatory remit variant. 
 5.3.1 TH E EFFECT  O F R EGU LATO RY  R EMIT  D EFER EN CE ON  T H E IS SU E OF W AST E DIS POS A L CAP A CIT Y 
 
On the issue of waste disposal capacity, Cuadrilla and FoE contested the procedural question of whether 
FoE’s case was material. Cuadrilla argued not, suggesting that the issue had already been considered 
and ultimately found acceptable by the EA, which they argued the Inspector must merely defer to. It 
was FoE’s case, on the other hand, that whilst the EA had regulated the method of treatment and the in-
theory existence of capacity, they had not considered the in-practice availability of that capacity. Were 
the planning decision maker not to consider this matter, they argued, then this would amount to a gap 
in the oversight. The Inspector agrees with FoE that, as a point of principle, the case law does establish a 
discretion for the planning decision maker to consider matters of overlapping regulatory responsibility, 
“particularly if there would otherwise be a gap in the environmental controls” (McKay 2016, 392). As to 
whether the evidence before the inquiry pointed to such a gap in this case, however, the Inspector sided 
with Cuadrilla in resolving that the approach taken by the EA had left no such gap (McKay 2016, 399). 
The Inspector adds that any growing need for treatment capacity “would be dealt with via the normal 
and appropriate mechanism of the market and the planning system” (McKay 2016, 399). 
The Inspector’s reasoning – which goes further than it did on the equivalent issue on the matter of 
public health – makes clear that regulatory remit deference prescribed in policy is not fully procedurally 
determined.  The discretionary option to reconsider a matter of overlapping regulatory responsibility 
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and potentially arrive at a different conclusion in planning terms is open to a planning decision maker. 
What ultimately shuts the door on FoE’s argument is the Inspector’s judgement that the evidence 
before the inquiry does not demonstrate the gap in the controls that would necessitate further 
consideration of the matter at this inquiry, and so there is no reason to revoke the assumption of 
horizontal deference to the EA’s existing decision.  
With the availability of capacity not being assessed by the EA - who consider capacity a matter 
‘primarily’ for the operator (EA 2015, 93) - and this not being considered a gap by planning; it is clear 
that the matter of treatment capacity is to be resolved between water treatment facilities and their 
clients, with clients potentially being forced to prevent the generation of waste in the event of a lack of 
available capacity. Furthermore, the Inspector makes reference to the EA’s slightly vague allusion, in 
response to a query from Watson, that “the waste treatment industry is looking into increasing capacity 
nationally but they are waiting to see what is going to happen” (McKay 2016, 399; Watson 2016b, 4). In 
other words, what prevents the gap in the controls is the ability of operators to prevent the generation 
of new waste if necessary as a stop gap, and the longer-term anticipation of an increase in capacity. The 
matter is excluded from further consideration through the avoidance of the discretionary power to 
oversee the matter, with reliance placed instead on both waste generating industries and the waste 
treatment industry to resolve the matter in practice, amongst themselves, and post- planning 
permission and environmental permit issuing. As a consequence, no assessment of the availability of 
capacity (including, for instance, likely demands from other users) was produced or scrutinised by either 
the EA or the inquiry, rendering the regulatory oversight of these applications entirely insensitive to any 
potential matters of concern over the in-practice availability of capacity.  
Of course, FoE’s case concerns the demands on treatment capacity represented by these two 
exploratory projects. Although Watson alludes to the expectation of an increase in demand from the 
possible ramp up of a domestic shale industry, FoE do not pursue the argument on the future adverse 
waste management impacts of an industry at scale. Nonetheless it is worth pointing out that, if 
repeated, the passive horizontal deference and discretion-avoiding approach adopted here would leave 
the ‘control’ of the availability of treatment capacity down to the wastewater treatment and shale gas 
industries to muddle through in practice and post-permission (application-by-application 
compartmentalisation may also obscure the issue). The passive approach of horizontal deference 
adopted here would leave planning with no role in determining whether there can reasonably be 
expected to be capacity to treat the waste produced by the development it is granting permission to. It 
would see planning avoid concerning itself with the consequences of the potential creation of a 
bottleneck in the system due to limited waste treatment capacity or the imperfect correspondence 
between the ramp-up of a shale industry and an increase in the waste disposal capacity to service its 
waste. 
In refusing to see the lack of oversight concerning the availability of treatment capacity as a gap in the 
environmental controls, the Inspector has arguably used ambiguity over spheres of regulatory 
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responsibility as a tactic of discretion avoidance and non-decision-making (Catney and Henneberry 
2012). With neither planning nor the EA overseeing the matter, it has effectively been left to the 
operators and industries involved to figure it out in practice and post-permission. 
In sum then, FoE’s arguments were rejected because the inquiry eschewed the discretionary power to 
oversee the matter of availability of capacity, based on an apparent satisfaction with the issue being 
resolved in practice, post- regulatory consent and amongst the waste generating and treatment 
industries themselves. Furthermore, the inquiry was entirely insensitive to the potential intensification 
of the issue in a future production at scale scenario. The issue of waste disposal capacity is therefore 
closed through the avoidance of regulatory discretion which kept intact the approach of horizontal 
deference to the EA’s prior decision. 
 5.3.2 TH E EFFECT  O F CONS UMM AT E R EG ULATI ON D EFER EN CE ON  TH E ISS U E OF  PU BLI C H EA LT H 
 
Cuadrilla and FoE contested the procedural question of regulatory remits on the issue of public health as 
well, with Cuadrilla arguing that FoE’s public health case was immaterial because the matter was the 
responsibility of the EA whose existing decision should be deferred to at this inquiry. However, the 
Inspector largely rejected FoE’s public health case through the second variant of horizontal deference – 
consummate regulation deference. That is, FoE’s arguments regarding the acceptability of health 
impacts contravened the policy-prescribed general expectation of effective regulation.  
Regarding the competence of the EA’s future regulatory oversight, FoE, in their initial objection to LCC, 
had sought to make an issue of the adequacy and efficacy of the regulatory system, though they did not 
fully pursue this line of argument at the inquiry. At the inquiry they argued that the indirect health 
impacts were unacceptable. Part of their case was that the indirect health impacts were based on public 
concern that is entirely reasonable because of inadequate regulation and ongoing scientific uncertainty. 
Finally, they also argued that general scientific uncertainty over the public health impacts of fracking is 
in itself a material consideration that necessitated a precautionary rejection of these appeals. Cuadrilla 
contended that the public concern underpinning the indirect health impacts was not reasonable 
because it was based on misplaced perceptions relating to the US experience and because the hazards 
to which it relates will be fully controlled by regulation. They also argued that any uncertainty in the 
scientific literature stemming primarily from the US is irrelevant in this case because regulation will be 
different in the UK, and because British regulators and statutory consultees (e.g. the EA, PHE) have 
assessed these specific applications and fracking more broadly and found low to negligible risk to public 
health.       
146 
 
 
 
Regarding direct criticism of the efficacy of the regulatory regime, made by many interested persons at 
the inquiry, the Inspector resolves that “their evidence does not lead me to find that the regulatory 
regime could not be relied upon to operate effectively in these cases” (McKay 2016, 404). She also sides 
with Cuadrilla on the matter of the acceptability of the indirect health impacts in granting them little 
weight. She does so on the basis that “all pathways that could potentially impact upon human health 
would be monitored and appropriately controlled”, and given this level of regulation, she did not 
consider that “the expressed fear and anxiety can be regarded as being reasonably engendered or a 
justifiable emotional response to the projects” (McKay 2016, 404). Finally, she pays little attention to 
the general uncertainty regarding the public health impacts of fracking in the scientific literature, though 
she does rule the US experience irrelevant given that the UK regulatory regime is ‘different’ (McKay 
2016, 403).  
The approach of consummate regulation deference, therefore, rendered the inquiry insensitive to 
matters of concern around the efficacy of the regulatory framework in general, particular regulators’ 
capabilities and competence, and the in-practice behaviour of operators. FoE had sought to make an 
issue of the adequacy of the regulatory framework in their initial objection to LCC; and many members 
of the public gave evidence at the inquiry as ‘interested persons’ raising concerns about Cuadrilla’s track 
record, the reliance on self-regulation and reporting, and staff and funding cuts to the EA and their 
competence as a regulator. However, none of these concerns were seriously considered or registered at 
the inquiry because they violated the expectation of consummate regulation prescribed in planning 
policy.    
Furthermore, the approach of consummate regulation deference also played a key role in the Inspector 
finding the public concern on which the indirect health impacts were based unreasonable, and so 
finding those impacts acceptable. The indirect health impacts of the projects are found acceptable 
because the level of monitoring and controls imposed on the activities renders public concerns 
unreasonable and unjustifiable. In other words, the Inspector uses the generic expectation of effective 
future regulation to reject public concerns as unreasonable, and therefore find the indirect health 
impacts they give rise to acceptable.   
The approach of consummate regulation deference, finally, also rendered the inquiry insensitive to 
concerns arising from the general scientific uncertainty over the public health impacts of fracking. The 
assumption of the effective operation of the regulatory system makes no distinction between situations 
of risk, uncertainty and ignorance. In other words, the regulatory system can be assumed to operate 
effectively in regulating all possible hazards, even potentially unknown and surprising ones. This 
effectively rids the decision maker of the troubles of accident and surprise in the oversight of shale gas 
development. In other words, what Brian Wynne would refer to as ‘indeterminacy’ (Wynne 1992b) – 
that is, the condition of incertitude arising from the dependence of assessments of risk on assumptions 
about the behaviour of human actors – is simply procedurally tamed by NPPF 122. The indeterminacy 
remains of course, but NPPF 122 banishes it beyond the scope of the inquiry by validating an entirely 
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implausible ‘heroic’ view of operators and regulators. In short then, the approach of consummate 
regulation deference plays a key role in closing uncertainty and indeterminacy over health impacts as 
matters of concern by effectively allowing the decision maker to feign certainty over the regulatory 
system’s ability to ensure no health impacts arise. Furthermore, FoE’s uncertainty case was undermined 
because it was based on extrapolating from the US experience, which of course was dismissed as 
unreasonable because of the expectation of superior – or indeed consummate - regulation in the UK.     
In sum then, on the issue of public health, closure was performed by the approach of consummate 
regulation deference through which the regulatory system is assumed to operate effectively in line with 
NPPF 122. As such, arguments and matters of concern over the efficacy of the regulatory system, 
general scientific uncertainty, and indirect health impacts were all excluded from serious consideration 
through horizontal deference.  
In conclusion, horizontal deference to the remit and existing work of the EA and the future efficacy of 
the regulatory system in general produced justification through the closure of FoE’s arguments across 
the issues of waste disposal capacity and public health at the inquiry. The EA’s permit decision was not 
judged to leave a gap in the environmental controls on the availability of waste disposal capacity, 
eschewing the discretionary power to oversee the matter and leaving the approach of regulatory remit 
deference intact. As a result, the EA’s existing satisfaction was not to be re-visited, rendering FoE’s case 
on the availability of capacity procedurally immaterial. Furthermore, as just seen, the approach of 
consummate regulation deference closed several matters of concern regarding the issue of public health 
from consideration and registration at the inquiry. Concerns over the efficacy of regulation, indirect 
health impacts, and scientific uncertainty were rejected as they either violated the assumption of 
consummate regulation, or are supposedly addressed through the ‘heroic’ view of regulation based on 
it. 
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5.4 SELECTIVE SCEPTICISM AND CREDULITY  
The three forms of closure considered so far have been blunt forms of procedural closure more or less 
prescribed in planning policy and convention. Put simply, they exclude arguments and matters of 
concern as immaterial because the rules say so, and thus produce justification through the resultant 
insensitivity of the inquiry to such matters. The procedural contests over their use say little about the 
intellectual merits of those arguments or the material details of those matters of concern. They focus 
instead on whether they can or should be heard, scrutinized and registered in this particular forum at 
this particular time. The rules in question that perform the closure are often explicit – a particular 
passage of planning policy or a well-established convention. The fourth and final form of closure is 
however of a different kind. Instead of engendering insensitivity through procedural exclusion, ‘selective 
scepticism and credulity’ displays insensitivity in its very mode of engagement with the detail of 
Cuadrilla’s estimate knowledge claims. This insensitivity, in other words, is produced not through blunt 
exclusion but through the conduct of scrutiny itself.  
The inquiry withholds scepticism over, and is therefore insensitive to, the problematic warrantability of 
Cuadrilla’s estimate knowledge claims. In the case of both Cuadrilla’s methane emission and flowback 
fluid volume estimates, the predicted scale of the impact of the projects is questioned by FoE. In both 
cases the Inspector is satisfied with the credibility of the estimate after ostensibly scrutinising them. The 
conduct of the scrutiny of these estimates however is in both instances shallow, and demonstrates an 
eagerness to avoid problematisation. In both cases then justification is produced by a shallow 
performance of scrutiny which partially obscures (though is on close inspection rather unconvincing) an 
orientation of credulity towards Cuadrilla’s estimates.                
 5.4.1 TH E EFFECT  O F S ELECTIV E S CEPTI CI S M AN D CR ED U LIT Y O N TH E IS S UE O F CLI MA TE CHA NG E 
 
The ESs estimate that each site will emit between 118,418 and 124,397 tCO2e. They suggest, 
furthermore, that “due to the conservative nature of the assessment there is potential for the actual 
GHG emissions to be even smaller” (Arup 2014a, 107). Anderson’s criticism of this estimate was twofold. 
First, he points to scientific uncertainty concerning leakage (or ‘fugitive emissions’) from natural gas 
production generally and shale gas in the UK in particular (Karion et al. 2013; McGlade et al. 2015). 
Second, he points to the use of a GWP conversion rate of 25 as opposed to 34, which he described as 
“the latest scientific assessment (IPCC AR5) of methane’s global warming potential” (Anderson 2016a, 
30–31). 
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In response, Cuadrilla contest Anderson’s claim on two grounds simultaneously. First, on the substance 
of the claim they argue that the estimates are reliable. Richardson’s technical note tells us that for each 
emissions source more than one conversion factor was used, ‘where possible’, to account for 
uncertainty in the input data. Furthermore, the methane emissions data comes from a US study (Allen et 
al. 2013) chosen because it focuses on well completions rather than the whole lifecycle of production 
wells and hence is more relevant to these exploratory applications. The study surveys 27 such 
completions across “four geographical regions of shale formation in the US” (Richardson 2016, 3). 
Second, on the relevance of the claim, they argue – via Smith’s evidence - that Anderson’s methane 
emissions argument is in any case irrelevant because the EA (who regulate flaring, and emissions to air) 
have already assessed the proposals and are satisfied with them. In other words, they appeal to the 
Inspector to dismiss the matter of the methane emissions estimates through the mechanism of 
horizontal deference (the regulatory remit variant) considered in the previous section of this chapter. 
The Inspector resolves that she is “satisfied that the method and assumptions, and the sources of data 
referred to, can safely be relied upon and there has been no material error in the ES estimate of 
methane emissions” (McKay 2016, 408). She does not explicitly rely on the EA’s satisfaction, and that is 
the full extent of her reasoning on the matter. She therefore appears to have made a judgement that 
the ES methane emissions estimates are credible beliefs about the likely scale of the projects’ emissions 
and that Anderson’s claim that there is a significant likelihood that emissions could be substantially 
higher is less credible. The treatment of this issue (or rather lack thereof) demonstrates, I will argue, a 
problematic insensitivity to possible matters of concern caused by the withholding of scepticism over 
Cuadrilla’s estimates. In order to do so I will have to delve a little a deeper into the matter than the 
inquiry was evidently willing or able to do. 
The ESs state that the data used in the assessment of GHG emissions is based on “the knowledge and 
experience that Cuadrilla have gained from drilling exploration wells and undertaking hydraulic 
fracturing in the UK”, that this represents “the best available data at the time of assessment”, and that 
as a result “secondary data source (such as GHG emissions in published data) have not had to be used” 
(Arup 2014a, 112). They then go on to list the ‘embedded mitigation measures’ adopted to reduce the 
projects’ carbon footprint. These are the use and maintenance of all equipment and pipework in 
accordance with manufacturers specifications; hydrostatic pressure testing of pipework and equipment 
to identify potential leaks before their use; the use of an enclosed completions system to separate gas, 
solids and liquids so that gas is burnt via the flare instead of being vented from tanks or lagoons; and 
fugitive emissions monitoring across the site at regular intervals to identify and fix leaks or faulty 
equipment (Arup 2014a, 113). 
The assessment calculates that approximately 70% of the projects’ total emissions are attributed to 
flaring (that is, completed combustion from the flare, and so not methane emissions) (Arup 2014a, 117). 
This assumes that 130,000m3 of unprocessed natural gas will be flared per day over a 90 day period per 
well (Arup 2014a, H4). The daily gas flow rate assumption (130,000m3) is described as a worst-case 
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scenario (Arup 2014a, 108). The flare is expected to have a 98% combustion efficiency, and the 
assessment has “assumed that the remaining 2% [a fugitive] consists entirely of methane” (Arup 2014a, 
H4). The 98% combustion efficiency assumption is referenced to Allen et al. (2013) in the ES (Arup 
2014a, 121). The EA, on the other hand, in their decision document, suggest that the 98% flare efficiency 
figure is “known from technical specification provided by the flare supplier” (EA 2015, 63). 
It is not clear whether flaring accounts for all fugitive emissions or whether there are expected to be 
additional non-flaring fugitives. The assessment estimates that each site will emit 16,016 tCO2e of 
fugitive emissions (Arup 2014a, 121, table 8.8). This estimate does not change between the lower and 
higher range unlike most other sources, so as a proportion of total GHG emissions fugitives account for 
between 12.88%-13.52% (as a proportion of the higher and lower total project emissions estimate 
respectively) (Arup 2014a, 117, table 8.3). With the above mitigation measures, “fugitive emissions from 
the Site are expected to consist of un-combusted methane as a result of incomplete combustion in the 
flare, [and] account for 13% of the total emissions” (Arup 2014a, 117). However, this is contradicted in 
Appendix H of the ES, where it is suggested that: 
“With the proposed embedded mitigation measures fugitive emissions from the Project will be 
significantly reduced. As a consequence the main source of fugitive emissions that have been 
assessed are associated with unburnt methane emitted from the flare” (Arup 2014a, H4). 
So, are flaring fugitives the only or the main source of fugitives? If they are the only source then the 
16,016tCO2e figure is based on the assumption of the consummate prevention of all non-flaring 
fugitives from accidental releases, which would amount to a ‘best-case scenario’ assessment. Working 
through the calculation using the assumptions and figures provided (with the exception of one claimed 
assumption which is false), it becomes clear that the assessment has used a 2% fugitive emissions rate 
(by volume of gas, not proportion of total emissions in tCO2e) which is exclusively accounted for by 
flaring emissions, and so assumes the consummate control of all other fugitives (see A2.1). It is worth 
pointing out that the inquiry failed to clarify the key assumptions underpinning the estimate in this way. 
Several questions arise from the figures and assumptions used in the methane emissions estimate, 
which I will now deal with in turn. The inquiry rendered itself insensitive to these questions by the 
closure performed by the withholding of scepticism. 
 
Are the conversion rates correct? 
The first and most obvious thing to point out is the two conversion rates that are, in the first instance, 
officially marginally incorrect, and in the second, whilst officially correct potentially scientifically 
inaccurate. In the first case, the conversion rate for the density of methane (kg/m3) recommended by 
DEFRA/DECC is in fact 0.72 as opposed to the 0.71 figure used in the estimate (DEFRA/DECC 2012a). This 
marginally increases the resulting fugitive emissions estimate from 16,016 to 16,241tCO2e. There 
demonstrably has been an error in the methane emissions estimate then, though a marginal one not 
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likely to be significant enough to problematize the Inspectors satisfaction that ‘there has been no 
material error in the ES estimate of methane emissions’ (my emphasis). However, if ‘material error’ 
means one significant enough to render the projects unacceptable on climate change grounds, then in 
the light of the closure performed by vertical deference on the issues of climate change, the statement – 
that there has been no material error - is a truism. As a result of the approach of vertical deference 
adopted towards the WMS, no error – no matter how big – could be material in that sense given that 
any revision upwards of the total GHG emissions estimate cannot undermine the critique-protected 
belief that shale gas exploration (and its emissions) necessarily and in general helps to reduce GHG 
emissions. 
The second potentially problematic conversion factor used is – as pointed out by Anderson at the 
inquiry – the (100yr) GWP figure of 25. A GWP of 25 is referenced to the 2007 IPCC Fourth Assessment 
Report (IPCC 2007, 33, table TS.2) in the ES (Arup 2014a, A8, table 1). Anderson describes a GWP of 34 
as “the latest scientific assessment (IPCC AR5) of methane’s global warming potential” (Anderson 2016a, 
30–31) (see A2.2 for further details).  
It is worth pointing out that IPCCAR5 was published in 2013 (IPCC 2013), and the ESs subsequently in 
2014. At the time of the inquiry, the latest (2016) Government GHG Conversion Factors report (BEIS 
2016a), however, maintained the use of a 100 year methane GWP of 25. It justified doing so on the basis 
that IPCCAR4: 
“[I]s the report which is accepted for use in national GHG reporting under the UNFCCC. 
Although the IPCC have prepared a newer version since [i.e. AR5], the methods have not yet 
been officially accepted for use under the UNFCCC” (BEIS 2016a, 8). 
The use of a GWP of 25 is therefore undoubtedly the procedurally correct approach for now. An 
assessment of the fugitive emissions of each site using the correct methane density figure of 0.72, and 
the IPCC5 GWP figure of 34 results in methane emissions of ~22,088tCO2e. This represents an absolute 
increase of 6,072tCO2e, which would increase each sites’ total emissions to between 124,490-130,496 
(tCO2e). 
Table 5: Conversion rates and their effect on estimated emissions 
 Figure used in ES ES estimate Alternative figure Amended 
estimate 
Density of 
methane 
0.71 16,016 (tCO2e) 0.72 16,241 (tCO2e) 
(with GWP of 
25) 
GWP of 
methane 
25 16,016 (tCO2e) 34 (procedurally 
incorrect, but the 
‘latest scientific 
understanding’) 
22,088 (tCO2e) 
(with 0.72 
density) 
 
The question of whether the increased IPCC5 GWP of 34 should be used was not explicitly addressed by 
the Inspector, though could easily have been procedurally closed by the continued official status of the 
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IPCC4 figure. One way or another, the inquiry did not have to consider, nor Cuadrilla defend, the 
acceptability or otherwise of 22,088 tCO2e of methane emissions. Furthermore, as already discussed, 
the deferential approach to the Government view in the WMS ensures that any increase in the 
emissions estimates could not render the projects unacceptable on climate change grounds. As Smith 
himself suggested, the actual figure of estimated GHG emissions is irrelevant given this deference to the 
Government view that shale development helps to achieve climate change objectives. Nonetheless, 
irrespective of the likely material effect (or lack thereof) of different conversion rates on the 
acceptability of the projects, the point here is that the inquiry failed to delve into the details of the 
estimates and subject them to proper scrutiny.     
 
Is 130,000m3 per day per well a reasonable worst-case scenario? 
Another key assumption made in the methane emissions estimates is the daily per day per well gas flow 
figure of up to 130,000m317. This daily flow rate is described as a worst-case scenario (Arup 2014a, 108), 
and appears to be based on the ‘knowledge and experience’ of Cuadrilla. I assume this means the figure 
is a worst case absolute daily figure, as opposed to a worst case average daily figure. The very purpose 
of the IFT is to – as the name rather gives away – test, amongst other things, the flow rate. As the EA put 
it in their decision document when justifying the use of flaring: 
“It is also not reasonably practicable to connect the flow of extracted natural gas to the gas grid 
during the initial flow tests. This is because the flow rates are unknown and the quality of the 
gas produced may not be compatible with gas grid requirements without further processing” 
(EA 2015, 61–62). 
Comparing gas flow rates during well completions18 from the US to the UK is problematic because of 
differences in geology and regulation. In this particular case a key difference concerns the length of time 
of the IFT (which is effectively an elongated completion) and the US completions that constitute the 
evidence base. In the US completions rarely last more than 2 weeks - the EPA assumes they last 
between 3-10 days (EPA 2011a); Allen et al.’s sample of 27 completions (on which Cuadrilla rely) last 
between 5–339hrs (approx. 2 weeks) (Allen et al. 2013). One would assume Cuadrilla have factored the 
knowledge and experience from Preese Hall (in spite of it being a vertical well) into their 130,000m3 
worst-case scenario daily flow rate (and so not relied exclusively or even at all on the US completions 
evidence base of dubious relevance because of the massive difference in duration), however this 
                                                                
17 The EA, however, refer to the figure of 15,444 tonnes per year of what is described as “surplus natural gas” (EA 
2015, 36, table 6.13), as opposed to 8,775 tonnes per well or 35,100 tonnes per site yielded from the maximum 
130,000m3 figure (density of natural gas of 0.75 – BEIS 2016b). It is suggested that this surplus gas is flared to the 
atmosphere at a maximum rate if 130,000m3 per day, yet 15,444 tonnes would amount to 57,200m3 of gas flared 
on average per day over 360 days of flaring. This may be a mistake by the EA or by Cuadrilla (who may have 
supplied contrasting figures), or, alternatively, it may be an average flow rate estimate supplied to the EA but not 
explicitly made public elsewhere. 
18 The period between the beginning of flowback and the well being connected to gathering lines. 
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evidence (the Preese Hall completion flow rates) was not before the inquiry and is not in the public 
domain.            
Table 6: Estimates of gas flow rates during completion (adapted from Mackay and Stone 2013, 42, table 
A3) 
Source Play Total volume of 
gas flow during 
well completion 
(i.e. total 
emissions 
potential per 
well)  
Assumed 
average duration 
of completion 
Approximate per 
day average 
(volume/duration)  
Jiang et al. (2011) Marcellus 603,000m3 9.5 days (base 
case) 
63,000m3 per day 
Howarth et al. 
(2011) (widely 
considered an 
outlier) 
Haynesville 6,800,000m3  10 days 680,000m3 per day 
Howarth et al. 
(2011) 
Barnett 370,000m3 9 days 41,000m3 per day 
O’Sullivan & 
Paltsev (2012) 
Haynesville 1,180,000m3 9 days 131,000m3 per day 
O’Sullivan & 
Paltsev (2012) 
Barnett 273,000m3 9 days 30,000m3 per day 
O’Sullivan & 
Paltsev (2012) 
Fayetteville 296,000m3 9 days 33,000m3 per day 
O’Sullivan & 
Paltsev (2012) 
Marcellus 405,000m3 9 days 45,000m3 per day 
O’Sullivan & 
Paltsev (2012) 
Woodford 487,000m3 9 days 54,000m3 per day 
Arup (2014) 
(these 
applications) 
Bowland 11,700,000m3 (if 
90 days) 
60-90 days ‘Worst case 
scenario’ of 
130,000m3 per 
day19  
 
As can be seen in Table 6 above, the 130,000m3 estimate is at the top end of average completion gas 
flow rates when compared to the US evidence base, especially if the Howarth et al. (2011) outlier is 
excluded. However, the 130,000m3 figure looks to be a maximum rather than average figure. The 
literature tends not to disclose maximum daily completion gas flow rates, using average figures to 
calculate total potential emissions instead. The apparent use of a maximum per day gas flow rate 
therefore appears to be a conservative assumption. However, it must be reiterated that the US cases 
above are much shorter in duration, and so, depending on the ramping assumptions used (see A2.3), the 
elongated completion (IFT) in these proposals may result in a higher average. If these wells are assumed 
to ramp up in a similar way to the US cases in the literature – and they may not, we simply do not know 
because the figure wasn’t scrutinised - that would potentially mean an average daily flow rate not too 
                                                                
19 Assumed to be an absolute per day maximum – with a lower per day average. The 57,200m3 figure potentially let 
slip by the EA may be the estimated average, or may simply be a mistake. 
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much smaller than the maximum rate (because the average is taken over 90 days, and so potentially 
includes a high number of post-ramp up days). The lack of disclosure over the assumptions used 
regarding daily gas flow during the IFT, though, leaves interested third parties only able to speculate as 
to whether the operations in table 6 are remotely comparable to the operations under consideration in 
these proposals. At the inquiry, of course, Cuadrilla were neither forced to disclose nor defend the 
assumptions used to arrive at the 130,000m3 figure due to the closure produced through the 
withholding of scepticism.   
The EA cap the amount of gas that can be flared daily at 130,000m3 (EA 2015, 21), so a higher than 
anticipated flow rate wouldn’t necessarily cause higher emissions given that Cuadrilla would have to 
slow the rate using the choke manifold (assuming the cap was actually enforced). It is unclear, however, 
what impact this would have on their testing and whether the IFT would potentially be extended as a 
result. The principle point here though is the lack of scrutiny the assumption received at the inquiry. 
 
Will flaring only occur for 90 days per well? Are fracking and IFT the discreet blocks of activity presented 
by Cuadrilla? 
The other side of the total emissions potential equation is the duration of the completion. The ESs state 
that the IFT will last for between 60-90 days per well (see A2.4 for a possible source of this assumption), 
potentially ten times longer than the typical duration of the equivalent process in the US. 
So far this discussion has assumed that gas is only flared during the IFT, which is the general impression 
given by the ESs and the EA decision document. For example, the ES states:  
“Natural gas produced during the initial flow test (but not extended flow test) will be burned 
via the two on-site enclosed flare stacks. Flaring of natural gas would only occur during this 
relatively short initial flow test period” (Arup 2014a, 51). 
This tallies well with the 130,000m3 of gas flared over 90 days per well assumption used in the 
emissions calculation (i.e. a worst-case scenario of the maximum duration of IFT is used for each well), 
as well as the EA’s 90 day limit on flaring (EA 2015, 98). 
However, the ESs also suggest that flowback (potentially including increasing quantities of gas), testing, 
and flaring also occur during the fracking phase.   
“Although initial flow testing is described below as a standalone stage there is potential for 
some initial flow testing to be undertaken while hydraulic fracturing is also being implemented 
(i.e. in between fracturing stages)” (Arup 2014a, 50). 
“At some point the well will start to produce mainly[20] natural gas, and diminishing volumes of 
flowback fluid. It is at this point when the initial flow test begins. This test will run for up to 90 
                                                                
20 This ‘mainly’, furthermore, suggests that the elongated completion in this case (IFT) will not in fact ‘ramp up’ from 
0, but begin at a point when the well is already producing mainly gas. This further brings into question the 
comparability of US average daily flow rates and potentially provides support for the notion that the average daily 
completion flow rate in this case may be reasonably expected to be higher than the US evidence base. 
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days by burning the gas in the flare system to establish an initial production rate or “IP”. If the 
findings are favourable, it may be followed by an extended flow test (as described below)” 
(Arup 2014b, 51, my emphasis). 
“The methodologies for assessing flaring and fugitive emissions are detailed in Appendix H. 
Although these two types of emissions occur during both hydraulic fracturing and initial flow 
testing, their effects have been assessed as a whole under initial flow testing” (Arup 2014a, 
112). 
Table 8.2 (Arup 2014a, 110), furthermore, suggests flaring and fugitives occur during fracking and the 
IFT, with fugitives occurring during the EFT and a flare present for safety and emergency reasons. This 
tallies with the eventual clarification on the flowback fluid issue (see section 4.3.3 above) – where 
flowback (potentially including some gas and so need for flaring) occurs during the fracking stage but 
the fluid, once any gas is removed (and flared), is 100% reused.  
Two wells will be fracked in 30 stages and the other two in 45. The ESs assumes the 30 stage wells will 
take 50 days and that the 45 stage wells will take 65 days (Arup 2014a, B13). 
What is not clear is whether any day’s worth of testing and so potentially flaring that occurs within the 
50 to 65 days of fracking is one fewer day of testing and flaring during the IFT phase – which would leave 
the maximum 90 days of flaring estimate intact. Alternatively, if it were to be additional as opposed to 
subtractive this would render the supposed worst-case scenario for flaring duration (in days) incorrect 
and result in the projects breaching their 90 days of flaring per well limit set by the EA. What is also not 
clear – in relation to the third quote above – is how any flaring or fugitive emissions occurring during the 
fracking phase are ‘assessed as a whole under initial flow testing’ given that the IFT is stated as lasting 
between 60-90 days.  
The ES suggests that “[i]t is likely that flow testing and hydraulic fracturing activities will run in parallel 
providing sufficient gas flows from the well” (Arup 2014a, 26). This rather suggests the ‘subtractive’ 
scenario. In other words, any overlapping with the fracking phase shifts the IFT forwards, rather than 
further elongating it. However, this is contradicted by the (more recent) indicative timetable in Smith’s 
written evidence (Smith 2016a, 15), which clearly depicts IFTs as discreet blocks starting as fracking 
finishes. One possibility appears to be that gas returns during the fracking phase (and so is flared), but 
not at sufficient rates to test (and possibly not at sufficient rates for the assumed flare combustion 
efficiency – see AEA 2012, 36; Zeng, Morris, and Dombrowski 2016, 77). In this scenario days of flaring 
would be being used up without yielding any testing (for which the days of flaring – limited by permit - 
will still be required later). Cuadrilla would require written approval from the EA to flare beyond 90 days 
for the purpose of testing, with any significant extension requiring a permit variation (EA 2015, 20–21). 
This, furthermore, raises the question of what constitutes a day of flaring in the EA’s eyes? 
Finally, it is unclear how flow testing during the fracking phase would be reconciled with the aim of 
achieving a constant flow during testing. The EA, for example, state that:     
“The aim of the well testing activity is to establish the quantity and composition of the gas, and 
its flow rates to forecast potential future production flows from the well. The data will be 
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gathered over a period not exceeding 90 days for each well, during which the aim is to achieve 
a constant flow” (EA 2015, 99). 
One would assume injecting fluid down the well would fundamentally interrupt the flow out of the well. 
This again raises the possibility of gas being flared before it can be satisfactorily tested (and so using up 
flaring days whilst not yielding testing days). 
The short answer to the question ‘will gas only be flared for a maximum of 90 days per well?’ is yes, 
because the EA permit limits flaring to that figure (assuming an extension isn’t requested and granted). 
The longer answer is that the methane emissions estimate uses the upper estimate of the duration of 
the IFT (90 days) for its duration of flaring figure, apparently without accounting for the possibility of 
flaring during the fracking phase of operations. Days of flaring during the fracking phase subtracting 
from days of testing required in the IFT would require a flow rate sufficient and constant enough to 
enable adequate testing, which does not appear to be a given. Once again, the source of the maximum 
of 90 days of flaring per well estimate (see A2.4) and its in practice plausibility were not required to be 
disclosed and defended by Cuadrilla at the inquiry due to the withholding of scepticism from the 
methane emissions estimate.   
  
Where does the 98% flare efficiency assumption come from, is it reasonable, and how is it monitored? 
Because the estimated methane emissions appear to arise entirely from incomplete combustion in the 
flare (and so are perhaps not strictly ‘fugitives’, given they are intentional and anticipated), a key 
determinant of the estimate is the combustion efficiency of the flare. As already seen the ES and the EA 
have different ideas as to where the 98% flare efficiency assumption comes from (see above). 
An at least 98% flare efficiency figure is in fact a common assumption used in unconventional gas GHG 
emissions estimates, including Allen et al. (2013) (see also Jiang et al. 2011; O’Sullivan and Paltsev 
2012b)21. The figure originates from the EPA (EPA 1991; EPA 2012), who state that: 
“The degree of combustion depends largely on the rate and extent of fuel-air mixing and on the 
flame temperatures achieved and maintained. Properly operated flares achieve at least 98 
percent combustion efficiency in the flare plume, meaning that hydrocarbon and CO 
emmissions [sic] amount to less than 2 percent of hydrocarbons in the gas stream” (EPA 1991, 
13.5–3). 
Some have questioned how often this widely used assumption is achieved in practice, and especially 
how this is monitored. For example, a recent paper by Zeng et al. (2016) notes that it is current practice 
to assume a 98% flare efficiency “provided that some surrogate parameters (e.g., heat content of the 
vent gases and exit velocity of gases at the flare tip) are within established ranges” (Zeng, Morris, and 
Dombrowski 2016, 77). Field studies and monitoring analyses in Texas, they suggest, have 
                                                                
21 Interestingly Bond et al. claim that “[i]n the UK, silent flaring technology allows 100% efficient burning of 
methane” and then use that as the assumed flaring efficiency in their assessment (Bond et al. 2014, 46). The EA – 
who consider Cuadrilla’s proposals to be the best available technique for disposing of gas – are either not aware of 
this possibility, or it is not in fact a possibility. 
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“demonstrated that these assumptions regarding flare CE [combustion efficiency] may be inaccurate, 
and total flare emissions in this airshed could be significantly underestimated” (Zeng, Morris, and 
Dombrowski 2016, 77). A flare combustion efficiency study by Allen and Torres (2011) demonstrated 
that even when operating in accordance with federal regulations, a flare may not achieve the widely 
assumed 98% combustion efficiency figure (Allen and Torres 2011). Finally, an AEA report suggests that 
for exploratory and development wells the efficiency of combustion “is expected to be 95% on average 
during completion / recompletion of the well” (AEA 2012a, 36).  
The ability of operators to achieve high flare efficiency in practice, Zeng et al. argue, is:  
“[S]everely limited by the lack of real-time measurement of the flare CE. Currently there is no 
technology that can provide real-time autonomous and direct measurement of flare CE” (Zeng, 
Morris, and Dombrowski 2016, 77). 
The EA, who regulate flaring, concur that directly monitoring combustion efficiency is technically 
impossible. Instead the efficiency must be calculated using ‘surrogate parameters’: 
“We are satisfied that assessing the emissions from the flare using the feed gas flow rate, the 
feed gas composition and the flare efficiency is appropriate considering that direct monitoring 
of the flare is not technically possible. This level of assessment will demonstrate whether the 
combustion is working at the correct level of efficiency to minimise harmful emissions” (EA 
2015, 63). 
The 98% flare combustion efficiency assumption originates from the EPA and is the current practice 
assumption, though some studies have raised questions over its achievement in practice and in 
particular how the efficiency of the flare is monitored. Again, consideration of these matters was closed 
at the inquiry through the withholding of scepticism.  
 
Is Allen et al. (2013) a sound basis for assuming a 2% fugitive rate for this project? Do Cuadrilla 
understand the 2% figure supposedly being relied upon? 
The methane emissions estimates assume a 2% fugitive emissions rate, accounted for entirely by gas 
escaping un-combusted through the flare. The 98% flare efficiency figure and the 2% emissions rate are 
therefore two sides of the same coin. As has just been discussed, the 98% flare combustion efficiency 
figure originates from the EPA. However, the ESs reference both a 97-98% reduction in fugitive 
emissions achieved by the proposed mitigation measures, and a ‘fugitive emissions rate’ of 2% from 
flaring to Allen et al. (2013). 
Allen et al. (2013) conduct direct measurements of the methane emissions of 27 well completions 
across various regions of the US. They find that, on average across 24 completions (3 are discounted 
because of ‘partial data loss’), measured emissions are 1.6% of potential emissions. Potential emissions 
are “the methane that would be emitted if all of the methane leaving the wellhead during the flowback 
were vented to the atmosphere” (Allen et al. 2013, 17769). The range in fugitive rates across the 27 
completions measured is between 0.01% - 100% (Allen et al. 2013, S–21, table S1–6). 
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Of the various surface equipment configurations and completion processes represented in the sample of 
27, ‘configuration 3’ most closely matches the Cuadrilla proposals. Configuration 3 operations saw 
flowback: 
“Flow directly from the well to a separator or multiple separators, with no initial flowback to an 
open tank; gases from the separator either to sales or flare; liquids from the separator to a 
flowback tank” (Allen et al. 2013, S–8, table S1–1). 
In these proposals, of course, during the IFT gas is flared once separated. There were five configuration 
3 operations in the Allen et al. sample, and of those only 2 involved flaring. The fugitive rates from those 
two wells were 11% and 24%. In fairness this is misleading because in spite of these operations 
conforming to configuration 3 a high proportion of fugitives in both cases arose from venting. The other 
three configuration 3 cases involved no flaring. Even in these cases there was a small level of fugitives 
measured from what is described as “[a]tmospheric Vent from Tank handling liquid water stream from 
Completion Separator” (see Table S1-4, pg. S17). These three completions are totally incomparable to 
the Cuadrilla proposals (because of the lack of flaring) and are also far and away the lowest fugitive rates 
(all three are 0.01%).  
Allen et al. (2013) themselves suggest that: 
“Some of the other relatively high emission completion flowbacks (∼3 Mg to 6 Mg of methane) 
involved large amounts of flared gas (up to 130 Mg of methane to the flare), which was 
assumed to combust the methane at 98% efficiency” (Allen et al. 2013, 17769). 
Two key points emerge here. First, Allen et al. (2013) does not support a 2% fugitive rate for 
completions in which 100% of the gas is sent to the flare22. Second, Allen et al. (2013) does not support 
the anticipation of the consummate prevention of all non-flare fugitives (there isn't a single operation 
sampled where fugitives were exclusively accounted for by un-combusted methane escaping through 
the flare).  
Allen et al. (2013) is not a sound basis for assuming a 2% fugitives rate in this case (see A2.5 for a 
summary), and the references to Allen et al. in the ESs suggest a misunderstanding of that study and its 
findings. There are three similar key percentages in Allen et al., one of which is an input assumption 
(98% flare efficiency), and the other two of which are very different findings (98.6% is the average 
proportion of total potential emission controlled across a sample of 24, and 97-98% is the reduction that 
this finding represents against the EPA’s emission estimates at the time of the study’s publication). 
These three figures appear to have been confused by the authors of the ES. Allen et al. (2013) – to the 
extent that it is relevant at all – justifies a fugitive rate assumption at least marginally higher than 2%. 
The suitability of Allen et al. (2013) as the basis of the claims referenced to it in the ES was neither 
                                                                
22 Two cases come close to this description, though both have small levels of fugitives on top of the flaring methane 
emissions. Neither of these cases were used in calculating averages because of ‘partial data loss’ (Allen et al. 2013, 
S–16). Furthermore, neither of these cases were configuration 3 operations.  
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scrutinised nor defended at the inquiry due to the closure performed through the withholding of 
scrutiny.  
 
Is 2% a reasonable assumption in relation to the broader literature? Is the consummate prevention of all 
non-flare fugitives a reasonable assumption? 
The ESs themselves are confused on this point, as Appendix H suggests that: 
“With the proposed embedded mitigation measures fugitive emissions from the Project will be 
significantly reduced. As a consequence the main source of fugitive emissions that have been 
assessed are associated with unburnt methane emitted from the flare” (Arup 2014b, H4, my 
emphasis). 
Furthermore, the EA add that: 
“It is not possible to apply a limit on fugitive emissions as by definition they are unplanned and 
from a variety of sources so it is not possible to measure all emissions of them” (EA 2015, 103, 
my emphasis). 
They go on to suggest that: 
Without measures being taken, fugitive emissions may arise from other parts of the process 
(e.g. in the event of a leak from any pipes). The permit requires the Operator to take necessary 
measures to prevent and/or minimise these emissions (EA 2015, 110). 
As already demonstrated the methane emissions estimate is calculated on the basis of a 2% fugitive 
rate, accounted for entirely by the flare fugitives resulting from the expected 98% efficiency of the flare, 
and so assumes the consummate prevention of all non-flaring methane emissions.  
Interestingly, The Sustainable Gas Institute criticise Bond et al. (2014) for their assumption of a 100% 
flaring scenario, stating that: 
“The assumption that gas is either 100% captured or 100% flared will result in an 
underestimate of well completion emissions: even with the use of RECs [reduced emissions 
completions], an initial venting of gas often occurs while flow increases such that it is suitable 
to connect to the routing and collection equipment” (Balcombe et al. 2015, 44). 
As is demonstrated in table 7, Cuadrilla’s proposed ‘100% capture and flare’ (at 98% combustion 
efficiency) scenario is not typical of either the assumptions used in bottom-up estimates or the findings 
of direct measurement studies in the literature on the methane emissions of unconventional gas 
completions. 
Table 7: Assumed and measured completion fugitive rates in the literature 
 
 
 
  
 
Proportion of total potential gas emissions (all 
gas passing the wellhead during a completion) 
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*Assumes that the scenario of “90% capture and flare (90% of gas is captured and 95% of that gas is 
flared)” means the gas that is captured but not flared is used. 
**Both assume capture is 90% effective, consistent with the approach of the authors (O’Sullivan and 
Paltsev 2012b, 25). 
The comparability of the Allen et al. average has already been discussed, suffice to say that this figure 
and the Mackay and Stone 0% scenario (an operator floated scenario, the possibility which is yet to be 
demonstrated in practice) – the two figures that are under the ESs 2% scenario - have question marks 
against them. On the other hand, the higher rates also involve various proportions of vented gas, a 
practice not permitted in the UK regulatory system24. Nonetheless, the consummate prevention of all 
non-flaring methane emissions is obviously a best-case case scenario. The inquiry, however, simply 
failed to fully scrutinise the underlying assumptions behind the methane emissions estimate, instead 
displaying credulity towards it. 
Having gone through each key assumption involved in the methane emissions estimate, the “method 
and assumptions, and the sources of data” which the Inspector was satisfied could “safely be relied 
upon” (but which remained largely obscure during the inquiry due to the withholding of scrutiny) are 
summarised in table A2 (see A2.6).       
                                                                
23 Gas emissions is used instead of methane emissions because large differences in the assumed composition of 
unprocessed gas would skew a comparison on the basis of methane emissions as a proportion of, say, a daily 
completion gas flow rate figure.    
24 The venting of gas is only permitted on these sites “for safety reasons” (EA 2015, 21). 
directly emitted23 (i.e. not accounting for the 
CO2 emissions of successful flaring combustion, 
where flaring is involved a 98% combustion 
efficiency has been assumed) 
Assumed scenarios in bottom-up estimates  
EPA, 2010  10% 
AEA, 2012 Various scenarios, but of interest here: 
Flaring – 11.8% 
Green Completion – 10%  
Balcombe et al., 2015 1-10% range of emissions lost in RECs found in 
the literature (Balcombe et al. appear to 
consider flaring as a type of REC) 
Mackay and Stone, 2013  Four scenarios - 100%, 11.71%*, 10%, 0% 
O’Sullivan and Paltsev, 2012a  Current field practice scenario – 22.33%** 
Industry survey scenario – 12.38%** 
Jiang et al., 2011 Base case – 25.53% 
Direct measurement findings  
Allen et al., 2013 1.4% (average across sample of 24, range 
0.01%-100%) 
ES proposal before the inquiry  
Arup, 2014 2% 
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Did the EA consider the reasonableness of the methane emissions estimate and its impact on the 
projects’ carbon footprint? Was there a gap in the controls? 
Though this was not explicitly done by the Inspector, rather than being satisfied with the questionable 
scientific credibility of the methane emissions estimate on the basis of clearly shallow scrutiny, she 
could have relied procedurally on the EA’s satisfaction to close the matter through horizontal deference. 
Cuadrilla certainly pursued this line of argument. Put another way, it might be argued that the level of 
scrutiny afforded to the methane emissions estimate at the inquiry doesn’t ultimately matter, because 
the EA had already scrutinised the projects and found them satisfactory. This begs the question of 
whether the EA did specifically assess the methane emissions estimate.      
As part of their assessment of emissions to air from the proposals the EA turn very briefly to the 
‘greenhouse gas impacts’ of emissions to air: 
“This section summarises the assessment of greenhouse gas impacts which has been made in 
the determination of this Permit. Emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) and other greenhouse 
gases differ from those of other pollutants in that, except at gross levels, they have no localised 
environmental impact. Their impact is at a global level and in terms of climate change. 
Nonetheless, CO2 is clearly a pollutant for IED [Industrial Emissions Directive] purposes. 
The principal greenhouse gas emitted is CO2, but the plant could also emit small amounts of 
methane (CH4) arising from the combustion process. We expect combustion efficiency of at 
least 98%, therefore there is potential for a small amount of unburnt CH4 to be emitted from 
the flare. (Fully efficient combustion converts CH4 to CO2 and water vapour). CH4 has a global 
warming potential 21 times that of CO2[25]. 
The major source of greenhouse gas emissions from the installation is however CO2 from the 
combustion of natural gas. BAT for greenhouse gas emissions is to maximise energy recovery 
and efficiency. We are satisfied that flaring the gas is the best available option” (EA 2015, 61). 
That is the sum total of the consideration given to the GHG impacts of the project. The general 
impression given is that the ‘localised’ impacts of emissions on air quality are of interest and assessed 
but not the ‘global level’ impacts of emitting GHGs. Some of the key assumptions used in the methane 
emissions estimate do therefore come up, but only in so far as they are relevant to the assessment of 
localised air quality impact. There has been no specific assessment of the credibility of the projects’ 
methane emissions or GHG emissions estimates (they do not refer to the figure of total CO2e 
emissions), or their acceptability in climate change terms. The EA then have clearly not scrutinised the 
estimate of the projects’ methane emissions and any attempt to close the issue at the inquiry through 
horizontal deference would have left a gap in the environmental controls. 
In sum then, a series of issues and questions have been raised about the assumptions involved in the 
methane emissions estimate, and the process – or lack thereof – through which the inquiry found the 
                                                                
25 A 100 year methane GWP of 21 comes from IPCC2 from 1996; this was revised upward to 23 in IPPC3 in 2001, 
fully 16 years prior to the publication of this decision document (IPCC 2001, 47, table 3; IPCC 2007, 212, table 2.14). 
As has been discussed previously, it was subsequently revised upward to 25 in 2007 (IPCC4) and then 34 in 2013 
(IPCC5) (IPCC 2007; IPCC 2013). 
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estimate satisfactory and safely reliable. The estimate is clearly highly uncertain, though not inevitably 
an underestimation as Anderson suggests (a much lower than assumed flow rate could cancel out the 
GWP underestimate, for example). Whether or not the issues raised add up to a reasonably likely 
underestimation (and they may very well do) is impossible to say with any confidence because of the 
uncertainty, lack of disclosure and remaining unanswered questions. The key finding here, however, 
concerns process not outcome – so much remains ambiguous precisely because the matter was not 
thoroughly scrutinised at the inquiry. Serious scrutiny of these matters at the inquiry was closed by an 
apparent withholding of scepticism and aversion to problematisation, or, put the other way around, an 
orientation of credulity towards the estimate. Unlike the blunt procedural exclusion of the forms of 
closure considered in the previous sections of this chapter, here justification is produced through a 
shallow performance of scrutiny whilst key assumptions behind the estimate remain obscure through 
the withholding of scepticism.   
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5.4.2 TH E EFFECT  O F S ELECTIV E S CEPTI CI S M AN D CR EDU LIT Y O N TH E IS S UE O F WA ST E DI SPO SA L CAPA CIT Y 
 
Closure performed through the withholding of scepticism was also evident in the treatment of the 
flowback fluid estimates. This contest concerned the ES’s estimate of the volumes of the flowback fluid 
expected to be produced by the sites (on which the waste treatment capacity demand assessment was 
based). FoE, through their waste expert Alan Watson, contended that the estimate potentially 
underplayed the scale of the sites’ demands. Watson queried the ES’s silence on nearby Preese Hall – 
the only ‘real local data’ available – which had a flowback rate of 70%. Watson also questioned the 
applicability of the US evidence, for the very same reason already discussed concerning methane 
emissions. The key period for both flowback of liquid and gas waste is the completion phase which 
typically lasts around 10 days in the US, but in these applications the IFT is expected to last between 60-
90 days. He also questioned the reasons for excluding the (generally higher flowback rate) Barnett shale 
from the comparison. Finally, Watson highlighted a discrepancy between the WMP’s 22,000m3 per well 
figure and the similar per site figure in the ESs. He suggested that this could mean that the actual 
flowback volume estimate is four times higher than the figure in the ES on which the assessment of 
treatment capacity demand was based. As such these estimates fell well short, argued FoE, of the 
‘appropriate information’ that DM2 requires.  
Cuadrilla on the other hand contended that the estimate of a 40% worst-case scenario flowback return 
rate was suitably conservative. They argued that most US formations experience lower rates than 40%, 
and that the higher rate Barnett shale should be excluded because of specific geological conditions not 
analogous to the Bowland. Furthermore, Preese Hall is also an inappropriate analogy, they argued, 
because the EPA suggest that vertical wells experience higher rates, as well as because the operations at 
Preese Hall differed. On the discrepancy Cuadrilla maintained that it was merely a typographical error, 
and that the smaller ES figure was the correct one. 
The Inspector resolved that Cuadrilla’s estimates were credible. She ruled that Cuadrilla have provided 
‘valid and logical’ reasons for discounting the higher Preese Hall rate, and that the US evidence taken as 
a whole in combination with the characteristics of the Bowland “do indeed provide strong grounds to 
support the Appellants’ view that the flowback percentage estimate of 40% is appropriately 
conservative” (McKay 2016, 394). Regarding the discrepancy, the Inspector concludes that this is “most 
likely to be simply due to a typographical error and that the fault lies with the WMP and Permits, rather 
than the ES” (McKay 2016, 396). 
Compared to the methane emissions issue above Cuadrilla are made to work harder to defend their 
flowback estimates as a result of Watson’s persistence, and the matter receives comparably closer 
scrutiny at the inquiry. The matter starts out as highly confused but is clarified to an extent throughout 
the proceedings of the inquiry. By the end of the inquiry then, many of the figures and assumptions 
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used in the estimate of flowback volumes had been clarified in a series of inquiry documents (Quarles 
2016b; Cuadrilla 2016d) (see A3.1 for a summary). As such, there is greater clarity about the claims that 
the Inspector finds credible. 
However, whilst the estimate had to an extent been clarified by the end of the inquiry (notwithstanding 
a series of remaining inconsistencies – see A3.1), scepticism continued to be withheld from the key 
assumptions on which it was based. There were three such key assumptions. First, the 40% worst-case 
scenario return rate during the fracking and IFT phases. Second, the 100% reuse rate during the fracking 
phase. Third, how these figures were then turned into a peak weekly flowback figure during the IFT. 
Ultimately, Cuadrilla do not clarify the calculations used to go from a total flowback figure, to the peak 
weekly flowback figure which was assessed against weekly identified capacity to produce the 65% 
demand on capacity for one site at peak time figure (68% for both sites together owing to staggering). 
Furthermore, the source for the 40% worst case scenario flowback rate remains an unpublished 
Cuadrilla report. Finally, the feasibility of the assumption of 100% reuse of flowback during the fracking 
phase went largely unscrutinised by the inquiry (no doubt in part because this assumption was clarified 
after Watson appeared at the inquiry, in inquiry document Quarles 2016b). I’ll now explore each of 
these matters in turn to demonstrate how closure by the withholding of scepticism and resulting 
shallow performance of scrutiny at the inquiry again played a key role in the production of justification.     
 
Can 100% of the flowback during the fracking phase be re-used? 
The first key assumption in the assessment of demand on waste treatment capacity, clarified in 
Cuadrilla’s inquiry documents, was the reuse of 100% of flowback during the fracking phase. This means 
that of the worst-case scenario 40% return rate during the fracking and IFT phases, only the IFT 
flowback, or approximately 20% of the total fluid injected (or 22,050m3), requires offsite treatment and 
disposal. This is all the more important because flowback tends to be most intense immediately after 
fracking, tailing off as the well increasingly returns gas rather than liquid, meaning that during the 
relatively short (1 to 2 months) fracking phase high volumes of flowback return relatively quickly. 
Furthermore, because of the proposed staggering of operations at the sites, the fracking phases of wells 
2 and 4 occur entirely during the beginning of the IFTs of wells 1 and 3. Any fracking phase flowback 
from wells 2 and 4 not able to be reused would be additional to the waste demands from the beginning 
of the IFTs of wells 1 and 3 (Smith 2016a, 15). This scenario could potentially create peak weekly 
flowback higher than the 1,750m3 figure (and so 65% of demand) given in the ES which assumes 100% 
reuse, although it is impossible to know for sure given that the method and assumptions used to 
calculate the peak have not been disclosed.     
The stridency of the clarification documents in assuming 100% reuse is not always repeated in the prior 
documentation. For example, the ES section on water use suggests that: 
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“To reduce the water demands some of the flow back fluid from the hydraulic fracturing 
process could be re-used in subsequent hydraulic fracturing stages (embedded mitigation). 
Depending on the availability and quality of flow back water the proportion of re-used water 
could be increased” (Arup 2014a, 613). 
Likewise, the WMP states that: 
“Between stages of hydraulic fracturing a mixture of injected hydraulic fracturing fluid and any 
produced fluid present, which we refer to together as flowback fluid, will return up the 
wellbore to the surface lifted by the release of pressure in the well. This flowback fluid will be 
captured and stored in enclosed containers and subsequently reused wherever possible” 
(Cuadrilla 2014b, 16, my emphasis). 
Finally, the EA suggest that: 
“The returning flowback fluid will be stored on site and will be reused during future hydraulic 
fracturing stages if its composition, which may require dilution with mains water, is compatible 
with the friction reducer which will be added to it” (EA 2015, 13). 
“Flowback fluid that it is not suitable for reuse will be sent to an appropriately permitted waste 
facility for treatment or disposal” (EA 2015, 23). 
“The operator will be required to reuse flowback fluid from the fracturing process in 
subsequent fracturing phases, wherever possible, to reduce the generation of waste requiring 
disposal. Flowback fluid will be monitored to ensure that it remains fit for reuse; the fluid that 
can be injected must remain non-hazardous” (EA 2015, 85). 
The broader literature is of little help in trying to establish whether the 100% reuse during fracking 
assumption is reasonable, because, firstly, it doesn’t split the process up into phases, instead estimating 
reuse rates across the entire period for which the well is producing flowback (and the timescale is often 
unclear). Second, the literature tends to estimate a rate without distinguishing between flowback that 
couldn’t be reused because of a lack of opportunity (not a problem in the fracking phase), and flowback 
that couldn’t be reused because it was unsuitable. For example, when Jiang et al. suggest that between 
30-60% of flowback can be reused (Jiang et al. 2011b), it is hard to say what proportion of the unusable 
remainder is down to unsuitability, and whether that unsuitability would likely arise during a period of 
operations like Cuadrilla’s proposed fracking phase.  
In any event the assumption of 100% reuse during fracking is demonstrably a best-case scenario, and 
the supporting documentation prior to the clarifying inquiry documents does not appear to consider its 
achievement is guaranteed. As discussed, according to the indicative timetable, this would particularly 
be an issue if fracking phase flowback fluid from wells 2 and 4 proved unsuitable for reuse, as this would 
create extra waste demand additional to the early IFT flowback for wells 1 and 3. This would potentially 
cause a higher peak than the one on which the peak demand on capacity (65%) assessment was based. 
Dehon suggests in closing that Cuadrilla provide ‘no cogent justification’ for assessing the best-case 
scenario for reuse and not assessing the worst-case of no reuse. However, given her general satisfaction 
with the estimate, the Inspector is evidently satisfied with the use of the best-case scenario, in spite of 
the apparent prior use of a less optimistic scenario (i.e. ‘a proportion’) and no explanation for the 
change. Taking the EA’s own words at face value brings into question whether they knew that 100% 
reuse during the fracking phase was a key assumption on which the flowback volume estimate and 
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waste disposal capacity demand assessment were based. Questions over the credibility of this key 
underlying assumption were closed through the withholding of scepticism and a shallow performance of 
scrutiny. 
 
Is a 40% flowback rate during the fracking and IFT phases a reasonable worst-case scenario? 
The second key assumption was that a worst-case scenario 40% of the fracking fluid would flow back 
during the fracking and IFT phases combined (a period of around 3-5 months per well). In the ESs the 
40% figure is referenced to an unpublished Cuadrilla report entitled ‘4 Wells Combined – With Reuse – 
Rev 5’ (Cuadrilla 2014a)26. In his technical note Quarles suggests that it is based on published literature 
on North American operations and Bowland shale geology and data (Quarles 2016a, 6). Quarles includes 
two tables of published US data to defend the 40% flowback worst case scenario assumption. Quarles’ 
table 1 references six studies reporting flowback rates from the US (Quarles 2016a, 7, table 1). Quarles’ 
table two summarises the findings of the EPA’s (draft) review of flowback rates (Quarles 2016a, 8, table 
2). They do not differ in the final version (EPA 2015, 7-4-7–5, tables 7-1 and 7-2; EPA 2016, 7-6-7–8, 
tables 7-1 and 7-2). All sources relied on by Quarles to defend the 40% figure are summarised in table 8 
below.  
Watson considers 40%, which he initially misinterprets as applying to the IFT only, to be conservatively 
low. His scepticism was no doubt compounded on learning that the assumption is 40% of the total 
injected volume over the fracking and IFT phases combined - the rate during the 60-90 days of IFT only is 
approximately 20%. To justify his scepticism, Watson makes reference to a DECC strategic 
environmental assessment, which assumes that 30-75% of the total fluid injected returns as flowback 
(DECC 2013). This assumption is referenced to an AEA report (AEA 2012b), who in turn reference it to a 
number of US sources (see table 8 below).  
Table 8: Return rate estimates 
 Return rate Timescale Play Source 
Cuadrilla (these 
proposals)  
40% 3-5months 
(approx. 20% over 
the first 1-2months 
– i.e. the fracking 
phase; approx. 20% 
over the following 
60-90 days – i.e. 
the IFT) 
Bowland Cuadrilla (the 
unpublished ‘4 
Wells Combined – 
With Reuse – Rev 5’ 
report)  
 
Bowland data and 
geology 
 
                                                                
26 Intriguingly, the WMP references the assumption to Mitschanek et al. (2014) (Cuadrilla 2014b, 32). Mitschanek et 
al. (Mitschanek, Thonhauser, and Prohaska 2014; see also Mitschanek 2013) in turn reference the claim to Slutz et 
al. who provide no source for the claim (Slutz et al. 2012). Further confusion is added by the fact that figure 13 in 
the appendix of Mitschanek et al. suggests that they consider the 10-40% flowback rate as applying to a 10 day 
period (Mitschanek, Thonhauser, and Prohaska 2014, 11). 
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North American 
literature 
The sources of the figures relied on by Watson  
US Department of 
Energy (DoE) 
(2009)  
30-70% The majority 
recovered over 
several hours to a 
couple of weeks, 
can continue for 
several months 
after beginning 
production (the 
EFT in Cuadrilla’s 
proposal) 
Various Personal 
communication 
with numerous 
operators and 
service companies 
EPA (2011b) 25-75% Typically several 
weeks  
Various Veil (2010), Pickett 
(2009), Horn (2009) 
Horn (2009) 34% First two weeks Woodford Sample of 13 shale 
wells 
Pickett (2009) 70-75% Several days Barnett 
(probably) 
David Burnett 
(probably) 
Veil (2010) 30-70% First few days to 
weeks 
Various DoE (2009) 
Cuadrilla (Preese 
Hall, vertical) 
70% 3 months Bowland Cuadrilla (emails 
between Cuadrilla 
and the EA 
obtained by FoE – 
see Watson 2016a, 
19–20)  
Quarles’ table 1 (Quarles 2016a, 7) 
Alkouh and 
Wattenbarger 
(2013)  
10-40% 
15-30% 
Not specified Not specified Chekani et al. 
(2010) – the 
relevance of which 
is hard to ascertain 
Blauch et al. (2009) 40% Not specified Marcellus Single example well 
Kuijvenhoven et al. 
(2013) 
4.5-12.7% 
11.9-23.3% 
4.5-81.4% 
15.8-308.7% 
(Barnett) 
10 day / final Various Not specified 
Lan et al. (2014) 3-32% 30 days  Horn River 
Basin 
18 well sample 
Slutz et al. (2012) 10-40% Not specified Not specified Not specified  
Susquehanna River 
Basin Commission 
(2013) 
7-10% Not specified Marcellus Not specified 
Quarles’ table 2 (Quarles 2016a, 8) 
Mantell (2011; 
2013) 
9-29% 
7-22% 
5% 
10 days Various Chesapeake data 
Clark et al. (2013) 10% 
20% 
5% 
10% 
10 days 
 
 
Various Personal 
communication 
with Mantell 
Hansen et al. 
(2013) 
8% 30 days  Marcellus West Virginia 
Department of 
Environmental 
Protection data 
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Hayes (2009) 24-25% 90 days Marcellus 14 well sample (8 
horizontals) 
Nicot et al. (2014) 60->100% 
(median) 
1-4 years Barnett Company reporting 
to Railroad 
Commission 
Ziemkiewicz et al. 
(2014) 
10-30% 115 months  Marcellus One West Virginia 
company estimate 
Nicot et al. (2012)  <20% Lifetime Eagle Ford Not specified 
 
As table 8 demonstrates, Quarles’ claim that these sources show Cuadrilla’s 40% worst-case scenario 
return rate to be conservative is somewhat misleading for two main reasons. First, Cuadrilla’s 40% 
return rate relates to flowback during the fracking and IFT phases combined. The North American 
literature tends to count timescale from the completion of fracking. In fact, there is no mention of the 
possibility of flowback between the hydraulic fracturing stages (when the literature talks of reuse the 
assumption tends to be that the flowback will be transported to another well in the vicinity, as opposed 
to reuse in the same well from which it returned or on the same site). As such the rates in the table 
above are comparable with Cuadrilla’s estimated flowback rate during the IFT only, which is 
approximately 20%. Second, the 20% IFT rate estimate refers to a timescale of between 60-90 days. The 
majority of the rates in the above table relate to shorter timescales. The picture painted in table 8 Is 
mixed and comparison is impaired by the variability between wells and plays, the various definitions of 
flowback and produced water27, and the lack of disclosure regarding samples and timescales in some 
cases. Nonetheless, the table above demonstrates Quarles’ claim that the 40% rate is conservative is 
problematic because the IFT flowback rate of 20% is the more appropriate comparator, most of the 
studies concern much shorter durations (even than the 60-90 days of IFT only), and many of the sources 
do not provide clear details about how their figures were produced.  
Of course, Watson makes much the same point at the inquiry when asked about Quarles’ rebuttal and 
the tables therein supposedly justifying the 40% rate. Pointing to definitions and timescales of 
‘flowback’, Watson suggests that “you’ve got to make sure you’re talking about the same thing”, and, 
“so it’s crucial when you’re talking about flowback you look at a particular period” (INQ Feb 26 p2 
01.00.00 – 01.03.35). These warnings were evidently overlooked when the Inspector resolved that the 
US evidence does “indeed provide strong grounds to support the Appellants’ view that the flowback 
percentage estimate of 40% is appropriately conservative” (McKay 2016, 394). The flowback fluid 
volume estimate appears to have been taken at face-value without any serious scrutiny of its underlying 
                                                                
27 The definition of flowback is not standardised, and the precise distinction between flowback and produced water 
appears to be a matter of debate. For example, Mantell uses ‘produced water’ as a catch-all term for all the water 
that is returned to the surface through the well, including both the water injected and natural formation water 
(sometimes distinguished as flowback and produced water respectively) (Mantell 2013, A–21). West Virginia state 
defines flowback fluid as either all fluid recovered in the first 30 days after injection, or 50% of the injected volume 
depending on which comes first (see Hansen, Mulvaney, and Betcher 2013, 20).  Finally, Horn suggests that 
flowback becomes produced water when a well has returned over 100% of the fluid injected (Horn 2009, 2). 
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assumptions, and treated in a mode of credulity rather than scepticism by the Inspector. As such, 
questions over the estimate and its underlying assumptions have been overlooked with the inquiry 
rendered insensitive to them through the closure performed by selective scepticism and credulity.           
 
How was the IFT peak weekly flowback volume figure produced and is it reasonable? 
The final key assumption used in the estimate of treatment capacity demand was the sites’ peak weekly 
flowback figure. When assessing just these sites what really matters is not how much waste is created in 
total but the most intense period of waste generation. To assess peak demand Cuadrilla calculate a peak 
weekly flowback figure during the IFT of 1,750m3 which represents 65% of the 2,700m3 identified 
weekly treatment capacity (for one site alone, but this only rises to 68% for both sites because of the 
staggering of operations). Watson expressed frustration at not being able to scrutinise Cuadrilla’s 
estimated week-by-week flowback assumptions which were not disclosed. The simple answer to the 
questions in the sub-title is that we don’t know on both counts because of a lack of disclosure.  
Cuadrilla do not disclose when this peak week would occur. One would assume, going by Smith’s 
indicative timetable (Smith 2016a, 15), and assuming 100% reuse of fracking phase flowback, that it 
would likely occur at the beginning of the IFT of well four (which coincides with the midpoint of the IFT 
of well 3 and the EFTs of wells 1 and 2). There would also be a slightly smaller peak during the beginning 
of the IFT of well 2 (which would coincide with the midpoint of the IFT of well 1, but without any 
additional EFT produced water). It is questionable as to whether any EFT phase produced water has 
been included in the peak weekly figure given that the figure is presented in the IFT section of the ES’s 
assessment, and a separate EFT assessment follows in the subsequent section.  
The 1,750m3 peak weekly figure is only 5% of the total amount of fluid injected into wells 3 and 4 
(33,725m3 each, 45 stage wells – see Quarles 2016b, no pagination, table 1). Given that the peak weekly 
figure inevitably includes some flowback from the midpoint of the IFT of well 3, as well as potentially 
some EFT produced water from wells 1 and 2, the first week of IFT flowback from well 4 cannot account 
for the entirely of the peak weekly figure, and so must be <5% of total injected fluid. When compared 
against the 10 day rate estimates in table 8 above this first week rate of <5% is at the lower end of the 
range (4.5-29%). The point is underlined by the 8 horizontal Marcellus wells in Hayes’ sample, which 
after 5 days had returned an average of 15% of the total fluid injected (Hayes 2009). Of course, this is 
somewhat speculative owing to the lack of disclosure from Cuadrilla over the precise well-by-well and 
site-total cumulative flowback volume over time assumptions behind their figures.   
The Inspector provides no explicit reasoning on the peak weekly figure, in spite of it being the key figure 
on which peak demand on waste treatment capacity is based. Nonetheless we must assume that she 
was satisfied with the figure provided and the lack of disclosure over how it was produced. Cuadrilla’s 
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key assumption was again taken at face-value, with the inquiry withholding scepticism and displaying an 
apparent aversion to problematisation.  
In sum then, the Inspector found the flowback volume estimate on which the projects’ demands on 
waste treatment capacity were based credible and that the provision of information was sufficient for 
her to be satisfied (DM2). However, none of the three key assumptions behind the estimate – 100% 
reuse of flowback during the fracking phase, the 10-40% return rate during the fracking and IFT phases 
combined, and the peak weekly flowback figure – were thoroughly scrutinised. Much like in the case of 
the methane emissions estimate considered previously, justification was produced through selective 
scepticism and credulity. This withholding of scepticism resulted in a shallow performance of scrutiny, 
rendering the inquiry insensitive to the issues detailed here.  
In conclusion, the section immediately above has demonstrated the closure performed by selective 
scepticism and credulity at the inquiry across the issues of waste disposal capacity and climate change. 
As well as this form of closure arising from the credulous mode of the inquiry’s engagement with key 
knowledge claims made by Cuadrilla, this chapter previously argued that closure was also performed by 
three ‘procedural’ mechanisms. In these cases, arguments and matters of concern were bluntly 
excluded as immaterial in reference to planning policy and convention. In total, then, this chapter has 
considered four key forms of closure operating at the inquiry – double compartmentalisation, vertical 
deference, horizontal deference, and selective scepticism and credulity. Taken together these forms of 
closure, it has been argued, played a key role in rendering the inquiry insensitive to the arguments and 
matters of concern raised by FoE and therefore establishing it as a site for the production of justification 
for these specific appeals and shale gas development more broadly. 
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6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
This chapter will draw out and reflect on some of the key implications of the study. The first two 
sections will refer back to the literature review and conceptual discussion presented in chapter 2. 
Section 6.3 will then reflect on the conceptual approach taken, followed by reflections on methods and 
the scope for generalising the findings of the study in section 6.4. In the final two sections a series of 
implications of the research will be offered to a range audiences, before, finally, the research is 
summarised and its conclusions stated.       
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6.1 CONTRIBUTIONS TO LITERATURE 
 
The ‘framing fracking’ literature discussed in section 2.3.1 catalogued the diversity of frames found 
amongst publics, policy-makers, and industry actors. These frames included a variety of views and 
judgements concerning the process (fracking) and product (shale gas) of shale development, as well as 
the actors and processes of its governance. Therefore the framing contest over fracking involves not just 
perceptions of risk but judgements on institutional ‘body language’ (see Wynne 1996) and procedural 
justice (see for example Cotton 2017). This focus on procedural justice – the extent to which publics and 
communities are able to participate in and influence policy and regulatory decisions – positions 
processes such as the one studied here as potentially both sites for addressing public scepticism and the 
subject of public scepticism themselves. In other words, opportunities for public participation in planning 
decisions could potentially help address concerns over procedural injustice or they could confirm and 
exacerbate such concerns. This will depend a great deal on the fine-grain detail of the design and 
conduct of such participatory opportunities, and the treatment of participating publics therein. This 
thesis has provided just such a fine-grain account. 
Some of the ‘framing fracking’ literature went further than ‘cataloguing’ frames to argue that dominant 
forms of industry, government or scientific discourse frame the issue in such ways as to potentially 
marginalise public views from sites of policy- and decision-making. These studies explicitly connected 
divergence at a broad discursive level between public and institutional frames and the ability of formal 
processes of policy- and decision-making to accommodate public views. These studies, however, did not 
go into concrete details about the design features and modes of conduct of such participatory sites that 
might orientate them toward receptiveness or insensitivity. 
The literature on ‘closure through planning’ considered in section 2.3.2, however, did provide some 
insights regarding these concrete details, harvested largely from work on planning disputes over energy 
development. In particular, four forms of closure were identified which are closely related to the forms 
of closure reported in the previous chapter. A lack of investigatory capacity and ability to scrutinise 
technical claims is related to what I have termed ‘selective scepticism and credulity’. The procedural 
exclusion of matters as beyond the scope of the inquiry describes the same blunt exclusion as the three 
forms of procedural closure reported above (double compartmentalisation, and vertical and horizontal 
deference). Issues around contrary views gaining decisional influence within a centralised and 
prescriptive statutory system and broader institutional context resonate strongly with the notion of 
closure by ‘vertical deference’. Finally, the ‘scaling’ or ‘salami slicing’ of issues, their oversight, and 
opportunities for participating on them, resemble the move I refer to as ‘double compartmentalisation’. 
These two literatures in combination located planning decision-making on shale gas development as 
potentially fertile ground for studying processes of closure curtailing the role of expert and public 
participation geared towards the production of justification for a particular form of development. Some 
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research related to this subject has been conducted and this was considered in section 2.3.3. I will argue 
that the present study makes a considerable contribution to these early efforts. This emergent literature 
demonstrated a concern over the extent to which certain sceptical frames and local publics are 
accommodated within or are able to influence planning decisions. It included some normative argument 
on the importance of public participation in regulatory decision-making, as well as some assessment of 
opportunities for such participation. The analysis just presented offers a series of insights to this 
literature. 
 6.1.1 CON TRI B UTION S  TO T H E ‘P A RTI CIP ATIO N IN  T H E  P LA NNIN G  OF SH A LE D EV ELO P MENT’  LIT ERA TUR E 
 
The previous chapter makes obvious the barriers to objecting communities gaining the kind decisional 
influence over planning decisions on shale gas proposals that Cotton and Whitton et al. argue they 
ought to have. There’s a slight ambiguity between the opportunity to participate and that participation 
amounting to influence or control in this work. Decisional influence may or may not be the outcome of 
the opportunity to participate, but there’s relatively little detail on what may enable or prevent such an 
outcome.  
Whitton et al. warn that without adequate public engagement on both the broader social and ethical 
viability of shale development and specific siting decisions “decision-making will solely reflect the 
choices of central, institutional actors rather than those that are directly affected” (Whitton et al. 2017, 
17). This thesis demonstrates how a more closed process of national policy generation than the 
participatory technology assessment envisaged by Whitton et al. has already established a series of 
commitments about shale development and its regulation that then filter through and constrain public 
participation at the downstream stage of siting decisions. Furthermore, as the discussion of double 
compartmentalisation demonstrated, the very separation of appraisal of and public participation on 
broader ‘policy’ on shale development on the one hand, and specific proposals for that form of 
development on the other (i.e. a site-by-site basis), potentially obscures many cross-cutting, cumulative 
and broader issues.  
This thesis therefore complements these normative arguments with a fuller appreciation of the extent 
to which participation on planning decisions can be highly conditioned by commitments already made in 
policy (e.g. the relationship between shale gas and climate change, the efficacy of regulation). By the 
time opportunities for communities and publics to participate in planning decisions arise key issues may 
no longer be on the table for discussion. Where local community, public, expert and NGO views differ 
from a planning or energy policy commitment already made, there is little hope for decisional influence 
on these grounds irrespective of how many opportunities to participate are granted. Therefore, what 
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emerges as more crucial than participatory access to ‘downstream’ sites of regulatory decision-making is 
the ability for publics and communities to influence or challenge policy commitments that subsequently 
circumscribe those sites.   
The findings reported here confirm Hilson’s largely anticipatory assessment regarding the ability of 
regulatory processes to accommodate key public fracking-sceptical frames (Hilson 2015). Hilson 
established two scalar frames – a local risk frame and global climate frame – and a novelty frame 
amongst fracking opponents. He then went on to assess the prospects of these oppositional frames 
gaining a hearing within planning and environmental permitting decision-making processes. Hilson 
suggested that many elements of the local oppositional frame can be considered by planning decision 
makers, though points out that certain issues are the responsibility of specialist regulators to which 
planning must defer. Regarding the global climate frame, he suggested that whilst it is ambiguous as to 
whether the ‘end use’ of fuel could fall under ‘indirect effects’ covered by EIA regulations, these 
arguments are in any event ruled out by the deference to Government energy policy established in 
planning. The subsequent FFR case has demonstrated (section 2.3.3) it is highly unlikely that ‘end use’ 
fuel emissions would be considered an indirect impact of a project. Hilson also pointed out that the clear 
separation between phases will also constrain the consideration of global climate arguments on 
exploration applications. Overall, on the prospects for the global climate frame, Hilson suggested that 
although the planning and environmental permitting regimes can register argument concerning direct 
and some indirect GHG emissions, the receptiveness of both to “indirect ‘final fuel use’ emissions from 
the production stage appears to be at best unclear and, at worst, completely excluded insofar as this 
might be taken to call into question national government policy choices on energy” (Hilson 2015, 202). 
The findings presented here suggest that this assessment was if anything a little optimistic. 
The approach taken to the WMS given by Amber Rudd to the House of Commons on September 16 2015 
(shortly after the publication of Hilson 2015) by the Inspector effectively prohibits any argument 
concerning the negative impact of shale gas applications on climate change from gaining decisional 
influence. Hilson is correct that planning policy accommodates consideration of direct and some indirect 
emissions, though he fails to anticipate the effect of energy policy and the approach of deference to it. 
As demonstrated in the previous chapter, the approach of vertical deference to the Government view as 
set out in the WMS effectively makes it impossible to find a fracking application unacceptable on climate 
change impact grounds. This includes arguments concerning the impact of the direct emissions of 
projects (like the GHG emissions emitted through flaring in this case). The global climate oppositional 
frame is incompatible with the Government’s positive ‘bridging’ climate frame. This positive frame 
expressed through the WMS defines shale development as necessarily and in general good for climate 
change. The decision maker, unless they take an entirely different approach to the WMS or the WMS is 
replaced, is compelled to defer to the Government view.  
This finding is particularly relevant to Hilson’s discussion on the significance of statutory climate duties 
for the planning oversight of unconventional hydrocarbon development (Hilson 2014). Hilson identifies 
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the key statutory climate duties relevant to planning oversight of shale gas development in the UK, but 
writing prior to the WMS, does not consider how such statutory duties aimed at climate change 
mitigation are sensitive to such an intervention. The statutory duties identified by Hilson impose a duty 
on particular authorities to, in various ways, mitigate climate change. However, they say nothing about 
the kinds of developments that may contribute to or detract from that aim. The WMS works in that 
void, defining shale gas development as an aide to climate change mitigation. Given planning’s vertical 
deference to this Government view, once defined in such a way, shale development, rather than being 
constrained by such duties, is seen as working towards them. In short, Hilson identifies the statutory 
basis of the duty to consider climate change in planning oversight generally, though the WMS seemingly 
determines the outcome of that dutiful consideration in the case of shale development. 
The previous chapters also confirm Hilson’s anticipation of some aspects of the local risk frame being 
the responsibility of specialist regulatory regimes. Section 5.3 in the previous chapter makes clear that 
FoE’s arguments on waste disposal and public health were largely closed through the approach of 
horizontal deference towards the existing work of the EA and the efficacy of the regulatory system more 
generally. Given, for instance, that the EA regulate the processes that give rise to direct public health 
risks (e.g. contamination of land, air or water), the approach of horizontal deference rendered the 
inquiry unreceptive to public framings that view fracking as risky to public health (this would have been 
the case even if the permit had not yet been granted as the inquiry would have deferred to their 
prospective competence). This is because policy prescribes that planning should respect the remit of 
other regulators and defer to their completed and prospective work unless there is evidence of a gap in 
the controls (regulatory remit deference), and assume the effectiveness of the system more generally 
(consummate regulation deference). In other words, and relating to the work of Stokes (Stokes 2016), 
the fact that these issues are covered by another regime and by regulation in general is taken to mean 
that there is no issue to consider here. Hilson doesn’t quite capture just how restrictive the assumption 
of the effective operation of regulation is in practice to oppositional frames and arguments concerning 
risks to health. This form of closure makes planning processes totally unreceptive to the issue of direct 
health risks, but also key ‘sociological and historical’ (see Wynne 1982) objector arguments concerning 
the efficacy of regulation and the trustworthiness of operators and regulators. Furthermore, concerns 
over ongoing scientific uncertainty and expert disagreement over the health risks associated with shale 
development are headed off by a ‘heroic’ view of regulation encouraged by this assumption.  
Hilson actually largely overlooks oppositional framings of fracking that concern not the technology itself 
or even shale development more broadly, but the conduct of its implementation. This includes issues 
around both the trustworthiness of operators, regulators and policy actors; and the extent to which 
policy and regulatory decision-making processes are inclusive of and responsive to public views. In fact, 
Hilson overlooks the oppositional frame concerned with the very same question that interests him – 
‘will our views be heard within regulatory decision-making?’ Of course, the conduct of the policy’s 
implementation may be seen as a distinct entity from the subject of that policy, but section 2.3.1 makes 
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clear that public framings of fracking tend not to make such a clear-cut distinction. He therefore makes 
no assessment of planning’s capacity to accommodate argument concerning the track record and 
trustworthiness of operators, the competence of regulators and the efficacy of regulation, and the 
adequacy of opportunities for participation in policy- and decision-making – all of which are closed as 
matters to be taken seriously.   
Hilson also identifies an oppositional ‘novelty frame’, though he doesn’t pursue the question of its 
accommodation. This relates to the work of Stokes on distinct regulatory strategies and their different 
ways of framing fracking as a regulatory object (Stokes 2016). Hilson identified that oppositional publics 
frame fracking as a novel technology whereas industry and policy-makers tend to frame it as already 
existing, widely used and altogether more familiar and mundane. Hilson also pointed out that these 
‘diagnostic’ frames have very different ‘prognostic’ implications regarding the required regulatory 
approach. Building on this, Stokes argues that each these very different framings-of-fracking-as-a-
regulatory-object underpin two distinct regulatory strategies which she terms ‘domain’ and ‘dexterity’. 
Stokes’ insight is to appreciate that UK Government does not exclusively see or present fracking as 
mundane and familiar, but selectively views it as exceptional, novel and even ‘revolutionary’ when it 
comes to justifying and enabling benefit realisation. In other words, this novel framing of fracking 
underpins the regulatory strategy of ‘dexterity’ which focuses on removing regulatory barriers in order 
to unlock fracking’s apparently extraordinary promise. The mundane framing, on the other hand, gives 
rise to the regulatory strategy of ‘domain’ which is selectively applied to matters of risk, health and the 
environment. This strategy focuses on the coverage of fracking by generic existing regulation, which is 
then taken to reflect the adequacy and efficacy of that existing regulation and so the lack of need for 
additional, specific and burdensome regulation. Stokes detailed how these strategies work in concert 
resulting in a normative pull in legal and regulatory practice towards a particular technological 
trajectory. She suggested that this ‘straightjacketing effect’ requires critical scrutiny. 
The previous chapter has made clear some of the mechanisms through which this ‘straightjacketing 
effect’ filters down to the ‘coalface’ of decision-making in practice. The risk normalisation of ‘domain’ is 
given clearest expression, as anticipated by Stokes, in the assumption of the effective operation of 
regulators and the regulatory framework in general. As already discussed, concerns over uncertainty, 
regulators and regulation can effectively be swept away through this generic assumption of 
comprehensive and consummate regulation. The impulse to benefit realisation of ‘dexterity’ on the 
other hand is clearly seen in the role of the WMS. This is especially evident in the indirect and 
unscrutinised weight granted in favour of the proposals through the WMS’ expectations of economic 
and climate change benefits which would have been ruled immaterial were they voiced by a rule 6 party 
(as indeed was the case with the CoC).  
As well as implementing these risk normalisation and benefit realisation strategies, the inquiry as a 
whole expressed the Government framing of fracking from which they arise. Mundane and typical 
planning nuisances were given a hearing (noise, landscape, traffic) and potential decisional influence, 
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whilst more extraordinary issues were closed from serious consideration and influence (FoE’s case on 
climate change, waste and health). Furthermore, Government-promoted benefits are given decisional 
influence without scrutiny (climate and economic benefits). The inquiry was a site through which these 
dominant broader frames could shape the issues and arguments that could be included and taken 
seriously, and where they could not be contested by oppositional frames (i.e. extraordinary risk frames, 
or underwhelming benefit frames). 
In sum then, the findings presented here complement normative arguments about the requirement for 
public participation in and control over planning decisions with a more fine-grain understanding of the 
treatment of participating publics within such a process. In particular, meaningful opportunities for 
participation in ‘downstream’ siting decisions are constrained by the conditioning effects of policy 
commitments already made. This is compounded by the separation of ‘national policy’ and ‘siting 
decisions’, where the former cannot be questioned in the latter through a combination of vertical 
deference and double compartmentalisation. With regard to work on the capacity for planning to 
accommodate oppositional ‘frames’, planning decision-making in practice plays out largely in line with 
the expectations of Hilson. Hilson’s approach to whether frames can be ‘heard’ manages to anticipate 
certain blunt procedural exclusions (‘end use’ fuel arguments, production phase emissions during 
exploration phase appraisal), but fails to fully anticipate the difficulty of any oppositional arguments on 
the matters of risk to public health and impact on climate change gaining decisional influence. 
Furthermore, Hilson could not have anticipated the closure of ‘selective scepticism and credulity’ from 
analysing policy and regulations because it is not a procedural form of closure but is achieved through 
conduct. Finally, the ‘straightjacketing effect’ described by Stokes was in evidence in the way ‘domain’ 
regulatory coverage provided the basis on which to close arguments concerning extraordinary risks 
associated with fracking. The dexterity strategy was in play when an energy policy intervention in the 
form of the WMS was key to promoting and securing benefit realisation through the planning system. As 
such, the inquiry excluded arguments associated with framings contrary to the Government framing 
(e.g. arguments associated with the extraordinary risk framing), and indirectly granted weight to 
arguments associated with Government framings that would otherwise be excluded as immaterial (e.g. 
arguments associated with the extraordinary benefits framing voiced in the WMS).    
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6.2 INSIGHTS INTO THE PRODUCTION OF JUSTIFICATION  
The three normative decision-making theories pointed to two key phenomena of interest in the study of 
collective decision-making processes. The potentially distorting influence of the role of power in 
decision-making and possible ‘frontstage/backstage’ dynamics between the actual basis of decision 
selection and the means of decision justification. Both of these phenomena were approached through 
the concept of justification discussed in section 2.2. The potential for power to distort decision-making 
was understood as operating through the tacit or deliberate conditioning of the design and conduct of 
appraisal, channelling such processes toward particular outcomes. To the extent that appraisal 
processes are geared to closing down towards a (particular) decision outcome in ways that are unitary 
and prescriptive, and where the outcome is at least implicitly presented as objectively compelling or 
democratically legitimate, the process can be said to be misleadingly expressive as well as 
instrumentally restrictive. In other words, it can be said to exhibit frontstage/backstage dynamics where 
the justification produced through the, in a sense, performative process of appraisal is at odds with the 
actual process of selection, which occurred previously and on the basis of different and obscured 
imperatives.  
It was recognised that there are two separate tasks facing the imperative to strong justification which 
are potentially in tension. The first is to instrumentally secure the particular favoured outcome by 
deliberate manipulation or inadvertent bias shaping the design and conduct of the appraisal process. 
That an option has been selected by an appraisal process may be sufficient to produce justification for 
that option, but often sceptical audiences will require further persuasion. The second task is therefore 
the expressive one of persuading relevant audiences that the process of appraisal confers compelling 
justification upon the selected option. The simplest means of securing a preference (dictatorial edict) is 
the least likely to succeed in expressing the justifiability of that preference. On the other hand, the most 
effective means of justification (forms of appraisal widely seen as legitimate – e.g. not biased or unfairly 
restricted in some way) typically tend to cede the most control over decision selection and so risk 
selecting and justifying the ‘wrong’ option. (i.e. non-preferred according to prior incumbent 
commitments).  
 6.2.1 DI D  T HE INQ UI R Y PRO DU CE JU STI FI CA TI ON FOR  S HA LE D EV ELO PMEN T? 
 
It has been argued throughout this thesis that the inquiry studied here produced justification for the 
appeals in question and UK policy on shale gas more broadly. As an appraisal process the inquiry arrived 
at the recommendation that the PNR site should be granted planning permission, and that the RW site 
should be refused permission on the grounds of unacceptable traffic impacts. Therefore, on the face of 
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it, the inquiry comes to a conclusion that at least happens to align with central Government preferences 
on one site but not the other. The contention of this thesis was that any alignment with the centre is not 
happenstance, but the result of imperatives towards the justification of shale gas development in the UK 
operating through the planning system.  
Of course, the rejection of RW on traffic grounds superficially appears to undermine the argument here. 
The procedural materiality of the local nuisance issues that have not been considered here – noise, 
traffic, landscape and visual impacts – was not in question, leaving the parties to argue over whether 
they amounted to unacceptable impacts. These local nuisance issues are clearly accommodated within 
the planning appraisal of shale development, and participating publics can potentially achieve decisional 
influence through arguments concerning them. The imperative to strong justification, therefore, does 
not occur uniformly across the process (i.e. on all issues) but operates through the conditioning of the 
process’ sensitivity to particular issues. 
As is made clear in the WMS it is government policy to support only shale gas development that is safe, 
sustainable and timely (DCLG/DECC 2015). In other words, the expressed government commitment to 
shale gas development is conditional. What the treatment of FoE’s case demonstrates though is the way 
energy policy and planning policy, convention and conduct restrict appraisal of shale development 
through planning in terms the aspects of safety, sustainability and timeliness that can be considered. 
The appraisal of the extent to which fracking planning applications satisfy these conditions is highly 
circumscribed by the commitment to a particular framing of fracking as a regulatory object imposed on 
the process through both vertical and horizontal deference. Justification is produced through the closure 
of arguments that go against the grain of a mundane framing of fracking’s negative impacts, as well as 
the indirect registering of arguments from an ‘extraordinary’ framing of fracking’s benefits. For instance, 
appraisal of the safety of the proposals was effectively limited to the impact of noise and traffic and so 
excluding the ‘extraordinary’ safety concerns that largely preoccupy oppositional publics. Furthermore, 
appraisal against these conditions is also stunted by ‘double compartmentalisation’ which blinkers 
oversight, potentially obscuring cumulative and broader issues around the sustainability, timelessness 
and safety of an industry at scale. Finally, even if such consideration had not been largely blocked 
through these procedural forms of closure, the selective scepticism and credulity in the conduct of the 
consideration of estimate knowledge claims when they were engaged with suggests both a lack of 
capacity and willingness within planning to effectively investigate whether shale developments satisfy 
these conditions. For instance, if the question was not avoided through procedural closure, would an 
inquiry have the ability or proclivity to assess the plausibility of a project’s estimated GHG emissions, or 
the authority to judge their acceptability in relation to carbon budgets?  6.2.2 TH E PRO B LEM W ITH  T H E BO UN DIN G O F TH E MAT ERIA LI TY  O F I SS U ES              
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Some will argue that the restrictive approach to relevant issues is not a problem given that any issue 
deemed beyond the scope of planning will only have been deemed so because it is to be or has already 
been overseen elsewhere. This argument however overlooks a series of problems. First, the planning 
system arguably offers the most expansive opportunities of any formal site of public participation on 
shale development. For instance, it seemingly offers a clear route to decisional influence. This is not the 
case with, say, ad hoc public engagement exercises without an explicit promise of or mechanism for 
policy influence (for example TNS 2014). The EA’s environmental permit regime offers opportunity for 
public participation through consultation. Publics can raise concerns and questions which in principle 
could be investigated by the agency but often are responded to by either reassurances that the issue is 
under control or clarification that the issue is beyond the scope of the agency’s remit. There is therefore 
a degree of distance between consulted public and the process of appraisal leading to the regulatory 
decision. There is a greater sense of proximity to the decision for publics participating in planning 
(perhaps encouraged by literal co-presence with the decision maker or at least recommender). 
Furthermore, in the case of rule 6 parties, there is seemingly scope to shape appraisal in a hands-on 
fashion by building a case around their chosen issues and cross-examining the witnesses of other 
parties. Therefore, if these issues are dealt with elsewhere in the regulatory and policy system they are 
done so more remotely from would-be participating publics. This problem is particularly acute in the 
case of the Government view on the relationship between shale development and climate change. In 
comparison to a planning inquiry, this view was committed to after a relatively closed process of 
appraisal without a clear locus for contrary publics and experts to coalesce around. This view once 
committed to then goes on to highly circumscribe opportunities for participation downstream, to the 
extent where climate change arguments cannot be successfully raised against fracking proposals 
because they contradict an already formed Government view. 
A second problem is that it was self-evidently perceived by participating parties (in particular FoE, but 
also the CoC) that these procedural questions of issue-relevance were not set in stone. FoE obviously 
would not have wasted precious resources raising issues they didn’t think were material. The inquiry did 
not draw conclusions as it went, but heard the whole suite of arguments together. The relevance of 
certain substantive arguments were evidently contingent on the outcome of certain procedural 
arguments. How the Inspector had adjudicated these scope-setting procedural arguments only became 
clear long after the fact in her report to the SoS. One possible consequence of this is a misleading 
impression of comprehensiveness. For instance, that the public health and climate change impacts of 
the projects have been overseen through planning and are accounted for in the decision. Of course, the 
inquiry primarily considered whether it ought to consider these issues. In reality, claims about public 
health impacts or climate change impacts are largely batted away through forms of procedural closure, 
and where specific claims are scrutinized the analysis is rather superficial.      
A third and final problem is that in some cases it is far from clear that oversight has occurred elsewhere, 
or that other processes of appraisal are not also subject to similar conditioning influences. For example, 
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the EA’s environmental permitting regime is subject to the same constraints of double 
compartmentalisation and deference to Government energy policy. Furthermore, in spite of Cuadrilla at 
one point claiming that they had done so, the EA did not oversee the acceptability of the projects’ 
impact on climate change through GHG emissions. They assessed the projects’ impact on local air quality 
which included consideration of some GHGs, but in terms of their impact on air quality rather than 
climate change. Similarly, at the conclusion of the inquiry, FoE’s argument about there being a gap in the 
controls concerning the oversight of the availability of waste treatment capacity was not really 
addressed, in spite of the Inspector’s declaration to the contrary.  
Finally, regarding the formation of the Government view on the relationship between shale 
development and climate change as presented in the WMS, this is presented as resting on the appraisal 
conducted by Mackay and Stone. They study the expected GHG emissions associated with the extraction 
and use of shale gas, and compare the expected emissions intensity of power generation from shale 
with coal and imported liquified natural gas (Mackay and Stone 2013). However, the commitment made 
in the Government view does not necessarily follow from the Mackay and Stone analysis. As has been 
pointed out by the UKERC, and indeed by Anderson at the inquiry, the Mackay and Stone findings are 
also perfectly consistent with the view that there is effectively no scope for shale gas to act as a ‘bridge’ 
in the UK (McGlade et al. 2015; McGlade et al. 2016). A more investigatory inquiry not circumscribed by 
an arguably prematurely settled Government view might very well have been sensitive to the 
fundamental contestability and contingency of the interpretation put forward in the Government view.   
The splintering of oversight and participatory opportunities in this way gives the impression from one 
point in the system that issues have or will be dealt by, and that participation did or should have 
occurred at, another point in the system. This in turn tends to give the impression of a comprehensive 
and open whole, when in fact, as seen here, matters of concern and questionable interpretations may 
slip through the cracks. Furthermore, the publics and experts that voice or question them may find that 
once they are formally invited to do so much of the debate has already been had.                      6.2.3 WAS  T H E CON DI TIONING  O F APP RAI S AL D ELI B ERAT E O R I NA DV ER T ENT? 
 
Another key point to address is the thorny question of whether the ‘channelling’ of planning appraisal 
toward the production of justification for shale development amounts to deliberate manipulation or 
inadvertent bias. The WMS is undoubtedly a deliberate intervention from the Government designed to 
help bring a particular future about. It doesn’t pre-determine decisions – applications can evidently still 
be refused permission on account of traffic impacts. It does though narrow the scope of debate by 
ensuring that the ostensibly settled issue of climate change cannot be reopened and reappraised 
through the planning system. The closure performed through vertical deference can be said to be a 
deliberate intervention in planning in order to prevent the intrusion of ‘extraordinary’ framings and 
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arguments concerning the negative impacts of shale development on climate change. The WMS also 
enabled the indirect registering of arguments associated with the ‘extraordinary’ benefit frame which 
would be immaterial in the hands of a rule 6 party.  
The case for intentionality on the remaining forms of closure is more fuzzy. ‘Horizontal deference’ is the 
result of an approach to regulation that is obviously intentional – an attempt to both improve efficiency 
by preventing unnecessary overlap between regulators and express authority by preventing criticism 
between regulators. This doesn’t mean that the justification it produces for shale development in the 
ways detailed here were intentional. The closure performed through the regulatory remit variant 
appears to be the unintended consequences of an, on the face of it, understandable approach to 
regulation. Not going over old tracks on the existing decisions of specialist regulators is of course 
perfectly sensible in many situations, but where new evidence is put forward or a gap in the controls is 
identified reappraisal should be possible. The Inspector ruled that this was possible in principle on the 
issue of waste but then demonstrated a reluctance to do so that gave the impression of a desire to avoid 
discretion. The consummate regulation variant resulting from the assumption of the effective operation 
of regulation more generally however expresses unrealistic expectations of control and a hubristic 
attitude to incertitude. It results in generic pressures towards not problematising the task of regulation 
(both existing decisions and future work), and in this case an inadvertent bias toward the justification of 
these applications and shale development more broadly.  
The case-by-case half of ‘double compartmentalisation’ is a long-standing planning convention, although 
there is precedence for inquiries taking a broader approach to the interpretation of the scope of their 
remit (Kemp, O’ Riordan, and Purdue 1986; Owens 1985). The phase-by-phase approach is specific to 
fracking and the result of intentional planning policy development, though the intent behind the 
intervention seems likely to be to make the decision process more efficient and the proposals in 
question more tractable. Production plans are obviously contingent on the outcome of exploration and 
appraisal schemes and to consider the impacts of all phases at the outset would rather ‘front-load’ the 
decisions-making process. This would no doubt lead to protracted processes replete with uncertainty 
and vague proposals. Furthermore, double compartmentalisation, equitably applied, ought to render 
exploration appraisal processes insensitive to any future economic benefits as well as any future risks 
(though this was covertly side-stepped through the WMS here). Selective scepticism and credulity, 
finally, seems likely to be a mode of practice borne out of a lack of technical and investigatory capacity, 
as well as a lack of willingness to problematise in keeping with the NPPF’s instruction that planning 
decision taking should be about looking for solutions rather than problems (DCLG 2012, 45, para. 187). 
These forms of closure then (horizontal deference, double compartmentalisation, selective scepticism 
and credulity), arise more from generic pressures toward decisiveness, efficiency, tractability, and the 
avoidance of discretion and problematisation; and amount to inadvertent forms of bias toward the 
production of justification for shale development in this case.    
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6.2.4 TH E EXP R ES SIV E TA SK OF P ERS U ASIO N 
 
Also still unaddressed is the question of whether, for its evident success in instrumentally selecting an 
outcome aligned with existing Government commitments (i.e. PNR), the inquiry actually succeeded in 
the expressive task of conferring compelling justification upon these applications and Government 
policy more broadly. As will be discussed in section 6.5 below, this is undoubtedly a matter for further 
research into public perceptions and experiences of participatory opportunities in shale gas policy and 
regulatory decisions. What can be said for now is that when it comes to the persuasion of a broader 
audience the devil may very much be in the detail. Scope for persuasion may be closely related to levels 
of awareness, attention and engagement with a process. Most people’s engagement with the process 
described here in unusually detailed fashion is likely to amount to an altogether more cursory glance at 
a news headline or story, with the intricacies of how the decision was arrived at detailed here 
understandably eluding them. This more distanced mode of engagement with the decision is likely to be 
more fertile ground for the expressive task of justification than those who were involved in the process 
or who are familiar at the level of detail presented here. This was what was meant at the end of section 
2.2 when it was suggested that the expressive task of justification does not require an audience to be 
outright deceived, but may simply occur through a lack of reflection or attention. A final question to 
raise on this matter is whether the authority of a planning decision even actually rests on its ability to 
persuade an audience of its justifiability (in say rational or participatory terms), or whether authority is 
primarily derived from its quasi-judicial statutory role. Whilst not able to fully explore the question here, 
it seems reasonable to suggest that although planning decisions derive authority from multiple sources 
– some of which are given and some of which must be earned from an audience – the intention is for 
the process and its decision outcome to be perceived as legitimate as widely as possible.    
 6.2.5 TH E EXT EN SION  OF T HE CON CEP T OF JU STI FI CAT ION 
 
In his discussion of the concept of justification as a tool or political resource, the kinds of cases Stirling 
has in mind differ from the case I’ve applied his insights to here. Justification is initially considered in the 
context of analytic appraisal through technology assessment techniques (Stirling 1994), before these 
ideas are extended to also cover participatory forms of technology appraisal (Stirling 2006; Stirling 
2008). In both cases Stirling’s focus is on the relatively broad level of technology choice. The case 
considered here focuses on the more specific and downstream point of siting decision-making. 
Furthermore, the process considered here is more routine and automatic than the appraisal processes 
considered by Stirling which tend to be commissioned, bespoke and ad hoc. These differences in 
empirical focus extend the concept in a couple of ways.  
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First, the focus on the ‘downstream’ location of siting decisions provides additional insights into how 
high-level commitments in technology choice and policy development filter through to regulatory and 
siting decision-making. The thesis has demonstrated how such high-level policy commitments can 
constrain appraisal and shape the participation of experts and publics at the point of regulatory and 
siting decision-making. This occurs through both specific interventions in planning (vertical deference to 
the WMS), as well as the ‘latching’ onto existing pressures and tendencies in the planning system 
towards weak justification and generic pro-development justification (double compartmentalisation, 
horizontal deference, selective scepticism and credulity). In the latter case, the more structured and 
routine status of planning appraisal (compared to one-off, ad hoc participatory or analytic processes of 
technology appraisal) means that it is endowed with a large repertoire of existing policy, rules and 
conventions already geared toward closure. As such, imperatives toward strong justification for a 
particular form of development operate more through interventions to overwrite certain tendencies 
whilst harnessing others, rather than the bespoke design of a process from scratch.  
Another difference already considered is that planning appraisal has a form of statutory, quasi-judicial 
authority not present in Stirling’s appraisal processes. As such a planning decision’s authority does not 
entirely rest on being seen to achieve particular standards of analytic rigour or participatory legitimacy, 
but is at least in part granted to it irrespectively. This may in turn mean that whilst being potentially 
highly effective forums through which to secure particular outcomes, planning decision-making 
processes may not be particularly successful in the expressive task of persuading a broader audience of 
the wisdom of that outcome. This is because they do not face quite the same pressures to justify their 
selection but can within constraints (e.g. possible legal challenge) merely assert their authority to 
choose. A final difference to consider is that the justification produced through these processes is 
ostensibly only conferred upon the application considered rather than the type of development more 
broadly. Of course, in reality, such processes do indirectly produce justification for the broader policy as 
well as the specific site. The closure of the ‘extraordinary’ framing of the risks of fracking, alongside the 
registering of the (unchallenged) ‘extraordinary’ framing of the benefits of fracking expresses and 
promotes the Government view of the technology whilst marginalising contrary expert and public 
voices. It is more indirect than in Stirling’s cases, but justification is produced for the broader policy 
commitment as well as the specific applications officially in question. 
In sum, it has been argued that the inquiry studied here produced justification for the particular sites in 
question as well as the broader government commitment in favour of shale gas development. This 
occurred through conditioning influences in the design and conduct of the process channelling it 
towards a particular outcome through the closure of certain arguments and matters of concern. These 
conditioning influences, however, did not occur uniformly, but were particularly engaged in the closure 
of FoE’s case and the ‘extraordinary’ framing of fracking’s risks (and corollary mundane or sceptical 
framing of claimed benefits) that underpinned it. The exclusion of these issues and arguments as 
beyond the scope of the inquiry is problematic for three reasons. First, in spite of the problems 
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highlighted here, planning arguably offers participatory opportunities not repeated elsewhere. Second, 
it was not necessarily clear from the outset that certain issues were beyond the inquiry’s scope, and it 
will not necessarily be clear in retrospect that they haven’t been covered (potentially giving a false sense 
of comprehensiveness). Third, in some cases it is far from clear that these excluded issues have or will 
be dealt with elsewhere, or that such processes are not also subject to similar justificatory pressures. 
The question of intent behind these conditioning influences was then broached. The forms of closure 
analysed here largely fell into the inadvertent bias category. The role of the WMS in ‘vertical deference’, 
however, is arguably an intentional intervention designed to both express the Government-promoted 
framing of fracking as selectively mundane and extraordinary, and to materially impact planning 
decisions. The two tasks of the production of justification were then raised. The process’ success in 
preferred option selection is clear, however the expressive task of audience persuasion is a matter 
requiring further research. Finally, a handful of differences between the empirical contexts in reference 
to which Stirling’s rendering of the concept of justification was forged and the case studied here were 
highlighted and some possible implications for the ‘extension’ of the concept sketched out.       
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6.3 REFLECTIONS ON THE CONCEPTUAL APPROACH  
As discussed in section 2.2 and as a result of insights garnered from section 2.1, the approach to the 
concept of justification was one that enabled seeing decision-making as both expressive (designed to 
persuade an audience) and instrumental (designed to select particular outcome). Stirling’s approach 
provided the insight that these two tasks may be in tension. In other words, the actual basis of selection 
and the way that decision is presented and justified may be separate. Stirling’s rendering of the concept 
also enabled the recognition of the possibility of strategic behaviour and systemic bias.  
This approach entailed rejecting Boltanski and Thevenot’s sincere approach to justification (Boltanski 
and Thevenot 2006). Boltanski and Thevenot are more interested in explaining why actors disagree, 
suggesting that this is explained by the use of distinct principles of evaluation according to which the 
same course of action might variously appear justified or unjustified. What Boltanski and Thevenot do 
not provide insights into is the potential for the management of disagreement in decision-making. That 
is, the ways in which appraisal processes might be channelled towards a swift and authoritative non-
specific resolution (weak justification) or a particular outcome (strong justification). In the latter case 
existing commitments are pursued, whilst the impression of a rigorous assessment fuelled by a 
comprehensive airing of disagreement is given. Boltanski and Thevenot’s sincere approach to 
justification, with its direct link between selection and persuasion, prevents the recognition of the scope 
for justification to amount to a political resource contributing to the momentum towards an existing 
commitment. An approach inspired by Boltanksi and Thevenot would have involved interpretively 
excavating distinct principles of evaluation underpinning the arguments of disagreeing parties at the 
inquiry. This would have attempted to explain why disagreement exists rather than demonstrating how 
the process is tilted in favour of a particular side of the debate. Though both approaches are perfectly 
legitimate and interesting, the approach adopted here was favoured because Boltanski and Thevenot’s 
scepticism about scepticism was felt to be overly optimistic in the context of both the concerns 
established in section 2.1, and broader societal concerns often referred to as the crisis of legitimacy. 
Connected to this sceptical approach to justification is a deeper theoretical commitment to approach 
claims and arguments at the inquiry in a constructivist and symmetrical fashion, as inspired by work 
from STS. That is, I have largely avoided making judgements as to the epistemic truth of arguments, 
instead assessing their treatment by the Inquiry. As it happened the inquiry largely avoided making such 
judgements in the treatment of FoE’s case as well, instead largely rejecting their arguments through 
blunt procedural exclusion. Where the Inspector did make a judgement as to the intellectual merits of 
knowledge claims (methane emissions, flowback fluid) the approach taken here was to explore the basis 
of evidence on which that judgement rested, and the extent to which underlying assumptions were 
interrogated or even recognised. Here my constructivism took on a critical realist inflection as once their 
production and assumptions were laid bare, the validity of Cuadrilla’s knowledge claims were at times 
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directly questioned (e.g. the reliance on Allen et al. 2013). This is in line with the approach of van 
Zwanenberg and Millstone, who whilst being supportive of the a priori agnosticism of constructivists on 
the question of what constitutes reliable knowledge, argue that in certain cases after their analysis 
sociologists of science can and should discriminate between better and worse constructed scientific 
knowledge claims (van Zwanenberg and Millstone 2000). Therefore, for the most part, the argument 
advanced here has not been that the inquiry necessarily made an incorrect decision, or that it 
overlooked the better argument. The more modest claim advanced here has been that the inquiry was 
insensitive through procedural exclusion to the arguments of contrary voices and the matters of concern 
they raised, where the question of the significance of this exclusion was viewed symmetrically and left 
largely open. The argument goes slightly further on Cuadrilla’s estimates though. Here the details of the 
knowledge claims overlooked by the inquiry’s cursory oversight have been presented and in some cases 
their validity questioned. In other words, amongst the estimates found satisfactory by the inquiry, poor 
arguments have been identified raising questions about the adequacy of oversight.    
A final conceptual matter to reflect on here is the focus on arguments and their treatment as the study’s 
object of analysis. The argument has been that an extraordinary framing of the benefits of fracking and 
a mundane framing of the risks is dominant within UK government and that the inverse frames are 
promoted by sceptical publics (and NGOs). The contention is that FoE’s arguments at the inquiry were 
rooted in and expressed the latter sceptical framing, as well as that their treatment and closure at the 
inquiry expressed and was in part driven by the Government framing (e.g. this proponent framing is 
evident in the WMS). In a sense, the inquiry has been viewed as a site for the selective inclusion, 
reification and amplification of frames. For example, the treatment of FoE’s arguments demonstrates 
how an extraordinary framing of the negative impacts on public health and climate change is largely 
procedurally filtered out leaving the Government-promoted mundane framing intact. Furthermore, the 
extraordinary framing of the benefits of shale development is voiced and registered through the WMS. 
In short, the inquiry’s receptiveness to particular frames can be charted through the focus on the 
treatment of arguments adopted here.   
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6.4 REFLECTIONS ON METHOD & SCOPE FOR QUALIFIED GENERALISATION  6.4.1 REFLECTIONS  O N  METH OD 
 
As sections 6.1 and 6.2 attest, the planning of shale development in the UK case has indeed proven 
fertile ground for generating insights on the production of justification through the closure-oriented 
conditioning of decision-making. In turn, the field-site of the RW and PNR appeals inquiry yielded rich 
empirical material on how planning oversight’s design and conduct was oriented toward the closure of 
certain arguments and matters of concern. As such, a series of insights have been contributed to the 
literature on participation in the planning of shale development.  
A single field-site has been sufficient for the purposes of this study because, whilst there may be scope 
for another decision maker on another day to make different judgements on a range of matters, 
planning is nonetheless a rule-based system and some of the forms of closure identified here are the 
result of particularly unambiguous passages of planning policy and long-established conventions (e.g. 
double compartmentalisation, vertical deference and horizontal deference). As an early and significant 
example of planning decision-making on shale gas development in the UK, the inquiry studied here will 
also likely have a precedent-setting role and will be taken into account by future decision makers. 
Similarly, a single case has also been sufficient for the purposes of this study in respect of the broader 
conceptual interest in the production of justification. The case has operated as an ‘extreme case’ 
(Flyvbjerg 2006), in the sense of being a rich source of information on ‘strong justification’. This is 
because of the Government’s strong and explicit support for the development of a shale gas industry; 
the Government’s evident capability to influence planning oversight; and planning’s nonetheless at least 
implicit claim to produce rational (through the role of expert witnesses and in the practices of legal 
rationality such a cross-examination), democratic (through the opportunities extended to participating 
publics) and so legitimate decisions. The case also provided the opportunity for ‘theory extension’ given 
that it took the concept out of the empirical contexts of Collingridge (broader policy processes) and 
Stirling (technology assessment techniques and participatory technology appraisal processes) and into 
fresh terrain. This has enabled the ‘extension’ of the concept in the ways argued in section 6.2.            
The retroductive approach has resulted in the near total failure of FoE at the inquiry being rendered 
more intelligible. The construction of the research problem was underpinned by an ontological 
commitment to the ‘myth of the best argument’ (Pellizzoni 2001). That is, FoE’s failure cannot be simply 
attributed to any inherent weakness in their case (or, in Pellizzoni’s terms, a lack of power internal to 
communication). Instead an explanation has been built around forms of power external to 
communication (‘forms of closure’ here). This is because of fundamental scepticism over the existence 
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of objective, independent, and uniquely and universally compelling grounds against which to determine 
the best argument (certainly for issues of any complexity amongst parties of any diversity). The 
construction of the research problem is also justifiable at the political level fitting as it does within the 
STS tradition committed to the democratisation of science, technology and innovation. In other words, 
the research makes clear the means through which certain voices have been marginalised and excluded 
from a process of technology regulation.  
Moving to the epistemic level, the validity of the explanation put forward here can be justified against 
five criteria. The first is the richness of the description presented in chapter 4, which enables the strong 
claim that critical detail has not been overlooked. Connected here is the second criterion - the sheer 
weight of evidential support presented detailing the source, operation and consequences of the each of 
the forms of closure across chapters 4 and 5. The third is the clarity that the forms of closure 
explanation brings to the problem of FoE’s failure. The explanation lifts the confusion that a cursory 
engagement with the process might engender. It clarifies that the production of justification for these 
applications and shale gas development more broadly at the inquiry rested upon the exclusion and 
insensitivity induced by the four forms of closure elaborated here. It does so whilst avoiding the ‘myth 
of the best argument’. An account of the failure of FoE based on a purely objectivist ‘best argument’ 
view would have had to overlook the largely procedural biases that, as evidenced here, clearly shaped 
the conduct and outcome of the inquiry.  
The fourth is the responsiveness of the process of the explanations production. As detailed in section 
3.3.2, the recursive nature of the retroductive approach means that the explanation put forward here 
has been built on several rounds of failed proto-explanation, with the lessons of those failures then fed 
back into another loop of the retroductive spiral. This notion of responsiveness also captures the ability 
of case details to ‘talk back’ (Flyvbjerg 2006). In short, the greater the responsiveness of an 
explanation’s production, the more avenues and opportunities for the feeding back in of empirical 
details and ‘extended’ insights, and the closer one hones in to a compelling explanation. Fifth and finally 
is the consistency with the forms of closure identified in the ‘closure through planning’ literature as 
noted in section 6.1 above. In short, these or similar tendencies toward closure in planning have been 
identified by other studies. It should be noted that the review of this literature was conducted after the 
completion of analysis, and therefore this consistency represents an external validity check rather than 
evidence of verification bias.   
The key methodological contributions of this thesis are, firstly, the interaction between abstract and 
foreign insights and concrete and local case details, and their explicit and accountable co-mingling 
through the employed retroductive approach (see section 3.3.2). A second contribution is the 
recognition of both an initially centrifugal movement of this approach toward a more context-attuned 
explanation and a possible subsequent centripetal movement through which insights produced here 
may be put to work in new contexts. Through this bespoke approach, inspired by but building on Glynos 
190 
 
 
 
and Howarth, a disparate set of academic influences and case details were cycled through in a 
centrifugal movement resulting the identification of the four forms of closure presented here.  
 6.4.2 SCO P E FO R  QU A LIFI ED  G EN ER A LIS ATIO N 
         
The purpose of the study has been to explain the failure of FoE at the inquiry and to produce insights 
into the concept of justification. As such, as well as the highly context-attuned explanation of the 
particular process studied here, the question of the scope for qualified generalisation of the insights 
produced arises. In chapter 3 it was noted that Glynos and Howarth’s approach to retroduction seemed 
likely to hone-in centrifugally toward a context-attuned explanation. Chapter 3 also a saw the 
introduction of the notion of theory-extension, my attempt at a subsequent centripetal movement. This 
notion described how concepts and insights that were generated through engagement with a particular 
empirical context might be put into potentially risky and productive engagements with different 
empirical contexts. In other words, the notion of theory extension is concerned with the question of 
‘generalisation’, or, put in a different language, the question of whether insights can travel to and be 
productive within new empirical contexts (by, say, rendering them more intelligible). The insights 
produced here are likely to be productive at two distinct scales of ambition, where ambition denotes the 
distance or difference between the empirical context studied here and the prospective new context. 
First, the forms of closure elaborated here are highly likely to be repeated in subsequent planning 
decisions on shale development in England unless and until there are changes to Government policy on 
fracking or major planning policy reform. There is of course scope for another decision maker on 
another day to arrive at different judgements on procedural or substantive matters, but this thesis has 
demonstrated the procedural constraints that circumscribe the action of not only participating experts 
and publics but also local authorities and other planning decision makers. In other words, these insights 
are ‘generalisable’ because the policy from which the forms of closure mostly emanate is general (within 
England).    
A second level of ambition concerns planning and regulatory oversight more broadly. There are good 
reasons to believe that the forms of closure identified here may also play a role in curtailing 
participation in the oversight of other forms of development. For instance, as already mentioned, 
section 6.1 above noted a striking consistency between the forms of closure presented here and those 
found across the ‘closure through planning’ literature on various forms of energy development and 
beyond. On this second level of ambition the specific detail of the forms of closure will vary but the 
more general way that processes of appraisal are designed and conducted will exhibit similarities. In 
other words, there will be a resemblance rather than perfect correspondence. For example, oversight of 
other forms of development will not be bound by para. 147 of the NPPF or para. 120 of PPGM, but they 
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may nonetheless be bound by procedural rules that slice and sequence oversight in ways that produce 
similar forms of exclusion and insensitivity. 
A final point to make here is that none of this generalisation, or as I prefer to say ‘extension’, will occur 
without work. Generalisation or ‘extension’ is viewed here as a practical accomplishment that requires 
researchers to put academic insights generated in a particular empirical context into potentially risky 
(because the insight may be transformed through the process) and productive (because the insight may 
contribute to the generation of an explanation that renders the situation more intelligible) encounters 
with new and different empirical contexts. There is therefore nothing automatic about the qualified 
form of ‘generalisation’ envisaged here. It is the result of a researcher applying ‘foreign’ insights to new 
empirical territory and of the unruly particularism of the case which will never quite be captured by 
insights abstracted from elsewhere. This approach shares much with that of Glynos and Howarth. For 
Glynos and Howarth, cases can be ‘generalised’ to contribute to the explanation of related cases and 
empirical contexts, but “the way they shed light is not straightforward” (Glynos and Howarth 2007, 190). 
Similarly to legal reasoning through which arguments are derived from precedents, the researcher must 
articulate the network of similarities and differences in order to justify the resemblance between two 
contexts. This is the task that was carried out regarding Stirling’s empirical contexts and the context 
studied here in section 6.3, and that will have to be carried out anew when generalising or ‘extending’ 
the insights produced here.          
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6.5 IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH, POLICY AND BEYOND 
 6.5.1 FU RT H ER  R ES EA RCH    
This thesis has focused primarily on the mechanics of conditioning effects operating through the design 
and conduct of a planning decision-making process and the way these ‘forms of closure’ shaped the 
process towards a particular outcome. Less has been said about the expressive task of persuasion 
through which the decision outcome and the process through which it was selected are presented to an 
audience in potentially misleading ways. What has been overlooked is the perceptions of external 
audiences about the process and outcome of the inquiry. Further research might therefore delve into 
public perceptions, expectations and experiences of planning appraisal processes. Assessments might be 
made of the persuasiveness of such processes amongst various parties, or the extent to which they are 
viewed as being shaped by inadvertent bias or deliberate manipulation. In other words, are processes of 
strong justification obscured or are they widely perceived and suspected? Another possibility to be 
explored is that there exists a kind of ‘expectations gap’ between participating publics and the 
institutions extending the participatory invitation over the depth of the opportunity and the ability to 
influence decisions. This work would amount not to public perceptions of fracking, but public 
perceptions and expectations of the governance of fracking with a focus on the perceived procedural 
justice and justificatory persuasiveness of decision-making processes. Research into the way these 
processes are viewed and experienced by publics is particularly important given the concerns over 
procedural justice identified in section 2.3.1. Much of the controversy over shale development arises 
from perceptions of the extent to which such processes accommodate or exclude publics, and are 
responsive or insensitive to their views.  
On the oversight of shale gas development in the UK more specifically, key questions remain about how 
oversight will differ on production phase applications, as well as later applications in areas with existing 
sites (i.e. industry scale). Of importance here will be whether the notion of ‘cumulative impacts’ is 
interpreted and implemented in an expansive enough fashion to cut through some of the insensitivity 
encouraged by ‘double compartmentalisation’. Furthermore, it will be interesting to chart whether 
questions that were closed at this inquiry due to the phase-by-phase separation of oversight are actually 
considered during production phase applications. The impression was certainly given that these issues 
were being deferred rather than ignored. Another point of interest will be how the emergence of local 
mineral plans with specific unconventional hydrocarbon policies will affect the forms of closure 
discussed here (see, for example, Hayhurst 2018c). Moreover, the impact that reforms to the planning 
system have on the forms of closure discussed here will be of interest. For instance, recently announced 
proposals to treat non-fracking exploratory projects as permitted development and production phase 
operations as nationally significant infrastructure projects (NSIP) will certainly have implications for 
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public participation in the planning of shale development (BEIS 2018b; BEIS 2018c; Ministry of Housing, 
Communities and Local Government 2018). Whilst the exact nature of these proposals is yet to be 
determined, it is widely anticipated that these reforms will limit scope for local input in planning 
decision-making on shale development (House of Commons Housing, Communities and Local 
Government Select Committee 2018), and the NSIP system has been criticised for curtailing scope for 
public participation in the planning of nuclear power development (Johnstone 2014).   
A final suggestion is provoked by the potentially dispiriting message of this thesis to public and civil 
society groups seeking to influence UK energy policy. The message of this thesis is, in short, that the 
planning system is heavily circumscribed in ways that make it an unpromising candidate for a site 
through which to contest energy policy or technology choice. This provokes the question ‘if not planning 
then where?’ In other words, where else in the ‘ecology of participation’ (see Chilvers and Kearnes 2016; 
see also Burall 2015)  are the openings and pressure points, and what are the methods, through which 
such influence might be achieved?   
 6.5.2 PO LICY 
 
With regards to policy, this research yields no recommendations concerning the merits of shale gas or 
its role within Government energy policy. Instead it offers a series of recommendations regarding the 
processes of policy-making and regulatory decision-making on shale development. The headline 
recommendation is that sites of public participation on policy- and decision-making are both potentially 
sites for addressing public scepticism over fracking and the subject or cause of public scepticism 
themselves. As established in section 2.3.1, the governance of shale development; the trustworthiness 
of policy-makers, operators and regulators; and the openness, inclusivity, and procedural justice of 
policy- and decision-making exercises are seen by some publics as part of the problem. Therefore, the 
public acceptability of shale development is driven not just by perceptions of the process of fracking and 
its risks, or of the product of shale gas and its relationship with climate change, but also by how 
decision- and policy-making processes are designed and conducted. Depending on their design and 
conduct, therefore, participatory opportunities are capable of exacerbating scepticism as well as 
resolving it. They are especially likely to do the former wherever they’re perceived as insufficient or 
unduly circumscribed in some way, or viewed as having been shaped through bias or intervention to 
exclude sceptical public views and produce justification for shale gas development. When attempting to 
address these issues, it is worth bearing in mind the insight that the task of expressing the legitimacy of 
a process to an audience is in tension with retaining controlling influence over the outcome that process 
selects.   
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With that expressive task in mind, several more practical issues have arisen. The closure performed 
through selective scepticism and credulity highlights the benefits of a more investigatory style of public 
inquiry – with the authority, resources and time to produce its own evidence on issues where the 
debate between rule 6 parties leaves matters in an ambiguous state. Also crucial here is the technical 
capability to assess knowledge claims such as Cuadrilla’s methane and flowback estimates, which 
section 5.4 strongly suggests the inquiry simply lacked. The analysis of horizontal deference raised 
questions about gaps in the environmental controls. On both the matter of the availability of waste 
treatment capacity and the matter of the GHG emissions’ impact on climate change there was ambiguity 
about precisely where oversight is situated and the possibility these issues will slip through the cracks 
between planning and the EA. In spite of Cuadrilla’s suggestion that they had, the EA did not assess the 
impact of the projects’ emissions on climate change (they assessed local air quality impact, which 
included the air quality impact of some GHGs). Whilst the inquiry had such an assessment before it from 
Professor Anderson it ultimately simply deferred to the general rule set out in the WMS – shale 
development is necessarily and in general good for climate change. That Government view not only falls 
well short of adequate oversight, it is, of course, also contestable and contingent (McGlade et al. 2015; 
McGlade et al. 2016). It was a similar story on waste management where laissez faire appeals to the 
market only strengthened the suspicion that the waste management capacity to service an industry will 
be ensured neither by planning nor the EA. 
If these meso and macro issues overflow the oversight capacities of the site-by-site planning and 
permitting regimes then they will have to be considered elsewhere. The tendencies of the double 
compartmentalised approach toward myopia and tunnel-vision have already been discussed (see 
section 5.1). Suffice to say that whilst this approach undoubtedly saves resources through tightly binding 
the scope of the inquiry’s remit (to a specific site and a specific phase) it is potentially susceptible to 
producing lock-in or sunken assets, as well as generating cynicism by excluding arguments concerning an 
industry at scale from the debate. The assumption of the effective operation of other regulatory 
regimes, furthermore, might fall into the category of a regulatory ‘necessary fiction’ however its clear 
consequence is to deny planning processes from considering some of the key concerns that preoccupy 
anti-fracking publics (e.g. the efficacy of regulation and capabilities of regulators). Though there is no 
guarantee that allowing these concerns to be considered in planning processes would allay them, 
excluding them in a blunt procedural fashion does nothing to inspire confidence and gives the 
unfortunate impression of a regulatory system unwilling to countenance its flaws. Finally, with regards 
to vertical deference, such a blatant intervention asserting the authority of Government policy and 
preventing the questioning of its underpinning reasoning - for all (or precisely because of) its evident 
success in shaping the process toward a particular outcome - is of course entirely counter-productive to 
the task of persuading an audience of the wisdom and legitimacy of the appraisal process and its 
outcome.  
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In section 2.2.2 it was made clear that for Stirling analytic and participatory appraisal processes were not 
doomed to operate as a tool for the production of justification. Instead they could ‘open-up’ technology 
choice by acknowledging and interrogating the susceptibilities through which scope for the production 
of justification exists. Given that Stirling’s notion of ‘opening-up’ offers a basis for reform, this begs the 
question of whether and how planning might open-up. The first thing to recognise is that the appraisal 
of the applications was already ‘open’ to a slight degree given that two contrasting perspectives were 
aired at the inquiry. Therefore, the debate preceding and informing the decision was plural though not 
conditional (with each party presenting their case as prescriptive). However, this openness only pertains 
to one dimension of appraisal - the airing of plural perspectives – within an otherwise highly regimented 
and restricted process (e.g. the question under consideration is set, as, to a great extent, are issues that 
are likely to be included and the types of argument likely to be received). Any inability of planning 
appraisal to open-up therefore stems from the constraints prescribed in planning policy and other 
material considerations (e.g. Government energy policy). In fact, a potentially misleading air of openness 
is given because much of this closure only fully occurs after appraisal when the decision and the 
reasoning behind it are published, retrospectively rendering much of the appraisal redundant. At the 
outset there is the perception of scope for interpretative flexibility in how to implement the policy in 
practice (otherwise there would be no procedural debate). In this case the Inspector sided with the 
restrictive interpretation of the scope of the inquiry’s remit on every occasion (with the marginal 
exception of horizontal deference where she ruled that in principle the inquiry’s hands weren’t tied, but 
that in practice the facts of this case did not require any action). A restrictive interpretation and 
implementation of an already closure-oriented set of rules led this inquiry to be characterised by the 
avoidance of the consideration of certain arguments and issues.  
Opening-up the appraisal of shale gas development siting proposals would require a more activist 
approach to discretion, a more investigatory approach to knowledge claims, and, of course, the 
loosening of certain procedural constraints. Most notably in this case the approach of deference toward 
government policy, the assumption of the effective operation of regulatory regimes, and the phase-by-
phase separation and sequencing of oversight. These reforms would, of course, most likely render 
inquiries slower and more unwieldy and they would possibly cede a degree of control over decision 
selection outcomes. On the other hand, they would bring the benefit of selected outcomes likely being 
viewed as less dependent on closure through exclusion and insensitivity and so potentially more 
legitimate. The site-by-site separation and sequencing of oversight, finally, prevents the participatory 
opportunity of a planning inquiry from being an occasion through which broader technology choice 
might be informed and this broader level of appraisal opened-up to a greater diversity of perspectives. 
The argument that participation on this broader policy question should occur somewhere else and 
another time is often fundamentally flawed, as already discussed. This is not to say that such 
participatory opportunities have to be located in the planning system, but that any argument suggesting 
that they shouldn’t needs to demonstrate where such opportunities do or should exist elsewhere. 
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 6.5.3 BEYO ND 
 
This work also contains potentially useful lessons for fracking-sceptical publics and civil society groups. 
These are, in truth, likely already to have been learnt through direct experience of the kind detailed 
here, though it is nonetheless worth briefly reiterating them. The empirical chapters include a great deal 
of useful information regarding the likely boundaries of issues that can or will be included and taken 
seriously within the planning system. Rightly or wrongly climate change, direct risks to public health and 
the availability of capacity for offsite treatment of waste all currently appear unlikely routes to 
decisional influence, irrespective of the intellectual merits of the case made. This is not to say that 
another Inspector on another day would necessarily see the procedural arguments in exactly the same 
way, although all of the Inspector’s procedural reasoning was accepted by the SoS which will likely have 
precedent-setting repercussions. A particularly glaring finding in this regard is that for as long as the 
current WMS stands, and unless subsequent decision-makers take a different procedural approach, no 
shale development proposal can be refused permission on the grounds of having an unacceptable 
impact on climate change. The assumption of regulatory efficacy has similarly restrictive impacts on 
issues such as the acceptability of direct public health impacts, ongoing scientific uncertainty over public 
health risks, and the efficacy of regulation itself.  
The broader general message to these groups concerns carefully identifying which processes are 
productive forums for voicing particular issues and arguments, as well as recognising the costs of invited 
or formal participation. Planning appears to be largely unreceptive to arguments associated with an 
‘extraordinary’ framing of the negative impacts of fracking not shared by the current Government. On 
the other hand, it evidently affords scope for decisional influence through more mundane nuisance 
matters. There is little scope for participating publics to shape these conditioning influences and so alter 
the kinds of issues and arguments that can be received within such processes. Participation in local plan 
making seems superficially to be an avenue for precisely this kind of influence, though local plans have 
to be tested for soundness against national policy before they’re accepted. In spite of the apparently 
‘local’, decentralised nature of the system, local plans ultimately have to cohere with the centre. 
Broader arguments may then be more effectively voiced through uninvited, informal forms of 
participation free from the constraints, biases and closure detailed here. The lure of the apparent 
prospect of influencing decisions may mask the cost of participating in formal processes where publics 
have a contrasting view on an issue to the Government. Ultimately these publics have to capitulate to 
the Government framing of the issue or face the closure of their arguments through blunt procedural 
exclusion. 
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6.6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS  6.6.1 SU MMAR Y 
  
Chapter 1 briefly introduced the case, field-site and broad thematic terrain of the study, before setting 
out the structure of what was to come. 
In chapter 2, three normative theories of decision-making were reviewed. The purpose here was to 
highlight a series of academic concerns about decision-making spanning various theoretical 
perspectives. Two key implications emerged. First, the theories, through their various prescriptions, all 
attempted to regulate the role of interests, power and strategy in decision-making. Second, critiques of 
the analytic-rational and deliberative models in particular were concerned about the prospect of a 
potentially misleading front-stage rationality or legitimacy obscuring the actual backstage process of 
selection potentially driven by altogether less worthy or agreeable forces. The concept of justification 
was identified as key to understanding these theory-derived interests and then explored in greater 
detail. Boltanski and Thevenot’s sincere conceptualisation was initially considered but rejected. There 
were two reasons for this. Their approach seemed to strip both actors of their strategic capacity in ways 
difficult to reconcile with common experience, and analysts of their critical capacity in ways that would 
potentially render the analysis intellectually implausible and politically redundant. Furthermore, the role 
of potentially shared underlying principles of evaluation and the sincerity with which actors ordinarily 
appeal to them defined the means of selection and justification as one and the same thing. In other 
words, there is no distinction between the way an actor decides upon a course of action and the way 
that actor attempts to justify taking that action to others. Stirling’s alternative conceptualisation was 
then identified as furnishing the analysis with the capacity to both recognise the potential for strategic 
behaviour in decision-making and distinguish between the means of selection and justification. 
Furthermore, Stirling’s approach recognised scope for inadvertent bias as well as strategic action in 
decision-making. The key insight of Stirling’s approach was that justification as a resource for a preferred 
option can be produced through the deliberate or inadvertent conditioning of appraisal processes 
channelling them toward particular outcomes in potentially obscured ways.  
Having established a conceptual interest in the scope for the production of justification through the 
design and conduct of decision-making processes, the relevant literatures connecting this interest with 
the chosen case were surveyed. Literature on ‘framing fracking’ demonstrated the diversity of ways that 
fracking is framed by distinct groups, and many authors pointed to a divergence between the views of 
policy and industry actors on the one hand and publics on the other. This divergence gave rise to 
concerns over the extent to which policy and decision-making processes marginalise or accommodate 
public views. The ‘closure through planning’ literature highlighted several forms of closure that have 
been found to prevent both public and expert arguments from being voiced or taken seriously within 
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the planning appraisal of energy development. In many cases, these processes were argued to be 
geared towards the legitimation of particular forms of development. The literature considered in section 
2.3.3 bridged these two sets of insights by considering both the necessity and capacity for planning and 
regulatory appraisal processes on fracking in the UK to accommodate sceptical public views. It was 
noted that this work has tended to overlook the fine-grain detail of how participating publics and their 
arguments are treated in practice within participatory settings, the key influence of prior commitments 
at the broader level of Government policy, and the treatment of participating experts and their 
arguments in such processes.             
The methodology chapter started with a brief guide to the field-site – namely the planning inquiry into 
Cuadrilla’s appeals over the RW and PNR sites. The concept of retroduction was then introduced, which 
was followed by critical engagement with it and an elaboration of the approach taken here inspired by 
it. This approach was adopted in part in response to events, but was also favoured because it was 
problem and empirically driven, recursive and open to case insights being fed back into the 
development of proto-explanations and theorising, and enabled the simultaneous generation of an 
explanation that rendered the situation studied more intelligible and the extension of the concept of 
justification. The practical methods of data collection and the analytic approach were then detailed. The 
latter consisted of a summary of the recursive process through which several rounds of 
problematisation and research question development, gathering insights from the case and academic 
literature, and the development and testing of proto-explanations were cycled through. Finally, the 
study’s research questions were formally stated. 
The first empirical chapter described the treatment of FoE’s case at the inquiry structured around the 
four key issues they participated on. This section detailed how the arguments unfolded on the issues of 
climate change, public health, waste disposal and economic impacts, and how these arguments were 
resolved by, first, the Inspector in her recommendations, and ultimately the SoS in his decision. As was 
seen, the Inspector and SoS sided against FoE on almost all occasions. The argument developed in the 
remainder of the thesis was that the failure of FoE’s case was not simply because their arguments were 
in some sense inherently weak, or Cuadrilla’s better. Instead, this failure was a result of the inquiry 
being, through various features of its design and conduct, rendered insensitive to certain framings of 
fracking and associated arguments and matters of concern.  
Chapter 5 analysed four ‘forms of closure’ through which this insensitivity was brought about. These 
forms of closure amounted to conditioning influences channelling the inquiry toward finding the appeals 
acceptable on certain ‘extraordinary’ frame related issues and the production of the justification for 
broader Government policy on shale gas. They were termed ‘double compartmentalisation’, ‘vertical 
deference’, ‘horizontal deference’, and ‘selective scepticism and credulity’. The first three arose from 
procedural rules governing the scope of the inquiry’s remit and the materiality of issues. The fourth 
arose from the conduct of appraisal itself. For each form of closure the analysis demonstrated how 
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appraisal was circumscribed, how FoE’s arguments fell foul of this, and some of the broader implications 
for planning oversight of shale gas development.            
Finally, the present chapter has reflected on several of the insights, limitations and implications of the 
research. In reference to the existing literature, normative arguments over the importance of public and 
community participation in decision-making have been complemented, if not complicated a little, by the 
constraining influence on participatory opportunities of both existing policy commitments and the 
compartmentalisation of oversight. Hilson’s anticipations were largely confirmed, though if anything he 
underplayed just how insensitive planning decision-making would be to sceptical public frames in 
practice. The ‘domain’ and ‘dexterity’ strategies highlighted by Stokes were identified as filtering 
through to planning decision-making, as was their ‘normative pull’ toward shale gas development.  
On the concept of justification, it was recognised that the production of justification for shale 
development at the inquiry did not occur uniformly across issues, but occurred through the inquiry 
being insensitive to the ‘extraordinary’ risk framing underpinning FoE’s case, as well as through the 
indirect registering of the ‘extraordinary’ benefit framing promoted through the WMS. The argument 
that such closure in the planning system is not a problem because these matters are properly 
considered elsewhere was problematized. The question of intent was then raised. It was argued that the 
WMS did amount to an intervention deliberately designed to produce justification for shale gas. The 
other forms of closure were seen as arising through various kinds of inadvertent bias and pressures 
toward generic decisiveness and in favour of development more broadly. The expressive task of 
justification was also discussed where the need for further research was acknowledged. Finally on the 
concept of justification, a series of differences between the cases Stirling applied the concept to and the 
case in question here were identified, as were the ways these empirical differences have resulted in the 
‘extension’ of the concept.      
Some of the limitations of and alternatives to the conceptual approach were briefly considered. The 
decisions to reject Boltanski and Thevenot’s conceptual approach and adopt a symmetrical and 
constructivist approach were defended. Finally, the relationship between arguments and frames was 
clarified. Section 6.4 reflected on methodology and set out the scope for my particular approach to 
qualified generalisation. Case and field-site selection were justified and the underpinning ontological 
commitment to the ‘myth of the best argument’ was briefly reflected on. The validity of the explanation 
put forward here was then defended in relation to five criteria – detail, evidential support, clarity, 
responsiveness and external consistency. The section ended with a discussion on the scope for qualified 
generalisation based on the notion of ‘extension’ in which two distinct scales of ambition were 
identified. Finally, turning to section 6.5, a series of implications for further research, shale gas 
governance, and participating public and civil society groups were discussed. 
 
200 
 
 
 
6.6.2 CON CLUSIO N 
 
The four forms of closure presented here narrowed and deadened the inquiry’s sensitivity to various 
issues, arguments and matters of concern. As demonstrated, this willingness or ability to sense, consider 
and attend to particular matters has a direction or tilt to it. Arguments associated with an extraordinary 
framing of the risks of fracking are filtered out, whilst arguments associated with an extraordinary 
framing of the benefits of fracking are indirectly registered without scrutiny. This is the channelling of 
regulatory sensitivity referred to in the title of this thesis. It was argued that these forms of closure, and 
the resulting ‘geography’ to what can be registered by the inquiry, establish a gradient exerting force 
toward the enabling of and production of justification for shale development. This focus on sensitivity 
stems from the inquiry itself, where participants often employed sensory metaphors, particularly 
relating to vision. Dehon spoke of ‘turning a very blind eye’, and Whitehead implored the Inspector to 
raise her eyes from the ground and look to the horizon. Perhaps the best analogy though was Murphy’s 
slightly farcical reliance on the redacted version of the DEFRA economic impacts on the rural economy 
report. Here we had a report in which the negative economic impacts had been obscured in a rather 
rudimentary fashion (literally ‘black boxed’), whilst more positive passages better aligned with 
Government policy remained visible for public consumption. There was a quite blatant, rather 
unpersuasive, and actually likely counter-productive modulation to what could be sensed, with an 
agency behind it and a direction to it. In short, sensitivity was being channelled toward the production 
of justification for shale development. 
In conclusion, it has been argued that the planning inquiry studied in this thesis can be seen as a site for 
the production of justification for the specific sites in question and for broader Government shale policy. 
These justificatory pressures arise from the design and conduct of the process resulting in an 
insensitivity toward certain kinds of issues and arguments. Four key conditioning influences have been 
identified and presented. These ‘forms of closure’ are ‘double compartmentalisation’, ‘vertical 
deference’, ‘horizontal deference’ and ‘selective scepticism and credulity’. The thesis has detailed how 
each of these forms of closure played a role in rendering the inquiry insensitive and inhospitable to the 
case of FoE. The production of justification occurs unevenly through the closure of arguments associated 
with an ‘extraordinary’ framing of the risks of fracking, whilst more mundane issues are left in play to 
potentially influence the decision. Furthermore, the inquiry indirectly registered arguments associated 
with the ‘extraordinary’ benefits frame expressed in the WMS in spite of their ostensive immateriality. 
Here justification was produced not only through the closure of certain rule 6 party arguments and 
matters of concern, but also through something like the dextrous regulatory strategy toward benefit 
realisation identified by Stokes (Stokes 2016). The thesis demonstrates how certain broader framings 
dominant amongst incumbent interests shape and gain material influence through more grounded 
processes of planning decision-making at the expense of contrary framings of the issue. Public and 
expert participation in the planning of shale development has been found to be deeply circumscribed. 
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This circumscription shapes the planning system toward the delivery of decisions that are aligned with 
broader Government energy policy and technology choice commitments. However, planning decision-
making seems likely to be less successful in generating compelling legitimation for shale development in 
the eyes of broader audiences because of likely reactions to the justificatory pressures detailed here. 
This final point, however, requires further substantiation through additional empirical research. 
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APPENDIX 1: KEY PASSAGES OF ENERGY POLICY, PLANNING POLICY AND CASE LAW 
 A1.1 ENERGY POLICY 
 A1.1.1 ‘TH E WMS’  
The ‘Shale Oil and Gas Policy Statement’ was given by the then Secretary of State for Energy and Climate 
Change Amber Rudd to the House of Commons on September 16 2015 (‘the WMS’). The WMS plays a 
key role in the form of closure ‘vertical deference’. 
Para. 1 (the WMS does not have paragraph numbers but for the purposes of this thesis key paragraphs 
shall be assigned numbers in the following way): 
“My Rt Hon Friend Greg Clark (Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government) and I 
wish to set out the Government’s view that there is a national need to explore and develop our 
shale gas and oil resources in a safe, and sustainable and timely way, and the steps it is taking 
to support this. In laying this statement before Parliament, it formally replaces the Shale Gas 
and Oil Policy Statement issued by DECC and DCLG on 13 August 2015. This statement to 
Parliament should be taken into account in planning decisions and plan-making” (DCLG/DECC 
2015, no pagination) 
Para. 2: 
“Exploring and developing our shale gas and oil resources could potentially bring substantial 
benefits and help meet our objectives for secure energy supplies, economic growth and lower 
carbon emissions” (DCLG/DECC 2015, no pagination). 
Para. 3: 
“Having access to clean, safe and secure supplies of natural gas for years to come is a key 
requirement if the UK is to successfully transition in the longer term to a low-carbon economy. 
The Government remains fully committed to the development and deployment of renewable 
technologies for heat and electricity generation and to driving up energy efficiency, but we 
need gas - the cleanest of all fossil fuels – to support our climate change target by providing 
flexibility while we do that and help us to reduce the use of high-carbon coal” (DCLG/DECC 
2015, no pagination). 
Para. 6: 
“There are also potential economic benefits in building a new industry for the country and for 
communities.  
• Nationally, we will benefit from development of a new industrial sector, building on 
the experience and skills developed here in 50 years of on- and offshore oil and gas 
development. 
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• Developing shale resources would deliver investment in key domestic energy 
infrastructure, boosting the UK’s capital stock and leading to increased productivity 
and growth. 
• Reducing imports would improve the balance of trade.  
• Consultants EY estimated in 2014[5] that a thriving shale industry could mean 
cumulative investment of £33 billion and support 64,500 jobs in the gas, oil, 
construction, engineering and chemical sectors at peak. Locally that might mean new 
facilities and jobs for local companies” (DCLG/DECC 2015, no pagination). 
Para. 8: 
“Shale gas can create a bridge while we develop renewable energy, improve energy efficiency 
and build new nuclear generating capacity. Studies have shown that the carbon footprint of 
electricity from UK shale gas would be likely to be significantly less than unabated coal and also 
lower than imported Liquefied Natural Gas[9]” (DCLG/DECC 2015, no pagination). 
Footnote 9 refers to the Mackay and Stone report (Mackay and Stone 2013). 
   A1.2 PLANNING POLICY 
 A1.2.1 ‘DM2’    
“Development for minerals or waste management operations will be supported where it can be 
demonstrated to the satisfaction of the mineral and waste planning authority, by the provision 
of appropriate information, that all material, social, economic or environmental impacts that 
would cause demonstrable harm can be eliminated or reduced to acceptable levels. In 
assessing proposals account will be taken of the proposal's setting, baseline environmental 
conditions and neighbouring land uses, together with the extent to which its impacts can be 
controlled in accordance with current best practice and recognised standards.  
In accordance with Policy CS5 and CS9 of the Core Strategy developments will be supported for 
minerals or waste developments where it can be demonstrated to the satisfaction of the 
mineral and waste planning authority, by the provision of appropriate information, that the 
proposals will, where appropriate, make a positive contribution to the:  
• Local and wider economy Historic environment  
• Biodiversity, geodiversity and landscape character  
• Residential amenity of those living nearby  
• Reduction of carbon emissions Reduction in the length and number of journeys made  
This will be achieved through for example:  
• The quality of design, layout, form, scale and appearance of buildings  
• The control of emissions from the proposal including dust, noise, light and water.  
• Restoration within agreed time limits, to a beneficial after use and the management of 
landscaping and tree planting.  
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• The control of the numbers, frequency, timing and routing of transport related to the 
development” (The Joint Advisory Committee for Strategic Planning: Lancashire 
County Council; Blackpool Council; Blackburn with Darwen Council 2013b, 10) 
 A1.2.2 ‘TH E NPPF’  
Para. 93: 
“Planning plays a key role in helping shape places to secure radical reductions in greenhouse 
gas emissions, minimising vulnerability and providing resilience to the impacts of climate 
change, and supporting the delivery of renewable and low carbon energy and associated 
infrastructure. This is central to the economic, social and environmental dimensions of 
sustainable development” (DCLG 2012, 21–22). 
Para. 120: 
“To prevent unacceptable risks from pollution and land instability, planning policies and 
decisions should ensure that new development is appropriate for its location. The effects 
(including cumulative effects) of pollution on health, the natural environment or general 
amenity, and the potential sensitivity of the area or proposed development to adverse effects 
from pollution, should be taken into account. Where a site is affected by contamination or land 
stability issues, responsibility for securing a safe development rests with the developer and/or 
landowner” (DCLG 2012, 28). 
Para. 121: 
“Planning policies and decisions should also ensure that: 
● the site is suitable for its new use taking account of ground conditions and land instability, 
including from natural hazards or former activities such as mining, pollution arising from 
previous uses and any proposals for mitigation including land remediation or impacts on the 
natural environment arising from that remediation; 
● after remediation, as a minimum, land should not be capable of being determined as 
contaminated land under Part IIA of the Environmental Protection Act 1990; and 
● adequate site investigation information, prepared by a competent person, is presented” 
(DCLG 2012, 28–29). 
Para. 122: 
“In doing so, local planning authorities should focus on whether the development itself is an 
acceptable use of the land, and the impact of the use, rather than the control of processes or 
emissions themselves where these are subject to approval under pollution control regimes. 
Local planning authorities should assume that these regimes will operate effectively. Equally, 
where a planning decision has been made on a particular development, the planning issues 
should not be revisited through the permitting regimes operated by pollution control 
authorities” (DCLG 2012, 29). 
Para. 147: 
“Minerals planning authorities should also: 
● when planning for on-shore oil and gas development, including unconventional 
hydrocarbons, clearly distinguish between the three phases of development (exploration, 
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appraisal and production) and address constraints on production and processing within areas 
that are licensed for oil and gas exploration or production; 
● encourage underground gas and carbon storage and associated infrastructure if local 
geological circumstances indicate its feasibility; 
● indicate any areas where coal extraction and the disposal of colliery spoil may be acceptable; 
● encourage capture and use of methane from coal mines in active and abandoned coalfield 
areas; and 
● provide for coal producers to extract separately, and if necessary stockpile, fireclay so that it 
remains available for use” (DCLG 2012, 36). 
 A1.2.3 ‘PPGM’  
 
Para. 12: 
“What is the relationship between planning and other regulatory regimes? 
The planning and other regulatory regimes are separate but complementary. The planning 
system controls the development and use of land in the public interest and, as stated in 
paragraphs 120 (…) and 122 of the National Planning Policy Framework (…), this includes 
ensuring that new development is appropriate for its location – taking account of the effects 
(including cumulative effects) of pollution on health, the natural environment or general 
amenity, and the potential sensitivity of the area or proposed development to adverse effects 
from pollution. 
In doing so the focus of the planning system should be on whether the development itself is an 
acceptable use of the land, and the impacts of those uses, rather than any control processes, 
health and safety issues or emissions themselves where these are subject to approval under 
regimes. Mineral planning authorities should assume that these non-planning regimes will 
operate effectively” (DCLG 2014, no pagination, para. 27–012). 
Para. 112: 
“What hydrocarbon issues can mineral planning authorities leave to other regulatory regimes? 
Some issues may be covered by other regulatory regimes but may be relevant to mineral 
planning authorities in specific circumstances. For example, the Environment Agency has 
responsibility for ensuring that risk to groundwater is appropriately identified and mitigated. 
Where an Environmental Statement is required, mineral planning authorities can and do play a 
role in preventing pollution of the water environment from hydrocarbon extraction, principally 
through controlling the methods of site construction and operation, robustness of storage 
facilities, and in tackling surface water drainage issues. 
There exist a number of issues which are covered by other regulatory regimes and mineral 
planning authorities should assume that these regimes will operate effectively. Whilst these 
issues may be put before mineral planning authorities, they should not need to carry out their 
own assessment as they can rely on the assessment of other regulatory bodies. However, 
before granting planning permission they will need to be satisfied that these issues can or will 
be adequately addressed by taking the advice from the relevant regulatory body: 
•Mitigation of seismic risks –the Department of Energy and Climate Change is responsible for 
controls, usually through the licence consent regime, to mitigate seismic risks. Seismic 
assessment of the geology of the area to establish the geological conditions, risk of seismic 
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activity and mitigation measures to put in place is required by the Department of Energy and 
Climate Change for all hydraulic fracturing processes; 
• Well design and construction – the Health and Safety Executive are responsible for 
enforcement of legislation concerning well design and construction. Before design and 
construction operators must assess and take account of the geological strata, and fluids within 
them, as well as any hazards that the strata may contain; 
• Well integrity during operation – under health and safety legislation the integrity of the well is 
subject to examination by independent qualified experts throughout its operation, from design 
through construction and until final plugging at the end of operation;  
• Operation of surface equipment on the well pad – whilst planning conditions may be imposed 
to prevent run-off of any liquid from the pad, and to control any impact on local amenity (such 
as noise), the actual operation of the site’s equipment should not be of concern to mineral 
planning authorities as these are controlled by the Environment Agency and the Health and 
Safety Executive; 
• Mining waste – the Environment Agency is responsible for ensuring that extractive wastes do 
not harm human health and the environment. An environmental permit is required for phases 
of hydrocarbon extraction and this will require the operator to produce and implement a waste 
management plan; 
• Chemical content of hydraulic fracturing fluid – this is covered by the environmental permit 
as operators are obliged to inform the Environment Agency of all chemicals that they may use 
as part of any hydraulic fracturing process; 
• Flaring or venting of any gas produced as part of the exploratory phase will be subject to 
Department of Energy and Climate Change controls and will be regulated by the Environment 
Agency. Mineral planning authorities will, however, need to consider how issues of noise and 
visual impact will be addressed; 
• Final off-site disposal of water – Water that comes back to the surface following hydraulic 
fracturing may contain naturally occurring radioactive materials. Whilst storage on-site and the 
traffic impact of any movement of water is of clear interest to local authorities, it is the 
responsibility of the Environment Agency to ensure that the final treatment/disposal at suitable 
water treatment facilities is acceptable 
• Well decommissioning/abandonment – following exploration, the well is likely to suspended 
and abandoned for a period of time. Health and Safety Legislation requires its design and 
construction that, so far as reasonably practicable, there is no unplanned escape of fluids from 
it. The mineral planning authority is responsible for ensuring the wells are abandoned and the 
site is restored” (DCLG 2014, no pagination, para 27–112). 
Para. 120: 
“Should mineral planning authorities take account of the environmental effects of the 
production phase of hydrocarbon extraction at the exploration phase? 
Individual applications for the exploratory phase should be considered on their own merits. 
They should not take account of hypothetical future activities for which consent has not yet 
been sought, since the further appraisal and production phases will be the subject of separate 
planning applications and assessments. 
When determining applications for subsequent phases, the fact that exploratory drilling has 
taken place on a particular site is likely to be material in determining the suitability of 
continuing to use that site only insofar as it establishes the presence of hydrocarbon 
resources”(DCLG 2014, no pagination, para. 27–120).  
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A1.3 CASE LAW 
 A1.3.1 ‘FFB V S.  WSCC’ 
 
In the case Frack Free Balcombe vs. West Sussex County Council, FFB challenged the decision of WSCC to 
grant Cuadrilla planning permission for hydrocarbon exploration and testing at Balcombe at the High 
Court. Part of the FFB case was that “the Planning Committee was wrongly advised that it should leave 
matters such as pollution control, air emissions and well integrity to the EA, HSE and other statutory 
bodies” (Justice Gilbart 2015, High Court:6).  In his judgement, Justice Gilbart ruled against FFB on this 
matter, stating that: “in my judgement there is ample authority to the effect that the Planning Authority 
may in the exercise of its discretion consider that matters of regulatory control could be left to the 
statutory regulatory authorities to consider. There was ample material before it that all matters of 
concern could be and would be addressed, as set out in the officer’s very careful report” (Justice Gilbart 
2015, High Court:41). 
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APPENDIX 2: THE METHANE EMISSIONS ESTIMATES 
 A2.1 TH E METH AN E ES TIMAT E CA LCULATIO N 
 
130,000m3 of gas will be flared per day per well for up to 90 days. In total, then, each site will flare up to 
46,800,000m3 of gas. 98% of this gas is combusted in the flare, emitting CO2 in the process which is 
accounted for in the approximately 70% of total GHG emissions from (successful) flaring. 2%, however, 
which amounts to 936,000m3, escapes un-combusted. We’re told that the gas is assumed to be 100% 
methane in appendix H (Arup 2014a, H4), though this is incorrect and by my calculation would result in 
an estimate of 16,614 tCO2e of fugitives. Instead, based on the Preese Hall data (Arup 2014a, B10), the 
ES estimate actually assumes this gas to be 96.4% methane. The 936,000m3 of un-combusted gas 
therefore equates to 902,304m3 of CH4. Arup use a 0.71 density conversion rate, which they reference 
to the 2012 DEFRA/DECC  ‘Greenhouse Gas reporting’ conversion factors (Arup 2014a, A7, table 2; 
DEFRA/DECC 2012b), to convert this into kgs, resulting in 640,635kg or ~640 (metric) tonnes of CH4. 
~640tCH4 is finally multiplied by the GWP figure of 25 to result in 16,015.896tCO2e. This confirms that 
in total fugitive emissions are estimated to be 2% of the total gas recovered and flared during the 90 
days of initial flow testing, which, owing to the assumption of 98% combustion efficiency, must 
exclusively be comprised of methane escaping un-combusted through the flare (which as I’ve just 
calculated, based on the ES’s figures and assumptions, amounts to the 16,016tCOe figure when rounded 
to 0 decimal places). In short, the methane emissions estimate assumes the consummate prevention of 
all non-flaring fugitives. 
 A2.2 IPCC5 AN D  T HE UPW AR D  R EVI SION  O F MET HA NE’S GWP 
 
IPCC5 makes a two-step upwards revision of the GWP of methane from 25 to 28 and then to the 34 
figure that Anderson references. The first increase relative to IPCC4 is a result of “changes in 
perturbation lifetime, a minor change in RE [radioactive efficiency] due to an increase in background 
concentration, and changes in the estimates of indirect effects”, as well as changes in the GWP of CO2 
itself (which as the benchmark effects all other GWPs) (IPCC 2013, 717). The second increase, is a result 
of including climate-carbon feedbacks for non-CO2 gases. The IPCC4 GWPs “include climate–carbon 
feedbacks for the reference gas CO2 but not for the non-CO2 gases”, and as “[s]uch feedbacks may have 
significant impacts on metrics [they] should be treated consistently” (IPCC 2013, 715). The IPCC4 figures 
may therefore “underestimate the relative impacts of non-CO2 gases” (IPCC 2013, 713). Whilst 
providing two figures – 28 (without climate-carbon feedbacks) and 34 (with climate-carbon feedbacks) 
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(IPCC 2013, 714, table 8.7) – the authors are clear on the question of whether climate-carbon feedbacks 
should be included consistently across gasses (and so the 34 GWP used): 
“Though uncertainties in the carbon cycle are substantial, it is likely that including the climate–
carbon feedback for non-CO2 gases as well as for CO2 provides a better estimate of the metric 
value than including it only for CO2” (IPCC 2013, 714).   
 A2.3 METH AN E EMIS SI ONS  D U RING  CO MP LETI ONS 
 
Completions are a key period for methane emissions as they precede the well being connected to the 
grid, though gas has started to flow from the well. Even if a connection already exists a well will still go 
through a period of completion to allow the level flowback fluid to reduce and the gas flow to increase. 
As such, the operator must do something with the gas produced during completion. Historically, in the 
US, much of this gas is thought to have been vented (let off into the atmosphere as methane). Such 
practices are now believed to be much rarer due to the tightening of regulation by the EPA to encourage 
flaring (combusting the gas to emit CO2 rather than CH4) and reduced emissions completions (where a 
proportion of the gas is captured for use, also known as green completions). These proposals cannot 
sensibly be considered to be RECs because 100% of the gas will be flared over such a long period28.  
Understanding a wells potential to emit during a completion requires knowledge of how much gas will 
flow from the well over what duration. Early high estimates of methane emissions from unconventional 
gas wells during completions assumed that the completion gas flow rate was the same as the initial 
production rate or the 30-day production rate (Howarth, Santoro, and Ingraffea 2011 and Jiang et al. 
2011b respectively). This assumption has been criticised for being incompatible with the basic physics of 
shale gas production – average daily completion gas flow rates cannot match or exceed the highest gas 
flow rate achievable (the initial production rate) when the well still contains fluid, as it does during 
completion (Cathles et al. 2012). Most subsequent estimates assume the flow rate ramps in some way 
(i.e. linearly or non-linearly) from zero to the initial production rate over the course of a completion (e.g. 
O’Sullivan and Paltsev 2012a). Of course, in the US peak gas flow rates are typically reached within 
between 3-10 days. It is far from clear how the elongated completion stage (60-90 day IFT) of the 
projects under consideration at this inquiry will affect average daily completion gas flow rates. 
                                                                
28 Whether flaring constitutes a reduced or green completion approach (because it reduces emissions compared to 
venting) appears to be a matter of debate. AEA, for example, define RECs as producing gas that can be delivered 
into the sales pipeline and as being able to “eliminate or significantly reduce the need for flaring” (AEA 2012a, 126). 
On the other hand, the Sustainable Gas Institute, for example, imply that capturing and flaring the gas still 
constitutes a REC (Balcombe et al. 2015, 23, 44). I would suggest that flaring all gas for the entirety of the elongated 
completion in this case (60-90 days) cannot sensibly be considered in the same category as completions capturing 
90% of gas flow over 9 days for sales even if the other 10% is vented. Without even taking into account the CO2 
emissions from the successfully flared 98% of gas, the latter, because of its much shorter duration, would emit 
around half of the methane of the former in spite of having a fugitive rate five times higher (2%-10%). The key here 
is the longer period of flaring in the IFT when compared to the US evidence base. 
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Depending on the ramping assumptions this could result in higher average daily flow rates (and so 
methane emissions potential) than the US evidence base.  
 A2.4 TH E SO UR CE O F T H E 60-90 D AY  IFT D U RATIO N A SS U MPTI ON? 
 
In a report assessing the lifecycle GHG emissions of Scottish unconventional gas published in August 
2014, the authors state that: 
“To appraise gas flow rates adequately and establish commerciality, shale gas and CBM [Coal 
bed methane] wells would require approximately 60 - 90 days of testing” (Bond et al. 2014, 31). 
Bond et al. are a little unclear as to whether they are referencing the claim to Foster and Parks (2012) or 
not29. Foster and Parks (AEA 2012a) is a report into the potential climate change impacts of shale gas for 
the European Commission. The report includes a review of the GHG-relevant regulatory requirements in 
England, Scotland and Wales, on the one hand, and Northern Ireland on the other. In England, Scotland 
and Wales, as of 2012, it is suggested that: 
If the well needs more than 96 hours of testing to evaluate its potential to produce 
hydrocarbons, the operator can apply to DECC for an extended well test of up to 60 days (once 
all other consents and permissions have been granted) which limits the quantities of gas to be 
produced and saved or flared (AEA 2012a, 81–82). 
In Northern Ireland, on the other hand, it is suggested that: 
At the exploration stage, it is expected that companies exploring for shale gas will seek 
permission for an “extended well test”, which allows production for a sufficient length of time, 
often 90 days, to establish commerciality (AEA 2012a, 84). 
Therefore, taken across the whole of the UK, the phase of activity required to assess the commercial 
viability of a well (an ‘extended well test’, interestingly, in this report) is either limited by the regulator 
at, or expected to require, between 60-90days. This may of course be a coincidence, or it may be the 
source of the 60-90 day IFT duration estimate. In the latter case, the assumption would not be a 
bespoke estimate based on Cuadrilla’s ‘knowledge and experience’, but a more generic UK regulatory 
requirement/expectation hailing from 2012.  
 A2.5 TH E IN APP ROPRI AT EN ESS  O F ALLEN  ET  AL.  (2013) 
 
Table A1: Appropriateness of Allen et al. (2013) as the basis for the ES’s fugitive emissions rate 
Claim referenced to Allen et al. (2013) Appropriateness of Allen et al. (2013) as basis for 
claim  
                                                                
29 The citation comes two sentences later, and it is unclear whether the whole paragraph, or just the final sentence 
is referenced to Foster and Parks. 
229 
 
 
 
“The embedded mitigation measures proposed are 
known to achieve an estimated reduction in fugitive 
emissions of 97%-98% [91]” (Arup 2014a, 117). 
Footnote 91 references Allen et al. (2013) 
The proposed mitigation is not ‘known to achieve an 
estimated’ reduction in fugitive emissions of 97-98% 
on the basis of Allen et al. (2013). 
 
The 98.6% is the average proportion of total 
potential methane emissions (all of the gas that 
passes out of the well during the completion) that 
were prevented from being emitted into the 
atmosphere as methane (in other words measured 
emissions were on average 1.6% of total potential 
emissions) from the Allen et al. sample of 27 (though 
3 were not used due to partial data loss so the used 
sample is 24) 
 
The 97-98% reduction refers to the reduction that 
the rate of 98.6% represents from the ‘bottom-up’ 
EPA emissions estimates at the time the paper was 
published (i.e. EPA estimated around 50% of 
potential emissions are actually lost, Allen et al. find 
1.6%, a reduction of roughly 97-98%). 
 
The sample contains a wide variety of gas handling 
approaches, and emissions sources, none of which 
look exactly like Cuadrilla’s proposal (100% capture 
and flare). 
 
Some of the sampled operations provide much less 
mitigation than the Cuadrilla proposal (i.e. the 
venting of gas, prohibited in the UK except in case of 
emergencies). 
 
Some of the sampled operations provide much 
greater mitigation than the Cuadrilla proposals (i.e. 
RECs, the capture of gas for sale – which will not 
occur during the IFT).   
 
“The most significant emission source at this stage is 
flaring, accounting for over 84% of initial flow testing 
emissions. Based on a fugitive methane emission 
rate of 2%[92] (by volume) GHG emissions from this 
source are estimated to amount to approximately 
15% of all GHG emissions associated with the 
project” (Arup 2014a, 121). 
Footnote 92 references Allen et al. (2013)  
Allen et al. (2013) does not support a scenario of 
fugitives arising exclusively from uncombusted 
methane escaping through the flare. 
 
Of the 27 cases in their sample there is not a single 
example of a completion in which methane 
emissions were limited to exclusively those 
associated with the flare (all had at least a small 
amount of non-flaring fugitives).  
 
1.6% is the average fugitive emission rate found 
across 24 operations, but the study does not support 
a 1.6% rate for operations that flare all gas (which by 
definition would be 2% - as they use the EPA flare 
efficiency assumption - plus any extra fugitives). 
 
Cuadrilla’s estimate is actually a 0% non-flare 
fugitive rate and a 98% combustion efficiency rate. 
Allen et al. (2013) does not support a 0% non-flare 
fugitive rate. In fact, their findings – to the extent 
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that they are relevant at all - are quite contrary to 
that expectation. 
 
 A2.6 TH E METH AN E EMI SSION S  ES TIMAT E AS SU MP TION S S U MMA RIS ED 
 
Table A2: Methane emissions estimate assumptions 
Assumption Was it explicitly 
scrutinised? 
Issues overlooked How was closure 
performed? 
Methane 
density of 0.71 
No The density of methane in the 
source referenced is 0.72 
(DEFRA/DECC 2012; see also BEIS 
2016b), the upshot of which is a 
marginal upward revision of the 
methane emissions estimate  
Scrutiny was withheld 
through an apparent 
unwillingness to adopt 
an orientation of 
sceptical curiosity to the 
methods, assumptions, 
and data sources behind 
the estimate 
100yr GWP of 
methane of 25 
Anderson 
questioned the 
use of a GWP of 
25, but Cuadrilla 
did not explicitly 
defend the figure 
nor did the 
Inspector 
explicitly 
consider it in her 
reasoning 
34 is the ‘latest scientific 
understanding’ of the 
effectiveness of methane as a GHG 
over 100 years relative to other 
GHGs 
The use of 25 did not 
have to be defended due 
to the lack of serious 
scrutiny at the inquiry. If 
it had been considered, 
however, it is 
undoubtedly the case 
that the matter would 
have been procedurally 
closed by continued use 
of 25 at Government 
level due to 34 not yet 
being accepted under 
the UNFCCC 
‘Worst-case 
scenario’ daily 
flow rate of 
130,000m3 of 
gas per well 
No The apparent use of the ‘worst-
case scenario’ flow rate (as 
opposed to an estimated average 
daily rate) in the estimate appears 
to be a conservative approach. 
Whether the apparent worst-case 
scenario is a reasonable figure, is – 
on the evidence before the inquiry 
– difficult to ascertain however. 
The Bowland has only been 
fracked once before and those 
Preese Hall results were not before 
the inquiry. What was also not 
scrutinised was how the elongated 
nature of this ‘completion’ (the 
IFT) will affect the ‘ramp up’ of gas 
flow, and therefore what a 
reasonable average daily 
completion gas flow rate would 
look like and the extent to which 
US completion gas flow rates are 
Again, scrutiny was 
withheld and satisfaction 
with the ‘safe reliability’ 
of the estimate was 
apparently somewhat 
easily forthcoming. 
Disclosure of potentially 
commercially sensitive 
information (i.e. precise 
estimates and results of 
gas flow rates during the 
IFT and from Preese Hall 
respectively) may have 
been an issue too 
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comparable. There was therefore 
no clear or satisfactory basis 
against which to assess the 
reasonableness of the 130,000m3 
daily flow rate worst-case scenario 
beyond the somewhat opaque 
‘knowledge and experience’ of 
Cuadrilla  
A maximum of 
90 days flaring 
per well 
No Using the upper estimate of the 
duration of the IFT (60-90 days) as 
the estimate assumption appears 
conservative. However, whether 
and how flaring during the fracking 
phase was accounted for in the 
estimate is not at all clear (given 
the 90 day assumption). It appears 
at least plausible that a day’s 
flaring during the fracking phase 
would not automatically yield a 
day’s testing and so potentially be 
additional not subtractive 
Again, this assumption 
was neither scrutinised 
nor defended. Of course, 
90 days of flaring per 
well is capped by the EA 
permit, so (assuming an 
extension is not sought 
and granted) the matter 
could be procedurally 
closed that way. 
However, the inquiry did 
not consider whether the 
details of the application 
suggest that the need for 
an extension might 
feasibly arise (as in the 
days of flaring not 
yielding days of testing 
scenario set out here)  
A flare 
combustion 
efficiency of 
98% 
No  Whilst a widely used assumption in 
the literature, it is nonetheless 
questioned by some studies. There 
are also difficulties in the real-time 
monitoring of whether it is actually 
being achieved 
Neither scrutinised nor 
defended at the inquiry. 
The EA were satisfied 
with this assumption and 
arrangements for the 
monitoring of its 
achievement – so in all 
likelihood, if raised, the 
matter would have been 
procedurally closed 
through ‘horizontal 
deference’ to the EA’s 
satisfaction 
2% fugitive 
rate (100% 
capture and 
flare) 
Anderson argued 
that the methane 
emissions 
estimate was 
“inevitably an 
underestimate” 
on the basis of 
leakage as well as 
the GWP figure  
The basis of this figure – as 
presented in the ES – is Allen et al. 
(2013). The claim that the findings 
of Allen et al. (2013) supports a 
fugitive rate of 2% in this case is 
seriously questionable, and 
appears to demonstrate a basic 
lack of understanding about that 
study and its findings.  
 
The broader literature is also a 
problematic basis for this 
assumption, and in any event is 
only tenuously applicable. The 
assumption appears primarily 
based on Cuadrilla’s own stated 
confidence in their ability to 
Anderson’s invitation to 
scrutinise the methane 
emissions rate that in his 
expert view was 
‘inevitably an 
underestimate’ was not 
seriously taken up at the 
inquiry. The matter 
remained obscure 
through a shallowness of 
scrutiny and an apparent 
aversion to 
problematisation. The 
inquiry also arguably 
lacked the capacity to 
explore such matters 
more fully  
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achieve their 100% capture and 
flare (consummate prevention of 
all non-flare fugitives) scenario 
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APPENDIX 3: THE FLOWBACK FLUID VOLUME ESTIMATES 
 A3.1 TH E CLARI FI ED  FLOW B ACK ESTI MAT ES  A T T H E CLO S E O F TH E IN QUIR Y 
 
All flowback during the fracking phase is expected to be reused as fracking fluid for subsequent fracks, 
and therefore is not expected to require offsite treatment and disposal. The total amount of flowback 
expected during the fracking phase is 22,730m3 per site (Quarles 2016b, no pagination, table 130). This is 
also expressed as a rate (i.e. a proportion of total fluid injected) of 15-25% (Quarles 2016b). Given that 
total fluid injected per site is approximately 111,950m3 (Quarles 2016b, no pagination, table 1), 
22,730m3 represents a rate of approximately 20%. The amount of flowback during the IFT is estimated 
to be 22,050m3 per site, all of which will have to be treated and disposed of offsite (Quarles 2016b, no 
pagination, table 1). This is based on the upper end of an estimated rate of 10-40%31 of the total fluid 
injected returning during the fracking and IFT phases combined (Cuadrilla 2016d, 1). Any liquid waste 
returning from the wells in the subsequent EFT phase is considered ‘produced water’ rather than 
flowback fluid, and does not appear to be included in the 40% flowback return rate figure used 
(Cuadrilla 2016d, 1). Cuadrilla’s own inquiry documents, however, manage to partially confuse the 
matter. On the 4th of March it was clarified that “[f]lowback fluid will be generated between fracturing 
stages during hydraulic fracturing operations as well as during the testing phases” (Quarles 2016b, no 
pagination). Six days later it was suggested instead that: 
“The 40% relates to the maximum estimated flowback from the start of the fracturing 
operation until the end of the Initial Flow Testing. Extended Flow Testing which follows the 
Initial Flow Testing generates “Produced Water” (Cuadrilla 2016d, 1). 
I assume that this means that regardless of whether it is termed ‘flowback fluid’ or ‘produced water’, 
the liquid waste returning from the well in the EFT is not counted in the 40% upper limit of the 
estimated flowback return rate.  
As well as partially contradicting themselves, these clarifying documents, produced in the face of 
Watson’s questioning, also contradict or correct a series of figures and claims made across a series of 
documents produced as part of the planning and environmental permitting applications. The EA had 
already issued the permit on the basis of these prior documents and the figures and claims therein. The 
key prior documents were the WMP (Cuadrilla 2014b), the EA decision document (EA 2015) and the ESs 
(Arup 2014a). For example, both the WMP and the EA decision document refer to the approximately 10-
40% flowback rate as applying to “between the hydraulic fracturing stages”, which, contrary to Lieven’s 
                                                                
30 Calculated by adding the ‘volume of water reused’ column figures together, given that 100% of flowback during 
the fracking phase is reused. 
31 It is not clear how, as a matter of basic mathematics, the lower range estimate of the proportion of total injected 
fluid returning during just the fracking phase (15%) could be larger than the equivalent lower range estimate for 
that phase and the IFT combined (10%).  
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protestations, can only sensibly be interpreted as referring to the fracking phase (Cuadrilla 2014b, 25; 
EA 2015, 22). In the ES the 40% worst-case return rate is suggested to refer to ‘all testing’ (Arup 2014a, 
374), which can only sensibly be interpreted as referring to the IFT and EFT. Likewise, Quarles’ rebuttal 
to Watson suggests that “Cuadrilla defines flowback as the hydraulic fracture fluid returned during initial 
and extended flow testing” (Quarles 2016a, 7). The absolute volume of flowback during the fracking 
phase is reported in the ES as 24,891m3 (Arup 2014a, 508, table 17.44). The absolute volume of 
flowback during the IFT is variously reported as 22,000m3 per well (Cuadrilla 2014b, 35; EA 2015, 35), 
21,250m3 per site (Arup 2014a, 511, table 17.52), and 21,500m3 per site (Arup 2014a, B10).  
Finally, Cuadrilla’s inquiry documents are silent on the matter of retained fluids (the proportion of total 
injected fluid that remains in the ground). The EA decision document and the WMP both state between 
16,000 and 24,000m3 is retained without explicitly stating whether this is a per site or per well figure 
(Cuadrilla 2014b, 35; EA 2015, 35), though I assume it must be per site. Alternatively, a figure of 
37,970m3 can be calculated from the clarified figures32. Intriguingly, the mid-range expectation of 
20,000m3 being retained in the WMP and EA decision document would require a total return rate (i.e. 
including the EFT) of approximately 82% (the total return rate for Cuadrilla’s clarified figures – i.e. 
including the EFT’s ‘produce water’ - is approximately 66%). In other words, the retained fluid figures 
reported in the EA documentation along with the clarified return rate appear to leave a proportion of 
fluid unaccounted for.  
 
 
 
                                                                
32 40% or 44,780m3 of the total injected fluids (111,950m3) returns during the fracking and IFT phases. The ES 
states that 29,200m3 per site then returns in the longer EFT (Arup 2014a, 514, table 17. 63). That leaves a figure of 
37,970 unaccounted for which must be retained in the ground.  
